Air University Review, November-December 1986
Captain John D. Williams, USMC
Questions of nuclear strategy occupy the key position in national security policy today. The Soviet deployment of SS-20 intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMS) targeted against Western Europe and their continued buildup of accurate intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which place the survivability of the Minuteman silos in jeopardy, has confronted the West with crucial questions concerning nuclear forces and doctrine. One possible solution to the growing vulnerability of the U.S. land-based ICBM force would be to adopt the strategy of launch on warning (LOW), 1 in which the weapons at risk would be fired once it is confirmed that the enemy has fired a first strike. The U.S. response to the SS-20s in Europe was the deployment of Pershing II and ground launched cruise missiles (GLCMS) in NATO countries. Moscow has protested this move vehemently, particularly the stationing of Pershing IIs within short striking distance of the Soviet Union. Some Western observers feel that this deployment may force the Soviets to adopt a LOW strategy.
Launch on warning has always been viewed as a pariah in the United States because of the potential for erroneous indications in the warning system that could lead to the accidental start of a nuclear war. The much-publicized false alerts generated by the U.S. Air Defense Command computers in 1979 and 1980 exacerbated this feeling. U.S. policy has always been to maintain forces with the survivability to absorb a first strike and still retain the capability to deliver a devastating counterattack upon the enemy.2 Soviet policy is not enunciated in public, so it must be interpreted from statements, writings, capabilities, and practices. The Soviets have not made any clear declarations of intention concerning a LOW posture. Nevertheless, it is important to attempt to discern how the Soviets regard launch on warning because of the implications for nuclear strategy.
Soviet attitudes toward LOW cannot be isolated from their overall strategy for nuclear war; an examination of the general doctrine will lay the groundwork for consideration of specific postures. Much has been written in recent years concerning the Soviet adoption of a warfighting approach to nuclear strategy as opposed to a deterrence posture which has been the cornerstone of U.S. defense policy for the past three decades. The goal of this doctrine, which has been elaborated by the Soviet leadership at the various Congresses of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and developed more eloquently in the major works Military Strategy and Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs is not merely to prevent a nuclear war but to be prepared to achieve victory in one. Soviet Major General M. I. Cherednichenko emphasized that his nation was "compelled to prepare our Armed Forces, country, and all the people for a struggle with an aggressor, first of all and primarily under conditions of a nuclear war."3
There are several key principles that make up Soviet doctrine. First, while war is not inevitable, the nature of the imperialist nations make conflict with the socialist countries likely. While the Soviets have vacillated through the years on the question of whether a war would automatically start with or escalate to a general nuclear exchange, they generally feel that a major confrontation would quickly become worldwide and be fought with nuclear missiles: "A world war, if it were unleashed by an imperialist aggressor, would undoubtedly take on the character of a nuclear missile war."4 Second, in such a war, the initial period would be crucial, if not decisive: Therefore, the initial period of a present-day nuclear rocket war will obviously be the main and decisive period and will predetermine the development and the outcome of the entire war."5 Finally, because of the importance of the initial period, surprise has become a key factor in modern warfare:
Surprise nuclear attacks are capable of changing the correlation of forces6 sharply in short periods of time and thereby exerting a decisive influence on the course and even the outcome of military operations.7
It follows logically then that the main goal of Soviet strategy is to avoid a surprise nuclear attack. Marshal V. D. Sokolovskiy confirms this in Soviet Military Strategy: "In this regard the main problem is the development of methods for reliably repelling a surprise nuclear attack."8
There are three ways to escape the consequences of a surprise nuclear strike. The first is to surprise the enemy before he can surprise you, i.e., to strike his forces preemptively once you feel that he intends to launch an attack upon you. The second is to develop defenses that are strong enough to negate the effects of a surprise attack. The third is to launch on warning, firing your missiles once those of the enemy are in the air. All three methods are part of Soviet strategy, although the emphasis has shifted over time in accordance with changing technological capabilities.
