Air University Review, March-April 1986
In 1909, the year the Army bought its first airplane, a far-sighted infantryman, one Captain John A. Taylor, suggested in the …Infantry Journal that aeroplanes might soon be able to perform the most important duty of cavalry—which he saw as "penetrating the fog of war to locate the heads of marching columns of the enemy." This seemingly innocuous suggestion immediately sent the blood pressure of the cavalrymen soaring upward. The Cavalry Journal promptly published an editorial in outraged reply, protesting that (Taylor) didn’t deserve serious consideration. How dare he tamper with the sacred function of the horse cavalry?1
THIS example of the difficulty in changing doctrine during the first third of this century typifies the environment in which General William "Billy" Mitchell spent a career dedicated to explaining, in terms of military doctrine, the impact that air power could have. His service branch did not support him professionally or doctrinally. More than fifty years later, the service that resulted from his efforts is facing a similar problem as space forces change the nature of military operations. Today’s Air Force, however, is in a better position to adapt to space forces than was the Army to General Mitchell’s air forces. The key difference will be the application of space experience gained during the past twenty-seven years.
During congressional testimony in 1913, General Mitchell said he did not favor separation of the air arm from the Army.2At that time, apparently, he could envision the integration of air and ground forces in some doctrinal context that did not require separation. However, before the end of the First World War, General Mitchell came to believe that control of air forces had to be separate from ground and sea forces. 3 Actual operational experience proved to be the deciding factor for him. By 1919, he returned from France convinced that land and sea power would soon be obsolete.4
Despite the experience of the First World War, the new doctrine for air power as an entity different from ground power was neither popular nor acceptable. The early air power advocates literally staked their careers on their doctrinal beliefs. Changes to the entrenched ways of thinking and operating were resisted with all the inertia that a traditional organization can muster. But the body of experience eventually grew until the resistant organization was overtaken by change. In resisting, the Army had laid the foundation on which the break with the air arm was made inevitable. Separate control might have been acceptably achieved had there been an adequate intellectual and physical reorganization to allow air forces within the doctrinal context of the existing military forces.
Today’s Air Force is at a similar crossroads: whether to reorganize doctrine to account for the uniqueness of space or whether, instead, to resist until space forces form a separate service. The former course would begin with earnest doctrinal recognition of the Air Force’s increasingly important space operations experience and the effects of the space-related organizational changes in the military. The latter course would be the result of inaction.
To proceed intelligently in choosing which path to take, we must define doctrine. Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine, states that "aerospace doctrine is an accumulation of knowledge which is gained primarily from the study and analysis of experience."5 Put another way, "doctrine is officially approved prescriptions of the best way to do a job. Doctrine is, or should be, the product of experience. Doctrine is what experience has shown usually works best."6
Is AFM 1-1 the right document to discuss doctrine for space forces? The new revision improves the cohesiveness and consistency of doctrine, incorporating serious and profound thought about air forces based on experience; establishes the proper doctrinal framework by describing and interrelating the environment, characteristics, and capabilities of air forces; and enumerates the Air Force missions and specialized tasks. In short, the new AFM 1-1 is purported to be the right guide for the air forces of today and the future. However, General James V. Hartinger, the first Commander of Air Force Space Command, said in 1983 that its predecessor’s "treatment of traditional Air Force mission areas and associated doctrine looks fine. But it makes no reference to space doctrine."7Air Force Manual 1-6, Military Space Doctrine, had appeared in 1982; subsequently, it was viewed as a shallow document, which the combination of air and space in Basic Aerospace Doctrine was to remedy.8 However, the assertion that air and space forces are identical in nature, concept, and employment reduced the value of the new AFM 1-1 to an increasingly important segment of the Air Force: space operations.
Assertions of such similarity lose the perspective of the most basic, inherent, and irreconcilable differences and are roughly akin to the cavalry officers of old espousing the idea that airplanes were good only for carrying hay to the cavalry in the field. To determine a wiser course, we must start with the environment and then proceed to examine characteristics, capabilities, missions, and tasks. With these ideas in mind, we may be ready to decide on the doctrine and organizational structure most promising for the future.
