Air University Review, July-August 1985
The systems approach is one of the methodological trends in modern science that was born of the need to find a way out of the crisis in scientific knowledge.
1E. Yudin
One of the basic principles of a Soviet ideology founded on the tenets of Marxism-Leninism is that man has the ability to determine the future. However, the growing complexity of many issues (e.g., the rapid development of science and technology, the necessity for increasingly intricate economic planning, the revolution in military affairs, etc.) has made it more difficult for the Soviet leadership to manage many of these areas, let alone, control their development. Eventually, the realization that many of these contemporary issues were becoming increasingly difficult to control prompted a reexamination within the Soviet Union of the existing approaches for managing these problems. This reexamination pointed to a need for a fundamental review of existing Soviet management techniques. This rethink ultimately produced a shift in thinking to what can best be described as a "systems perspective" (i.e., where individual issues are not looked at in isolation but as subsets of a larger whole; where each component has a relationship to the system; and where each component is viewed as interacting with other components of the system). To illustrate this point, Dzhermen Gvishiani, Deputy Chairman of the State Committee for Science and Technology, U.S.S.R., stated that "systems studies emerged in response to the growing complexity of the technicised world."2
development
The development of the Soviet systems perspective can best be described as evolutionary rather than revolutionary. Soviet systems literature indicates Soviet use of a systems approach that extends back to the early part of the century.3 However, it was not until the 1960s that a real systems perspective began to develop in the Soviet Union. The publication of two books on Western systems theory in the Soviet Union during the late 1960s appears to have played a role in spurring the development of the Soviet systems perspective.4 The 1970s were marked by a considerable expansion of the systems approach. For example, a notable increase in the amount of systems literature published in the Soviet Union took place during the early 1970s.5 Moreover, a review of Soviet literature indicates that since the 1970s, a systems perspective has been applied to a wide variety of areas, such as economic planning and development, science (including the social sciences), environmental protection, and military affairs.6 As one Soviet systems researcher noted:
Within the last decade systems ideas have penetrated the field of management and control; they formed the basis for rapidly developing methods for the solution of major complex problems in defense, economics, education, communications, transport, city development, etc.7
At the same time, a number of research centers dedicated to systems research were founded at various locations in the Soviet Union, further confirming the Soviet commitment to a systems approach.8
These developments attest to the fact that systems research not only was becoming progressively accepted as a useful discipline for managing complex problem areas but also had the approval and support of the Soviet leadership. Professor John Erickson, a well-known authority on the Soviet military, recently pointed out:
The systems approach is one that is apparently being adopted with some enthusiasm by Soviet specialists, one objective being to investigate responsiveness and adaptiveness to change.9
The increased emphasis on using a systems perspective to manage complex problem areas has continued apace into the 1980s. Undoubtedly, this trend will intensify in coming years as issues facing the Soviet leadership become increasingly complex.
Due to the fact that the vast majority of current Soviet systems ideas and concepts have been borrowed from the West, there is a close correlation between Western and Soviet systems perspectives. Nevertheless, differences do exist, primarily in the areas of terminology usage and the role of ideology. For example, while much of the Soviet systems terminology is similar to that used in the West, there has been a proliferation of a unique and frequently esoteric Soviet systems terminology (e.g., sistemotekhnika, globalistika, and bionizatsiya).10 With regard to the role of ideology, the principal Soviet criticism of Western systems approaches centers on their failure to incorporate Marxism-Leninism. The fact that the systems approach has been characterized in Soviet writings as "an object of acute ideological struggle" highlights the importance some Soviet systems proponents attach to the role of ideology.11
It is important to note that ideological differences exist within the Soviet Union, as well as between East and West. For example, there appear to be considerable differences among Soviet systems specialists on the exact role of ideology in the development of the Soviet systems perspective. These internal differences are apparent in a 1977 Soviet publication which states that the relationship between the systems approach and Soviet ideology "remains a subject of lively discussion."12 While it is essential not to overemphasize the importance of ideology in the Soviet systems approach, it is nevertheless necessary to realize that ideology does have an influence on the content and direction of the Soviet systems perspective.
The proliferation of a systems perspective within the Soviet Union raises some important questions. For example, what are the implications of this shift in Soviet thinking? More important, what approach should Western analysts take to better understand the impact of the systems perspective on Soviet affairs?
implications
Nowhere has the impact of the scientific and technological revolution been more evident than with respect to military affairs. The effect of the rapid development of science and technology on a number of areas, such as weapons procurement, tactics, and even strategy, has been far-reaching. For example, the increasing sophistication of technology has made many weapon systems and associated tactics obsolete shortly after and even before they become operational. One Soviet military writing states: "The scientific and technical revolution has become the basis of a revolution in military affairs."13 Hence, a Soviet desire to cope with the military implications of an increasingly sophisticated technological environment should come as no surprise.
