Air University Review, November-December 1986
IN the title of his provocative book, Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984? the late Soviet dissident Andrei Amalrik posed specificially a question about the longevity of the Soviet Union, a subject that has intrigued Western analysts of that country for some time, and about which there has recently been considerable speculation.1 Reflecting for a moment on the fact that the answer to Amalrik’s query is now clear in the affirmative, it is still the case that many take seriously the notion that the Soviet Union is in distress and might even collapse under the weight of internal economic, social, and political problems. Given the adversarial relationship between the superpowers, it is probably natural that this issue will be raised again by others in updated form, and that in most cases the responses will to some degree be biased by the ideological climate of the times and the personal views of those involved. After all, if one perceives the Soviet Union as a military and political threat to the Western democracies, then there is considerable appeal in the idea that our chief rival in the international arena might vanish of its own accord, or at least become less menacing.
The issue of the condition of the Soviet system is not entirely an academic one. The strength of the modern state is no longer a function solely of military power, especially now that the awesome destructiveness of that power places strong constraints on its use and that unconventional forms of warfare (i.e., guerrilla war and terrorism) have proliferated. Thus, the long-term influence of the Soviet Union in international affairs, like that of other countries, will be determined to a large extent by the cohesiveness of its society and the vitality of its economy, not only for the value that these factors might have in the competition between ideologies but also because social and economic forces directly and indirectly shape military capabilities and nonmilitary options. Recognizing this, Richard Pipes and others have suggested that American policy toward the Soviet Union should be more assertive, taking into account weaknesses in the Soviet economy and society.2
The only problem with this notion—and it is a potentially dangerous problem—is that it is based on a false premise and a questionable corollary; it is certainly wrong to view the Soviet Union as beset with crises of such magnitude that its very existence is in doubt and probably wrong to think that the problems confronting that country will in some way make it more susceptible to direct, unfriendly pressure from the United States. This is not to suggest that the Soviet Union is without its difficulties, or that these difficulties do not present a serious challenge to the Soviet political leadership. On the contrary, that same leadership has itself taken an increasingly more candid and concerned view of the economic and social situation in the Soviet Union and calls for various reforms intended to correct or at least to ameliorate some of these problems have received wide attention in the Soviet and Western press. Likewise, the present circumstance and near-term future do offer certain opportunities for an enhancement of American national interests vis-à-vis the Soviet Union, provided that our initiatives are well grounded in the facts of the matter and are pursued in a fashion calculated to avoid overt confrontation or outright hostility.
With the seriousness of these issues in mind, it does seem that the immediate past few years and the coming decade constitute an especially important transitional period for the Soviet Union and therefore demands some assessment and guarded forecasts from those trained to evaluate the Soviet condition. At this writing, we are at an excellent vantage point from which to take stock of Soviet prospects and their implications. A relatively young leader has recently acceded to power, the economy is entering a new Five-Year Plan (the Twelfth, 1986-90), and the XXVII Party Congress (a major political event held every five years) has just concluded.
However, reasonable people will disagree about the dimensions and interpretations of recent events and trends in, and particularly the direction of, the Soviet economy, society, and political order during the near term. Accordingly, my discussion here will focus on several key issues in terms of possibilities. However, definitive statements about these questions and particularly their future course are simply not feasible or prudent.
There can be little doubt that Soviet economic performance has experienced a downturn of serious proportions during the past three decades, a condition that has worsened within the last ten years. This trend is evidenced in the steady drop in the average annual growth rate of the Soviet gross national product (GNP) from 5.9 percent for the period 1956-60 to 5.0 percent for 1961-65, 5.2 percent for 1966-70, 3.7 percent for 1971-75, and 2.7 percent for 1976-80.3 Although still respectable by international standards (the US GNP grew at an average rate of 3.1 percent between 1975 and 1980), these figures are in dramatic contrast to Soviet economic growth rates of from 6 to 11 percent a year in the era prior to and immediately after the Second World War.
Specialists on the Soviet economy by and large concur on the causes for this secular decline in growth rates. In general, the economic development strategy adopted by the Soviet leadership (the "Stalinist" model) in the late 1920s—which was to prove successful in implementing and sustaining very high rates of increase for about thirty years—is no longer appropriate. The classic Stalinist model, featuring a centrally planned and tightly controlled system, was able to achieve impressive economic results by mobilizing cheap labor and abundant natural resources, by mandating a high level of investment, and by devoting a large share of capital to producer goods industries (e.g., iron and steel machine building).
