Air University Review, November-December 1985
THE United States is unquestionably the world leader in space technology. Currently, however, Americans are debating about how to use this advantage to enhance U.S. national security. At the center of this debate is a renewal of the whole question of ballistic missile defense––an issue that was once thought to have been put to rest by the ABM Treaty.
Most strategic thinkers accept the fact that technology and military power in themselves cannot prevent nuclear war and provide for our security. They understand that security is dependent on a rational mix of the application of technology to military power and the use of diplomacy to arms control and disarmament.
Arms control agreements in the recent past have resulted primarily in shifting the arms race to weapons not covered by them. Supporters of the nuclear freeze movement point to the freeze's universality as one of its greatest virtues. Rather than limiting or banning specific weapons (as has been done in the past), adoption of a freeze would attempt to put a stop to a whole range of activities connected with a broad class of weapons. It is true that, because of the breadth of the proposal, verification of compliance would be fairly straightforward. But there are many types of weapons that would not be covered. It is likely that a freeze, as presently proposed, would foreclose the arms race in the nuclear arena, only to have it accelerate in other areas, such as space weaponry.
The primary purpose for arms control is to reduce the chance of war. (Secondary benefits, such as reducing the cost of preparing for war or reducing the destructiveness of war, have been rendered less important in this nuclear age.) I shall attempt to show here that preventing an arms race in space is critical to the primary arms control objective. Allowing the arms race in space to continue, I believe, will greatly increase the danger that nuclear weapons, even those remaining after a freeze, will be used calamitously. Treaty initiatives that would enhance the security of the United States are still possible. I shall suggest several concrete proposals that may be workable and, indeed, reduce the chance to a future nuclear conflict. To understand the role of space weapons in the risk of war, one must first review recent developments in strategic thought.
Public support for the nuclear freeze was aided substantially by the perception of the American people that we as a nation had suffered a profound and dangerous change in national policy and military strategy.
Though divided over Vietnam, our country was for years relatively united on strategic matters. The motto of the Strategic Air Command, "Peace Is Our Profession," expressed the prevailing public concept of our entire military effort. The military services were rather selective in the weapons they developed and deployed, choosing those that contributed to stability and rejecting those which were destabilizing and which would hurt, rather than help, the job of keeping the peace. There were always those who cared little for strategy and yearned for whatever weaponry technology would allow. But until recently, this minority had little influence.
Central to our military philosophy has been the subjection of weaponry to strategy. Our greatest success in this regard was the conclusion of the ABM Treaty in 1972. The United States and the Soviet Union both recognized that antiballistic missile systems were potentially destabilizing. Of course, agreement was aided by the facts that (a) such weapons were very expensive and technically risky and (b) neither side perceived the possibility of emerging from an ABM race with a decided advantage. Still, the agreement was an important validation of the principle of maintaining stability in order to prevent war.
The negotiations that led to this success were simultaneously our greatest failure in the subjection of weaponry to strategy, in that we refused to outlaw MIRVs also. Multiple- independently-targetable reentry vehicles have led directly to our present less stable situation by making a first strike theoretically advantageous. As long as there was only one warhead on each ICBM, it would take at least one ICBM to "kill" an ICBM. Actually, since accuracy and reliability were not perfect, the kill probability was always considerably less than one. For the new generation of highly accurate missiles, it is about 0.6. This means that if one side launches 1000 ICBMs against 1000 of the enemy's, they will destroy about 600. If both sides started with 1000, then the attacker would be left with none, while his opponent would be left with 400 to do with as he pleased. Under such circumstances, it is unlikely that either side would be foolish enough to attack the other. This is a very stable situation. With MIRVs, however, a single ICBM can send two or more of its warheads to each of several enemy silos, thereby destroying a number of opposing ICBMs. The newest generation can achieve about a five to one kill ratio. Thus, the one to strike first can theoretically emerge with a big advantage. This destabilizing effect of MIRVs was recognized at the time, and an agreement banning them could have been reached. But we were blinded by our technological superiority and refused to include MIRVs in the treaty. Instead, we went ahead with MIRVs on our missiles.
When, a few years later, the Russians followed suit, we discovered that we were less secure than before. We had created for ourselves what we now call the window of vulnerability––something impossible without MIRV.
The MX was supposed to solve that problem by being highly survivable. Survivability is a highly stabilizing feature, making it possible to "ride out" a first strike and retain a strong retaliatory force. But while we were at it, we couldn't help throwing into our new missile all the goodies that advanced technology makes possible, including a highly accurate guidance system that gives the MX a potential first strike or "silo-busting" capability. When the survivability of the MX proved too expensive and difficult to achieve, we were left with what we have today––a system with no more survivability than its predecessors but with much greater accuracy. Such a weapon is useful only in a first strike and thus is provocative to the other side and highly destabilizing. The MX was a misfit in our deterrent strategy. Gradually, our strategy has been changed to fit our weapons. Meanwhile, war has been avoided largely because of the stabilizing influence of space systems.
The military surveillance systems of the United States and the Soviet Union have until now contributed immeasurably to peace by denying the element of surprise to an attacker and eliminating any advantage of a first strike. By giving each side the knowledge that they could not be taken by surprise, these systems have reduced the pressures for preemptive strikes and led to a considerable lessening of tension. Space systems provide time for analysis, confirmation, consultation, and deliberation, thereby making hair-trigger responses unnecessary. They also have provided the technical means of verification that have made arms control possible.
But now we are at a juncture. Space can continue to provide even greater benefits and solutions, or it can become a massive and perhaps decisive part of the problem. What has changed? Our military forces have become more and more dependent on space systems––not only for surveillance and warning but also for communications, targeting, weather, terrain mapping, navigation, and other "force multiplier" support functions.
Once policy and strategy had been changed to accommodate the MX and a protracted, limited nuclear exchange scenario adopted, military strategists realized to their horror that the space systems on which their war-fighting capability depended were strictly peacetime systems, designed to support a strategy of deterrence and not survivable in a conflict situation. The function for which they had been designed was to give early and unequivocal warning of an enemy attack and to support the launching of a retaliatory strike. It had been assumed that any attempt to destroy our satellites would constitute warning that an attack was either under way or imminent and would put in motion the retaliatory machinery. The obvious inability of the United States to keep a full set of satellite systems operating for more than a few hours into a nuclear war did not seem to matter.
The peacetime nature of our space assets was reinforced by the national decision to compel the Air Force to design all its new satellites for launch on the shuttle. Over the vehement opposition of the military, the shuttle was literally crammed down the throats of program offices responsible for operational satellite systems. At the time, this decision was deemed necessary in order to justify the shuttle financially. Later in the development of the shuttle, the political and financial support of the Air Force was the only thing saving the shuttle project from cancellation. Time and again, the Congress was forced to ante up more money to complete the shuttle development because of the total dependence of the Air Force on it––a dependence thrust upon the Air Force to create just this situation. The shuttle, of course, both in orbit and on the ground, and its two coastal launching sites are so vulnerable to attack that it is inconceivable that the United States could launch any new or replacement satellites once any hostilities had broken out. Two World War II submarines (or rowboats for that matter) or even two terrorists with hand grenades or mortars could totally wipe out the country's launch capability in minutes. Similarly vulnerable is our capability to communicate with the shuttle and to get data back from it or any of our other satellites. Even the new multibillion-dollar Consolidated Space Operations Center, which the Air Force has just completed building near Colorado Springs, will be vulnerable to attack or sabotage by the most meager of forces.
It is therefore ironic that at the same time as national decisions were being made which irretrievably limited our space capabilities to the peacetime tripwire role for which they had been designed, other decisions were being made to spend hundreds of billions of dollars for weapons whose only usefulness is in a protracted nuclear war and which depend heavily on space systems not designed for that purpose.
One choice available when this dichotomy was recognized was obviously to abandon the MX and other protracted war weapons and to stick with a policy of war prevention. That choice was not made. Once a system gets so far in the pipeline, it is extremely difficult to kill (witness the B-1, rising from the ashes like a phoenix). Instead, the choice selected was to attempt to upgrade the nation's space capabilities to give them a war-fighting capability.
Increasing the survivability of satellites by hardening them against attack was given much lip service and several millions of dollars, but very little was accomplished. Providing survivable launch capability by returning to expendable launch vehicles was considered for selected systems. But most of the effort went into a program to develop a U.S. antisatellite (ASAT) system to match that of the Soviets. The rationale evidently was that if they're going to threaten our satellites, then we'll threaten theirs. The fact that we are much more dependent on our satellites for command and control of strategic forces than they are did not prevent such a decision from being made.
We have now developed a far more sophisticated, far more capable ASAT than that possessed by the Soviets. It was ready to begin operational testing in early 1983 and had a successful booster system test in January 1984. Its first critical test against a target in space was held up temporarily by congressional action and could not take place before April 1985, but, in September, it was tested and found to be fully satisfactory. Antisatellite weapons now threaten to negate the beneficial stabilizing influence of surveillance and warning satellites.
For years, our policy was to negotiate a ban on ASATs if at all possible. In 1975 we dismantled the ASAT system that we had had operationally deployed since 1963. It had been a nuclear-tipped system, far too indiscriminate in its destructive power and inconsistent with our treaty obligations. We recognized the fact that we were more secure in a world without ASATs than with them––even if ours were superior to the Soviets'.
This truth is now being ignored. We seem to be intent on surpassing the Soviets in the arms race in space and are therefore eager to test our new ASATs. Because ASAT deployment (or absence thereof) will be almost impossible to verify, testing of our ASAT weapons may therefore be an irreversible step that will make it very difficult to return space to the status of a sanctuary for peaceful and nonthreatening military support systems.
As long as there are nuclear weapons and delivery systems for them, the United States and the Soviet Union are going to need space surveillance systems to provide some measure of stability. To allow those systems to be threatened by antisatellite weapons is reckless and foolhardy.
This danger is now being compounded by our unfortunate pursuit of weapons with a firststrike capability. Although some proponents of our new war-fighting strategy have invented second-strike scenarios where silo-busting capability is required, thereby justifying the MX, others blatantly talk about situations in which the United States, in their opinion, should strike first, destroying Soviet ICBMs in their silos, together with Soviet command posts and hardened communications centers. Provided we also abrogate the ABM Treaty, install a point-defense system, and embark on a huge civil defense program involving evacuation of cities, we can, according to these strategists, hope to limit U.S. casualties to as few as twenty million deaths.
There is one minor flaw in this "optimistic" portrayal of victory. It depends on the Soviets' continuing their present policy of requiring committee approval before a nuclear strike can be ordered––a very time-consuming procedure. Clearly, if we proceed with the MX, Trident II, and Pershing II, the Soviets, with as little as four minutes' warning, will have to go to an automated launch-on-warning procedure. Their doing so would put the survival of the United States in a very precarious circumstance ––dependent on the reliability of Russian computers. Our own sophisticated and technologically advanced computer warning system has given many false alarms. One of the recent ones was not identified as false until after six minutes had elapsed. If the Soviet automated system did no better, such a fault could bring about the annihilation of the United States.
Administration strategists have the answer to that scenario: "Knock out their surveillance satellites prior to a nuclear attack, and they won't have any warning!" I wonder what makes such "strategists" think that the Soviets, once blinded, will just sit there and let themselves be decapitated?
Herein lies the greatest danger. Once the United States has both a first-strike capability and an ASAT capability, what happens if a Soviet warning satellite is struck by a meteor or suffers a catastrophic electrical failure? Might the Soviets not reasonably assume that we have just destroyed their satellite so that they will not see the attack we are launching against them? Will they not then be likely to give the order to launch a "retaliatory" attack?
First-strike offensive weapons are dangerous to our security. The ASAT is dangerous to our security. Together, they are devastating and are very likely to destroy our security by bringing on a war that neither we nor the Soviets want ––a war that neither we nor the Soviets can survive.
The militarization of space is an accomplished fact––on both sides. However, until recently, the emphasis was on nonweapons applications, such as communications, navigation, and surveillance. Now a new phase is beginning––the weaponization of space.
This change has been a gradual one. Military spacecraft still perform their stabilizing missions, but they now perform others not so benign in nature. Coverage and responsiveness of surveillance systems have improved to the point that they can be used not only to provide strategic intelligence and warning information but also to perform targeting of tactical targets on a real-time basis. Such systems, while not normally thought of as weapons, perform the function of "spotting scope" and perhaps even of "gunsight." Therefore, they are increasingly being considered a part of the total weapon system that they support. Similarly, navigation systems, which originally were only accurate enough to allow ships to roughly locate themselves in vast ocean reaches, now give position and velocity in three dimensions with astounding precision. Therefore, they are able to help warheads of all kinds navigate to their targets, providing ICBMs and SLBMs, for example, with potential silo-busting accuracy. Thus, we have gradually turned strictly retaliatory weapons into potential first-strike weapons, greatly destabilizing the arms race.
These threat-enhancing space systems, having been introduced on both sides, have prompted both sides to pursue antisatellite weapons to counter them. Perhaps without realizing the Pandora's box they were opening, both sides have embarked on a new and far more dangerous phase of the military use of space––weaponization.
ASATs, although originally developed to attack threatening space-based force-multiplier systems, are now becoming indispensable as necessary precursors and adjuncts to a Star Wars space-based ballistic missile defense (BMD) system. Because of the technology overlap between ASAT and BMD, because of the vital role of ASATs in countering BMD systems, because of the necessity of anti-ASAT (AASAT) systems to protect the enormous investment represented by space-based BMD, and because of the powerful ASAT capabilities of even primitive BMD systems in the space age, it is. probably no longer possible to deal with either ASATs or BMD alone. One of the weaknesses of the ABM Treaty and the Outer Space Treaty is that neither prohibits ASATs. The development of ASATs is threatening the viability of these treaties. Similarly, no ASAT ban can be effective if the development of BMD systems continues and destroys the ABM Treaty. From an operational military point of view, as well as an arms control point of view, space weapons must be dealt with as a whole.
ASAT technology is infinitely simpler than Star Wars technology, and the development of ASAT systems is at a critical stage. The decision about whether to proceed is time-urgent. But that decision is driven by the prospects for space-based BMD systems, and therefore (even though the operational deployment of such systems may be decades away) the advisability of pursuing these systems must be determined now. If Star Wars weapons are indeed likely to make us more secure, then we should reject any current or proposed ban and move to gain operational control of near-earth space. If, on the other hand, such weapons are either infeasible, unaffordable, or detrimental to our security, then we should attempt to negotiate a comprehensive and verifiable ban on all space weapons, including ASATs.
Because Star Wars BMD systems and their strategic implications are of crucial importance, we must consider them in the context of both the past and the most likely future.
What has changed since the United States abandoned Nike-X, Nike-Zeus, Spartan, and Sprint and embraced the ABM Treaty? If here have indeed been advances in the technology for such point defenses. We can imagine the possibility of survivable radars to support such systems. The Army's Homing Overlay Experiment (HOE) showed that with modern infrared (IR) homing sensors, it was possible to destroy incoming reentry vehicles (RVs) without nuclear-tipped interceptors. But these advances are not behind the reevaluation of the prospects for ballistic missile defense. Rather, the motivating factor has been the growing technology to support the possibility of the interception of ICBMs in boost phase.
boost-phase intercept
Boost-phase intercept has several distinct advantages over BMD operating later in the trajectory. Boosters under power have flaming exhaust tails that are easy to detect and track with infrared sensors, even from satellites 20,000 miles away. Reentry vehicles are small, relatively cold objects that can be seen only by exotic sensors focused accurately on a small volume of space at relatively close range. Boosters are basically cans of fuel and, although far more durable than satellites, are much more vulnerable than reentry vehicles, which are built to withstand the rigors of reentry. Finally, boosters are far fewer in number. A launch of 1000 boosters will "MIRV" into perhaps 10,000 warheads and 100,000 decoys. It is easy to see that being able to attack ICBMs in boost phase rather than having to wait until they are in-bound to their targets changes the whole nature of ballistic missile defense.
Of course, boost-phase intercept has its drawbacks. The boost phase lasts only a short time (40 to 300 seconds) and occurs very near the launch point. The intercept must therefore occur over enemy territory (or for SLBMs, over the ocean). This circumstance very much complicates the basing of the defensive system.
The problems of boost-phase intercept are well illustrated by Dr. Richard Garwin. He likes to tell about the U.S. boost-phase BMD system he has invented. It is technically feasible, requires no new technology, is extremely affordable, and could be implemented quickly. It consists of a machine gun manned by a red-blooded American standing next to each Soviet missile silo (two per silo for redundancy might be prudent). When the silo cover slides back and the missile emerges, the American squeezes the trigger and shoots the booster full of holes, causing it to explode. The problem with this system, as Dr. Garwin points out, is clearly its vulnerability. The Soviets would see us putting it in place. They would have to accede to its being there. And they could eliminate it whenever they chose (probably just prior to launching an attack).
Of course you don't have to station a boost-phase defense on the ground next to the silos. You can put it in space, a few hundred miles above the silos. But you've still got essentially the same vulnerability problem. The Soviets would see us putting the system in place. They would have to accede to its being there. And they could eliminate it (with ASATs or space mines, for example) whenever they chose.
By moving your "machine guns" into space, you have also introduced a new complication. They can't just stand there but must orbit the earth at a velocity dependent on the altitude. Any given component (laser battle station, machine gun, or whatever) spends only a small fraction of the time within range of the missile fields where boost phase will occur. Therefore, there must be (depending on the lethal range of the particular weapons being used) ten to thirty components in orbit for every one on station. This fact does not negate the technical feasibility of such defenses but certainly influences the economic tradeoffs between the offense and defense. The offense can drive up the number of space-based battle stations required and therefore the cost of the defense by increasing the number of offensive boosters to be intercepted, by hardening the boosters to decrease the lethal range of each defensive weapon, by modifying the boosters to shorten the vulnerable boost time, or by implementing some combination of these measures.
There is one other possible basing mode for boost-phase intercept systems. It attempts to overcome the enormous vulnerability problems of either Garwin's machine gun or space-based orbital systems. It is the "pop-up" basing mode, most prominently proposed by Dr. Edward Teller for his nuclear-pumped X-ray laser Excalibur system. In this scheme, the defensive weapons are kept on the surface until needed and are then "popped up" into orbit within range of the boosters. Of course, these surface-based systems can't be based near the missile fields or, as Garwin points out, they would be just like his machine gun. They must be based in friendly territory or in international waters not controlled by the enemy ––which puts them quite a distance from the missile fields. The closest that one could get would probably be on a submarine in the Indian Ocean. The difficulty then is to get the defensive weapon up into space fast enough that it can get a clear line of sight over the curve of the earth before the ICBM leaves the boost phase. This capability would require an incredibly powerful and efficient rocket. If the offense were to reduce their burn time even a little, it would increase the size of the pop-up rockets (and therefore of the submarines) by a large factor. You fairly quickly reach the ridiculous state where the ocean isn't deep enough to hide the submarine, even when it is sitting on the bottom.
The idea of boost-phase intercept has introduced some exciting possibilities into BMD. They really aren't new. Boost-phase BMD schemes are as old as the space age. A lot of technology, however, is new. Directed-energy kill mechanisms propagate at the speed of light. And there is a new generation of technologists eagerly considering the possibilities. But the new technology is also available to the offense for countermeasures and improved offensive weapons. What's more, the old problem remains of finding a survivable basing mode within range of where boost phase occurs.
countermeasures to boost-phase BMD
There are many effective countermeasures available for each of the candidate systems. Most could be implemented quickly with existing technology at a tiny fraction of the cost of the defensive systems. It is instructive to mention just a few countermeasures that have wide applicability against any kind of boost-phase BMD system.
Direct attack. One of these widely applicable countermeasures, of course, is direct attack upon the space-based elements of the defense. Whether or not the kill mechanism is based in space, all of the proposed systems would be completely dependent on some kind of space-based surveillance and tracking system, space-based battle management computers or command and control satellites to communicate data to and from ground-based computers, and other vulnerable satellite elements. Basing the kill mechanism somewhere else, as with the orbiting mirrors scheme that keeps the laser on the ground in the United States or with the submarine-based "pop-up" systems, does not eliminate the problem of the great vulnerability of the space-based support elements, and these schemes introduce enormous complexities into an already complicated problem.
Offensive proliferation. One of the first effects of the attempt, by either side, to deploy a Star Wars system, would be the removal of all restraints on the proliferation of offensive systems. Neither the United States nor the Soviet Union was willing to negotiate a limit on its offensive forces until the ABM Treaty put a cap on the defenses those forces would face. SALT I without the ABM Treaty would have been unthinkable. While the offensive arms race has continued through qualitative changes, MIRVing of missiles, and improvements of accuracy to give counterforce capability, this competition has been conducted under the numerical limits imposed by SALT I and SALT II. Even though the former has expired and the latter has never been ratified by the U.S. Senate, both sides have been keeping their missile forces within the constraints of these agreements. The reason for this restraint is that greater numbers were not necessary to assure a devastating retaliatory capability in the absence of large-scale defenses. A breakout from the ABM Treaty would change all that. The obvious first response to a Star Wars deployment would be a drastic increase in the number of ICBMs, so as to swamp the defense. If the Soviets estimated that a defense we were attempting to deploy would be 50 percent effective, they would double the size of their offensive missile force as quickly as possible. Since military planners on both sides are always conservative and cautious, they tend to greatly overestimate opposing capabilities and underestimate their own. Thus a system that the Soviets feared would be 50 percent effective might actually be only 10 percent effective. The net effect of this escalation would be to increase the likelihood of war and to result, if war did occur, in nearly twice as many warheads reaching their targets in the United States.
Quick-burn boosters. There are many ways in which ICBMs could be modified to reduce their vulnerability to various Star Wars weapons. One of the most effective of these would be to change from liquid-fueled rockets to quick-burn solid-fueled boosters. The effect of this change would be to shorten the burn time from 300 seconds (that of a typical SS-18) to a more reassuring 40 to 120 seconds (comparable to that of an MX). Boosters begin to be vulnerable to high-energy long-wave length chemical lasers about 30 seconds after launch. Shortening the burn time from 300 seconds to 120 seconds reduces the length of the vulnerable period from 270 seconds to 90 seconds. This abbreviated time frame would triple the number of laser battle stations required to shoot down the same number of boosters. It would also complicate the task of the battle management computers significantly,
While this countermeasure multiplies the cost of a defensive system incorporating laser battle stations, it is even more effective against all the other candidate systems. None of the other kill mechanisms can reach down into the atmosphere. They must wait until about 90 seconds after launch to attack a booster as it emerges from the protection of the atmosphere. Short-wave length lasers, particle beams, and X-ray lasers are all absorbed by even a very thin layer of air and cannot penetrate much below altitudes about seventy miles above the earth. Kinetic-energy kill vehicles can fly down into the atmosphere; but as they do so, they heat up and their infrared sensors are immediately blinded. Thus a missile like the MX with its 120-second burn time is vulnerable to such systems for only about 30 seconds. If the burn time is shortened even further, so that the boost phase ends before the missile exits the atmosphere, then these kill mechanisms are completely negated.
In testimony before Congress, industry experts testified that for a modest increase in cost (10 percent or so) burn times of ICBMs could be reduced to as little as 40 seconds. Were the Soviets to implement this countermeasure after we had invested hundreds of billions in a boost-phase BMD system, they could render our investment totally worthless.
alternative offensive systems
In light of the preceding discussion, it seems highly improbable that an effective boost-phase ballistic missile defense could ever be deployed. It is not that our technology, ingenuity, and creativity cannot overcome staggering obstacles. They can. The problem is rather that the new technology is also available to the offense for countermeasures and improved offensive weapons, and innovations for these systems tend to be available more easily, more quickly, and much more affordably than the defenses they must overcome. What's more, in the game of countermeasures, counter-countermeasures, counter-counter-counters, etc., the tremendous destructive power of nuclear weapons gives the offense the advantage: the offense has to overcome only a small part of the defense to succeed, while success for the defense demands near-perfection.
However, even if a totally impregnable, invulnerable Star Wars system could be deployed––one capable of destroying all ICBMs in flight––it would be of little or no strategic value. Ballistic missiles can also be launched by submarines from fairly short range. These missiles can use low-angle trajectories such that their entire flight––not just the boost phase––lies within the protective blanket of the atmosphere. They could not be intercepted by any of the Star Wars defenses thus far imagined, with the possible exception of the long-wavelength lasers.
In addition, nuclear weapons can be delivered by cruise missiles launched from bombers or submarines. Cruise missiles fly at very low altitudes, safe from even the lasers. No one has yet imagined a Star Wars system capable of reaching down into the atmosphere and attacking cruise missiles. If such a thing were to exist, it would also have the capability to be used as an offensive weapon to destroy any target on earth at will. Cruise missiles therefore represent an "end run" around any Maginot Line in the sky.
Space weapons proponents say that they would not mind the Soviets' putting greater reliance on cruise missiles, because these missiles, being slow, do not constitute a first-strike threat. That is not necessarily true. At the present time, we do not have any means of even detecting cruise missiles, much less defending against them. If they were used, we would not even have the thirty minutes' warning time we get with ICBMs.
If the objective of Star Wars is to eliminate the threat by making nuclear weapons "impotent and obsolete," then one must be concerned with other means of delivery also. Nuclear weapons can be delivered by light aircraft, barge, sailboat, diplomatic pouch––indeed, by any of the ways that enterprising criminals smuggle cocaine and marijuana into the country. If one is concerned with nuclear blackmail, then one must consider the threat of preemplaced nuclear weapons that could be detonated on command. No Star Wars system can eliminate that threat.
If Star Wars defense can neither disarm potential nuclear terrorists nor protect the people of this country from a massive (or even less than massive) surprise attack, what then could it do? What is a realistic and legitimate objective for a Star Wars system? That indeed is the question. The debate over Star Wars is (or should be) primarily one of strategy and objectives, not technology.
There are four possible objectives for ballistic missile defense:
Each of these four objectives results in its own unique set of system requirements and associated technology challenges. They are listed in order of decreasing difficulty. Each also presents its own political and diplomatic challenges.
Achieving the first objective, in particular, is difficult because it involves the complex problem of managing, in conjunction with the Soviet Union, the transition from the current offense-dominated to a defense-dominated strategy without passing through an unstable situation. Implementing the program would have to be accomplished so that at no time the combination of offensive and defensive capabilities brought about deployment patterns appropriate for achieving objective three, the disarming first strike. Although nearly everyone agrees now that the kind of perfect defense needed for this first objective is impossible, such a defense, if it were possible, would be exactly like that needed for first strike, except that it would have to deal with approximately twenty times as many targets. Thus, there is no way to get such a capability without, along the way, getting the capability to complete a first-strike posture.
The second possible objective for a BMD system––limiting the damage should deterrence fail––is particularly troublesome. Such an objective is legitimate, provided the system put in place to achieve it does not increase the likelihood of deterrence failing. Since the system requirements are very similar to those for objective three, the chances of diminished deterrence are high. Damage limiting is essentially preparing to fight and win (or at least survive) a nuclear war. However, there is almost unanimous agreement now that a nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought. Indeed, scientists are arguing over whether even people in the Southern Hemisphere, thousands of miles from the most likely arena of battle, can survive, Because it is not clear that damage limiting will do much good, given the potency of nuclear weapons, it should not be allowed to increase the likelihood of war occurring in the first place. In addition, abrogation of the ABM Treaty by either side will lead to an enormous offensive buildup. The best military judgment is that attempting to implement a damage-limiting ABM would probably lead to the deployment of so many offensive weapons to overcome the defensive system that, if a nuclear conflict did erupt, more nuclear weapons would actually reach our soil than if we had maintained the status quo through a mutual nuclear freeze. Therefore, when one considers the likely outcomes (both reduced deterrence and increased numbers of offensive weapons), a BMD system for damage limiting makes no sense whatsoever.
The third possible objective for a BMD system is to complete a first-strike potential by achieving the capability to shield oneself from retaliation. Since a first strike (which could be called preboost-phase defense) might get 95 percent of the adversary's weapons, an ABM system to support this objective would differ in the following respects from one needed for retaliation:
These factors make a big difference. They still leave enormous technological shortfalls, the inherent vulnerability of space systems, and the lack of a good kill mechanism for boost-phase interception. But they certainly lower the "level of impossibility" significantly. We cannot expect the Soviets to ignore this possible objective if we set out to develop and deploy a BMD system for any purpose.
The final possible objective for ballistic missile defense is to "enhance deterrence" by protecting offensive weapons and increasing our ability to retaliate. This is, in fact, the current Pentagon justification for the Strategic Defense Initiative program. It is certainly arguable, in light of the survivability of our Triad as a whole, whether deterrence needs enhancing. One can argue, of course, that the land-based leg could use some shoring up if we are to keep it. But this protection could be attained by implementing the kind of ground-based point defense allowed by the ABM Treaty. If this is in fact our objective, then it can be satisfied without Star Wars systems, without weapons in space, without violating the ABM and Outer Space treaties, without spending $5000 for every man, woman, and child in the country, and without putting our survival in the hands of computers.