During the 1960s, a restructuring of Soviet military thinking began to take place, prompted by a desire to cope with the phenomenon of an increasingly complex and rapidly changing environment. During the 1970s, this restructuring intensified. In the early 1970s, General Viktor Kulikov, now Marshal and Commander-in-Chief of the Warsaw Pact, alluded to the rethinking process then under way by acknowledging that the sophistication of modern warfare had led to the emergence of new branches of knowledge within Soviet military science, such as forecasting, modeling, and cybernetics (integral concepts of the systems approach).14 This rethinking received even greater impetus during the late 1970s, after senior personnel changes took place within the Soviet military establishment. Professor John Erickson has stated:
[The] rethinking and restructuring [of the Soviet military] now went almost hand in hand, a process accompanied by the increasing technocratization of the Soviet officer corps, the advent of Dimitri Ustinov as Defense Minister, and the arrival of Nikolai Ogarkov at the General Staff in 1977.15
Both Ustinov and Ogarkov have been key proponents of the systems approach.
Eventually, this rethinking process within the Soviet military led to concrete results. For example, since the 1960s the development of some weapon systems, as well as the reorganization of some portions of the Soviet military, can be traced directly to the adoption of a systems perspective.16 In fact, systems analysis has been characterized as having been "originally developed as an instrument for the solution of military strategic problems."17
While the advent of a systems approach to manage complex military affairs can be traced back as far as the 1950s, the period from the early 1970s to the present has witnessed the most intensive development of a military systems perspective. During this period the effects of rapidly changing technology have become pronounced. One Soviet systems expert states:
The efficiency of systems ideas and methods was demonstrated, in particular, in solving problems that arose during the construction of complex technological and defense systems.18
The trend of using a systems approach to solve complex military-related problems is likely to continue into the 1980s and should intensify in the coming years as technological development continues to accelerate.
forecasting
What is forecasting from the Soviet perspective? In order to answer that question, it is first necessary to understand Soviet use of forecasting terminology. For example, it is important to note the difference between the Soviet meanings of the terms forecasting (prognozirovaniye), planning (planirovaniye), and prediction (predskazaniye).
Forecasting is intended to establish "what may occur in the future and under what conditions;" whereas, planning is "determining what is supposed to occur in the future."19 In reality, forecasting is viewed as the first stage in the overall planning process. The concepts of forecasting and prediction are used to convey the meaning of foresight or recognition. However, forecasting is considered to be a research process; while prediction is an art.20 In this sense, "forecast (prognoz) denotes a probabilistic statement about the future with a relatively high degree of reliability," and "prediction (predskazaniye) is an apodictic (nonprobabilistic) statement about the future based on absolute reliability."21
Soviet forecasting theory and methods are similar to those used in the West. In fact, a considerable amount of theory and current application in the Soviet Union has been borrowed from the West.22 The differences that exist generally are based on either ideological or philosophical considerations. For example, some Soviet writings extol the virtues of socialism and state that forecasting must be based on the "scientific approach" (i.e., Marxism-Leninism). In addition, Soviet forecasters claim that their Western counterparts do not dwell sufficiently on the philosophical aspects of the problem under study and thus do not have a thorough understanding of the problem being addressed.