The Wrong Environment
Our Basic Aerospace Doctrine explains that "land, naval, and aerospace forces possess certain intrinsic capabilities to produce…[desired effects]. Each force derives its intrinsic capabilities from the characteristics and medium in which it operates."9 The manual explains that aerospace is synonymous with air and that both terms mean the aerospace medium.10 It reads well substituting air for aerospace, but not space for aerospace. The mutual identity of air, space, and aerospace is fundamentally untrue, both legally and physically. Legally, aircraft require a country’s permission for overflight, whereas space systems do not. More important, vehicles do not operate in the same physical manner in air and space.
The manual has only one paragraph on space.11 In that paragraph, space is identified as the outer reaches of the aerospace medium. This philosophically pleasing concept of a continuum of the aerospace environment from the earth’s surface to the point where the last vestige of atmosphere gives way to deep space has no practical use. The history of unsuccessful attempts to define a boundary between the air and space has been so for good reasons. The legal implications alone have been difficult to surmount. While that inability is not new (it actually predates the first Earth-orbiting satellites), wherever the boundary exists, the legal and physical rules that govern things in space and those that govern things in the air are fundamentally different. These differences may seem obvious, but they are crucial.
The Wrong Characteristics
Perhaps the most significant differences in air and space forces are in their characteristics. "Aerospace allows potentially unlimited horizontal and vertical movement for aerospace warfare systems. The capacity to maneuver freely in three dimensions allows our forces to exploit the characteristics of speed, range, and flexibility."12 Because of the laws of physics, there are constraints on space systems that result in very limited movement (a few percent or less) in either the horizontal or vertical once in orbit. Space systems are particularly unmaneuverable in relation to air forces, due to the energy considerations that keep science fiction such as Luke Skywalker’s starfighter exactly what it is—fiction.
From the point of view of air forces, it would seem that increases in characteristics are desirable. Aircraft that fly faster, go farther, and do more things are the qualitatively superior air vehicles we depend on to counter numerically superior opponents. "The prior acceptance and application of the thesis that superior arms favor victory, while essential, are insufficient unless the ‘superior arms’ are accompanied by a military doctrine…which provides for full exploitation of the innovation."13 Increasing the speed, range, and flexibility of space systems does not exploit their innovation or produce correspondingly more desirable results. Once an orbit is chosen, the parameters of inclination, the degree of circularity, and the time for one complete circuit of our planet are fairly well fixed.
Speed is of little practical value to space forces, compared to the advantage it holds for air forces. While the absolute speed of a space vehicle greatly exceeds that of an airplane, the airplane’s speed is much less constraining. Due to orbital mechanics, altering a satellite’s speed actually reduces its ability to do its job, since a change in speed results in different orbital parameters. Interestingly, some space systems with nearly zero speed relative to Earth have the most value. Those satellites in geosynchronous orbit perform valuable tasks, yet are nearly stationary, relying on their low net ground velocity to take advantage of a tremendous Earth overview.
Range is also of little practical value. A satellite with a ten-year operating lifetime may be placed into an orbit that will result in reentry several hundred thousand millenia after launch. Such a satellite will circle the earth billions of times before its atmospheric reentry. Such vast range is useless.
Flexibility of space forces is problematical, since they are mostly oriented toward accomplishing a single mission, with little capability to do anything else. For instance, a global positioning system satellite provides navigation information to terrestrial forces. A defense meteorological satellite provides weather information. Neither is flexible enough to have a simple software change or the replacement of some black box and then to be ready to assume each other’s missions. Even if a satellite could be designed to carry out either navigation or weather observation, the orbits required for the two missions are so distinctly different and incompatible that such flexibility would have no practical purpose. The flexibility of space forces is sharply reduced by the demands of high reliability and the environment in which they operate. Technologically sophisticated, highly reliable space forces are essentially the antithesis of the flexibility ascribed to aerospace forces in Basic Aerospace Doctrine.
The Wrong Capabilities
Our manual on basic doctrine addresses capabilities in this statement: "Each force derives its intrinsic capabilities from the characteristics and medium in which it operates."14 Within four pages of having described this truth, the manual loses the point that the medium and the characteristics of space and air forces are so fundamentally different that the capabilities of each must also be fundamentally different. Here it states that the capabilities of aerospace forces are to be responsive, mobile, and survivable; to show presence; to deliver destructive firepower; and to provide unparalleled observation.15 Of these capabilities, only the last is directly related to space forces. All of the other capabilities relate essentially to air forces. The different characteristics and capabilities ascribed to space forces are not such that merely "doing them better" would allow them to be like air forces. These are inherent due to the inherent differences between air and space.