Much has been written concerning the tendency toward preemptive strike in Soviet strategy.9 The Soviets have never stated their intention to use a preemptive strike; however, if they believe that any war would automatically become a general nuclear war and if a surprise attack holds the key to success in such a war, then it follows that they would attempt to execute such an attack as a means of achieving their goal of victory. The Soviets generally expect a period of tension to precede the outbreak of war and believe they would detect any preparation for war being undertaken by the West. Should they detect such preparations, they would most likely use the preemptive strike to attain surprise and seize the initiative. 10 In this vein, the Soviets often write of "frustrating the intentions of the enemy" and "thwarting of the aggressor’s surprise attack." The only way to do this is to destroy the enemy’s weapons before they can attack you. Thus, Sokolovskiy writes that in addition to repelling a surprise nuclear attack, the Soviets must develop "methods of frustrating the aggressive designs of the enemy by the timely infliction of a shattering attack upon him."11 A. A. Grechko, then the Minister of Defense, stated in Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs that "the Armed Forces should be able under any conditions to thwart a surprise attack by the aggressor ... and by rapid crushing strikes defeat his basic nuclear missile weapons."12
Soviet doctrine recognizes that it may not be possible to beat the enemy to the punch, and in fact they may be taken by surprise: "The capabilities for detecting an attack being prepared are sharply decreased at the present time and the probability of achieving surprise is increased,"13 If the Soviets are surprised, the key is to minimize the damage: "Countering surprise boils down to ensuring that one is not taken by surprise; if this attempt is unsuccessful then it is essential to reduce to a minimum the consequences of surprise, to neutralize them in a prompt manner."14 The Soviet emphasis on defense against nuclear attack is well documented.15 Sokolovskiy noted:
An extremely important type of strategic operation is the protection to territory of the country from nuclear attacks by the enemy, using PVO, PRO, and PKO. Without the effective conduct of these operations, successful conduct of a modern war and assurance of the normal vital activities of the country are impossible.16
The Soviets have made massive expenditures on their air defense network and are constantly upgrading it. They deployed and continue to maintain an antiballistic missile (ABM) system, have been pursuing research and development in this area, and have also developed a massive civil defense system throughout the country. Missile silos and launch facilities have been extensively hardened, particularly those of the latest generation of ICBMS;17this upgrading indicates that the Soviets perceive the need for ensuring the survivability of their strategic forces should they be the recipient of an attack.
The third option is launch on warning. Another former Minister of Defense, R. Y. Malinovskiy is credited with describing this posture as "a poor second best" to a Soviet surprise first strike.18 Nevertheless, this concept has been present in Soviet doctrine for some time. In 1967, Marshal Nikolai K. Krylov, then head of the Strategic Rocket Forces, wrote in the journal Military Thought:
With the presence in the armament of troops of launchers and missiles which are completely ready for operation, as well systems for detecting enemy missile launches and other types of reconnaissance, an aggressor is no longer able suddenly to destroy the missiles before their launch on the territory of the country against which the aggression is committed. They will have time during the flight of the missiles of the aggressor to leave their launchers and inflict a retaliatory strike against the enemy.19
Other articles reinforce this statement of intention. One, titled "Determining the Correlation of Forces in Terms of Nuclear Weapons," notes that the ability to neutralize missiles before they can be launched is critical, and a combatant must be able to save his weapons from such destruction if he is to survive.20 The emphasis is on launching the missiles before they can be destroyed in the silos. Another article titled "Modern War and Surprise Attack" echoes Krylov's position in stating that modern reconnaissance will detect the launch of a first strike and ensure "the immediate infliction of a destructive retaliatory strike."21 In fact, the Soviets consider the concept of restraint during a nuclear exchange to be illogical. Commenting on U.S. debate over ICBM vulnerability, Mikhail Milshtein, a member of the Soviet Institute for the Study of the United States and Canada, noted that "it is inconceivable to me that any government would wait to see if the incoming warheads were only aimed at silos or were part of an all-out attack…It would be all-out war."22