Star Wars is far more than is required to enhance deterrence and far less than is required to replace it. There is simply no legitimate objective for the kind of program we are currently pursuing.
the prospect for ASAT negotiations
Negotiations with the Soviet Union aimed at preventing an arms race in space were cut off by the United States at the time of the Soviets' incursion in Afghanistan. Until recently, enamored with the possibilities of high-tech weaponry in space and engaged in a quixotic quest for a return to strategic superiority, the administration refused to resume those negotiations.
Then, in response to growing congressional and political pressure, the Reagan administration agreed to a Soviet proposal to meet in Vienna in September 1984 to discuss space weapons. For a variety of reasons, the talks never occurred.
Arms control talks have resumed in 1985, and serious discussion on space weapons may actually take place at some point. Whether or not an agreement can be reached is another matter. If both sides are more interested in blaming the other for negotiation failure than in achieving success, little will be accomplished. Clearly, there are people in both governments who are sincerely interested in reaching an agreement, although their motivations and objectives differ greatly.
It is clear that U.S. agreement to discuss space weapons in 1984, after four years of intransigence, was due to the following factors:
(1) The Tsongas Amendment to the 1984 Defense Authorization Act required such negotiations as a precondition to testing of the new U.S. ASAT against a space target. The 1985 version is weaker in many respects but still contains a requirement that the administration indicate its willingness to negotiate some sort of limitation on antisatellite weapons.
(2)The Democratic party made space weapons one of its main issues in the 1984 election, and the administration needed to do something to defuse this issue, as well as the larger issue of its lack of success in arms control in general.
(3) More and more people in government were becoming convinced that preventing an unconstrained arms race in space is vital to the national security of the United States. An Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) Workshop on Arms Control in Space, held 30-31 January 1984, revealed differences in philosophy toward arms control but also a rather broad consensus that there were verifiable steps that could be taken to restrict space weapons in such a way that U.S. security would be enhanced.
The main substantive difference between the U.S. position and that of the Soviet Union seems to be over how comprehensive a ban is desirable. The Soviets, although agreeing to discuss "limitations" on ASATs, clearly would prefer a total ban on all space weapons. The U.S. position seems to be along lines that would prevent the development of more capable Soviet systems while allowing the United States to complete development of its new miniature homing vehicle designed for launch from the F-15. This U.S. goal can be accomplished by either "grandfathering" existing systems or limiting ASAT capabilities to lower orbits and prohibiting systems capable of reaching geosynchronous or other very high orbits.
Such an approach by the United States would probably satisfy the administration's political objectives and would allow the administration to continue testing our ASAT against targets in space, but this approach has absolutely no chance of resulting in an agreement with the Soviets (which is precisely what some members of the administration would prefer). Soviet obstinacy on this matter is understandable. While all of the critical U.S. strategic satellites are in very high orbits, Soviet communications and early-warning satellites are in highly elliptical Molniya orbits, which come very close to the earth over the Southern Hemisphere. Therefore, most Soviet satellites would be threatened by a highly sophisticated U.S. system capable of striking without warning from anywhere on the earth, while all but a few U.S. low-altitude "spy" satellites (and the shuttle) would be granted permanent sanctuary.
The best way for the administration to show both the Soviet Union and the American public that it is sincere in wanting an agreement would be to join the Soviet moratorium on ASAT testing and to avoid taking positions that are patently inequitable and nonnegotiable. A testing moratorium can be verified. Space weapons might possibly be hidden, but their testing cannot. The rate of approach in rendezvous can be limited to prevent homing systems from being perfected in the guise of civilian applications. The size and power of lasers can be limited. The proximity of orbiting systems to those of other nations can be controlled. The development of new dedicated ASAT systems can be prevented. In summary, verifiable treaty agreements that would greatly enhance the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union can be reached, reducing the danger of a terrible war. We should end our recalcitrance and pursue such agreements at our first opportunity.
Institute for Space and Security Studies
Potomac, Maryland
Robert M. Bowman (B.Ae.E., Rensselaer Polytechnic Institute; M.S., AFIT; Ph.D., California Institute of Technology) is president of the Institute for Space and Security Studies, Potomac, Maryland. As an Air Force officer, he served in a variety of assignments, including faculty, Air Command and Staff College; director, Advanced Space Programs Development, Space Division, AFIT; head, Aerospace Engineering Department, AFIT; and deputy director, Ballistic Systems, ABRES. Dr. Bowman is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Armed Forces Staff College, and Air War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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