Air University Review, September-October 1985
Colonel Thomas A. Fabyanic, USAF (Ret.)
PERIODIC reform is an absolute necessity for any institution that intends to maintain its viability in the face of extensive external change or prolonged internal degeneration. Even a cursory examination of history will unearth numerous examples of political, economic, social, and military institutions that failed to meet the challenge of adaptation. A detailed study of these institutions, moreover, would reveal that in some instances collapse occurred at the very time institutional self-assessments were rendering judgments of basic soundness.
In military institutions, the need for reform usually becomes fully evident only after a clear military crisis of major proportions. This sequence of events need not be the case, however, since the external and internal causative factors that would indicate the need for reform quite often are evident beforehand. To recognize them, one needs to understand fully the phenomenon of war and, equally important, how it might be affected by prevailing and emerging circumstances. Such awareness, regrettably, is not apparent in today's U.S. military establishment.
If one views war within a Clausewitzian framework consisting of society, its government, and its military, and then applies that structure to the profound changes that have been occurring in much of the Third World, the first of several reform challenges for the U.S. military becomes very clear. Far-reaching political, economic, and social changes--accompanied by rising expectations--are evident throughout Latin America, the Middle East, and Southeast and Southwest Asia. Evident also are the conflicts likely to result, as well as our seeming inability to deal with them militarily. It is obvious that our employment concepts for "low-intensity conflict" or "constrained operations" are virtually nonexistent, and it is equally apparent that the conventional force structure available to us for use is based on an unsubstantiated assumption that what deters the Soviets will function adequately anywhere. Moreover, there appears to be little recognition that without prior development of employment concepts this force structure will remain irrelevant, regardless of its potential and flexibility. Vietnam and Lebanon are the most obvious examples of what probably lies ahead; whether future historians will view them as the beginning of the end of America's military prowess or as turning points in the continuing effort to achieve unparalleled military conpetence will depend largely on how we assess them now.
A far greater challenge, however, is an internal one involving the degeneration of our military organizational structure. In the course of organizational evolution, we have experienced a loss of military function. Anyone familiar with the existing structure can see the deficiencies readily. The Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has become an institution within an institution; it routinely involves itself in professional military matters such as strategic and logistical planning and operational issues to include strategy and tactics. Too much authority is vested in the Secretary of Defense. By law, the secretary is responsible for professional military matters; but with very few exceptions, the individuals holding that office have not demonstrated sufficient competence. In the words of one analyst, "they found on-the-job training imperative," and "few passed the primer stage before they were replaced." The power vested in the secretary and OSD explains, in part, the corresponding lack of influence by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. In effect, the latter have been removed from the chain of command and replaced by bureaucrats who, for the most part, have no professional responsibility for the defense of the nation. The net results of this prolonged degeneration are obvious; they cast long, bold, and dark shadows that stretch from Vietnam, to a desert landing site in Iran, and thence through the remnants of a city called Beirut.
The most serious internal challenge, however, concerns professional military competence. Our only real reason for being, which is war, is not understood by many officers. All too frequently, war is viewed as a great engineering enterprise; and, as a consequence, we prepare for war as it appears on paper rather than as it is likely to occur on the battlefield. Crucial issues at times are turned over to civilian experts who, like the bureaucrats in OSD, have no long-term, direct responsibility for, the nation's security. Such actions are necessary because programs still dominate purpose in the Pentagon and program managers continue to hold sway over strategists. The "management mania," although somewhat subdued, remains with us. Moreover, it is likely to remain, in part, because of the military's willingness to pay 75 percent of tuition fees for its officers to receive advanced degrees in business, management, and public administration. Given all this presumed management expertise by the uniformed military, one is tempted to ask, for example, why our defense procurement practices are in such a shambles. Those difficulties, when viewed in the context of our previously mentioned operational inadequacies, make one wonder whether we have sacrificed our previous military competence for a measure of managerial incompetence.
Perhaps it is time to reestablish ourselves as a professional military organization, one that understands war and knows how to prepare for it, deter it, and, if necessary, fight it across a spectrum of conflict. Fortunately, we have some professional officers who possess an understanding of war, and it is they who are capable of meeting the challenges of adaptation. My advice to them is, "Burners, now"!
University of South Florida, Tampa
Contributor
Dr. Fabyanic teaches at the University of South Florida.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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