In the Soviet Union, as elsewhere, forecasting is viewed not as an end in itself but as an aid to the decision-making process. As previously noted, forecasting is viewed as a research process in which the end result has a relatively high degree of reliability. According to Soviet systems literature, "a forecast, together with an analysis and diagnosis, is assigned the important function of providing the scientific basis of a decision."23 As one well-known Soviet forecaster has pointed out, forecasting aids the decision-making process first by highlighting a problem, then by aiding the problem-solving process.24 Basically, the forecasting sequence includes five stages: information analysis, model construction, determination of the unknown parameters, the actual forecast, and, finally, an estimate of the forecast error.25
Soviet forecasting generally is subdivided into short-term (up to five years), midterm (five to ten years), and long-term (usually ten to fifteen years). However, it is important to note that the time categories can vary and depend to a certain extent on the forecaster's perspective as well as the subject being forecast. For example, one Soviet specialist subdivides forecasting into four separate divisions: short-term (up to ten years), medium-term (up to thirty years), long-term (up to fifty years), and superlong-term (four to five centuries or longer).26
While 150-200 different methods of forecasting reportedly exist, only about 15-20 (e.g., heuristic and mathematical forecasting are used extensively) have become widely adopted in the Soviet Union.27 As forecasting has become more accepted as a method of aiding decision making, it has been applied to additional problem areas. For example, beyond the fields of science and technology and military affairs (which account for the majority of forecasting research), forecasting has been applied to economic affairs, town planning, education , demography, law, philosophy, and political affairs.28
One of the most evident areas of a Soviet systems perspective has been military forecasting. As one senior Soviet military officer pointed out in 1972:
Scientific prediction and forecasting are of particular importance in military affairs. This is due to the very nature of this particular field of social activity. It is perhaps precisely here that scientific and technical progress has the keenest effect and where it is implemented most rapidly and decisively.29
Soviet military forecasters view forecasting in much the same way as their Western counterparts. The basic goal of Soviet military forecasting is to predict the nature of future conflict in order to reduce the uncertainty of the outcome of warfare and the concomitant potential for adversely affecting national and military objectives.
Naturally, military forecasting has had a profound impact on a number of military-related areas, such as weapons development and procurement, tactics, and military art. In fact, weapons development and procurement, along with military art, have been singled out in Soviet writings as the areas most affected by the rapid developments in science and technology. Several reasons why weapons development and procurement are so greatly influenced by science and technology have been cited:
In addition to affecting weapons development and tactics, forecasting has influenced Soviet military art. For example, one senior Soviet military officer specifically referred to the impact of forecasting on Soviet military art:
Scientific prediction and forecasting in military affairs, verified and confirmed by military practice, accelerate the process of the development of military art [and] enable us to see the long-range development of the armed forces and to improve the style of their work and the methods of leadership.31
Like other types of forecasting, military forecasting is divided into short-term, midterm, and long-term. However, the time interval applied to each of the categories varies according to the subject being forecast. For example, the time frames associated with the flight times of ballistic missiles would be measured in terms of seconds and minutes. For combat operations, the time factors would be longer and may vary from just hours (short-term) to days (midterm) and weeks (long-term). For weapons development, the time frames would be considerably longer and might be measured in terms of years or decades.32
In Soviet military writings, forecasting has been divided into a number of subject areas (i.e., strategic, operational-tactical, economic, and technical).33 Strategic forecasting in the military realm encompasses the conduct of future conflict and includes such areas as military objectives, missions, plans, and force composition. Operational-tactical forecasting includes the detailed investigation of future methods of conducting combat operations and employing existing and future weapon systems. Economic forecasting involves budgetary matters of a military nature (while taking into consideration the overall economic situation of the nation). Finally, technical forecasting, which has been characterized as "the most rapidly developing division of military forecasting," focuses on weapons development.34
What is the future of Soviet forecasting? In 1976, Robert Randolph, an American futures researcher, questioned future Soviet progress in the field:
Despite its prominence, Soviet futures research has a somewhat uncertain future; further growth will depend both on its own achievements and on any realignment of official policy which may come with the inevitable leadership changes in the Kremlin.35
While Randolph's basic doubt has not been confirmed, his assessment that the continuing success of Soviet forecasting would depend not only on its achievements but also on the support of the Soviet leadership has proved correct. Since 1976, forecasting in the Soviet Union has flourished, in part because of continued support from Soviet leaders. Moreover, the Soviets have perceived a demonstrated need for more extensive forecasting, particularly in science and technology, economic planning, and military affairs.
modeling
Soviet modeling (modelirovaniye) is closely patterned after concepts used in the West and is viewed as a method for aiding forecasting and decision making at both the national and global levels. While attempts at modeling can be traced back to the 1950s, it was not until the 1970s that modeling began to emerge as a major approach to help manage complex issues facing the Soviet system. This change in Soviet thinking occurred because of two major factors: the rapid development of sophisticated computers and the publication of non-Marxist Western global models dealing with a variety of topics. Sophisticated computers have aided the construction of complex models. These complex models have helped planning and decision making, since they are able to replicate real-world phenomena more accurately. The development of non-Marxist Western global models was an important event also, since it served to stimulate Soviet interest and dialogue in modeling. Moreover, the early models helped to establish the foundations for more complex follow-on models.
At the national level, models have been developed to help manage more effectively a variety of areas. For example, modeling is used extensively for economic planning. As one Soviet economist points out, a comprehensive "system of economico-mathematical models is being fostered by the need to further improve management and planning, the requirements of economic practice."36 Environmental protection and the management of military affairs are other areas in which modeling plays an important role at the national level.37 More recently, modeling has been used extensively in Soviet military forecasting.
