Air University Review, March-April 1986
Successive New Zealand governments have based their country’s defense on the concept of effective deterrence via the pursuit of a policy of collective security. Prior to the Second World War, New Zealand’s defenses were fully integrated into the British Imperial defense system. Since 1951, however, Wellington has aligned itself with the United States and Australia under the ANZUS Treaty. The New Zealanders’ continued adherence to this defense policy is due to New Zealand’s small resource base and its traditional commitment to Western values and interests. The population of New Zealand is only 3.3 million, the New Zealand Defence Force (NZDF) numbers 12,443 regulars, the economy is essentially based on the export of agricultural products, and there is little heavy industry. For a nation with such slender defense resources, considerable worldwide economic and trade interests, and a heavy dependence on sea transport of its exports and imports, defense alignment with other Western nations was the only viable option open to New Zealand officials following the failure of British military power in the Far East during the Second World War.
At the same time, it must be stressed that due to the geographic remoteness of New Zealand and the lack of any immediate threats to that country, defense expenditures have been kept to the absolute minimum. The defense vote for financial year 1984-85, for example, will be just under $NZ 775 million.1 Consequently, the development of the individual services of the NZDF has been contingent on limited funding and then only for the most pressing requirements. Because of the small size of the three services of the NZDF, particular emphasis has been placed on developing the capability to operate within larger allied formations, even at the expense of creating joint NZDF operational capabilities and doctrines. Moreover, as NZDF units have traditionally operated within these larger formations, the acquisition of expensive combat support weapons and the development of an adequate logistic support structure for independent New Zealand operations have often been deferred for financial considerations.
It is in the light of New Zealand's current situation—stringent financial limitations, few direct threats, and a traditional reliance on allies for equipment and supply—that the Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF) must be analyzed. With a budget of only $NZ 250 million in financial year 1984-85 and a force of approximately forty combat-capable aircraft and 4325 regular officers and airmen, the New Zealand Air Staff must provide for the air power requirements of New Zealand in addition to those required by treaty commitments for Southeast Asia and the South Pacific.2 Yet in spite of its resource limitations, the RNZAF has managed to develop a professional volunteer service that maintains operational capabilities in the five basic air roles expected of a modern air force: strike, maritime reconnaissance, training, transport, and helicopter operations. (See Table 1.)
Royal New Zealand Air Force
To appreciate air power determinants in New Zealand, however, one must understand the relationship between the RNZAF and New Zealand's allies in both the logistic support and the operational areas. Indeed, the relationship that has developed between the RNZAF and its Anglo-Saxon allies' air forces has become so close that the continuation of modern air operations in New Zealand is dependent on the maintenance of these ties. Moreover, beyond describing the extent of the RNZAF's dependence on external support and the Western Security Community's arrangement for maritime security in the South Pacific, I shall also argue later in this article that the New Zealand Labour Party (NZLP) government's stand on access to New Zealand ports by U.S. Navy vessels and the resulting downgrading in the ANZUS defense relationship will inevitably damage the operational effectiveness of the RNZAF and impede the pursuit and protection of Western interests in the South Pacific region.
Since the mid-1970s, a major shift has taken place in the direction of New Zealand defense policy. Prior to the 1978 Defence Review (an official white paper), the focus of the NZDF as a whole was oriented toward the Southeast Asian region. New Zealand Army units were stationed in Malaysia and Singapore, naval units regularly deployed there, and, until they were finally withdrawn in 1966, RNZAF Canberra B-12 bombers of 75 Squadron were based in Singapore. The 1978 Defence Review officially called for changing New Zealand defense policy, however, reorienting the direction of the NZDF efforts toward the South Pacific.3 There were good reasons for this policy adjustment besides the overall improvement in the Southeast Asian security situation. The long-standing ANZUS strategy in the South Pacific has been to deny the region to the Soviet Union, but since the early-1970s, the Soviet Navy has continued to expand its presence in the region. In 1976 and 1977, the Soviet Union attempted unsuccessfully to establish its first resident diplomatic missions in Tonga and Fiji. With a growing number of newly independent micro-island states emerging in Melanesia and Polynesia, the ANZUS nations could no longer take the region's political and strategic stability for granted.4
In line with Australian and U.S. initiatives, maritime capabilities in the region needed to be expanded as ground operations in Southeast Asia diminished and became less likely as a future course of action. New Zealand also had its own compelling reasons for improving its maritime forces. The New Zealand economy is heavily dependent on both the export of 25 percent of its gross domestic product and the importation of industrial goods and many raw materials, especially petroleum. As the Soviet Navy has increased its presence in the Pacific and Indian oceans, increased concern has developed about the security of New Zealand's sealines of communication. As it now stands, approximately 99 percent of New Zealand's trade is seaborne.
