Air University Review, May-June 1986
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen T. Rippen, USA
In a 1984 article titled "Targeting Soviet Forces," Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. Mercer stated in simple terms the problem facing our joint doctrinal thinkers: "The success of the AirLand Battle hinges on attacking the critical elements of enemy formations with the maximum means available in the minimum amount of time."1 To achieve this synchronization of AirLand forces, the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force must practice a joint doctrine that enables them to concentrate the maximum amount of combat power based on an operational concept at the decisive point in time and space against enemy forces. To what extent do current U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force principles and procedures provide for the effective conduct of AirLand warfare at the operational level of war under modern conditions?
Two definitions are integral to a clear understanding of this topic.
Operational level of war—
the operational level of war encompasses the movement, support, and sequential employment of (large) military formations (usually corps and above) in the conduct of military campaigns to accomplish goals directed by theater strategy or other higher military authority. It is the connecting link between strategy and tactics.Synchronization—
To synchronize is commonly defined as "to occur at the same time." Synchronized joint military operations result from an all pervading unity of effort by air and ground forces. They are characterized by a concentration of combined arms combat power that complement and reinforce each element at a decisive point in time and space based on an operational concept.By tracing the evolution of joint doctrine in World War II and surveying contemporary joint U.S. air/ground doctrine, Soviet air/ ground operations, and U.S. Army corps operations, several contemporary issues that affect operational effectiveness become apparent. Adoption of several fundamental joint war-fighting principles may help to ensure optional synchronization of Army and Air Force efforts in AirLand warfare.
The AirLand warfare principle of coequal and interdependent air and ground forces developed in World War II. The principles and procedures learned in North Africa through experience and solidified with the publication of Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power, proved to be operationally sound.
The misapplication of air power at the beginning of the North African campaign caused a reexamination of AirLand warfare doctrine by the British. The fundamental air power problem that had to be solved before air forces could support AirLand warfare effectively was how to gain and maintain air superiority. Interservice rivalries, personalities, and coalition warfare politics aside, the air superiority issue caused the British to structure their AirLand forces to take the maximum advantage of the inherent flexibility of air power, which allowed air power to concentrate rapidly on the battlefield. With the reorganization of forces in the North African theater and the publication of Field Marshal Bernard L. Montgomery's Notes on High Command, which led to the publication of FM 100-20, the Americans had established an AirLand warfare doctrine for what they determined to be the most effective control and use of air power.
On 21 July 1943, when Field Manual 100-20 was published, it superseded Field Manual 1-5, Employment of Aviation in the Army, and was regarded as rendering Field Manual 31-35, Aviation in Support of Ground Forces, obsolete.2 FM 100-20 stated that land power and air power are coequal and interdependent forces. This idea was a radical departure from previously accepted American ideas concerning air and ground relationships. FM 100-20 established the principle that
the command of air and ground forces in a theater of operations will be rested in the superior commander charged with the actual conduct of operations in the theater, who will exercise command of air forces through the air force commander and command of ground forces through the ground forces commander.3
Finally, this manual institutionalized the prioritization of air power effort in a theater of operations:
First priority—To gain air superiority [currently referred to as counterair].
Second priority—To prevent movement of troops and supplies into and within theater [currently referred to as air interdiction and battlefield air interdiction].
Third priority—To participate in a combined effort of air and ground forces [currently referred to as close air support].
With the publication of FM 100-20, an army commander had an established, battle-proven doctrine that allowed concentration of combat power in time and space to support an operational concept. Subsequently, the forces in the European theater of operations were structured in support of that doctrine. This structure allowed for the continued development of more effective procedures, such as those for visual markings, a thorough air/ground liaison system, joint planning, and an air-ground tactical fighter control/communications system. According to Army Ground Forces Study No. 35, the primary reason for operational success was the close tie-in between armies and tactical air commands through the employment of a thorough liaison system and adjacent air and ground headquarters. The study goes on to state that the majority of air missions performed "continued to be those planned jointly in the combined operations centers at army-tactical air command level."4 Therefore, the centralization of air power at the operational level allowed the army and air component commanders to concentrate their combat power most effectively in consonance with the goals established by higher authority. Practical men had developed a workable solution to the problem of operational joint doctrine for air and ground forces. They designed a system that would gain air superiority as a first priority and then attack targets in consonance with a campaign plan.