Like strategic defense, LOW requires specific capabilities to be executed successfully. Among these are means for immediate detection of an enemy strike, a responsive command and control system to reach a decision and transmit it to the operating forces, and nuclear forces in a state of readiness to execute a strike on short notice. Soviet doctrine recognizes the need for these capabilities and has made readiness one of the main goals for its armed forces. Marshall N. V. Ogarkov, former Chief of the General Staff, writes:
A most important point of the military-technical content of Soviet military doctrine, dictated by the rapid development of nuclear missile weapons and the possibility of a surprise attack by the enemy employing these weapons, is the demand that the USSR Armed Forces be maintained at a high state of combat readiness, ensuring their prompt and expeditious deployment in order to repulse an enemy sneak attack, to deliver powerful response strikes on the enemy.23
An article on the development of military art noted that the importance of constant readiness of missile guidance systems and continuous early warning operations is stressed in Soviet strategy.24 The previously cited article on correlation of forces stresses the importance of an automated control system,25 and Ogarkov stated that readiness is enhanced by the automated firing procedures of modern missiles.26
It is important to note that the Soviet concept of LOW is fundamentally different from that which is normally associated with this type of concept in the West. Most Western military experts regard LOW as an act of desperation, a throwback to the days of "massive retaliation" where missiles would be hurriedly launched in an effort to save them from destruction. The lack of flexibility to respond to varying situations is one primary reason for U.S. rejection of a LOW strategy.
In contrast, the Soviet LOW is a controlled, measured response to the outbreak of nuclear war. Soviet doctrine consistently maintains that even though the initial phase of the war will be crucial, a single strike will not be sufficient to ensure victory: "A battle, an operation, and even more, a war cannot be reduced to one act of destruction of the enemy; they must be planned in any event as a series of consecutive strikes, each of which is different in its nature."27 Flexibility and responsiveness are emphasized to ensure "the probability of a correct response."28 It is necessary to continually evaluate and update the estimate of the situation to determine the next moves:
Besides this, the indicated objectives should be examined and classified by the degree of their danger for the attacker. Thus, the launch position from which 10 minutes ago a strategic rocket was launched does not represent an immediate threat, since the firing of another missile requires a certain period of time.29
Clearly, a massive launch of all available ICBMs in desperation does not fit the Soviet scheme for fighting a nuclear war. Figure 1 provides confirmation of this, and it also depicts a Soviet response to a U.S. first strike. A large number of Soviet missiles would be launched on warning, indicating again that as early as 1970 launch on warning was an integral part of their strategy. However, a significant quantity would also be retained to ride out the U.S. strike and formulate the nucleus of the next response.30 The continuing emphasis on hardening of missile silos and launch complexes illustrates that the Soviets intend to have forces that can survive the effects of a first strike and be available for follow-on attacks. Thus, in the Soviet mind, the LOW concept is a flexible strategy that would guide the initial thrust of war, laying the foundation for the future conduct of operations. This perception differs significantly from the view of LOW in the West where it tends to be seen as an irrational act of desperation.
Thus, it appears that Soviet doctrine recognizes three methods of avoiding surprise attack as legitimate strategies depending on the situation. Launch on warning would be an appropriate response should the enemy attempt to launch a surprise first strike. But while the Soviets have assembled the forces necessary for a preemptive first strike and for defense of the Soviet Union against a surprise nuclear attack, their capability to execute LOW is much less evident. Although doctrine expresses the intention to employ a LOW strategy, without the capability, that strategy could hardly be seriously considered. The question of the capability to perform LOW must also be examined.