The RNZAF, perforce, has had to alter its former orientation from meeting contingencies in the Southeast Asian environment to improving its maritime surveillance and strike capability. Fortunately, the existing inventory of P-3B Orion maritime patrol and A-4K Skyhawk attack aircraft is well suited for these requirements. Moreover, the RNZAF's task is made easier since the air threat to New Zealand is not assessed as credible and thus the RNZAF does not need to provide a modern air defense system for the country.5 Therefore, resources have been concentrated on improving the operational functions and force strength related to maritime missions. The five Orions, which were purchased in 1966, have undergone extensive upgrading of their sensor and computer systems.6 A modernization of the Orions’ weapons delivery and electronic warfare systems is scheduled to begin shortly. On 31 March 1985, a part-life former Royal Australian Air Force P-3B was purchased from the Lockheed Corporation, which will be modified to the existing RNZAF's standards.7 The Skyhawks are to undergo an updating of their avionics and weapons delivery systems, including head up displays and new radars, and will be structurally refurbished under a $NZ 140 million contract with a U.S. firm. Ten additional Skyhawk G-series aircraft were purchased from the Royal Australian Navy in July 1984 for $NZ 69 million. These Skyhawks are to be modified to K-series standards and will undergo the same modernization.8 Interested in obtaining a force multiplier for the Skyhawk force, the NZLP has elected to follow the directives of the 1983 Defence Review and is studying the possibility of acquiring an air-to-air refueling capability. This acquisition will most likely take the form of converting some of the RNZAF's C-130H Hercules for the mission.
With such a small force of modern aircraft, the RNZAF is unable to maintain an adequate structure to provide for its complete support requirements. This is not to say that the RNZAF is completely dependent on overseas sources for all of its support/maintenance needs. Although small, RNZAF Support Group is capable of all stages of maintenance with the exception of completely rebuilding an airplane.9 When modifications are undertaken in-country, the facilities of Air New Zealand, the commercial airline, are often used. Beyond these exceptions, however, the RNZAF simply cannot realize the economies of scale as can larger air forces. Hence, the RNZAF is dependent on its allies, mainly the United States, for its support requirements.
The beginnings of the post-World War II relationship between the RNZAF and the U.S. Air Force date back to the early-1960s, when the first "Airmen-to-Airmen" talks and other bilateral discussions on mutual assistance were held.10 Although the RNZAF had been established and developed along the lines of the Royal Air Force, defense ties with Britain overall were scaled back during the 1960s as Britain progressively ran down its presence in the Far East and concentrated force development on the combat requirements of the European theater. Since that time, the RNZAF has largely reequipped itself with U.S.-manufactured aircraft and has adopted many of the USAF's doctrines, tactics, etc.11
The logistic support side of the New Zealand-United States air power relationship was initially formalized on 20 May 1965 with the signing of a cooperative logistics agreement and subsequent implementing of procedural arrangements for the supply support of RNZAF aircraft by the U.S. Air Force (1965) and U.S. Navy (1966 and 1967). This agreement was upgraded to a memorandum of understanding in 1982.12 These agreements have been beneficial from the standpoint of the RNZAF for two reasons. First, should New Zealand become involved in a conflict, the assurance of logistic support from a superpower in its general region (vis-à-vis in Western Europe) is important for defense planning. Second, the RNZAF's requests for materiel fromU.S. sources receive the same priority as the United States Armed Services. Since the RNZAF Support Group is able to depend on a secure flow of weapons, spares, ammunition, and other items from the United States, there is less need to maintain expensive war reserves. Thus, the logistic support relationship with the United States has allowed the RNZAF to keep support costs at a minimum, thereby allowing resources to be directed to training and operational missions.13 As an illustration of this dependence, in 1981, approximately 60 percent of all RNZAF purchases were from U.S. sources.14
Although the relationship with the United States is important in terms of support and supply, the RNZAF also maintains beneficial relationships with other allies. In recent years, the bilateral defense relationship with Australia has grown considerably, particularly in the area of logistic support and maritime surveillance coordination. In addition, although aircraft requirements differ between the two air forces, increased cooperation is expected in the field of training.15 The RNZAF is also a member of the little-known Air Standardization Coordinating Committee (ASCC), which includes the air forces and naval air units of the United States, Britain, Canada, and Australia. By taking part in the activities of the ASCC, the RNZAF has access to the latest developments in modern air operations and technology. Although the original objective of the ASCC was to ensure that member air forces were able to conduct combined operations (which in itself is important for a small air force like the RNZAF), it has grown to include such areas as the exchange of information and coordination of research and development projects, cost-free trials of equipment, etc. Because helpful information is provided by the members to one another essentially without cost, the RNZAF has realized further financial savings that can be used elsewhere.16
Beyond the support and force modernization functions of the RNZAF, which are highly dependent on external sources, the operational side of New Zealand air power is also closely integrated with allied security arrangements. New Zealand remains committed to the security of Malaysia and Singapore via the Five Powers Defense Arrangements. The RNZAF provides personnel for the Integrated Air Defence System headquarters at Butterworth Air Base in Malaysia, and its Skyhawk aircraft deploy to Singapore every year for joint exercises under this arrangement.