Now, however, the Stalinist model is experiencing difficulties principally because the Soviet economy has moved into an era where consumer goods and agriculture are given higher priority, which means that productivity counts for more than brute size; quality (or efficiency) has superseded quantity as the prime determinant of growth. James Miller has aptly described this structural shift in the Soviet economy as requiring " . . . changes in the leadership’s long-standing preference for industry over agriculture, for the urban worker over the rural—for, in short, the hammer over the sickle."4
More specifically, Soviet planning and controlling agencies are no longer able to handle the tasks associated with a much larger and complex economy; thus, output targets are often irrational and measures of production are inaccurate. Prices are difficult to establish; they are unrealistic and rarely adjusted, which frequently makes the allocation of resources perverse. Perhaps most important, the technological changes required to raise productivity seem very difficult for the Soviet system to generate internally. Some reasons for this difficulty are:
All of these reasons have led to a steady deterioration of both capital and labor productivity.5
If there is general consensus on the dimensions of and reasons for the current Soviet economic malaise, the course of events during the coming years will be much more controversial. We do know with some certainty that future Soviet economic growth will be constrained by several factors. First, because of a long-term drop in the birthrate, the number of new entrants into the work force will shrink through the mid-1990s, which means that the profligate use of labor which Soviet economic planners have taken advantage of in the past will no longer be possible; there are no large reserves of labor remaining, as the rural population has been drained of surplus workers, and women are already employed to the maximum. Aggravating this problem are pronounced interregional differentials in the birthrate, which have created labor surpluses in the Asian areas and labor deficits in the European U.S.S.R.6
Second, inputs of industrial raw materials have become increasingly expensive as more favorably located deposits are depleted and production shifts to remote and costly sources.7 Third, the perennial problems of agriculture will no doubt continue; plagued by a poor environmental base for farming, the Soviets compound this shortcoming by grossly mismanaging agriculture. This problem has an especially deleterious impact on the overall Soviet economy, inasmuch as agriculture accounts for about 20 percent of GNP (as compared to less than 3 percent in the United States). Historically, the agricultural sector has not received adequate investment (capital went primarily to industry), although recently this imbalance has been largely corrected. Shortfalls in agricultural production force the Soviet Union into the world market to purchase grain and other commodities, using about 40 percent of precious hard currency funds to maintain an adequate diet for the Soviet citizen.8
By far the most important constraint on economic prospects for the U.S.S.R. is military spending, which is the subject of lively debate in the field of Soviet studies in the West. Because the Soviet government does not provide complete details of its defense budget, there is considerable disagreement regarding various estimates of Soviet military expenditures derived by different methods. Thus, it may be that the Soviet military budget absorbs anywhere from 10 to 18 percent of GNP.9 Regardless of what constitutes the "true" figure, the important point is that with an economy only approximately 60 percent of that of the United States (which spends between 6 and 7 percent of its GNP on defense), the economic burden of maintaining a military establishment of roughly comparable size weighs much more heavily on the Soviet Union. Further, it is widely believed that Soviet defense industries are accorded highest priority in the allocation of material and human inputs in both quantitative and qualitative terms, which acts further to the detriment of the civilian sector.
Taking into account these limiting factors, the outlook for improvement in the Soviet economy is difficult to predict. In the past, attempts to enhance economic performance have been half-hearted, amounting to little more than "tinkering," mainly because the bureaucracy and political elite viewed genuine reform as a threat to their position. Shortly after taking power in 1985, however, the new General-Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, began giving clear signals that he intended to push for better planning; to raise labor productivity through a carrot-and-stick approach, involving wage and consumer goods incentives and greater work discipline (including a campaign against alcoholism and absenteeism); to dismiss aging bureaucrats and managers; and to promote a more open discussion of economic problems.10 The Twelfth Five-Year Plan, the blueprint for the Soviet economy for the period 1986-90, bears the imprint of these Gorbachev policies, including goals for significantly higher labor productivity, a more efficient use of capital investment, a doubling of consumer goods production, greatly expanded medical and social services (which account for a large share of the real income of Soviet citizens), and major increases in personal income. Under this plan, GNP growth is projected to rise to 3.5-4.1 percent yearly, fueled by the modernization of existing enterprises through an infusion of new industrial technologies, by greater autonomy for factory managers, by improving the linkages between research and development and production, and by rationalizing prices to demand and costs.