Soviet modeling practices are patterned closely after Western concepts and methods. Thus, as Western military modeling proliferates and displays more sophisticated methods, it should not be too surprising to see a similar occurrence in Soviet military modeling.38 While there exists a wide range of different types of models available, Soviet military specialists have described their existing models as being based on either a heuristic or a mathematical approach, or a combination of both. Heuristic modeling and forecasting––characterized as the oldest methods used in military affairs––are quite subjective and are based on a sampling of qualified specialists' predictions of future developments. Heuristic modeling is used in such areas as assessing a combat situation, discerning the tactics of friendly and opposing forces, forecasting the intentions of opposing forces, and adopting a concrete plan of operations.39 Naturally, heuristic modeling is affected by both subjective factors (e.g., knowledge and thinking patterns, combat experience, commander's will, etc.) and objective ones (e.g., laws of armed conflict, specific combat conditions such as weather and terrain, etc.).40
In contrast, mathematical modeling tends to be more objective than heuristic modeling and has several phases:
According to Soviet military writings, a short-term forecast can be modeled effectively by using the mathematical approach, but the heuristic approach should be factored into the modeling process when the time frame under study becomes greater.42
Global modeling also receives a great amount of attention in Soviet systems literature.43 One of the primary reasons for this is based on ideological considerations. Soviet writings clearly exhibit an ideological uneasiness with Western global models. One of the basic ideological objections to non-Marxist global models is the existence of future global forecasts independent of the principles of Marxism-Leninism. Dzhermen Gvishiani, a Soviet expert in the systems field, provides an insight into the basic Soviet view of Western global models:
It is evident that global modelling cannot but become a sphere of fierce ideological struggle, because it is linked with the shaping of a more or less concrete idea of the future of humanity.44
This quotation highlights the basic ideological concern of Soviet systems specialists––the existence of a potential alternative to Marxism-Leninism as a prescription for the future. Despite the perceived challenge posed by Western global models, however, Soviet systems specialists appear reluctant to advance comparable global models that could demonstrate the inefficacy of the Western models and the superiority of their own. While comparable Soviet global models may exist within certain circles in the Soviet Union, they are not readily available outside them.
Although Soviet writings still are generally critical of non-Marxist Western global models, there does appear to be a slowly emerging shift away from outright rejection of Western global models. Initially, during the 1970s, Soviet literature was singularly critical of the global modeling advanced by Western modelers such as Forrester, Meadows, Mesarovic, and others. However, since the late 1970s, Soviet writings have become somewhat less critical of the early models, and even have exhibited––albeit sometimes grudgingly––a more objective and positive appraisal of Western global models. For example, Gvishiani has stated:
The Forrester and Meadows models have focused attention on the really existing problems of a global character and dealt a telling blow at incompetent optimism with regard to these problems.45
Basically, the predominant Soviet view now appears to be that, in spite of their ideological faults, the early models served to call attention to important problems as well as establish the foundation for follow-on models to deal with these problems. Nevertheless, the Soviet assessment is that Western models exhibit a number of shortcomings (e.g., they are too pessimistic, underrate the ability of man to influence future developments, and do not account for different social systems).
In the final analysis, modeling is becoming a widely accepted method for managing internal Soviet problems as well as global-oriented problems. One of the primary reasons for this development is the proliferation of increasingly sophisticated computers.