However, the defense arrangement that has become progressively more important to New Zealand's immediate security is the Radford-Collins Agreement of 1951.18 This maritime security arrangement, named after its signatories, Admiral William Radford, U.S. Navy, and Vice-Admiral Sir John Collins, Royal Australian Navy, provides for the implementation of allied naval control and protection of shipping in the Pacific and Indian oceans. The present members of the agreement are assigned "areas of maritime responsibility," where, in times of tension or conflict, each nation is to provide command and control of shipping as well as direct antisubmarine warfare operations. In recognition of its limited defense capability, New Zealand is not expected to be able to provide for all the vessels and aircraft that would be required for the complete security of the New Zealand area.19
The RNZAF and the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN), working jointly, are responsible for maintaining an adequate level of forces to contribute to the security of New Zealand's area of responsibility. With the growth in Soviet naval activity in the region, the Radford-Collins agreement has taken on added significance. Indeed, the formal orientation of the RNZAF is publicly stated to be to contribute "to the effective maritime control over New Zealand territorial waters, the EEZ [exclusive economic zone], and the South Pacific."20
Should certain political and international trends continue, it can be expected that the RNZAF will continue to direct an ever-increasing proportion of its resources and attention to maritime missions. In terms of domestic New Zealand politics, it is becoming increasingly evident that the "blue-water" element of the RNZN may be phased out once the present force of four Leander-class frigates reach the end of their operational life in the 1990s, in part because of the continually rising costs of maintaining and operating modern surface combatants and also because of the evident lack of political will to undertake the heavy financial burdens for the replacement of the retiring vessels.21
While New Zealand officials contemplate the future structure of the RNZN and the South Pacific continues to see increased Soviet naval activity, an additional maritime development may complicate the equation. If the Antarctic Treaty is not renewed in 1991 but is allowed to lapse, the oceans to the south of New Zealand, now infrequently traveled, may experience a significant increase in resource exploration and extraction now restricted by the treaty. Should this eventuality come to pass, increased naval activity by outside powers to support territorial or resource claims could follow. Thus, future trends in New Zealand defense clearly call for improving the NZDF's maritime force structure.
Regardless of whether the RNZN loses its blue-water capability, the RNZAF will certainly continue to expand and improve its maritime elements. However, as New Zealand is clearly incapable of providing for the requirements of its allocated "area of maritime responsibility" under Radford-Collins, it is difficult to see how the RNZAF alone will be able to meet New Zealand's immediate maritime security needs (especially in the area of modern antisubmarine warfare) and contribute to collective security arrangements as well. The obvious option for New Zealand then is to continue, if not expand, its collective security arrangements. The continuation of the operational effectiveness of the RNZAF and the overall security of the country would seem to dictate such a policy course.
Surprisingly, the present New Zealand Labour Party government has taken a different view. Many in New Zealand feel that their country's security can be best enhanced by the establishment of a nuclear-free zone in the South Pacific. Consequently, military aircraft and warships from "nuclear" countries are prohibited from using New Zealand's airfields and ports unless they are nonnuclear-propelled and declared to be not nuclear-armed. The United States, in keeping with its long-standing policy of neither confirming nor denying which aircraft or ships are carrying nuclear weapons, has responded to the NZLP government's initiatives by reducing its level of defense cooperation with New Zealand as a sign of its displeasure. Exercises, personnel exchanges, and intelligence contacts have been either discontinued or reduced from previous levels. In the important area of supply, the United States Department of Defense has stated that in light of the present NZLP government's policies, New Zealand will be treated as a friendly government but no longer as an ally in meeting supply requests.22 Wellington, for its part, has declared that it wants to continue the ANZUS relationship but in nonnuclear areas. The NZLP government has offered to provide a greater proportion of its own defense requirements, particularly in the area of maritime surveillance.23 The response from Washington has been that port access makes possible the operational demonstration of deterrence implicit in the treaty and that, without such visits, there can be no resumption of close defense relations.
Washington has been placed in a dilemma, as it is not in the U.S. interest to contribute to the lowering of the operational effectiveness of a traditionally close ally's defense force. Yet, at the same time, Washington has been fearful of the possible extraregional effects that the NZLP government's policies might have on other allies with large antinuclear popular movements.24 Unless a major diplomatic breakthrough or a change in the NZLP government's policy occurs, the RNZAF may well find its task of providing for the air power requirements of New Zealand progressively more difficult and expensive.