Early indications are that the Gorbachev reforms have had a positive impact on Soviet economic performance. Industrial production and labor productivity were both up in the first quarter of 1986, and oil production increased thus reversing a decline that began in 1983.11 This latter index is especially important as the petroleum industry was the first to be singled out by Gorbachev for reform (he fired the Minister of Petroleum, personally inspected the giant West Siberian oil fields and called for greater investment in oil production); petroleum also accounts for less than 60 percent of Soviet exports and hard currency earnings, which they use to purchase grain and industrial technology from the West. Two countervailing factors to this optimistic preliminary assessment are the slump in world oil prices (which reduces the value of Soviet petroleum exports) and the nuclear accident at Chernobyl (which will curtail the production of electricity and depending on the long-term effects from radiation might damage agricultural production in the Ukraine and require the Soviets to import additional foodstuffs).
Although in the Soviet context these measures are wide-ranging in scope, the basic structure of the economy remains unchanged. The large and powerful central planning apparatus, although somewhat chastened by the Gorbachev initiatives (the long-time chief of Gosplan, the state planning agency, was dismissed and replaced by a Gorbachev appointee), is still very much a force to be reckoned with. Other bureaucratic and ministerial fiefdoms in the government and the party will continue to some extent to resist the proposed reforms out of vested interests in the status quo. Further, some of the price revisions contemplated—and necessary for real progress economically—will prove unpopular and may need to be curtailed for political reasons. A diversion of resources from the military to the civilian sector depends on external considerations and thus will be difficult to implement in the face of rising American defense spending and the stalled arms limitations talks. Although the influence of the Soviet military in decisionmaking at the national level is probably less than most in the West imagine, the military leadership can be expected to oppose cuts in defense spending, making any shift from guns to butter that much more problematic.
As Millar notes, " . . .the fundamental strength of the Soviet economy, like the American, resides in its size, in the skills of its population, in the extraordinary richness of its natural resources and in the proven ability of the leadership to respond effectively to problems new and old." 12 Following this view, in my opinion it would be best not to overdramatize the difficulties currently confronting the Soviet economy, which will for the foreseeable future continue to grow and to provide the Soviet Union with most, if not everything, of what they need to maintain superpower status, both politically and militarily.
Over the last several years, in a wide variety of scholarly and mass media publications, Western researchers and journalists have painted an increasingly darker picture of social conditions in the Soviet Union and have hinted at even more difficult times to come. Nick Eberstadt, for example, stated that: "From what I can make out, the USSR is indeed in the midst of a social and spiritual collapse the likes of which we in the West have never seen, and in fact can scarcely imagine."13 Eberstadt, who was apparently spared the trauma of the Great Depression in the United States, bases his dire forecast on what he perceives to be a debacle in health care in the Soviet Union and a concomitant increase in the mortality rate. Similarly, in a popular book with the arresting title, Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt, the French author Helene Carrere d’Encausse described at length various aspects of the ethnic situation in the Soviet Union (including language, migration, intermarriage, and socioeconomic inequalities), which she believes will prove especially vexatious for the Soviet leadership.14 Leaving aside for the moment the fact that the Soviet Socialist Republics are decidedly not "in revolt," it is nevertheless true that problems related to ethnic group relations exist in the Soviet Union today and will continue to be a factor in the years ahead.
The question in both cases has two parts: to what extent are the circumstances described real, and if they are—to whatever degree—then what do they mean for the Soviet system? Again, such subjects are important for other than the grist they provide for the academic mill. At the extreme, if social conditions in the Soviet Union are as bad as some maintain, then this may be symptomatic of a systemic breakdown. Needless to say, if the very fabric of Soviet society is coming undone, the political consequences would be enormous.