In my opinion, the most significant criteria that caused the World War II AirLand campaigns to succeed were:
The air/ground interdependent and coequal system, as originally designed by Field Marshal Montgomery and reflected in FM 100-20, was intended to function at the operational level of war. Montgomery summarized in a few words how he solved the air/ground coordination and cooperation problem:
All that is required is that the two staffs should work together at the same HQ in complete harmony, and with complete mutual understanding and confidence.5
Additionally, the personalities of the Allied leaders were a dynamic force, albeit difficult to capture, that certainly had a significant impact on the doctrine, organizational structure, and very effectiveness of the AirLand forces themselves. The impact of practical experience and innovation can be measured only through conjecture. Yet, as is characteristic of the American people, the "system" took advantage of practical experience and encouraged innovation. Simply put, it worked.
In November 1984, the Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (J-SAK) Joint Service Agreement was signed by the Air Force and Army Chiefs of Staff, and in December 1984, the J-SAK Procedures Manual was published. These significant documents are among our first statements concerning how air and ground forces will jointly conduct modern warfare. They are significant because since the end of World War II, the Army and Air Force have become separate services, have had separate interests, and have followed separate paths.
Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force, states that as a crucial element in interdependent air and ground forces, air power can be the decisive element in warfare and thus commanders must design their organizations and plans to maximize the effects of this relationship.6 The J-SAK is a joint attempt to strengthen this interdependent Army-Air Force relationship. In scope, the J-SAK applies to the employment of Army and Air Force interdiction assets that disrupt, delay, or destroy enemy second-echelon forces.7 The stated objective of joint attack of second echelon targets is to divert, disrupt, delay, and destroy the enemy's capability to wage war by altering the momentum of his effort. This joint attack will give commanders at the forward line of own troops (FLOT) the time and space necessary to fight the FLOT battle while senior headquarters plan for follow-on operations.8 Most significantly, the J-SAK establishes:
In short, while historical antecedents suggest that consultation and coordination are not adequate to execute joint operations, the J-SAK procedures are built around these fundamental principles.
However, NATO—based on the principle of air superiority first, with limited resources for simultaneous tactical air missions—has established fundamentally different principles and procedures for modern AirLand warfare:
Furthermore, the stated purposes of NATO’s operational doctrine described in ATP-27(B), Offensive Air Support, reflect those of one of its historical antecedents. FM 100-20: gain and maintain air superiority, first to prevent the movement of enemy forces into and within the theater and to destroy these forces once in theater, and second, to assist in ground force objectives through joint operations.9
It is the fundamental principle of air superiority first, with limited resources for simultaneous tactical air missions, that has driven the conceptual thinking concerning how best to employ air power. ATP-27(B) describes the unclassified, generic principles and procedures that NATO employs to solve this dilemma. Although the end result may be the same, the command, control, and liaison agencies existing in Central Europe and the functions performed at each level are somewhat different from those defined in the J-SAK. The Central European battlefield is characterized by a highly complex, coalition warfare environment where the efforts of several nations must be combined into a single theater campaign plan. As such, different principles and procedures have been developed to solve the problems associated with air and ground relationships in maneuver warfare.
