Air University Review, July-August 1985

On Low-Intensity Conflict

Captain Michael T. McEwen, USA

WHILE I am in agreement with much of what is said in Dr. Sam Sarkesian's excellent article on low-intensity conflict, I find it is surprising that Sarkesian makes virtually no mention of psychological operations (PSYOP) as the most appropriate focus for a new and enlightened U.S. low-intensity conflict policy.* When it comes to prescribing forces for low-intensity operations, he presents several significant suggestions for the use of Special Forces but provides only a token mention of psychological operations. It is certainly true that Special Forces units and personnel are equipped for some of the operations necessary in low-intensity warfare, but they are extremely limited in the psychological and social skills that are the designated responsibility of PSYOP. Special Forces units excel as trainers of indigenous combat forces, but it is not their mission to perform the sophisticated analysis and direct the extensive public programs that are necessary to accomplish the essential psychological and social missions that Sarkesian has so effectively outlined.

The proper employment of PSYOP in low-intensity conflicts is not a new concept. Existing U.S. military doctrine prescribes the manifold requirements for psychological operations as a foundation for the internal defense and development programs that will defeat an insurgency. Army Field Manual 100-20, Low-Intensity Conflict, describes this relationship in detail. The manual, based on lessons learned in Vietnam, is currently undergoing revision, but its emphasis on the primary importance of the political and psychological dimensions in low-intensity conflict will not be altered. More specific information on the role and employment of PSYOP can be found in Army Field Manual 33-1, Psychological Operations, which includes three separate chapters on psychological operations in foreign internal defense, unconventional warfare, and special operations.

Because Special Forces has had much higher visibility than the other elements of Special Operations Forces (SOF), it is probably understandable that they would receive a disproportionate emphasis in U.S. low-intensity conflict policy and operations. But if Sarkesian's analysis is accurate, as most recent writers seem to agree, then it is time to emphasize those other SOF activities that more directly address the critically important political, social, and psychological aspects of revolutionary conflict.

Sarkesian properly points out that the development and utilization of Special Forces have been limited by conventional organizational wisdom, which tends to view these forces in terms of either small-unit commando raids or covert operations carried out in concert with resistance forces operating in enemy rear areas during conventional conflicts. This institutional myopia is even more severe with respect to understanding the role and capabilities of PSYOP in low-intensity struggles. A major educational effort is obviously needed in service schools and on a less formal basis with senior military and civilian leaders at the policymaking levels.

*Sam C. Sarkesian, "Low-Intensity Conflict: Concepts, Principles, and Policy Guidelines," Air University Review, January-February 1983, pp. 4-23.

Sarkesian is correct in stating that coherency is necessary to achieve U.S. policy objectives and that such coherency depends on coordination of policy, strategy, and operational doctrine. Ideally, this coordination will be based on an understanding that effective operations in low-intensity warfare must address the political, psychological, and social dimensions as well as the military ones. If low-intensity operations begin with combat activity, then the situation has already deteriorated to a dangerous point. It would be far better to begin operations at the earlier stages of the conflict when the confrontations are basically political and psychological.

While it sounds trite, there is something to the argument that low-intensity conflict is the battle for the hearts and minds of the people. Clearly, this battle must be fought with the appropriate psychological weapons. There is a major role for PSYOP in low-intensity conflict long before the shooting starts and, of course, once guerrilla warfare is under way, PSYOP requirements continue at a very high level. Not all of the PSYOP needs will be met with military assets. Field Manual 100-20 emphasizes the requirement for highly coordinated civilian and military internal defense and development operations.

In the purely military PSYOP realm, there needs to be an intensive effort to build awareness that PSYOP must pervade joint operations in limited conflicts. PSYOP is definitely not just an Army game, even though the bulk of the military PSYOP assets are in Army units. When psychological operations are actually conducted, there are major requirements for Air Force and Navy participation, as Operation Urgent Fury in Grenada recently demonstrated. The new joint PSYOP Officer Course, which is being developed under joint Chiefs of Staff mandate, will be an excellent vehicle for creating this needed joint PSYOP consciousness.

Whether a low-intensity conflict situation involves U.S. forces as participants or as trainers/advisors, every effort must be made to increase the emphasis on psychological operations. As Sarkesian and other observers have pointed out, low-intensity conflict is much more a political and psychological struggle than it is a military contest. As such, it requires psychological operations in all its forms, from amnesty campaigns to national unity programs to civic action projects. To be best prepared to meet this challenge, we must improve the visibility and priority of PSYOP.

Washington, D.C.

Captain McEwen is assigned to the U.S. Army's Fifth Psychological Group, an operational PSYOP unit.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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