Air University Review, July-August 1985
MEMBERS of a political extremist group have overpowered the security guards of a nuclear power plant and have taken control of the facility. In the few hours they have been inside, the terrorists have built an atomic bomb using nuclear material from the reactor. They now threaten to detonate their weapon unless their demands are met. Detonation of their weapon would cause extensive damage to the reactor and would spread deadly radioactive particles over a wide area.
A terrorist group has planted a nuclear bomb in a Manhattan building and is demanding that a Latin American government release five political prisoners. If the prisoners are not released in twenty-four hours, the bomb will explode.
These are among the types of scenarios that have been suggested as possible by some writers on nuclear terror. All of the scenes put forward by these writers are frightening; many are implausible. To ascertain whether nuclear terror is a likely danger facing the world, a detached and unemotional examination of potential nuclear terrorism must be made. Three questions must be considered in this examination: Could terrorists acquire and operate nuclear weapons? Of what use would a nuclear weapon be to terrorists? And will terrorists want to use nuclear weapons? The special case of very small extremist groups and of the pathologically motivated can be considered separately from other terrorists in answer to the third question.
A terrorist group could consider two ways of getting nuclear weapons: steal them or fabricate them. It would be difficult, however, to gain workable nuclear weapons by either of these means.
Assuming a terrorist group could steal a weapon from a nuclear weapons site (an unlikely event, considering the security at these sites), the group would have great difficulty making it work. A coded sequence of events must be followed to arm the weapon, and the weapon may require separate firing equipment. Some weapons (those that fly to targets) will not fire except at a certain velocity, barometric pressure, and the like.
Atomic demolition munitions (ADM) do not have this second set of detonation requirements, since they are not used in bombs or missiles; however, a coded signal is needed to detonate the ADM. If the terrorists were to attempt to remove the core of the ADM or any stolen weapon, it would very likely fail to produce a nuclear explosion, since these weapons depend heavily on the particular spatial relationships between the nuclear core and the outer explosive.
If terrorists are very unlikely to be successful in stealing an intact weapon or in exploding one if they acquired it, perhaps there are terrorist groups that could build their own nuclear devices. It is widely recognized that a great amount of unclassified literature is available that would be of much help to a group seeking to build a nuclear weapon. The U.S. Atomic Energy Commission and its successor, the Nuclear Regulatory Commission, have made much previously classified material available since the 1960s, and there is a large nuclear-skilled labor force from which to draw people to produce a bomb.
The ease with which material from a commercial reactor could be used to produce a nuclear explosion is questionable. Spent fuel from uranium reactors would not produce explosions above the force of a kiloton of TNT; how much less force the explosion might yield is unpredictable. The spent fuel from thorium reactors is highly radioactive; terrorists might not want to risk their lives working with it. A possibility does exist, however, of terrorists using reactor-grade enriched uranium successfully in a nuclear weapon, although not just anyone could convert it to usable form.
If a terrorist group actually did have weapons-usable material, could the group build a nuclear weapon? Physicist Theodore Taylor and nuclear policy expert Mason Willrich describe a bomb-building scenario in which perhaps one person could develop a nuclear weapon within a few weeks. They state that "the key persons or person would have to be reasonably inventive and adept at using laboratory equipment and tools ... used by students in chemistry and physics laboratories and machine shops" and would have to have an understanding of "nuclear explosives, nuclear reactor technology, and chemical explosives."1
Inventiveness in using laboratory equipment and tools and understanding of essential nuclear and chemical concepts come generally from significant training in the sciences, as does the ability to understand technical publications on the subject. The field from which people who are capable of directing the production of a nuclear weapon can be recruited is thus significantly reduced. Terrorists themselves tend to be well educated but in the humanities rather than in the sciences. Because of these considerations, nuclear bomb-building would be a much more extraordinary undertaking than Taylor and Willrich believe.
It could well require ten to twenty persons to construct a usable weapon. Among this group, it would be necessary to have a nuclear physicist, a nuclear engineer, a chemical engineer, a metallurgist, people skilled in nuclear laboratory procedures, and perhaps an assembler who can work with metals. They would be working with equipment costing $50,000 to $100,000.2
A less reliable weapon could be produced at a higher safety risk by four to six people––among them, a nuclear engineer, a nuclear physicist, and someone with extensive knowledge of explosives. Lacking safety precautions, the members of this four- to six-man team might be killed by radiation.3 If this small group were itself the entire terrorist organization, the organization might not survive its effort to build a bomb.