The Soviets are organized to exploit their numerical superiority and their overall offensive strategy that takes advantage of their capability to concentrate large numbers of troops and equipment.10 In order to breach defenses rapidly and maintain offensive momentum, Warsaw Pact doctrine advocates the use of massed, high-speed heavily armored forces at a time and place of their choosing.11 During offensive operations, the advanced penetration element and the first echelon would maintain pressure on the defense in an attempt to find its weakness. Then second-echelon forces and operational maneuver groups (OMGs) would be used for exploitation. The Soviet offensive would probably be conducted in three major phases: "the air operation, the anti-air operation and rapid, deep OMG-led penetrations on the ground."12 The purpose of the air operation would be to neutralize the bulk of NATO's air nuclear capability.13 Shortly following the start of the air operation, ground forces would attack with large-scale OMG-led raids in conjunction with air assault and airborne landings into the depths of NATO's defenses.14 Simultaneously, the antiair operation would seek to protect the air and ground forces throughout the entire depth of the battlefield. 15 Follow-on forces would then conduct exploitations in an attempt to conclude the war rapidly.16 The Soviets are convinced that they can win conventionally. Their entire structure is designed for fast-tempo operations that can be executed to defeat NATO forces, presenting them with a fait accompli, before NATO can execute a nuclear option.17
The Soviet Air Force consists of three components: Frontal Aviation, Long-Range Aviation, and Military Transport Aviation. Soviet Frontal Aviation is comparable to the United States Air Force Tactical Air Command.18 It has approximately 6000 combat aircraft that are assigned to military districts within the Soviet Union and to the Western theater of military operations (TVDs). 19
A typical Soviet front has an assigned "aviation of the front." This organization has also been referred to as a "tactical air army." The organizational structure for this aviation of the front is not fixed. However, it would routinely include fighter, fighter-bomber, bomber, reconnaissance, and helicopter transport regiments.20 Furthermore, evidence currently exists that the front commander may subordinate his Su-25 Frogfoot attack aircraft, which performs the equivalent role of NATO's A-10, to the army level for operations.21 The planning and preparation of air support before an offensive begins is driven by the front commander's orders to his army commanders. The front commander's concept of operation, as approved by higher authority, is the focus of the entire combined arms effort. According to FM 100-20-1, The Soviet Army, Operations and Tactics, the front commander's order specifies "the air units to be committed, the ground armies to be supported, and the time of attack."22
The Soviet approach to military organizations is highly functional. It emphasizes unity of purpose and unity of command. An important point to remember is that the Soviet front commander (approximately equivalent to a U.S./NATO army group commander) has at the operational level all of the combat power under his command to accomplish goals as directed by theater strategy or other higher military authority. This difference between the U.S. and Soviet approach is fundamental; the Soviet operational level commander does not have a coequal air commander with whom coordination must be made. Air and ground forces are not, in the Soviet view, coequal and interdependent. Rather, they are both subordinate to the operational dictates of the front commander. The significance of this fact is that because of the Soviet functional approach, the necessity for U.S. joint doctrinal thinking to integrate air and ground operations effectively is increased exponentially.
In the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle concept, it is the army commander's campaign plan that "provides the concept of operations and objectives which will allow the corps commander to put his own plans in perspective vis-à-vis the overall army objective and the operations of adjacent corps."23 Corps operations will require the synchronization of air and ground combat power.24 That is why the corps cornmander must understand the overall air campaign plan, the overall theater interdiction campaign plan, and the resultant, expected apportionment of air resources. The allocation and use of air combat power by the army commander must fit within both the objectives of the various corps campaign plans and the objectives of the joint force commander's theater campaign plan. The army commander's intent must be communicated clearly to the corps commanders. The corps commander must understand how his corps fits into the army's mission in support of theater goals and how the army commander visualizes mission accomplishment.
Corps operations, therefore, are conducted in consonance with the army commander's campaign plan.25 Current doctrinal thinking and objective realities posit that corps campaigns, such as would be conducted in Central Europe, generally consist of sequential phases which can be described as defensive, offensive, and exploitation.26 National strategy, such as our forward defense in Europe, dictates that the initial phase of a campaign would be operationally defensive. The objective of this phase is to reduce the tempo of the attacking force, to create an opportunity for offensive actions, and to force the enemy to change his plan.27 Once the attacker's tempo is disrupted and he is forced to alter plans, the corps has an opportunity to regain the initiative and to force further enemy reaction.28 The objective of the offensive phase is to sustain the initiative by rendering the enemy's first operational echelon ineffective.29 During the exploitation phase, operational maneuver is conducted to accomplish army objectives in consonance with the army commander's campaign plan. Therefore, each phase of the campaign plan must be designed to accomplish sequential objectives that build on one another to accomplish the corps mission as assigned by the army commander. Additionally, each separate phase of the campaign plan is conducted with the understanding that the rear, close, and deep battles are "inextricably linked."30 To fight and win, the corps commander must be able to synchronize his combat power in time and space as dictated by the flow of the battle. This synchronization of combat power is the corps commander's primary task; he must isolate and focus his efforts on the deep threat.31
Another important point to remember is that the army and corps campaign plans must counter the two Soviet characteristics of aggressive offensive orientation and numerical superiority.32 These campaign plans must be proactive. Actions must alter the Soviet troop control and decision process, which essentially means disrupting follow-on forces, to cause the enemy to react to our actions. The object is to counter the enemy's ability to interfere with each proposed friendly course of action.