The Wrong Missions and Tasks
Basic Aerospace Doctrine breaks aerospace activities into Air Force missions and specialized tasks. These categories claim to encompass "the most current guidance on those assigned military responsibilities and functions for which the Air Force must prepare forces."16 Air Force missions are summaries of the overall objectives attained by aerospace forces’ employment. Air Force specialized tasks are those activities which "enhance the execution and successful completion of Air Force missions."17 Yet of all the missions and specialized tasks, none are related to space, nor are they discussed in such a way that they could apply to space.
Department of Defense Directive 5160.32 designates the Air Force as the DOD executive agency for space launch and tasks the Air Force with all launch and orbital support operations for the DOD.18 Thus, Basic Aerospace Doctrine is wrong when it claims that the categorization of Air Force missions and specialized tasks incorporates "the most current guidance on…assigned military responsiblities…"19 It fails to list the space missions or specialized tasks for which the Air Force is the DOD executive agent. In the previous edition of AFM 1-1, there was a discussion of space operations, yet that was eliminated in the revision in spite of the DOD directive and the extensive space operations experience of the Air Force.
Thus, the entire fabric of Basic Aerospace Doctrine is woven for air forces and is inappropriate for space forces. Its "force fit" does not agree with our experiences in space for more than a quarter of a century, in peace, crisis, and conflict. We have come to understand in detail the differences in the environment, characteristics, capabilities, missions, and specialized tasks. Those listsed in the manual really apply to air forces and not space forces. Other components are needed for a doctrine useful to space.20
The Right Doctrine
The nature of the place we call space is that the environment exhibits global coverage, vastness, and free access, but not versatility or legal and physical boundaries. Space forces are characterized by their inhospitable environment, constrained maneuverability, endurance, and technical sophistication—not by their speed, range, and flexibility. More useful measures might describe how long a satellite operates in orbit and the lifetime of each particular orbit, measured in days in space or years, ad infinitum.
The differences in the environment and characteristics result in the need for a doctrine that speaks more eloquently and correctly about the capabilities of space forces. Such are the cornerstones on which the U.S. Air Force must build a doctrine that accurately imparts "to all Air Force personnel a basis for understanding the use of aerospace forces in peace and war."21 These words by General Charles Gabriel in the foreword to Basic Aerospace Doctrine are most important. We must recognize that space is a place and not a mission—but it is a different place than the air.
Those functions that can be supported from space best illustrate the capabilities of space forces. The speculative diagram shown in Figure 1 divides the functions supported by space forces into both support and combat roles involving four major types of activities. The long-term trend seems to be from those activities on the left to those on the right. The shift from traditional support roles toward incorporation of more active and participative military roles is analogous to the airplane and its integration into military operations. The U.S. Army first relegated the airplane to support roles such as battlefield observation and courier missions. Later, the airplane was allowed to evolve into more combative roles, such as close air support and interdiction, and ultimately to strategic air power. While there are no force application space systems presently, should the President decide to develop a ballistic missile defense based on the Strategic Defense Initiative technologies, such systems would fall under that category. Many of the activities outlined in the figure fall technically into either Air Force missions or specialized tasks.
Of the four major types of activities listed on the figure, one in particular would seem appropriately called an Air Force mission. That is space control. This is the space age counterpoint to the Navy’s mission of sea control and the Air Force’s counterair. It consists of "providing freedom of action in space for friendly forces while denying it to the enemy."22 The air-launched antisatellite currently undergoing development testing is an example of a space control system. It would seem, then that not only is space a place from which Air Force missions are supported or enhanced, but also it is a place in which the Air Force has missions. However, just as General Mitchell tried his best to get the "old guard" military to recognize that the air was an arena in which valuable missions could be performed, today we should be recognizing that there are missions performed in space which are not air missions. Hopefully, we shall not be guilty of trying to prevent tampering with the sacred functions of the horse cavalry ourselves.
There are other examples that AFM 1-1 should have treated as missions or, at the very least, as specialized tasks associated with space. Space support functions of space launch and orbital operations are candidates, especially considering their unique attributes, their support and enhancement of other Air Force missions and tasks, and their assignment to the Air Force as their DOD executive agency.
