Air University Review, July-August 1985
Captain Tom Lytle
Captain Alex Gimarc
WE feel compelled to add our two cents worth to the argument on William Lind's article on policy review.* At the risk of incurring the wrath of Lieutenant Colonel Dennis Drew, we think that Lind has several valid points in his article. We also think that in his commentary, Colonel Drew has missed most of them.**
*
William S. Lind, "Reading, Writing, and Policy Review," Air University Review, November-December 1984, pp. 66-70.**Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew, "Beware of Simplisitic Solutions," Air University Review, January-February 1985, pp. 102-04.
In commenting on Colonel Drew's article, "Beware of Simplistic Solutions," we believe that a small review of recent history is in order. The last time that a set of arguments was presented based on the phrase simplistic solutions was during the 1980 presidential election. In that election, voters rejected this argument rather convincingly. We feel that arguments using that phrase have no more validity today than they did then. If the fields of science, mathematics, and management are any guide, the simple elegant solutions are very often the most correct, most understandable, and most powerful. It is only when the arguments become so muddled in complexities that a clear understanding of the problem and possible solutions does not take place. The point, however, is not about simplistic solutions. It is that Lind has called a spade a spade, and that call is not appreciated.
In our opinion, Lind's thesis was crystal clear. He expressed great concern with the failure of USAF officers to read, write, and think about issues affecting the Air Force. His conclusion was that we are, as a service, by far the most reluctant to discuss these issues in any forum. He then suggested a reason why this was so. We feel that he is exactly correct in his analysis and that his concern is very well placed. Colonel Drew's comment that "his patience was tried" likely has far more to do with a basic disagreement about Lind's point than a taxing attempt to find the thesis of the article.
The comment on Lind's "shoddy research and incomplete analysis" exemplifies the USAF problem with issues discussions. In a single sentence, Lind is accused of doing "shoddy research," conducting an "incomplete analysis," and being a "self-anointed expert" who is, by inference only, incapable of commenting on military affairs. Does this mean that any research which does not lead to agreement with accepted conclusions is shoddy? Hardly. If this were so, we would still be fighting wars on horseback because it has been proved inconclusively that man (or woman) cannot fly. Is an "incomplete analysis" an analysis that does not agree with accepted policy? What is the officially approved method of "anointing" a military expert? Does it require one to be on active duty in a uniform? Does it require one to be actively working in the field? Or does it just require one to be competent and have an interest?
The resort to a personal attack is typical of those who would rather not engage in discussions of issues. It is also one of those things that we were told long ago in Squadron Officer School (SOS) that we were not supposed to do. Perhaps a comment here to Colonel Drew about practicing what he preaches would be in order. A charge that one's opponent obviously lacks expertise in sensitive areas of discussion is typically thrown up as a smoke screen to obscure discussion of the real issues. If a critic (or, conversely, an enthusiast) can be engaged in defending his or her expertise, then the discussion will never really center on the matters brought up in the first place. This is an effective debating and courtroom tactic, but it serves absolutely no purpose in discussing issues and solving problems.
Further commentary includes a comparison of censorship requirements between the services. Colonel Drew draws the conclusion that because the Army does not have the MX or cruise missiles, its members are allowed to participate in policy and issues discussions in print, while we as USAF officers are not. We would like to know why. We suggest that Colonel Drew also review the Lind article on this point. Lind pointed out that every other service has publications which take up controversial subjects and issues in a better manner than the Air Force. He pointed to the Marine Corps Gazette, Army's Parameters, and U.S. Naval Institute's Proceedings.
We think that Colonel Drew's suggestion that the U.S. Air Force is somehow different from the other uniformed services because it controls strategic and theater nuclear weapons could not be more wrong--perhaps dangerously wrong. If the requirement to hinder open discussions of policy hinges on ownership of nuclear weapons, why does the Navy, with Trident submarines and tactical nuclear weapons, allow it to take place? Why does the Army with the Pershing I/II and tactical nuclear weapons allow it? In nuclear capability, the U.S. Air Force differs only in degree from the other services. Granted, any discussion of issues involving nuclear weapons are, by definition, more sensitive. However, this sensitivity should not in any way keep those types of discussions from taking place internally, and certainly it should not preclude open discussion on the myriad of other missions performed by the Air Force. Such freedom does not seem to be a problem elsewhere.
Open internal discussions on a variety of issues of importance to those interested in conventional weapons, issues, and doctrine do not take place often. When they do, they appear only briefly. For instance, where is the discussion of the relative merits of the upgraded F-16 Fighting Falcon and the F-15 Strike Eagle taking place? Where is the discussion of the relative merits of training philosophies for the Aggressors and the impact that might have on a replacement for the F-5 taking place? What became of the discussions on close-air support started in the pages of this very publication in 1978 and 1979? Where is the discussion on the merits of procuring and using 2.75-inch rockets rather than the AGM-65? These are discussions we do not see or expect to see internally in print.
We believe that the problem which Lind is concerned with is deeper than that which appears in the service school publications. We would like to expand Lind's list of publications with an additional subject area. A comparison of publications in the field of the art of tactical employment is instructive. The Army publications Infantry, Armour, Artillery, and Air Defense are filled with articles on the art of fighting and surviving. These articles discuss doctrine, training, issues, and the decisionmaking process. All have extremely active letters and opinions sections that regularly discuss all aspects of the relevant arts. There is no "party line" apparent because the discussion is open and honest. The Canadians' publication Fighter Forum serves a similar function for their fighter community. It has the same type of open discussion and active letters as the U.S. Army publications.