The corps is the level of command where information from national systems and tactical systems is combined to form an accurate intelligence picture of the threat in depth.33 The corps uses this information both to plan future operations and to disrupt follow-on forces while the battle at the FLOT is under way. According to FM 32-20, Military Intelligence Group, in the corps area of influence the corps commander must have the location of "enemy division and army command posts, NBC [nuclear, biological, and chemical] delivery systems, radioelectronic combat units, logistic installations, communications, and frontal aviation operations center" in order to plan and conduct a proactive campaign.34 Although specific capabilities are classified, the corps obtains this information from a variety of sources: subordinate divisions, armored cavalry regiments, corps military intelligence units, adjacent corps, tactical air reconnaissance, echelons above corps, and national systems.35 The corps must integrate information from all sources to conduct a successful proactive campaign. Generally, because of current capabilities, information that the corps receives beyond its area of influence will be provided by higher headquarters or national systems.
The result of the intelligence effort must be to determine where, when, and in what strength the main attack will occur. The corps campaign plan must shape the battle at the FLOT so that the campaign can become proactive and proceed logically to its offensive and exploitation phases. The significant point in synchronizing air and ground combat based on intelligence information is target value analysis.36 The value of a given set of targets or enemy capabilities is a function of their ability to influence the corps campaign at a given point in time and space. For this reason, AirLand warfare must be jointly conducted in consonance with the overall operational goals in the context of the theater campaign plan. Without the joint employment of forces in accordance with a single operational concept, we greatly reduce our ability to synchronize our combat power against high-value target sets. However, there are many contemporary issues that directly affect our ability to employ joint forces in accordance with a single operational concept.
Conceptually, the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force view the term doctrine differently. Doctrine, in Army terms, conceptually translates into "how the Army fights." Doctrine, in Air Force terms, conceptually translates into "a statement of officially sanctioned beliefs and warfighting principles." Simply put, the Army will fight wars based on its doctrine, while the Air Force may fight its wars based on "theater specific doctrines" that will be more specific than that which is "officially sanctioned."
General Lew Allen, Jr., a former U.S. Air Force Chief of Staff, summed up the importance of focusing the majority of our joint doctrinal efforts on our most dangerous threat when he stated in 1982: "We are thus faced with a confrontation which we must fully address. As far as the United States is concerned, Europe is the central focus of that confrontation."37 This conclusion seems to create a paradox for the Air Force. While Europe provides the most dangerous high-intensity battlefield threat and indeed the resultant justification for many of the U.S. Air Force's procurement efforts, there still exist fundamental differences between "officially sanctioned" joint doctrines and those established for Central European AirLand warfare.
As previously stated, the development of the J-SAK Joint Service Agreement and the subsequent J-SAK Procedures Manual is a significant step forward in U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force "jointness." These documents are among our first joint statements concerning how air and ground forces will conduct modern warfare. Not intended to be theater-specific, the J-SAK package provides a generic joint doctrine that allows a theater the flexibility to modify this doctrine in accordance with its specific requirements and peculiarities. The single greatest flaw with J-SAK is that it attempts to establish procedures without establishing fundamental principles for AirLand warfare.
According to J-SAK, it is the corps that orients primarily on the operational level of war. Although true as a generalization, corps operations can range from purely tactical, to tactical and operational, to purely operational. Nevertheless, the J-SAK states that this orientation on the operational level of war involves "conducting campaigns and battles ... and seizing and exploiting the initiative when planned windows of opportunity open for friendly offensive action."38 Therefore, it is at this level that joint planning by "two staffs ... at the same headquarters in complete harmony" should occur. J-SAK, however, advocates coordination and consultation at the air and land component level and makes no provisions for joint planning at the corps/operational level. Central Europe (CENTAG) recognizes the necessity for joint planning and has therefore collocated the Army Group and Tactical Air Force staffs. However, even in Central European NATO, there is no institutionalized method for joint planning at the corps level when and if a corps would conduct operational-level warfare. In short, the principle should be joint planning and collocation of headquarters at the operational level regardless of the organizational level at which operational warfare occurs. Our current joint doctrine is inadequate because it establishes only coordination and consultation at the operational level.
