Air University Review, September-October 1986
THIS issue focuses on the institutional Air Force, addressing the topics of who we are and what we are. When independence came in 1947, it was based on our ability to deliver the decisive weapon––the atomic bomb. Because air power can be decisive in war, the Air Force retains its independence.
There are many themes we could use to trace the development of the Air Force. The struggle between the bomber mafia and the fighter mafia for control of the service is one enduring theme. Our preoccupation with technology is another. Without technology, there would be no bombers and no fighters to provide the substance of the first theme. Our preoccupation with technology, then, is perhaps the more enduring of these themes and is one that is full of both promises and pitfalls.
For all that technology can do, it cannot in and of itself win wars. The side that "holds the technological high ground," does not always prevail. In fact, history teaches that quite the opposite is true.
During the Second World War, the Germans produced the greatest technological breakthroughs. German tanks were superior to most Allied tanks. The Allies had nothing that matched the technological excellence of the Me-262 jet fighters. If used properly, V-2 rockets might well have delayed the Allied advance in the west. Despite holding the technological high ground, Germany lost the war. What beat the Germans was not technologically superior weaponry; rather, it was 300 Soviet divisions grinding down their forces from the east while British and American forces, including their air forces, kept up the pressure in the west. The aircraft that made the difference over Germany were not those that were technologically superior. Numbers prevailed over quality. Leaders in the Royal Air Force and in the Army Air Forces were wise enough to insist that production of bombers not be slowed to accommodate new technology. In the end, it was the B-17, a plane that was born of mid-thirties technology, that prevailed, and the side that held the technological high ground was ground down by superior numbers of comparatively inferior weapons wielded under the aegis of an appropriately devised strategy.
In the years since the Second World War, technology has caused a revolution, the scope of which exceeds those of the first and second industrial revolutions. Our military experiences since 1945, however, do not confirm that high technology has been the decisive factor in war. Did the side with the most technologically advanced weapons prevail in Korea or in the French Indochina War? Korea was a stalemate prompted by the introduction of massive numbers of Chinese troops. The Vietminh defeated the French because they devised a superior strategy, not because they used better weapons.
Technology served us well in Vietnam. We were innovative in its use, and, undoubtedly because of our superior firepower, many Americans are alive today than otherwise might have survived. We used air power to kill people and to destroy things, and we did so on a far greater scale than our enemy. But was technology decisive? We point, for instance, to the use of laser-guided bombs to drop the infamous Thanh Hoa Bridge. But, we need to ask, did dropping the Thanh Hoa Bridge make any difference in the outcome of the 1972 enemy offensive? The fact is that while air power played a key role it preventing the North Vietnamese from achieving total victory in 1972, NVA troops stood it, greater numbers on more South Vietnamese territory at the end of the offensive than they had at the beginning.
In the years since the endof the Vietnam War, our affair with high-tech weaponry has intensified. We can point with pride at our ability to fly from England to Libya andachieve significant results in night bombing. Nevertheless, we should note, American policy in Lebanon was left in a shambles when a truck loaded with explosives blew up the Marine barracks in Beirut. A truck full of dynamite is not high-tech stuff, but in Beirut it succeeded both tactically and strategically.
The bottom line in war is victory. Wars are won or lost in the minds and hearts of men, especially in the leadership. While technologically sophisticated weaponry can be used to good effect, the advantages provided by technology have not always been enough to win. Mastery of the art of war is far more important than the stuff that is used in combat. To prepare our minds and hearts for war, we must master the study of military history because it provides the foundation on which strategy and doctrine are based, That is a tall order for a service that worships at the throne of technology, but it is one we cannot fail to fill.
The Editor
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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