Richard Garwin has identified seven requirements necessary to have the capability to execute the LOW strategy.31 While information regarding the detailed capabilities of Soviet strategic forces is limited, from the data that are available, it appears that until recently, the Soviets were deficient in at least three key areas: sensors to detect enemy launchings, adequate warning time, and rapid response in missiles. However, improvements over the past few years may have corrected these deficiencies and resulted in an increasingly viable ability to exercise the LOW option.
The first Soviet early warning system was the Hen House radar net located near the borders of the Soviet Union. This system is associated with the Soviet ABM system which was developed in the late 1960s.32 Assuming capabilities equivalent to the U.S. ballistic missile early warning system (BMEWS) of the same time period (a generous assumption considering the U.S. advantage in electronics), the Hen House net would have provided fifteen to twenty minutes warning.33The limited time available would strain the capability of any command and control system to confirm the information, pass it to the decisionmakers, allow the decisionmakers time to reach a decision, and communicate that decision to the operating forces in time to execute a launch before the arrival of the incoming attack. In addition, like the BMEWS, the Hen House system has gaps in its coverage and may have similar reliability problems.34The Soviets have since built an over-the-horizon radar system that would correct some of the deficiencies of the Hen House system.35 Nevertheless, until the Soviets developed and deployed an early warning satellite, their system still lacked the dual phenomenology capability in which two independent sensors provide separate warning and, therefore, confirmation of an attack. It is questionable whether the cautious Soviet leadership would have based their nuclear strategy on input from a single warning source.
The Soviets apparently began developing early warning satellites much later than the United States. While the United States embarked on the Midas program in the early 1960s, it is only recently that a launch detection satellite system has been developed by the U.S.S.R. Cosmos 775, launched in October 1975, was their first early warning satellite in geosynchronous orbit.36 The period 1979-81 saw a flurry of early warning satellite launches, indicating a major push toward achieving an operational system, probably resembling the U.S. Defense Support Program.37 Again, if comparable to its U.S. equivalent, the Soviet launch detection satellite system would provide about thirty minutes warning.38 At the same time, the Soviets have also begun constructing a network of new phased-array radars near their borders which would significantly enhance the existing radar coverage.39 Thus, since the early 1970s, the Soviets have significantly improved their early warning system; with the latest additions of launch detection satellites and phased-array radars, their capability to execute the LOW strategy will have improved immensely, since their ability to detect launches has been enhanced and the warning time increased.
The remaining shortcoming in the Soviet ability to execute launch on warning in the past was based on the inability to maintain their missile forces in a high state of readiness. It was generally recognized in the mid-1970s that the Strategic Rocket Forces maintained a much lower level of readiness than the U.S. missile forces.40 This low level of readiness may have been due in part to a Soviet belief that any hostilities would be preceded by a period of tension which would allow the gradual increase in readiness levels, but it is possible that the low alert rate was a result of technical constraints. For example, the limited operational lifetime of earlier Soviet guidance systems may have precluded the maintenance of high alert rates.41 The latest generation of Soviet ICBMs have more advanced guidance systems, and the strategic Rocket Forces are currently capable of maintaining high alert levels.42
Thus, until recently, the Soviets possessed a limited capability to carry out the LOW strategy. Their early warning system did not permit adequate response time and lacked the redundancy necessary to confirm an attack, while the low-missile-readiness level precluded the rapid response necessary for LOW. The deployment of new radar systems and launch detection satellites has corrected deficiencies in the warning system while missile readiness has improved. The Soviets now have the capability to execute the LOW strategy with confidence.
There has been a shift in the emphasis placed on LOW in Soviet strategy during the past few years.43 Very subtle indications of this shift appear in Soviet writings and pronouncements on the subject; the only indication being a more frequent mentioning of retaliation as opposed to discussions that imply a preemptive posture. However, where operational tendencies are concerned, it has been noted that "the Soviets practice launching weapons under the stringent time constraints that would prevail under hypothetical launch-under-attack circumstances"44 and exercise their ICBM force under conditions that are in some respects more stringent than those for U.S. missile exercises.45 While exercises do not necessarily reflect actual responses (the United States practices launching missiles under stringent time constraints too), historically, Soviet military exercises have rigidly adhered to the prevailing doctrine.