The Need for the Right Stuff
The omission of explicit reference to space in favor of the term aerospace did little doctrinal justice for an important segment of the Air Force and our national security. Without a doctrine, the growing importance of space forces will not diminish, but the overall effectiveness of space forces could be hurt, since doctrine is the foundation of strategy. However, my discussion of this doctrinal gap should not be mistaken for a justification to establish a separate space service in a manner similar to the separation of air and ground forces in the late 1940s. Although some of the same seeds for separation are present, the establishment of the Air Force Space Command as a line organization could be a positive step to integrate space forces into the framework of the Air Force, if accompanied by appropriate doctrine.
Asked for his view of severing the air arm from the Army, Major Horace Hickam put it succinctly: "I am confident that no general thinks he can control the Navy or no admiral thinks he can operate an army, but some of them think they can operate an air force."23
Neither the Navy nor the Army were doctrinally prepared to integrate air operations into their services. We have the benefit of much more employment experience and understanding of space systems than the early air pioneers had when they began their advocacy. Yet without a space doctrine today, the Air Force is in much the same position as the Army of sixty years ago.
The past twenty-seven years of operating space systems in both peace and war have resulted in considerable valuable experience. It is on that experience that a space doctrine must be based. With far less experience in aerial warfare and air operations, Lieutenant Henry "Hap" Arnold wrote a visionary article title "Aircraft and War" in a 1913 issue of the Infantry Journal. He cited uses of aircraft in peacetime maneuvers, as well as limited combat experience in tactical, brushfire wars. He explained that the use of aircraft for reconnaissance had been confirmed, and he further conjectured that aircraft could be used for air superiority, messenger service, forward air controlling, air transport, and offensive operations.24 Whatever Lieutenant Arnold’s expectations were in 1913, he laid the intuitive doctrinal foundation, which eventually led to his prominence in the establishment of the Air Force as a separate service. After only ten years of the aircraft’s existence and even less demonstration of its practical value, he was able to see the importance of air forces in the future of warfare. By 1945, his thinking was that "any air force which does not keep its doctrines ahead of its equipment, and its vision far into the future, can only delude the nation into a false sense of security."25 The Air Force has had space equipment operational for more than a quarter century, but it does not have a space doctrine to match.
Doctrine alone, however, is insufficient without a proper organizational infrastructure. The importance of space and the need for space organization were emphasized in the formation of Air Force Space Command. The future holds a more striking reiteration by the imminent formation of the Unified Space Command. The Air Force ought to be the doctrinal leader of the new Unified Command. As Major General I. B. Holley has stated, "…one can say with assurance: doctrine and organization are intricately and probably inextricably related."26
There are considerable omissions in our Basic Aerospace Doctrine to justify another needed publication, Space Doctrine.
We are on the verge of a great age in space when it will be of the utmost importance to exploit the spacecraft as a weapon to its fullest potential in our struggle for survival…We must explore the full range of the offensive and defensive capabilities of space- craft and study no less avidly their limitations…We must not delay our effort to conceptualize the eventual combatant role of spacecraft even if current treaty obligations defer the actual development of hardware.27
If doctrine is "the building material for strategy" and is "fundamental to sound judgment," then we are not keeping faith with our experience and the lessons of the past.28 Our roots as a separate service owe a great deal to the lack of foresight that prevailed with respect to the airplane, except on the part of a few great captains who were exceptional early aviators. Today, we are in a far better position to understand the nature of space forces than the people who objected to the airplane’s challenging the sacred functions of the horse cavalry.
Space forces are vital to our national security. They support and perform integral roles and missions for the U.S. Air Force. They have done so for more than a quarter of a century, in peace, crisis, and conflict. For that length of time, the Air Force has not been keeping its space doctrine ahead of its equipment as General Arnold told us we must do. If we can learn anything from the past and the genesis of the Air Force, it must be that space doctrine as an explicit entity is more necessary today than at any time in the past. In Basic Aerospace Doctrine, General Gabriel tells us all to "study, evaluate, and know our doctrine—for each of us, as professional airmen, has a responsibility to be articulate and knowledgeable advocates of aerospace power."29
So, Space Doctrine, quo vadis?
Washington, D. C.
Notes
Contributor
Major L. Parker Temple, III
(USAFA; M.B.A., University of Northern Colorado; M.S. West Coast University) is serving as the Assistant for the Defense Space Operations Committee and has been assigned to the Air Force Secretariat Office of Space Plans and Policy since 1984. He has flown the T-37 and F-4 and has done pioneering work in the development of the space shuttle facilities at Vandenberg AFB, California. His other assignments have included Hq Tactical Air Command and Air Force Systems Command. Major Temple is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Naval War College.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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