The corresponding USAF publication, Fighter Weapons Review, has none of this. Controversial articles do not appear or are rewritten to agree with established policy. The review process has little to do with the significance or merit of the ideas in the submitted articles but much to do with maintaining the appearance that everyone is in complete agreement with approved tactical solutions. Controversial letters and discussions simply do not appear in print. The problem is so bad that those in the field have all but stopped writing letters to the editor. The last request by the editor for comments from the field on how to improve the publication was all but ignored. The mix of published papers in Fighter Weapons Review reflects editorial bias strongly in favor of papers written internally by the USAF Fighter Weapons School personnel and those stationed at Nellis AFB, Nevada. The submission of papers from the field has dropped significantly--an alarming indication to some of us in the field. This is hardly the same publication that existed five years ago.
Other evidence of Air Force publication difficulties can be found in the issues of this very publication. What is the mix of authors in the Air University Review? Why are the great majority of USAF authors field grade or higher? Where are the lieutenants? Why do they not contribute? The crucial point of Lind is this: USAF officers are not contributing. Why not?
Colonel Drew touched on another facet of the problem in his commentary when he stated that he "had seen a large number of important [our emphasis] articles and studies denied publication because of security and policy review. Many, it would seem, were denied clearance on questionable policy grounds and perhaps could be accurately characterized as victims of Pentagon paranoia." By his own admission, the writing and publication of important articles and studies done by the upper echelon of USAF officers--those selected to attend intermediate service school in residence--is stifled by some sort of "Pentagon paranoia." We submit that the problem is not with the Pentagon but with the U.S. Air Force. Why? The other services seem to get along just fine without our review process. Discipline does not seem to suffer. Success in convincing Congress for more funding does not seem to suffer. Readiness and combat skill do not seem to suffer either.
We argue that the problem is not with the service members themselves but with the review process or Air Force gauntlet which officers are forced to traverse in order to write and publish. If an organization puts down layer after layer of reviewers, each of which can disapprove publication with little or no recourse offered the writer, that organization will eventually cease to get inputs from service members wanting to improve their organization. Our example with the USAF Fighter Weapons Review serves to illustrate that point, as does Lind's bewilderment with the lack of response to his less than cordial discussion in the Review last year.
Colonel Drew is correct when he states that the military has the right and the duty to restrict what its officers publish. We could not agree more. However, any organization that has this responsibility has the responsibility also to apply those restrictions in a legitimate manner. The easiest and safest thing to do as a censor is to say "No" and let the burden of proof fall on the writer. A censor is paid to censor, and that is precisely what he or she will do.
It seems that there are those in the hierarchy that entertain a significant distrust of those serving under them. Colonel Drew states that "even Lind would agree that the Air Force cannot allow one of its officers to publish an article advocating willful disobedience to lawful orders." This is a red herring. Our question is: Does he really believe that is the type of articles that would be submitted to a professional journal under a more open review process? A professional officer corps will cultivate constructive debate in an open forum almost by definition. We have never seen any articles advocating any such thing in any of the other service journals in ten years of reading. The implied notion that, if the censorship was lifted, the professional officer corps, would soon be advocating willful disobedience is ludicrous and should be recognized as such.
Our view is that USAF leaders need to define exactly what they expect the review process to accomplish. If we in the Air Force cannot stand the heat of a pointed, open discussion like the other three services, we are going to be more and more hard-pressed to defend ourselves on issues brought up by skeptical senators and congressmen. Not only does an active internal discussion of all issues make us all collectively smarter by forcing us to think through the positions we take on issues, but also it allows us to see a problem from all sides and attack it with a variety of solutions. A free and open debate is the literary equivalent of capitalism--the concept that everybody can have his or her say (produce a product) and then the market place decides which idea is best (decision-makers as consumers of ideas pick the solution they will apply). This type of discussion appears to be taking place in the other three services. Why are we in the U.S. Air Force so different that we cannot stand it?
We believe that we have a few "simplistic solutions" to this problem. However, first we must ask exactly what the U.S. Air Force desires out of its publications review process. If the desire is to prohibit publication of all papers or articles that conflict with accepted or approved policies, then we suggest that our basic regulations be changed to state exactly that. Do not let the author find it out by inference or fiat. If that is indeed our desire, we can also help the administration reduce the deficit this year and many years to come by offering budget request reductions. Why? A service with an officer corps that does not evaluate, does not comment about, and is not expected to improve the state of the art of warfare (or is not trusted to do so) will be less than useless fighting the next war and need not be (indeed, does not deserve to be) supported by the taxpayer.
If the intention is to control sensitive information only, then the following changes can be made easily and quickly:
Colonel Drew is correct in stating that the process needs to be reworked. We feel that he is incorrect in tying the entire discussion to the censor. It would be far easier to eliminate the censor along with the multilayered review process entirely and implement our suggestions.
We have much to learn from our sister services in this area. They are by no means doing everything right, but then neither are we. The major difference is that we are not discussing in print the myriad solutions possible to the problems posed by the Soviets and the demands of warfare in the future. Critical analysis is vital to our survival. It is a very American thing. It should be encouraged. It should be required. It should not be hindered in any way. There is no subject too hot to be discussed.
England AFB, Louisiana
Contributors
Captains Lytle and Gimarc are operational A-10 pilots.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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