The greater importance placed on LOW is probably due to two causes. First, the achievement of a viable capability to execute the strategy was a necessary prerequisite to serious consideration of the LOW option. Once they acquired the capability, the Soviets could endorse the strategy with increasing confidence. Second, Soviet assessment of the shift in the balance of forces to the point where they achieved strategic parity with the United States probably reduced the need for a preemptive stance. Rough equality meant that the U.S. capability to launch a successful surprise attack would be reduced; thus, the United States would probably be less likely to initiate such an attack and the pressure to preempt would be reduced accordingly. At the same time, the impending development of U.S. strategic systems that could destroy land-based ICBMS made the defensive option more dangerous. Thus, the LOW strategy offered an acceptable middle course. While preemption and strategic defense remain integral parts of Soviet nuclear thought, there are indications that launch on warning has now assumed an equal or slightly favored role.
The recognition of LOW as a viable option is not new. A comparison of statements from the mid-1960s and early 1980s shows very little variation in content:
With modern means of reconnaissance, early detection, warning and control, should an aggressor succeed in putting the chief means of destruction into operation . . .an immediate retaliatory strike of immense destructive power is inevitable.46
Fourteen years later, then Minister of Defense Dimitri Ustinov said in a similar vein:
The aggressor, too should know that the preemptive use of nuclear weapons would not insure victory. With modern detection systems and the combat readiness of the Soviet Union's strategic nuclear forces, the United States would not be able to deal a crippling blow to the socialist countries. The aggressor will not be able to evade an all-crushing retaliatory strike.47
Attempts by Western analysts to imply that LOW is a new element in Soviet policy reflect an ignorance of long-standing doctrine and strategy for nuclear war. What is new is the emphasis on retaliation ahead of the concepts of "thwarting a surprise attack" and "frustrating the aggressive designs of the enemy."
This development may be reflective of increasing Soviet confidence in their ability to launch their ICBMs on warning; this, in turn, has resulted in the deemphasis of the preemptive strategy. Indeed, the Soviet Union renounced the first use of nuclear weapons for the first time on 15 June 1982.48 This indicates that LOW may have achieved a higher priority than preemptive first strike in the Soviet hierarchy of nuclear options. This shift would also reinforce an apparent tendency in recent Soviet thought to recognize the potential to conduct warfare at various levels (conventional, limited nuclear, and general nuclear) without inevitably escalating to the next highest level. The Soviets perceive that the correlation of forces, particularly strategic nuclear forces, is shifting decidedly in their favor; the pressure to strike preemptively is probably less than it was in the past since they now believe they can conduct warfare at any level and prevail. The development of an effective capability to execute a LOW strategy ensures that they can avoid the consequences of a surprise attack without having to launch a preemptive strike.
The significance of the shift in emphasis from preemption to LOW has largely been missed in the West. The Western press and some military analysts regard statements from the Soviet leadership concerning LOW as indicative of the adoption of a new strategy that the West considers to be a dangerous escalation in the arms race. For example, the 17 May 1983 pronouncement by the president of the Soviet Academy of Sciences, Anatoly Alexandrov, that the firing of medium-range nuclear weapons from Europe would result in "automatic retaliation, with all available means, at all targets on the territories of all potential opponents" was reported as "the most explicit threat so far that Moscow would adopt a launch-on-warning posture."49 As with the Ustinov statement, Alexandrov's threat of "automatic retaliation" was nothing new; it was merely a restatement of a well-defined Soviet policy. If anything, the United States should have felt somewhat relieved that the Soviets were relaxing their grip on the nuclear trigger somewhat by backing away from preemption. The Soviets were aware of the mistrust of warning systems and paranoia over the LOW option in the West; they were undoubtedly attempting to exploit this situation. By hinting at their position publicly, the Soviets hoped to arouse fear in the West and slow the deployment of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and the development of the MX.