A nuclear bomb, however, is not the only weapon that can be produced with plutonium. The toxicity of certain isotopes of plutonium has caused many to believe that a device that disperses plutonium aerosol would produce casualties in high numbers. The release of finely separated particles of plutonium in the air-conditioning system of a large building is the most common such scenario envisioned.
However, the release of plutonium aerosol into a building's air-conditioning system is not without problems: the large surface areas of the air ducts of large buildings on which many of the particles will "plate out"; humidity that creates a drag on the particles; and the effects of air filters.4 Other limits to the effectiveness of plutonium dispersal have to do with human physiology . As much as 25 percent of inhaled aerosol particles 0.5 to 7 microns in diameter will lodge in gas exchange sacs deep in the lungs. Specialized cells may remove particles less than 0.5 microns in diameter, or these particles may leave the lungs by slipping between its cells. About 80 percent of all particles less than 7 microns (and an even greater percentage above 7 microns) will be trapped in the nose and in the airway through the trachea. Cilia and mucous will remove the small fraction of particles that deposit in the tracheo-bronchial zone that leads to the deep lung tissue where gas exchange takes place. Few particles above 7 microns can deposit in the small exchange sacs. However, if enough plutonium were deposited there, it could be fatal.5
Plutonium must be inhaled or ingested to be lethal; mere contact with it will not be lethal, unlike chemical and biological substances such as the nerve gas Sarin. At least a milligram of insoluble reactor-grade plutonium must be deposited in the gas exchange sacs of the human lungs to cause rapid death. Factors affecting the distribution of the aerosol, the time it remains effective, and the proportion of inhaled particles that reach the pulmonary region result in a requirement that a million times the lethal amount of material be released in an uncontrolled environment. That is, it would require a total of only one gram of material to cause 1000 fatalities if those people were forcibly confined to a room and administered breathing devices; but, in an uncontrolled environment, it would require a total of approximately 1000 kilograms to hope to overcome all the factors affecting the dispersal.6
Lesser amounts of plutonium would cause a shortening of life for those exposed, but the purpose of terrorism is not served by such long-delayed consequences. If a terrorist wants fatalities, he wants them immediately.
Although it may not be impossible for committed, technically educated terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons, terrorist groups would presumably examine the situations in which they might use nuclear weapons before making the considerable investment of time and resources required. Great publicity would arise for a group known to possess a nuclear capability, but mere possession may be inadequate in forcing legitimate authorities to comply with demands. Most other groups would have to use their weapons (at least once) in order to gain from possessing them. (For the Palestinians, the mere possession of a weapon might be advantageous, but most terrorists do not hold a role similar to that of the Palestinians in the Middle East.)
A group seeking the removal of a government or the liberation of a territory could possibly use nuclear weapons against a nation's armed forces, economically important structures, or symbolic targets. Because of the international attitude toward nuclear weapons, an explosion would be intimidating and alarming. A government's legitimacy could be eroded. Widespread and lasting world attention would be gained by the group.
On the other hand, the destructive use of nuclear weapons might involve a significant loss of respectability and support for the terrorist group. For this reason, it might be to a group's advantage to use underground, underwater, high-altitude, or remote land detonations of nuclear weapons that would cause little damage while demonstrating a group's nuclear capabilities. However, underground and underwater explosions might escape public notice and might not be revealed by nations with the appropriate detection devices, and detonation over a remote land area might prompt the government with sovereignty over the land area to seek revenge on the terrorists. A high-altitude explosion would be the best demonstration of nuclear capability, since many could see it, there could be little fallout, and there would be no damage other than retinal burns among people who looked directly at the fireball.
Having demonstrated that it possessed atomic weapons, the group would presumably be in a position to demand special treatment. Would possession of nuclear weapons enable a terrorist group to demand greater concessions than terrorists in the past have demanded? To achieve permanent policy changes, the terrorist threat would have to be maintained indefinitely. How long could a terrorist nuclear group expect to maintain a threat before its weapon is captured? Governments would certainly demand in negotiations that the threat be eliminated; they would not wish to give in to demands, knowing that new threats might be forthcoming. Brian Jenkins, an expert on terrorism for the Rand Corporation, points out that, in the case of nationalist groups like the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO), " they could not create a homeland ... without offering the victims of the blackmail a future set of hostages to retaliate against."7 And certainly terrorists could not demand more nuclear weapons and expect their delivery.
Unenforceable demands such as policy changes are thus ruled out. If a terrorist group is to hold a city or government hostage with the threat of nuclear explosion, the demands would have to involve something that can be complied with in a short time, such as the release of prisoners. However, the release of maybe a dozen prisoners would probably not justify a threat to kill thousands, even to a terrorist. It is difficult to find an enforceable demand that would be worthy of the threat. Also, there are limits to what a government or a people would be willing or able to relinquish. All things considered, terrorists would find little use for a nuclear threat, as opposed to actual use of a weapon.