The J-SAK formally recognizes the concept of both an air and a land component commander in a theater of operations. This principle may be effective in a theater with one or two corps or possibly a single army group. However, if Central Europe is the focus of our readiness efforts, it seems dysfunctional to advocate a doctrine that is unworkable in that theater. There was no land component commander in Central Europe during World War II and, by definition, there is no land component commander in Central Europe today. Furthermore, although there is an air component commander in Central Europe (Commander of Allied Air Forces Central Europe), the procedures outlined in the J-SAK further complicate the component's role in theater-level warfare. Since the Allied Air Forces Central Europe (AAFCE) commander has no land component headquarters with which to plan, it is critical that the AAFCE commander have the same understanding of the theater commander's intent as the army group commanders. Otherwise, the air effort may be out of synchronization with army group campaign plans. Our current joint doctrine is inadequate because it establishes the specific principle of a land component commander in a theater of operations and procedurally builds on this principle. Therefore, our joint doctrinal principle can be neither universally applied nor applied to the theater in which we face our most dangerous threat, Central Europe.
Air superiority is fundamental. Once again, the system was originally designed at the operational level of war to gain air superiority first and to attack targets in consonance with the operational campaign plan. When this line of thought is implemented, separation of BAI from AI makes good sense, giving the operational commander the opportunity to focus his planning efforts and designate targets/missions that synchronize combat power. BAI should be commanded and controlled by the Air Force. BAI should be allocated to a corps only in consonance with an army campaign plan agreed on through joint planning with the corresponding air commander's staff. BAI is nothing more or less than another combat power resource used to accomplish an operational objective. The NATO principle of air apportionment recognizes and reflects the historical framework on which AirLand warfare was built. Therefore, our current joint doctrine, as established by J-SAK, is inadequate concerning the synchronization of combat power at the operational level of war. Simply stated, the J-SAK principle that the air component commander is responsible for the entire interdiction campaign and, therefore, designates BAI targets prioritized by the operational commander degrades the operational commander's ability to focus planning efforts and synchronize combat power in consonance with an air/ ground campaign plan.
To conduct modern AirLand operations effectively, we must get out of the "target list mentality." Patton illustrated the validity of mission-oriented air requests in fast-moving, fluid situations when the XIX Tactical Air Command protected the Third Army's right flank as it moved across France. The J-SAK recognizes the necessity for mission-oriented air requests. This recognition represents a milestone in our joint ability to conduct modern operational warfare. The institutionalization of this principle will have tremendous implications for the Air Force. Mission-oriented air requests will undoubtedly change the Air Force's approach to training (in a shift from mission to target orientation) and will more functionally integrate the Air Force into campaign planning and execution.
To what extent do current U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force principles and procedures provide for the effective conduct of AirLand warfare at the operational level of war under modern conditions?
The answer is that although the J-SAK has enhanced interservice dialogue significantly and is an important step forward in "jointness," the joint doctrinal principles and procedures as practiced in Central European NATO most closely approximate historical antecedents and provide for the most effective conduct of AirLand warfare at the operational level of war under modern conditions. This argument is not based on a Central European doctrine that is theater-specific; rather, it is based on fundamental principles and procedures for AirLand warfare that are reflected in historical fact and should be roughly applicable to all theaters at the operational level of war.
The "ultimate" solution to our joint, generic AirLand warfare doctrine should recognize fundamental criteria for warfighting based on historical fact and procedurally adapted to modern circumstances. The essence of these joint doctrinal principles at the operational level of war are reflected in the following five criteria that are necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for operational success:
Our joint AirLand warfare doctrine as established in the J-SAK must provide a framework of principles for targeting and attacking Soviet forces. Currently, fundamental principles have not been established. The J-SAK should be descriptive versus prescriptive, establishing doctrinal principles applicable to all theaters, with a focus on our most dangerous threat, that of the Soviets in Central Europe. The five criteria recommended here provide a fundamental framework of principles that can be procedurally adapted to specific theaters. Furthermore, these criteria reflect historical precedent and closely approximate those principles already established for AirLand warfare in Central Europe.