Clearly, there is more at stake in the present strain in New Zealand-United States relations than the continued capability of a Western air force to operate its aircraft efficiently. Unwittingly, the present New Zealand government has been perceived to have called into question the ANZUS strategy of "strategic denial" of the South Pacific to the Soviet Union. Should bilateral relations continue to deteriorate, it is not difficult to see that it will be Western interests in the South Pacific which will suffer, not simply those of the Royal New Zealand Air Force.
Washington, D.C.
Notes
1. Estimates of Expenditure of the Government of New Zealand for Year Ending 31 March 1985, New Zealand "Ministry of Defence" (Wellington: Government Printer, 1985), pp. 74-76.
2. Ibid.; and New Zealand Parliament, Appendices to the Journal of the House of Representatives (AJHR), (1984) G. 4 Ministry of Defence, p. 43.
3. AJHR (1978) Defence Review, p. 11.
4. AJHR (1983) G.4a Defence Review, pp. 9-10. This official concern about Soviet motives in the Far East is articulated in this defense white paper.
5. See the New Zealand Ministry of Defence's assessment of a Soviet air attack from bases in Indochina in New Zealand Times, 28 October 1984.
6. For a description of this updating, see Benjamin M. Elson, "New Zealand Updates P-3B Electronics," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 9 January 1984, p. 75. A copy of the agreement with the United States providing for the Orion's modification can be found in United Slates Treaties and Other International Agreements (TIAS) 10231, 3 August 1981.
7. New Zealand Herald (Auckland), 1 April 1985. The cost of the aircraft and its updating to RNZAF Orion standards is placed at $NZ 19 million.
8. Information provided by RNZAF Operations Group, October 1984.
9. Benjamin M. Elson, "New Zealand Updates Its Military Inventory," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 13 July 1981, pp. 129-36.
10. David Filer, The New Zealand Armed Services: Their Development in Relation to Defence Policy, 1946-1972 (M.A. thesis, University of Canterbury, Christchurch, 1972), p. 107.
11. It is interesting to note that although the RNZAF has strong ties with the United States Air Force, its principal combat aircraft are not flown by the U.S. Air Force but by the United States Navy.
12. The latter agreement can be found in TIAS 10542, 21 June 1982.
13. The 1983 Defence Review identified the requirement to increase the range of air weapons so as to improve the RNZAF's ability to mount independent operations, op. cit., pp. 1, 34-35. It is expected, however, that the NZDF will attempt to continue to purchase ammunition, missiles, and other items in conjunction with U.S. purchases, thereby taking advantage of lower unit costs and prompt delivery. See remarks by former Chief of Defence Staff, Vice-Admiral Sir Neil Anderson, RNZN, New Zealand Times, 21 October 1984.
14. Information (dated December 1981) provided by the New Zealand Ministry of Defence, October 1984.
15. Information provided by RNZAF Support Group, October 1984.
16. For details on the ASCC, see the pamphlet issued by the ASCC Management Committee, "Air Standardization Coordinating Committee," June 1984, Hq USAF/XOXX-ISO, Washington, D.C. It must be pointed out that as a full member of the ASCC, the RNZAF is expected to contribute to the general pool of information as well.
17. For details of New Zealand's presence in Malaysia and Singapore, see New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Five Power Defence Arrangements (Wellington: Government Printer, 1971).
18. This agreement has only recently become publicly acknowledged to exist. As it is still an operational arrangement, its precise details remain privileged information. General information on Radford-Collins can be found in the Star (Christchurch), 11 February 1985; and in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, volume XII, part 1 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1985), pp. 99-100, 328. Note that the agreement was amended in 1977 by the ANZUS MARSAR Agreement.
19. Filer, p. 142, New Zealand's "area of maritime responsibility" is reported to be from south of the equator to the Antarctic and between 170ºE to 160º W. See Desmond Ball, "The Security Relationship between Australia and New Zealand," paper presented at the conference on the ANZAC Connection, Canberra, Australian National University, 10-11 May 1984. p. 23.
20. Estimates, op. cit., p. 76.
21. See Thomas-Durell Young, "New Zealand's Dilemmas," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, August 1995, p. 51.
22. Washington Post, 21 February 1985.
23. Washington Post, 3 March 1985.
24. See Assistant Secretary of Defense Richard Perle's television interview remarks reported in the Washington Post, 15 February 1985.
Thomas-Durell Young (B.A., California State University; M.A., Johns Hopkins University) is serving a short-term appointment as a research assistant at the Wilson International Center for Scholars, Smithsonian Institution, Washington, D.C. At the University of Geneva, Young is with the Programme for Strategic and International Studies also as a research assistant and with the Graduate Institute of International Studies as a Ph.D. candidate in international relations. He has written previously for the U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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