The real danger in deploying the Pershing II and MX missiles is not in pushing the Soviets into a LOW strategy but in pushing them back into a preemptive posture. As defense analyst John Steinbrunner has pointed out: "from a Soviet military perspective, the deployment of US intermediate-range missiles in Europe is a significant new dimension of strategic threat. The presumed target of these new weapons ... is the central command system of the Soviet Union, concentrated around Moscow and in the Western part of the Soviet Union."50 The Soviets consider this one way in which the West might try to achieve surprise in a general war:
It is possible that it is the intercontinental missiles which will be launched first, but the operational-tactical missiles.... as a means which is closer to enemy objectives, they can be used above all for a strike against antimissile and anti-air defense means and control posts in order from the very beginning to deprive the state subjected to attack of the capability of defense.51
The increased capability of the Pershing II over past tactical systems makes it a strategic weapon in Soviet eyes. The improved accuracy and decreased warning time available to react increases the pressure on the Soviets for preemption. Raymond Garthoff has noted that one of the specific concerns Soviet commentators (in particular, Ogarkov) have raised is that the short flight time of the Pershing would not allow sufficient time to exercise the LOW option before critical command and control targets would be attacked and destroyed.52
The same is true for the MX. The potential lethality of this system as a hard-target killer will again place a premium on launching a first strike, particularly if the MX is deployed in a vulnerable basing mode. The attractiveness of the target and the destructive potential it represents may push the Soviets back toward preemption. In addition, they can be expected to continue to improve their LOW capability, as the penalty for not launching on warning goes up appreciably with the MX and Pershing II operational.
One of the primary themes of Soviet doctrine for nuclear war has been the avoidance of surprise attack. Launch on warning is one way of neutralizing surprise. It began to assume increasing importance in Soviet nuclear thought when the Soviets deployed an improved early warning system and missiles that could be maintained in a high state of readiness. The Soviets have not recently moved to LOW as a result of the deployment of intermediate-range nuclear missiles in Europe or the development of the MX ICBM. The danger in these moves is not that the Soviets will adopt LOW but that it might push them back toward preemption.
The Soviet utilization of LOW results in two key implications for U.S. nuclear strategy. The first is that U.S. and Soviet perceptions of what constitutes a stable nuclear posture are different. The United States has always felt that the use of nuclear weapons would be a last resort; its posture of "riding out" a nuclear attack provides maximum protection against accidental or premature firing of strategic systems. In contrast, the Soviets believe that in a crisis or conflict, its adversaries would quickly resort to nuclear weapons; the principal threat for them has been from a surprise first strike. As a result,
their posture has been less restrictive, employing LOW and preemption as the primary options. The possibility of achieving stability as defined by U.S. strategists is therefore remote. We must accept the fact that as long as both sides have nuclear weapons, there will be strategies to employ them and that the Soviet strategy for employing them will always be less restrictive than we would like.
The second implication is that strategic decisions cannot be made in a vacuum. Security in the nuclear age depends primarily on psychological perceptions of relative strength and vulnerability. Any change in type, quality, quantity, or employment of strategic weapons will change these perceptions. Moves intended to enhance the security of one side may pose a new and ominous threat to the other, triggering a destabilizing response. The potential reaction of the other side must be weighed against perceived gains in considering any changes in weaponry or force posture. Ultimately, security concerns may outweigh the consequences of any potential response. This would appear to be the situation in the case of both the Pershing II and MX, where a strong case exists for the deployment of both systems, regardless of any Soviet countermoves. However, we must anticipate any potential responses and be prepared to cope with them.