In developing our joint doctrine, we must never forget that the difference between the U.S. approach to AirLand warfare and the Soviet approach is fundamental: the Soviet air and ground forces are both subordinate to the operational dictates of the frontal commander. Therefore, to overcome this difference, our coequal and interdependent air and ground forces must be employed with doctrinal principles that effectively synchronize our forces based on a single operational concept at a decisive point in time and space. Both the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force have common interests. Both services, when they fight, want to win. Both services want a highly functional joint doctrine that maximizes the flexibility of air power to concentrate on the battlefield. We have made significant steps forward with Army and Air Force joint initiatives, agreements, and manuals. Now is the time to capitalize on our progress thus far and to develop fundamental joint principles.
Notes
1. Lieutenant Colonel Donald L. Mercer. " Targeting Soviet Forces," Military Review, May 1984, p. 24.
2. Colonel Kent R. Greenfield, Army Ground Forces and the Air-Ground Battle Team, Study No. 35 (Fort Monroe, Virginia: Army Ground Forces, 1948), p. 47.
3. Field Manual 100-20, Command and Employment of Air Power (War Department, 1943), p. 1-11.
4. Greenfield, p. 91.
5. Field Marshal Sir Bernard Montgomery, Notes on High Command in War (Tripoli: Headquarters Eighth British Army, 1943). 1), p. 29.
6. Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of the United States Air Force (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1984), p. 1-3.
7. U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force, Joint Service Agreement for the Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (Washington: Departments of the Army and Air Force, November 1984), p. 2.
8. Ibid., p. 4.
9. North Atlantic Treaty Organization Military Agency for Standardization (MAS), ATP-27(B), Offensive Air Support (Hq NATO, 15 November 1983), p. 1-1.
10. Operational Concept for Corps Deep Battle as Part of the AirLand Battle, draft, prepared by Deep Attack Study Group, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, December 1984 (hereafter referred to as Corps Deep Battle), p. 17.
11. Ibid., p. 13.
12. Phillip A. Peterson and John G. Hines, "Military Power in Soviet Strategy against NATO," Journal of the Royal United Services Institute for Defence Studies (RUSI), December 1983, p. 53. 13. Ibid.
14. Ibid.
15. Ibid.
16. Ibid.
17. Corps Deep Battle, p. 18.
18. "Organization of the Soviet Armed Forces," Air Force, March 1984, p. 104.
19. Ibid.
20. Ibid., p. 32.
21. Major John G. Hines and Phillip A. Peterson, The Soviet Conventional Offensive in Europe (Washington: Defense Intelligence Agency, DD8-2622-4-83, Information Cutoff, March 1983), p. 17.
22. Field Manual (FM) 100-2-1, The Soviet Army (Washington: Department of the Army, July 1984), p. 1-1.
23. Corps Deep Battle, p. 15.
24. Ibid.
25. Ibid., p. 16.
26. Ibid.
27. Ibid., p. 17.
28. Ibid.
29. Ibid.. p. 16.
30. Ibid., p. 30.
31. Ibid.
32. Ibid.
33. FM 34-20, Military Intelligence Group (Combat Electronic Warfare and Intelligence) (Corps) (Washington: Department of the Army, May 1983), p. 1-10.
34. Ibid.
35. Ibid.
36. Corps Deep Battle, p. 38.
37. General Lew Allen, Jr., "U.S. Air Power," U.S. Military Power in the 1980's (London: Macmillan, 1983), p. 115.
38. TAC-TRADOC-REDCOM (Hq USAF Tactical Air Command, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command, and U.S. Army Readiness Command), General Operating Procedures for Joint Attack of the Second Echelon (JSAK), 31 December 1984, p. 4-1.
Contributor
Lieutenant Colonel Stephen T. Rippen, USA (B.A., Norwich University, M.M.A.S., U.S. Army Command and General Staff College), is the Commander, First Battalion, 4th Infantry, 3d Infantry Division, Aschaffenburg, West Germany. He has served as regimental adjutant and squadron executive officer, 11th Armored Cavalry Regiment, Fulda, West Germany, and as battalion adjutant, assistant operations officer, and infantry company commander, 82d Airborne Division, Fort Bragg, North Carolina.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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