Short of that, less cataclysmic—but still serious—problems, such as the deteriorating health standards mentioned by Eberstadt, or the possibility of rising ethnic tensions, as suggested by d’Encausse, have implications for the Soviet leadership and for the military. As Ellen Jones has demonstrated, the Soviet armed forces, like military organizations elsewhere, draw manpower from the larger society and are, therefore, to a significant extent microcosms of that society.15 Thus, manifestations of social infirmity in the Soviet Union are germane to our attempt to assess the well-being of the Soviet state, not only for their value as indicators of national vitality (or lack thereof) but also because these factors relate directly to military power. In this section, there are two issues which have emerged as points of contention in the analysis of the contemporary Soviet Union: population trends and ethnic group relations.
population trends
The demographic history of the Soviet Union is the most tragic of any country in the twentieth century in terms of the scale of population losses, not to mention human suffering. The enormity of these catastrophes is almost impossible to grasp; although precise figures are not available, it is estimated that direct and indirect population decrements due to World War I, revolution and civil war, families, purges, forced labor, collectivization, and World War II amount to between eighty and ninety million people.16 World War II alone is believed to have resulted in twenty to twenty-two million deaths; for purposes of comparison, the United States lost about 300,000 men and women in that conflict.17
The most important long-term consequence of these disastrous events is the effect they have on population growth. Because war losses occur largely to men of military age and other traumas also tend to be selective of adults, there are huge gaps in the age structure of the Soviet population, gaps which "echo" from generation to generation, mocking the passage of time as a healer of past calamities. Combined with the normal decline in fertility, which typically accompanies modernization, the birth deficits owing to war casualties have greatly reduced the manpower pool for civilian economic and military needs; as was discussed earlier, this is one reason why the Soviet economy is currently in difficulty.
Now, according to some authorities, the Soviet people may be experiencing another type of demographic adversity: an upturn in mortality caused by a deterioration in living standards, shortcomings in health care, and the effects of smoking and alcoholism among Soviet citizens.18 Evidence of this trend, which would be unique in the history of modern, industrialized countries, is seen in indicators of infant mortality (which is rising) and adult longevity (which is declining). 19 Although these may appear to be esoteric points, their importance, if true, cannot be overstated; such signs are ominous indeed and would represent a genuine crisis in Soviet society. There is reason to believe, however, that the purported increase in mortality is spurious, in that it can be attributed to technical factors associated with the collection of population data. In this regard, Robert Lewis has shown that improvements in the statistical reporting system in the Soviet Union created an artificial "rise" in mortality indicators, because a higher percentage of deaths is now captured by the registration network than before.20
Unfortunately, this question is all the more difficult to resolve because the Soviet government ceased the publication of detailed mortality data in the mid-1970s (after the figures showed that the death rate was going up). The obvious connotation that most would give to that action is that "they have something to hide." Although that certainly may be the case, it is also plausible that the Soviets panicked when the more efficient reporting system generated a rising mortality index, and—having publicly taken pride in earlier declines in the death rate—decided to withhold the information thereafter.
It would seem prudent, in light of these conflicting interpretations of the data, to downplay the crisis implications of population trends in the Soviet Union. I noted earlier that Gorbachev has addressed the need to make improvements in health care, which might bring about positive developments in the quality and length of life for the Soviet people. Although all is not well in that country, it is probably not the case that this aspect of Soviet society will prove to be a major consideration in the calculus of Soviet power.
the ethnic factor
One of the most common misconceptions about the Soviet Union is that its citizens are all "Russians." Actually, the Soviet population consists of members of approximately 100 different ethnic groups, each with its own language and culture, and with various combinations of religious affiliation and physical appearance.21 Not surprisingly, such a remarkable ethnic diversity leads to social and political problems. These include discrimination and other forms of intolerance, some hostility on the part of minorities toward the Russians (who are the majority and predominant group), as well as language, education, and employment disputes.