The United States has lived with a Soviet preemptive nuclear strategy in the past and can do so in the future. A LOW posture would be preferable but only by a matter of degrees. We must be aware of the current Soviet posture and alert for apparent changes or shifts toward preemption. Either strategy requires the United States to take a cautious approach during a strategic crisis, knowing that the Soviets have their fingers a little closer to the trigger than we do. However, caution during crises in the nuclear age should be standard operating procedure; neither LOW or preemption would require any other significant change in strategy or posture. We must also be aware of Soviet attempts to play on Western fears of the LOW and preemptive strategies. They have and will continue trying to manipulate public opinion against U.S. nuclear strategy by portraying the United States as the aggressor while denying their own positions. Such attempts will have to be met with clear descriptions of actual Soviet posture and firm resolve to carry through with programs essential for U.S. and Western security.
Washington, D.C.
Notes
1. The two terms used to describe the firing of missiles in response to an anticipated or actual initiation of attack by an adversary are launch on warning (LOW) and launch under attack (LUA). Technically, LOW could require an attack once indications of an impending attack were received whether or not the missiles had actually been fired, whereas LUA describes only the situation in which it was confirmed that missiles had actually been fired. Since LOW is the more commonly used term, for the purposes of this article, LOW will be utilized to describe the initiation of an attack in response to actual missile launchings by an enemy.
2. Caspar A. Weinberger, DOD Annual Report to Congress FY 1984 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), p. 34.
3. Major General M. I. Cherednichenko, "On Features in the Development of Military Art in The Postwar Period," Military Historical Thought, June 1970, in Selected Soviet Military Writings, 1970-75 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 121.
4. Ibid.
5. Marshal of the Soviet Union V. D. Sokolovskiy, Soviet Military Strategy, translated by Harriet Fast Scott (New York: Crane, Russak, and Company, 1968), p. 205.
6. The "correlation of forces" is a Soviet concept of evaluating the relative military strengths of two or more adversaries. The correlation of forces will determine the outcome of a military action; therefore, factors affecting this balance assume primary importance and influence any Soviet course of action.
7. Major General S. A. Tyushkevich, " The Methodology for the Correlation of Forces in War," Military Thought, June 1969, in Selected Readings from Military Thought, 1963-73 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1982), p. 69.
8. Sokolovskiy, p. 210.
9. Joseph D. Douglass and Amoretta M. Hoeber, Soviet Strategy for Nuclear War (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute Press, 1979), pp. 98-107; Robert P. Berman and John C. Baker, Soviet Strategic Forces: Requirements and Responses (Washington: Brookings Institution, 1982), p. 36.
10. Douglass and Hoeber, pp. 103-5; Berman and Baker, p. 37.
11. Sokolovskiy, p. 210.
12. General N. A. Lomov, Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1973), p. 159.
13. Major General N. D. Vasendin and Colonel N. Kuznetsov, "Modern Warfare and Surprise Attack," Military Thought, June 1968, in Selected Readings from Military Thought, p. 226.
14. Colonel D. L. Kuleszynski "Some Problems of Surprise in Warfare," Military Thought, May 1971, in Selected Readings from Military Thought, p. 89.
15. Berman and Baker, pp.142-53; Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1983), pp. 27-31.
16. Sokolovskiy, p. 284. PVO, PRO, and PKO are acronyms for the Soviet terms describing antiair, antimissile, and antispace defense.
17. The earlier SS-9 and SS-11 silos were hardened to withstand 1000 psi overpressure. The silos for SS-17, 18, and 19 missiles are hardened to 2500-4000 psi. Roger D. Speed, Strategic Deterrence in the 1980s (Stanford, California: Hoover Institute Press, 1979), p.142; Soviet Military Power (1983), pp. 16, 21.
18. Douglass and Hoeber, p. 16.
19. Leon Sloss and Stanley Kober, "Russian's Pershing Ploy," Washington Post, 25 January 1983, p. 13.
20. Major General S. I. Anureyev, "Determining the Correlation of Forces in Terms of Nuclear Weapons," Military Thought, August 1968, in Selected Readings from Military Thought, vol. 5, part 1, p. 167.