cybernetics
The Soviet approach to systems analysis has been affected profoundly by developments in computer technology. No where is this more apparent than in the field of cybernetics (kibernetika), which is defined in Soviet writings as "a science studying the most general laws of control in systems of any nature and complexity."46
Over the years, Soviet systems literature has displayed a considerable enthusiasm for cybernetics.47 This enthusiasm generally has centered on the potential that cybernetics offers for managing complex problem areas. According to V. Afanasyev, chief editor of Pravda and a leading proponent of the systems approach, "cybernetics is one of the most brilliant offshoots of contemporary scientific and technical progress."48
Several cybernetic concepts have proved important for the Soviets. For example, the concept of "feedback" has made a significant contribution to their systems approach. Feedback is the idea that certain actions affect the object under study, and that the effects of these actions should be taken into consideration in one's analyses. Feedback is an important element in the development of modeling and forecasting. According to Soviet military writings, other important cybernetic concepts include "information," the "algorithm," and the "control device."49
While cybernetics has been applied to a variety of problem areas facing the Soviet system (e.g., economy, production, science and technology, etc.), military affairs is one of the areas in which cybernetics has been applied widely. Military cybernetics (kibernetika voyennaya) is a rapidly developing specialized field within the Soviet military. The Soviet Dictionary of Basic Military Terms defines military cybernetics as:
A military-technical science which is a branch of cybernetics. Military cybernetics deals with the structure and laws of operation of systems for the control of troops and weapons, and also defines the tactico-technical requirements which the technological equipment of such systems must meet.50
While the Soviet Military Encyclopedia traces the development of military cybernetics back as early as the late 1950s, it was not until the 1970s that cybernetics really became an important factor in Soviet military affairs.51 The primary emphasis in military cybernetics is on troop control (upravleniye voyskami).52 One senior Soviet military officer noted that due to the increasing complexity of military affairs, a special branch of cybernetics (i.e., military cybernetics) was created for command and control.53 In support of command and control, military cybernetics reportedly uses
automated control systems, including the transmission, storage, processing, and use of situation data (information) for its evaluation and working out decisions, defining problems (the direct link in the fundamental cybernetic system of the control process), and receiving reports on the completion of missions, the status, position, and the character of operations of friendly and enemy forces (feedback).54
It is also important to note that military cybernetics has had an important impact on other areas, such as operations research, mission analysis, training, and weapons development.
The conflict between the increasing complexity of many issues and the Soviet desire to control future developments has led to a fundamental shift in Soviet thinking. One result of this shift has been the adoption of a Soviet systems perspective. A review of Soviet writings shows that over the years, the systems approach has been applied to a variety of disciplines––especially military affairs. The proliferation of Soviet systems literature over the past few years, coupled with the creation of several institutes dedicated to systems research, suggests that the Soviet leaders made a conscious decision to pursue a systems perspective. As the rapid development of science and technology accelerates during the 1980s, reliance on the systems approach undoubtedly will grow.
What should be the Western response to the Soviet shift to a systems approach? First, it is important that analysts recognize that the adoption of a systems approach is an important development that can have a major impact on Soviet planning, and hence, decision making. Second, the impact of the systems approach on Soviet affairs must be factored into Soviet studies in the West. Finally, a more thorough investigation of the impact of the systems approach on the Soviet Union should be undertaken. Only by broadening our efforts beyond conventional analytical methods in our Soviet studies and considering the Soviet systems perspective will we understand fully the events now taking place in the Soviet Union.
University of Edinburgh, Scotland
Notes
1. I. V. Blauberg, V. Sadovsky, and E. Yudin, Systems Theory: Philosophical and Methodological Problems (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1977), p. 15. Emphasis mine.
2. J. Gvishiani, "The Philosophical Basis of Systems Studies," Social Sciences, vol. XIII, no. 3, 1982, p. 62. Emphasis mine. It is important to note that Gvishiani's first name is translated into English sometimes as "Dzhermen" and other times as "Jermen." While "Dzhermen" (abbreviated-Dzh.) is a more proper translation, "Jermen" (abbreviated-J.) will be cited where it has been used.
3. For example, see I. Blauberg, "The History of Science and the Systems Approach," Social Sciences, vol. VIII, no. 3,1977, p. 98, for a discussion on a supposed shift to a "systems point of view" in Marxist theory of value in 1927. However, it is interesting to note that the Soviet systems perspective really began earlier with A. Bogdanov's theory of "Tektology." While Bogdanov's theory was severely criticized by Lenin as a deviation from Marxism-Leninism (and is still so criticized in Soviet systems literature today), Bogdanov's theory really advocated using a systems approach. For a synopsis of Bogdanov's theory, see Julius Hecker, Russian Sociology (London: Chapman and Hall, 1934), pp. 279-96.
4. See V. Altayev, editor, General Systems Theory, abridged translation from M. Mesarovic, editor, Views on General Systems Theory, Proceedings of the Second Systems Symposium at Case Institute of Technology (New York, 1964; Moscow, 1966). Also see V. Sadovsky and E. Yudin, editors, Issledovaniya po obshchei teorii sistem (Studies in General Systems Theory), a collection of translations (Moscow, 1969).
5. A survey of systems-related books and articles shows a dramatic increase in the amount of Soviet systems literature published during the 1970s. In addition to the numerous books published, see the Soviet journal Social Sciences, published by the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences, which had a notable increase in systems-related articles published during the 1970s.