This ethnic factor in the Soviet Union tends to be portrayed in the West as considerably more negative and potentially more disjunctive than similar cases elsewhere. Thus, subjects like language rights and bilingualism (which are typical issues in multiethnic societies) are in the Soviet context often seen as part of some sinister effort to force the assimilation of non-Russian ethnic groups into a Russian cultural and linguistic norm. Likewise, the fact that over a period of four centuries the ethnic Russians expanded their state to control the lands of numerous neighboring peoples—the borders of that state have remained largely intact through the transition to Soviet power—results in the characterization of the Soviet Union as ". . . the world’s last empire."22 The maintenance of this "Soviet empire" is then said to be dependent on clever manipulation of the political system and the pervasiveness of the secret police. Such a situation, according to Richard Pipes, means that ". . . ethnic conflicts in the USSR assume the form of a battle of wits . . . [wherein the non-Russians] . . . try to outsmart Moscow."23 Beneath the surface, however, Pipes believes that "there smolders resentment and, in some areas, hatred that can quickly explode into genocidal fury should the heavy hand of Russian authority weaken."24
Short of this catastrophic "genocidal fury," there are some specific ethnic issues that might influence the Soviet military and society. For example, much publicity has been given lately to the changing population balance between the Russians and other European peoples of the Soviet Union, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, the predominantly Muslim peoples of the Caucasus and Central Asian regions of the country.25 Because of a considerably higher birthrate among the latter, their share of the Soviet population is growing; meanwhile, the percentage of Russians is declining (they currently account for about 52 percent of the population). Some of the consequences of this trend are obvious and important: there will be a steadily larger non-Russian component in the Soviet armed services and in the labor force. However, the "crisis" label that has been attached to this trend is probably undeserved. Although some adjustments—such as more attention to Russian language training for minority draftees—will need to be made in both the military and civilian sectors, Jones reminds us " . . . that the USSR is by no means the only modern state whose military manpower management system must cope with ethnic, linguistic, and regional diversity among its troops."26
Like most other issues relating to the study of the Soviet Union, an assessment of the importance of the ethnic factor depends mostly on the degree to which one is predisposed to view the Soviet Union in general. Whereas the basic structure of the Soviet state, created by Lenin in 1922, has endured these many years through extremely difficult times, there are many who nevertheless see the entire thing as ready to come apart at the scams. Certainly, many features of the Soviet political system are not what they purport to be, and there is genuine discontent on the part of many minority group members because of their inclusion in the "fraternal socialist brotherhood of peoples." A case can be made, however, that over the decades a certain legitimacy has been attached to the Soviet federation of ethnic political units; that most people at least acquiesce to its continuation; and that a non-Russian political elite has learned how to operate within the system to gain economic and social benefits for their constituents.27 As long as the Soviet leadership manages to keep nationalist urges channeled within the existing political structure, such issues as bilingualism and the changing ethnic composition of the country can probably be handled without serious trouble.
"A Nice Smile, But Iron Teeth"28
It is probably safe to say that the composition and outward appearance of the Soviet political leadership has undergone a more rapid and sweeping change than anyone would have thought likely, even as recently as two years ago. More than representing a generational shift and an end to the succession of elderly, ailing leaders, the Gorbachev era holds at least the possibility of major reforms in the party and government apparatus, the revitalization of the economy, the invigoration of the political elite, and a more positive or hopeful feeling about the prospects for the Soviet system among its citizenry.
The spectacular rise to power of Mikhail Gorbachev apparently began earlier than we had once thought; it now seems clear that his route to the top was assured long before his formal assumption of the General Secretary's post following the death of Konstantin Chernenko in March 1985.29 This partly explains the adroit consolidation of power and elimination of rivals at the upper levels of the party and state which Gorbachev orchestrated in the first year of his administration. Grigory Romanov, former Leningrad Party chief and once believed the most likely heir to Andropov and Chernenko, was removed from the Politburo in disgrace over abuses of his position. Other prominent figures, such as Prime Minister Nikolai Tikhonov and Moscow Party head Viktor Grishin were packed off into retirement. Perhaps most important, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko was "promoted" to the largely ceremonial post of Chairman of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet; his replacement, Eduard Shevardnadze, has no prior experience of international affairs, which suggests that Gorbachev intends to run both foreign and domestic policy himself. New appointees to the Politburo or other high positions, such as Nikolai Ryzhkov (the new Prime Minister), Yegor Ligachev, Viktor Chebrikov, and Vitaly Vorotnikov, appear to be close Gorbachev associates.
The reach of the Gorbachev personnel moves, however, goes far beyond the highly publicized changes in the Politburo, portending a more fundamental restructuring of the nomenklatura, or listing of individuals approved for leadership or managerial positions. Thus, heads of various agencies, regional government officials, and members of the Party Secretariat have been fired or transferred to lesser duties; their replacements adhere to the new line of efficiency and discipline. In one of Gorbachev's early speeches, intended to set the tone for his administration, he told the audience: "Those who do not intend to adjust and who are an obstacle to solving these new tasks must simply get out of the way."30 The blatant cronyism, stagnation, and corruption of the Brezhnev era, the "don't rock the boat" mentality epitomized by the "stability of cadres" job tenure policy may well be ending.
These sorts of actions are typical of the new leadership, which seems to have a sense of urgency about its mission to get a moribund economy, society, and political system moving ahead again. This is represented by the vigorous and highly visible personal style of Gorbachev, which is in dramatic contrast to Soviet leaders of the past decade who had trouble walking unassisted. Using an approach reminiscent of an American political campaign, in which he kisses babies, conducts meetings on the street with passersby, visits factories, and appears frequently on television, Gorbachev misses no opportunity to get his message across: down to the level of the average citizen, the Soviet people must dedicate themselves to hard work and a higher standard of personal conduct (e.g., a curtailment of alcoholism, corruption, and absenteeism).
The key question, of course, is how successful Gorbachev and his allies will be in effecting real political reforms and in building a popular consensus for his programs. The central problem here is that the crucial economic initiatives, especially the need to acquire advanced technology, may ultimately come at the expense of social services and price increases, a move that would no doubt alienate many people. Likewise, attempts to streamline the labor force could spell an end to the cherished job security that Soviet workers enjoy (and which contributes to low productivity). These will be difficult choices to make and may force Gorbachev to slow the pace of change.
Finally, it is unclear to what extent Gorbachev is willing to relax controls on the arts and literature and to allow open expression of dissent. Two schools of thought exist in the West on this subject. First, Seweryn Bialer and others believe that the "technocratic" approach identified with Gorbachev has nothing to do with liberalism, but rather "stresses authoritarian rule, discipline, and predictable conformist behavior." Furthermore, should Gorbachev prove successful in making the state more efficient, the extent of its oppressiveness will also increase.31 Stephen Cohen, on the other hand, argues that Gorbachev's emphasis on order is designed to placate the conservative wing in the party, while he proceeds cautiously to thaw the cultural ice.32 Cohen’s viewpoint received some reinforcement recently when Pyotr Demichev, Minister of Culture since 1974 and a member of the Brezhnev clique, was shifted to an insubstantial position; although Demichev’s replacement has yet to be named at this writing, this move—together with the showing of plays and films with political themes, and greater candor in the media—may herald a more relaxed environment.
If Gorbachev and his associates are planning and attempting to alter the Soviet political system and society, the struggle will be a difficult one. As Cohen notes, Gorbachev "has restored the general secretaryship as an active leadership position, relegitimizing the principle of fundamental change and created a political atmosphere of reform. But faced with legions of conservative and neo-Stalinist defenders of the status quo, Gorbachev is still far from being the master of power or policy."33
Given the obvious importance of attempting to understand the Soviet Union, present and future, it comes as something of a disappointment that our knowledge of that country today and our ability to forecast guardedly its course are so limited. Much of this state of affairs is, of course, attributable to the secretiveness of the Soviet government; although more information is available through open sources than is generally thought, the amount of data falls far short of that needed to make reasonably accurate judgments. Yet, Churchill's famous adage that Russia is a "riddle wrapped in mystery inside an enigma" is to some extent of our own making. It might be appropriate, in conclusion, to consider how we might go about reducing this aura of mystery that seems to shroud the Soviet Union, and in so doing perhaps to contribute to a more realistic view of our major competition.
First, we should put an end to the exaggeration of everything Soviet, from its military power to its social and economic difficulties. Unfortunately, writing about the Soviet Union is often and easily given to hyperbole, most of which eventually shows itself to be unfounded. In the meantime, however, the unwary can be misled and form a false picture of the Soviet condition. The best recent example of this tendency immediately to assume the worst about the Soviets is the news reporting of the Chernobyl nuclear accident, where headlines of "thousands dead" and "mass graves" caught the attention of the American public.34Without wanting to downplay the seriousness of this event (it now appears that direct deaths owing to the mishap will number about thirty), or to excuse the Soviet government’s irresponsible and unforthcoming handling of the incident, this episode shows how badly informed we are and our inclination to overstate the case. In this regard, Lewis stated:
Crisis-mongering and predictions of the collapse of the Soviet Union have been put forth in the West regularly since the founding of the state. From the current Western literature one derives the impression that here is a country characterized mainly by weaknesses and few strengths, and yet it appears to be quite stable. Such interpretations reveal more about the authors than about the Soviet Union and involve considerable wishful thinking.35
Second, more emphasis must be given to a comparative perspective when analyzing the Soviet Union. How, for example, does the notorious Russian alcoholism problem compare to the proliferation of drug abuse in American society? Is the rising proportion of minorities in the Soviet armed forces different in its impact from a similar trend in the American military? An effort to see things in the two systems as more similar than not might provide better insights into how the other side lives, works, tries to deal with problems, and perceives and defends its interests.
The Soviet Union is a large and highly complex society which, like other such countries, faces a range of social, economic, and political problems in the years ahead. In areas where cooperation and a reduction in tensions are seen by the Soviet leadership to be advantageous, these problems will probably make them more receptive to negotiation with the West. Failing that, however, we can expect that the Gorbachev administration will do what it deems necessary to maintain the Soviet Union’s status as a military, if not an economic, superpower. In so doing, the Soviet government will no doubt have the support of its citizens. In my opinion, to think otherwise is to run the risk of committing that most dangerous of mistakes, that of underestimating one’s adversary.
Florida International University, Miami
Notes
1. Andrei Amalrik, Will the Soviet Union Survive until 1984? (New York: Harper and Row, 1970).
2. Richard Pipes, Survival Is Not Enough: Soviet Realities and America’s Future (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1984). See also Dimitri K. Simes, "The New Soviet Challenge and America's New Edge," in Soviet Foreign Policy in a Changing World, edited by Robbin F. Laird and Erik P. Hoffman (New York: Aldine, 1986), pp. 422-39;Seweryn Bialer, The Soviet Paradox: External Expansion, Internal Decline (New York: Knopf, 1986); and Theodor Winkler, "The Tottering Empire: Problems Facing the USSR in the 1980s," International Defense Review, No. 3, 1981, pp. 263-69.
3. James R. Millar, "An Economic Overview," in The Soviet Union Today: An Interpretive Guide, edited by James Cracraft (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), p. 175.
4. Ibid.
5. See Morris Bornstein, "Soviet Economic Growth and Foreign Policy," in The Domestic Context of Soviet Foreign Policy, edited by Seweryn Bialer (Boulder, Colorado: Westview. 1981), pp. 227-55; Arthur W. Wright, "Soviet Economic Planning and Performance," in The Soviet Union Since Stalin, edited by Stephen F. Cohen (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980), pp. 113-34; and Marshall I. Goldman, U.S.S.R. in Crisis: The Failure of An Economic System (New York: Norton, 1983), pp. 1-62.
6. Robert A. Lewis, "Regional Manpower Resources and Resource Development in the USSR: 1970-90," in Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy, edited by Robert G. Jensen, Theodore Shabad, and Arthur W. Wright (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), pp. 72-96.
7. See Robert G. Jensen, Theodore Shabad, and Arthur W. Wright, editors, Soviet Natural Resources in the World Economy (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1983), chapters 2, 3, 11, and 16.
8. D. Gale Johnson, "Agriculture," in Cracraft, op. cit., pp. 195-207.
9. Various points of view on this subject are presented by Donald F.Burton, "Estimating Soviet Defense Spending," Problems of Communism, July-August 1984, pp. 33-43; Steven Rosefielde, False Science: Underestimating the Soviet Arms Buildup (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Transaction Books, 1982); and Franklyn D. Holzman, "Assessing Soviet Military Spending," International Security, Spring 1982. pp. 78-101.
10. Fyodor I. Kushnirsky, "The Limits of Soviet Economic Reform," Problems of Communism, July-August 1984, pp. 33-43; Serge Schmemann "The Soviet Economy: Gorbachev Faces Daunting Task of Rousing Agriculture, Industry and the Bureaucracy," New York Times, 15 March 1985, p. 1; Serge Schmemann. "Labor Productivity Rise Stressed in Soviet Plans," New York Times, 16 October 1985, p. 29; Philip Taubman, "Soviet Premier, at Congress, Faults Economy," New York Times, 4 March 1986, p. 8; and Leonard Silk, "Soviet Oil Troubles," New York Times, 5 June 1985, p. 28.
11. Marshall I. Goldman, "A Threat to Soviet Economic Reform: The Grim Toll of Chernobyl," New York Times, 4 May 1986, p. 2F.
12. Millar, p. 179.
13. Nick Eberstadt, "The Soviet Union's Health Crisis," Washington Inquirer, 1 April 1983, p. 7.
14. Helene Carrere d’Encausse, Decline of an Empire: The Soviet Socialist Republics in Revolt (New York: Newsweek Books, 1979).
15. Ellen Jones, Red Army and Society: A Sociology of the Soviet Military (Boston: Allen and Unwin, 1985), pp. xv-xvii.
16. Indirect losses are shortfalls in births resulting from the deaths of potential parents. See Robert A, Lewis, Richard H. Rowland, and Ralph S. Clem, Nationality and Population Change in Russia and the USSR: An Evaluation of Census Data, 1897-1970 (New York: Praeger, 1976), pp. 275-76.
17. Ibid., p. 276; and U.S., Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States, 1981 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1981). p. 364, table 606.
18. Nick Eberstadt, "The Health Crisis in the USSR," New York Review of Books, 19 February 1981, pp. 23-31, and "Ultimate Verdict on the Soviet Health System: Shorter Lives," New York Times, 11 October 1981, p. 11; and Murray Feshbach, "Social Maintenance in the USSR: Demographic Morass," Washington Quarterly, Summer 1982, pp. 92-98.
19. Christopher Davis and Murray Feshbach, Rising Infant Mortality in the USSR in the 1970's, U.S Bureau of the Census, series P-95, no. 74, June 1980; and Murray Feshbach, "The Age Structure of Soviet Population: Preliminary Analysis of Unpublished Data, Soviet Economy, April-June 1985, pp. 177-93.
20. Robert A. Lewis, "The Universality of Demographic Processes in the USSR," in Geographical Studies on the Soviet Union, edited by George J. Demko and Roland J. Fuchs (Chicago: University of Chicago Press,1984), pp. 109-30. See also Fred W. Grupp and Ellen Jones, "Infant Mortality Trends in the USSR," Population and Development Review, June 1983, p. 224.
21. See Ralph S. Clem, "The Ethnic Dimension of the Soviet Union," in Contemporary Soviet Society: Sociological Perspectives, edited by Jerry G. Pankhurst and Michael Paul Sacks (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 11-62.
22. Pipes, p. 178.
23. Ibid., p. 184.
24. Ibid., p. 185.
25. Herbert E. Meyer, "The Coming Soviet Ethnic Crisis," Fortune, 14 August 1978, p. 158; "The Population Time Bomb That Kremlin Faces," U.S. News and World Report, 6 December 1982, p. 28; and Alexander Bennigsen and Marie Broxup, The Islamic Threat to the Soviet State (London: Croom Helm, 1983), pp. 124-52.
26. Jones, p. xv.
27 Teresa Rakowska-Harmstone, "The Dialects of Nationalism in the USSR," Problems of Communism, May 1974, pp. 1-22.
28. A remark about Gorbachev attributed to Andrei Gromyko. See Serge Schmemann "In Gorbachev, A New Start: First 100 Days," New York Times, 17 June 1985, p. 1.
29. Jerry F. Hough, "Gorbachev's Strategy," Foreign Affairs, Fall 1985, pp. 33-55.
30. Schmemann. "In Gorbachev, A New Start."
31. Seweryn Bialer and Joan Afferica, "Gorbachev's Preference for Technocrats," New York Times, 11 February 1986, p. 31.
32. Stephen F. Cohen, "Sovieticus," The Nation, 29 March 1986, p. 448.
33. Ibid.
34. In their anxiety to cover the Chernobyl accident. two of the major television networks were victimized by a confidence man who sold them what he said was videotape footage of the burning reactor. It was later determined that the film actually showed a cement factory in Italy.
35. Lewis, "Universality of Demographic Processes in the USSR," p. 114.
Contributor
Ralph S. Clem (B.A., San Diego State College; M.A., Ph.D., Columbia University) is Professor of International Relations at Florida International University, Miami. Dr. Clem is the author ir editor of several books and articles on the population and ethnic groups of the U.S.S.R.; his most recent edited book is Research Guide to the Russian and Soviet Censuses (1986). Dr. Clem is an Air Force Reservist assigned to the 482d Tactical Fighter Wing, Homestead AFB, Florida.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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