21. Vasendin and Kuznetsov, p. 226.
22. Time, " The Vulnerability Factor," 31 August 1981, p. 16.
23. Marshal N. V. Ogarkov, Always in Readiness to Defend the Homeland, translated by Joint Publications Research Service, JPRS L-10412 (Washington: JPRS, 25 March 1982), p. 42.
24. Cherednichenko, p. 121.
25. Anureyev, p. 167.
26. Ogarkov. p. 35.
27. Major General V. Prokhorov, "Principles of Troop Control in the Light of Requirements of Cybernetics," Military Thought, May 1968, in Douglass and Hoeber, p. 48.
28. Anureyev, p. 169.
29. Major General K. M. Dzhelavkov, " The Infliction of Deep Strikes," Military Thought, February 1966, in Selected Readings from Military Thought, vol. 5, part 1, p.110.
30. Douglass and Hoeber, pp. 47-52.
31. Richard L. Garwin, "Launch under Attack to Redress Minuteman Vulnerability," International Security, Winter 1979-80, pp. 118-19.
32. Soviet Military Power, p. 27; Institute for Foreign Policy Analysis, The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile Defense: A Conference Report (Cambridge, Massachusetts: 1980), p. 55.
33. Albert C. Hall, " The Case for an Improved ICBM," Astronautics and Aeronautics, February 1977, p. 28.
34. Soviet Military Power, p. 27; General James V. Hartinger, "The Resurgence of Strategic Defense," Defense 82, June 1982, p. 31.
35. Soviet Military Power, p. 27.
36. "Washington Roundup—Soviet Big Bird," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 17 November 1975, p. 13.
37. "Soviet Military Programs in Space Move Forward," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 8 March 1982, p. 106.
38. Hall, p. 28.
39. Soviet Military Power, p. 27.
40. Berman and Baker, p. 36; U.S. Congress, Joint Economic Committee, Subcommittee on Priorities and Economies in Government, Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1978, Hearings, 95th Congress, 2d Session (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 67; Joseph J. Kruzel, "Military Alerts and Diplomatic Signals," in The Limits of Intervention, edited by Ellen P. Stern (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1977), p. 87.
41. Berman and Baker, p. 88.
42. Ibid., p. 15.
43. Raymond L. Garthoff, " The Soviet SS-20 Decision," Survival, Fall 1983, p. 116.
44. Soviet Military Power, p. 16.
45. Allocation of Resources in the Soviet Union and China—1978, p. 118.
46. Vasendin and Kuznetsov, p. 227.
47. Serge Schmemann, "Arms Policies Questioned within the Soviet Union," New York Times, 13 July 1982, p. 3.
48. Bernard D. Nossiter, "Soviet Forswears Using A-Arms First," New York Times, 16 June 1982, p. 1.
49. Washington Post, "Soviet Warns of Automatic Retaliation against New US Missiles," 18 May 1983, p. 12.
50. John Steinbrunner, "Arms and the Art of Compromise," Brookings Review, Summer 1983, p. 9.
51. Vasendin and Kuznetsov, p. 229.
52. Garthoff, p. 116. The Soviets hold that the Pershing II has the range to reach Moscow and the strategic targets located around it, despite the U.S. and NATO contentions that the missile’s range is limited to theater targets.
Contributor
Captain John D. Williams, USMC (B.A., Cornell University; M.S., Defense Intelligence College), is an Intelligence Analyst assigned to Hq U.S. European Command. Captain Williams has served as intelligence collections officer, 1st Marine Division; intelligence officer, 4th Marines; recruit training officer at Marine Corps Recruit Depot, San Diego, California; and chief intelligence analyst, 1st Marine Division, Camp Pendleton, California. His articles have appeared in Proceedings and Marine Corps Gazette.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor