Air University Review, September-October 1986
There has been much written within the pages of the Review lately on the subject of space doctrine. Some of it, like Lieutenant Colonel Charles D. Friedenstein's article (November-December 1985), insists that space is unique and totally different from the air environment and, therefore, the U.S. Air Force should develop a unique and separate space doctrine. Colonel Friedenstein states––I believe in a general sense correctly––that "the environmental principles of aerospace war do not uniformly apply to space because the air and space environments are different. " (p. 21) While I disagree with some of his arguments on the nonapplicability of some of the principles of war to the space environment, I would not take issue with the idea that the air and space environments are basically different.
In another article by Major L. Parker Temple III (March-April 1986), the image of General William "Billy" Mitchell is once again revived to support an argument for separate space doctrine (it seems that a good many "space power" advocates associate themselves with this early crusader for the separateness of air power). Major Temple states, correctly in my view, that our current doctrine pays very little attention to the space environment other than to say that air and space are one––the aerospace. He then makes what I consider to be the critical and unfortunately all too common error of our current space doctrinal thinking––namely, assuming that since the environment is different, then what space forces do in that environment must also be different. He points out that "Basic Aerospace Doctrine is wrong..." when it "fails to list the space missions or specified tasks for which the Air Force is the DOD executive agent" (p. 27) and instead discusses our traditional missions such as interdiction and strategic offense from an aerospace perspective.
What AFM 1-1 is attempting to do, albeit poorly, is to point out that regardless of factors such as orbital mechanics, differences in vehicle design, or relative vehicle speed and maneuverability that space force advocates use to imply separateness, air and space forces perform the same fundamental functions. In a very basic sense, what all military forces (tanks, planes, missiles, ships, and satellites) do is provide the capability for strategic and tactical offensive and defensive actions. More specifically, the U.S. Air Force has developed its particular missions and tasks as subsets of this larger strategic and tactical whole. What the manual is attempting to make clear is that strategic offense, counterair, and interdiction are really strategic aerospace offense, counteraerospace operations, and aerospace interdiction and that air and space forces are complementary in aerospace operations. The basic missions are the same in both the air and space, irrespective of the claims of space doctrine pundits that what space forces really do is "force application, space control, space support, and force enhancement"––the missions that Major Temple referred to in his article. I must agree with our doctrine in this instance: we are an aerospace force and, as AFM 1-1 states, "Air Force missions describe broad military objectives attained by employing aerospace forces." These do change fundamentally when we go into orbit.
I would agree, however, with critics such as Colonel Friedenstein and Major Temple when they point out that there is a paucity of discussion of the space environment and its effect on warfare in Air Force doctrine. They are correct when they say that our doctrine assumes that what is true for air operations is also true for space operations. With current technology (and very possibly with any technology), orbital mechanics do impose certain constraints not present with traditional air forces. For example, altitude provides a satellite a greater field of view than an aircraft, and space provides a far greater "loiter" capability (years or even centuries in orbit); on the other hand, their predictable orbits and lack of cover make satellites vulnerable, and their very high speed severely restricts classic maneuverability. One could list a similar comparative balance sheet for air forces; the point is that our "aerospace" doctrine does not do so. AFM 1-1 assumes away strengths, weaknesses, and synergisms with the statement that "the use of 'air' should not be construed as a more limited treatment of the aerospace medium."
What is needed is a sort of compromise. The Air Force "establishment" needs to recognize officially the differences of the space environment and the advantages that space forces provide in accomplishing traditional Air Force missions. At the same time, space force advocates must recognize the disadvantages of space forces and realize that the missions of air forces also apply to space systems––that we are an aerospace force and that system characteristics do not imply separateness. There is no better place for this compromise than AFM 1-1, and the sooner we get on with it, the better off the Air Force will be. Our doctrine must do a much better job of describing and integrating the aerospace environment.
I would not end my critique with AFM 1-1, however. The discussion of the synergism of air and space forces must filter down to our operational and tactical doctrine (our 2- and 3-series manuals) to include consideration of how space elements enhance our capability to accomplish our strategic and tactical missions. AFM 1-1 and its Air Staff authors must take the lead here, however, or a truly unified aerospace doctrinal regime will be slow, maybe dangerously slow, to emerge (the Soviets do not seem to have as much trouble integrating as we).
One further point with respect to the presumed separateness of the air and space environment begs discussion. Until now, access to and operation in space have required "different" equipment––rockets rather than jets or props, launch pads instead of runways (only half true for the shuttle), and space suits rather than g-suits. Astronauts have been seen as "different," space capsules do not look or "fly" like airplanes, satellites do not need pilots, and, of course, space is more "hostile" to humans than air. These perceptions have developed almost a cultural heritage of their own but are slowly changing and will, I think, almost completely break down in the future. Today, the SR-71 crews wear space suits and fly at the edge of space, according to some definitions; the shuttle uses a crew to carry cargo to space and then "flies" to a runway landing. For the future (the fairly near future, according to some prognosticators), the United States will have an aerospace plane (or TAV––transatmospheric vehicle) that most official predictions state will be able to operate in space and in the air, will be able to accomplish strategic and tactical offensive and defensive missions, and will, as the space shuttle does today, deliver payloads to and from orbit––all totally from a runway rather than a launch pad. Introduction of the TAV will not mean that air and space differences will disappear, but it will surely make them less meaningful than they are today.
During the late 1920s and the 1930s, the U.S. Navy–– at the "urging" of one General Mitchell and despite the reluctance of many of its senior "battleship" officers––laid the doctrinal and technological groundwork for what is now a powerful naval air arm. The Navy accepted and incorporated the "unique and different" air environment into its operations; it ventured into an essentially alien environment in order to strengthen U.S. naval power. Today, the Navy seems to have few problems venturing into space to do the same thing––control the seas. The air is not alien to the Air Force, and neither should space be. The Air Force exists today largely because of the reluctance of the Army of the 1940s to accept the need for the long-range projection of air power beyond the immediate battle area. In the future, a separate U.S. Space Force (with all the associated "empires" and bureaucratic competition) could exist simply because the U.S. Air Force refused to integrate space forces and doctrine fully into its operations and the all-important budget process––because it failed to make the logical and natural step to a truly aerospace force.
Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research
and Education
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Major Grover E. "Gene" Myers (B.S., Clemson University; M.S., Utah State University) is a Research Fellow at the Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education (CADRE), Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His last assignment was as a political-military affairs officer at Hq Strategic Air Command. Major Myers has also served as a B-52 pilot and instructor flight commander and a rescue helicopter pilot and CCTS instructor. His first book, Aerospace Power: The Case for Indivisible Application, will be published later this year.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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