6. A review of Soviet literature published since the late 1970s reveals a noticeable increase in the use of a systems perspective or systems approach for investigating a wide range of phenomena that affect Soviet society. For example, see V. Sadovsky and A. Osnitsky, "Systems Approach in the Study of Psychic and Physiological Phenomena," Social Sciences, vol. IX, no. 4, 1978, pp. 179-84. Also, the systems approach has been used in other areas, such as environmental protection. See Yu. Trusov, "The Ecological Approach and Problems of Moulding the Noosphere," in A. Ursul, editor, Philosophy and the Ecological Problems of Civilisation (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), pp. 58-66. Also see Yu. Svirezhev and D. Logofet, Stability of Biological Communities (Moscow: Mir Publishers, 1983). A systems perspective was even evident in the 1977 Soviet constitution. For an analysis of the presence of a systems perspective in the 1977 Soviet constitution, see Robert Shatter, The New Soviet Constitution of 1977: Analysis and Text (Brunswick: King's Court Communications, 1978), pp. 10-15.
7. Blauberg, Sadovsky, and Yudin, p. 12. Emphasis mine.
8. For example, the Institute of Systems Studies located in Moscow is oriented purely to systems studies and reportedly has a research staff of more than 400 people. Created in 1976, the institute has eight main departments: Social and Economic Studies, Management studies, Global Models, Scientific and Technology Developments, Computers and Man-Machine Systems, Simulation of Scientific Progress, Optimization, and Computer and Software. In addition, the Institute of Control Sciences and the Institute on Management of the National Economy (both founded during the 1970s) are concerned with systems studies. Information was obtained in discussions at Defence Studies, University of Edinburgh, with Professor John Constable of Cranfield Institute of Technology, on 17 February 1984, after his visit to the institute. Also see I. Besluzhev-Lada, "Futures Research in the Soviet Union," Futures, April 1976, pp. 184-85, for a discussion on systems research-oriented centers located in the Soviet Union. For example, in Kiev, the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences acts as a central coordinating body for forecasting; in Leningrad, the Scientific Forecasting Section of the Leningrad Department of the Soviet Sociological Association acts as an information exchange center; in Novosibirsk, the Social Forecasting Section of the Leningrad Department of the Soviet Sociological Association acts as a central information exchange; and in Moscow, the State Committees for Planning, Science and Technology, Construction, and the U.S.S.R. Academy of Sciences act as central coordinators in the field of forecasting. Also see Blauberg, Sadovsky, and Yudin, pp. 80-82, for a further elaboration of Soviet systems-oriented organizations that were founded to explore systems studies.
9. John Erickson, "Toward 1984: Four Decades of Soviet Military Policy," Air University Review, January-February 1984, p. 31. Professor Erickson's view that the emergence of a systems perspective in the Soviet Union is a major event that requires careful consideration is the prime motivating factor for undertaking this study.
10. For example, sistemotekhnika (systems engineering) has been described as follows:
It [sistemotekhnika] is a discipline, which includes the theory, methodology and apparatus for the preparation of solutions, and the theory, methodology and apparatus for the creation of systems, with the capacity for single-minded and purposeful activities in complex situations (at complex systems).
See V. Druzhinin and D. Kontorov, Voprosy voyennoy sistemotekhniki (Moscow: Voyennoye izdatel'stvo, 1976), p. 33. Also see Voyennyy entsiklopedicheskiy slovar' (Moscow: Voyennoye izdatel'stvo, 1983), p. 675, for a more lengthy definition of sistemotekhnika.
11. See I. Naumenko, review of The Systems Principle in Marxist Theory an Methodology, by Vsevolod Kuzmin, in Social Sciences, vol. IX, no. 1, 1978, p. 250.
12. Blauberg, Sadovsky, and Yudin, p. 103.
13. Yu. Chuyev and Yu. Mikhaylov, Prognozirovaniye v voyennom dele (Moscow: Voyennoye izdatel'stvo, 1975), translated and published under the auspices of the USAF in Forecasting in Military Affairs: A Soviet View, Soviet Military Thought Series, No. 16 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 1.
14. See General V. Kulikov, "Sovetskiye vooruzhennye sily i voyennaya nauka" (The Soviet Armed Forces and Military Science), Kommunist, No. 3, Moscow, February 1973, translated and published under the auspices of the USAF in Selected Soviet Military Writings 1970-1975: A Soviet View, Soviet Military Thought Series, No. II (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 99.
15. Erickson, p. 33.
16. One apparent result, for example, has been a reorganization of some portions of the Soviet military (e.g., the Soviet Air Defense Forces, restructuring of the Military District, etc.). For an excellent discussion on some of the restructuring of the Soviet military, see John Erickson et al., Organizing for War––The Soviet Military Establishment Viewed through the Prism of the Military District, College Station Paper 2 (College Station: Texas A&M, 1983). Also see Julian Cooper, "Scientific and Technical Change in the U.S.S.R.," Futures, December 1979, p. 473, where Cooper states that a major forecasting exercise in 1965 "helped to focus the attention of the Soviet aircraft industry on the importance of vertical takeoff, variable-geometry wings, on-board computers and the use of liquid hydrogen as a fuel."
17. Blauberg, Sadovsky, and Yudin, p. 259.
18. Ibid., pp. 110-11.
19. Chuyev and Mikhaylov, p. 6. Emphasis in original.
20. Ibid., p. 8.
21. Ibid., p. 7.
22. Soviet writers may not always acknowledge the direct influence of the West. Thus, Bestuzhev-Lada states: "The methods and techniques of forecasting [in the Soviet Union] are developing along general world lines." Bestuzhev-Lada, p.182.
23. Ibid.
24. Ibid., p. 181.
25. Chuyev and Mikhaylov, p. 29. However, also see V. Kosolapov, Mankind and the Year 2000 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1976), pp. 41-43, where he divides forecasting into eight basic stages; define the object to be forecast; retrieve and process information on the object of the forecast; identify its direction and determine the time limits; bring the three preceding stages together; adjust the forecast; coordinate the forecast with other forecasts; evaluate and reappraise the forecast in the light of an analysis of the objective social needs; and utilize the information obtained from the forecasts.
26. Kowlapov, p. 42.
27. Bestuzhev-Lada, p. 182. Also see Dzh. Gvishiani, "The Scientific and Technological Revolution and Scientific Problems," Social Sciences, vol. I, no. 7, 1972, p. 51, where he states that over 100 different forecasting methodologies exist.
28. For a fairly comprehensive list of Soviet writings on forecasting published during the 1970s on a variety of areas, see Bestuzhev Lada, pp. 182-84.
29. Lieutenant General I. Zav'yalov, "Nauchnoye predvideniye v voyennom iskusstve" (Scientific Prediction in Military Art), Krasnaya Zvezda, Moscow, 3 August 1972, translated and published under the auspices of the USAF in Selected Soviet Military Writings 1970-1975: A Soviet View, Soviet Military Thought Series, No. 11.
(Washington:Government Printing Office, 1977), p. 214. Also see John Erickson, "From Prophecy to Prediction," Futures, August 1977. pp. 335-39, for a discussion on the military implications of Soviet forecasting.
30. Colonel General N. Lomov, editor, Nauchno-tekhnicheskiy progress i revolyutsiya v voyennom dele (Moscow: Voyennoye izdatel'stvo, 1973), translated and published under the auspices of the USAF in Scientific-Technical Progress and the Revolution in Military Affairs (A Soviet View), Soviet Military Thought Series, No. 3 (Washington:Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 30-31.
31. Zav'yalov, p. 218. Emphasis mine.
32. For a discussion on forecast time intervals for military-related areas, see Chuyev and Mikhaylov, pp. 14-15.
33. Ibid., pp. 17-20.
34. Ibid., p. 20.
35. Robert Randolph, "Social and Technological Forecasting in the Soviet Union," Futures, December 1976, p. 485.
36. N. Fedorenko, " Mathematical Methods in Economic Science," Social Sciences, vol. VII, no. 3, 1976, p. 75. For an extended discussion on using models for economic management, see pp. 75-77. For example, Fedorenko lists seven economico-mathematical" models used in management: economic forecasting models; economic- mathematical models used directly in drawing up national economic plans; models of individual industries; economico-mathematical models of the current planning of industrial, civil engineering, transport, and other associations and enterprises; territorial simulation; economico-mathematical models of the organization of material and technical procurement and supply; and models of functional blocks of the economic system.
37. For examples of using models to manage environmental problems, see I. Frolov, Global Problems and the Future of Mankind (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1982), pp. 126-43; Dzh. Gvishiani, "Methodological Problems of Modelling Global Development," in Ursul, pp. 233-52; and Svirezhev and Logofet. For discussions about the use of models for managing military affairs, see Chuyev and Mikhaylov, pp. 65-111; and V. Druzhinin and D. Kontorov, Ideya, algoritm, resheniye (Moscow: Voyennoye izdatel'stvo, 1972), translated and published under the auspices of the USAF in Concept, Algorithm, Decision: A Soviet View, Soviet Military Thought Series, No. 6 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1975), pp. 17-22, 89-91, and 227-29.
38. For example, see Constance Holden, "World Model for the Joint Chiefs," Science, 11 November 1983, p. 595, for a discussion of FORECASTS, a new, extremely sophisticated. global model being developed for the U.S. military. Also see Marjorie Sun, "The Pentagon's Ambitious Computer Plan," Science, 16 December 1983, pp. 1213-15, for a discussion on the Defense Department's proposal for an ambitious program to further develop the military applications of computer technology and artificial intelligence.
39. Chuyev and Mikhaylov, p. 114. Chuyev and Mikhaylov give a rather detailed explanation of the differences between heuristic and mathematical modeling.
40. Ibid., p. 133.
41. Ibid., p. 117.
42. Ibid., p. 121.
43. For a comprehensive review of Western global models, see N. Lapin, "Social Indicators in Global Models," Social Sciences, vol. X, no. 1, 1979, pp. 80-92. Also see Dzh. Gvishiani, "Theoretical Aspects of Modelling Social Processes," Social Sciences, vol. IX, no. 3, 1978, pp. 104-23, for an extended discussion on global modeling. On the same subject, also see V. Gelovani, S. Dubovsky, and V. Yurchenko, "Methodological Aspects of Modelling," Social Sciences, vol. XII, no. 2, 1981, pp. 55-65. These latter writers divide global models into two categories: simulation models and optimization models. Simulation models use a closed system of equations (i.e., all functions and parameters are given prior to beginning the models); whereas, the equations used to describe an optimization model are not closed. (pp. 59-6 1)
44. Gvishiani, "Theoretical Aspects of Modelling Social Processes," p. 113.
45. Ibid., p. 106. Also see Dzh. Gvishiani, "Methodological Aspects of Global Development Modelling," in Society and the Environment (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1983), p. 33, where he states:
The criticism leveled at the models in existence is largely justified, especially where one-sided assumptions which distort the historical perspectives are concerned [i.e., non-Marxist-Leninist]. However, even these defective models show the positive, creative potential offered by methods of analysing social development. [Emphasis mine.]
46. Lomov, p.165.
47. As one Soviet specialist stated, he advent of cybernetics promised (and we may say, still promises) a revolutionary overturn in forecasting." Shakhnazarov, The Destiny of the World & The Socialist Shape of Things to Come (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1979). p. 14. It must be noted that much of the initial euphoria exhibited in Soviet writings over the potential benefits of cybernetics has been tempered more recently with a far more pragmatic view. Nevertheless, the current Soviet view of cybernetics remains positive.
48. V. G. Afanasyev, The Scientific and Technological Revolution––Its Impact on Management and Education (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1975), p. 35.
49. For example, see Lomov, pp. 175-78, for an extended discussion on these concepts. Basically, "information" is defined as "the aggregate of intelligence concerning the processes occurring in nature, society, and technical devices." (p. 175) The "algorithm" is defined as "an aggregate of rules, the following of which inevitably must lead to the solving of one or another problem." (p. 177) "Control devices" are "devices designed for automatic information processing." (p. 178)
50. Slovar' osnovnykh voyennykh terminov (Moscow: Voyennoye izdatel'stvo, 1965), translated and published under the auspices of the USAF in Dictionary of Basic Military Terms: A Soviet View, Soviet Military Thought Series, No. 9 (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1977), pp. 37-38. Also see Sovetskaya voyennaya entsiklopediya (SVE), vol. 4 (Moscow: Voyennoye izdatel'stvo, 1977), p. 151, which defines military cybernetics as
an area of cybernetics studying the axioms of the command and control of troops and weapons on the basis of the standard concepts for cybernetics; the theoretical basis for the automated command and control of troops and weapons.
51. For example, see SVE, vol. 4. p. 151.
52. See SVE, vol. 4, pp. 151-53, for an extended discussion on Soviet military cybernetics and troop control. Also see John Hemsley, Soviet Troop Control (Oxford: Brassey's Publishers, 1982), for a discussion on military cybernetics and Soviet troop control.
53. Lomov, p. 166. Emphasis mine.
54. SVE, vol. 4, p. 151.
Major Kenneth A. Rogers (B.S., University of Oklahoma; M.A., California State University at Sacramento; Ph.D., American University) is a faculty member, Department of Political Science, U.S. Air Force Academy. He has served as a Soviet area specialist at the Pentagon and an international politico-military affairs officer at Bolling AFB, D.C. Major Rogers was assigned to the USAF Research Associates Program, University of Edinburgh, Scotland, when he wrote the article appearing in this issue. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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