On the other hand, nuclear terrorists might find some use in a threat to detonate a weapon if and when a government took a particular action––a deterrent threat similar to that practiced by today's nuclear powers. Compliance with a negative threat would involve not doing something, which is far easier for governments and other highly visible, structured organizations than conceding to a demand to take some action not previously planned. Such a threat could take the appearance of diplomacy, with the victim saving face while the terrorists preserved respectability among their "constituents" as a responsible group.
Certainly it is technically possible for terrorists to acquire nuclear weapons; and the weapons could be used to pursue terrorists' goals through a deterrence strategy. However, it does not directly follow that terrorists will acquire and use nuclear weapons. Why, one might ask, have terrorists generally limited themselves to such weapons as submachine guns and dynamite? Biological weapons have been viable threats for terrorist use in mass destruction activities at least as long as nuclear weapons, and chemical weapons have been around longer. Both types of weapons are easier to obtain and use than nuclear weapons. Why have terrorists not gone on a rampage using all the nonnuclear technology and weaponry at their disposal?
Perhaps they have not done so because they do not want to commit mass murder. As Brian Jenkins writes, "terrorists want a lot of people watching, not a lot of people dead.... Mass casualties may not serve the terrorists' goals and could alienate the population."8 Thus, the main appeal of a nuclear weapon in a terrorist group's arsenal is not the weapon's ability to kill thousands of people simultaneously; instead, terrorists are likely to be attracted to nuclear terrorism because of public perceptions of the word nuclear. A terrorist action involving nuclear material would cause great public fear and perhaps panic.
That reaction is the sole attraction of a nuclear capability to the terrorist. A political group needs to be respected internationally to receive aid and friendship; even a terrorist group needs some friends and allies. A nuclear detonation that caused high rates of death and destruction would work against these supportive relationships. A terrorist group that has received significant, widespread support and is therefore more likely to be able to acquire nuclear weapons would find that "nuclear escalation" is not a desirable substitute for broader action and is thus a waste of energy.
Consider revolutionaries based within the territorial boundaries of the government under attack: they cannot afford to alienate the general-population by resorting to a nuclear detonation that would result in significant death and destruction. A nuclear detonation in such a circumstance would likely increase support for the established government and stir opposition to the revolution. Latin American guerrillas, for example, have been consistently careful in choosing targets, usually selecting symbolic ones. The only situation in which violence against one's own people is advantageous is when guerrillas would like to demonstrate the consequences of collaborating with their enemy. Fidel Castro learned this lesson during the Cuban revolution against the Battista government, abandoning the use of random violence when he found that the Cuban people were hostile to such violence.
Against an external power that supports the targeted government, on the other hand, the destructive use of a nuclear weapon by a revolutionary group might advance the group's cause with little risk of alienating its constituency, potential or actual. However, such an action might still cause the terrorist group to lose the support of its sponsor states, thereby damaging the group's "respectability." Also, the nation attacked would almost certainly increase its efforts in support of the targeted government and against the terrorist group.
Some groups are based outside the territory of the target government. The Irish Republican Army (IRA) and the PLO, for instance, can contemplate mass destruction in "enemy territory" that would bring no harm to their own people. But would the government of the territory where such a group is based tolerate the group's possession of nuclear weapons? It and nearby states would certainly resist such an increase in the group's power, fearing the group might become uncontrollable. It would be difficult for a terrorist group to complete a bomb before the intelligence agencies of the terrorists' host government detected the extensive activities connected with nuclear weapons manufacturing. Would political groups that have gained the support and financial backing to carry out such a sophisticated operation want to risk losing that support in pursuit of a nuclear weapons capability that would be of questionable utility at best?
Terrorists might be provided nuclear weapons by some state, but such an act would likely be traced to the sponsoring state. Which state is likely to risk retaliation for nuclear acts perpetrated by terrorists? Not only would the victim state be certain to retaliate against the sponsoring nation, but also suppliers of nuclear fuel, reactors, parts, and technical assistance might embargo these and other items in response to what would be a blatant violation of treaty agreements and commercial contracts. Only if the gift of nuclear weaponry could be kept secret forever could the sponsoring state escape retaliation. Is maintaining such a secret likely?
One can observe the PLO and the other Palestinian terrorist groups and find evidence that many of the inhibiting factors discussed here are actually at play. The Arab governments that support these terrorists tend to restrain them, fearing Israeli retaliation for extreme acts of terror. The terrorists, not wanting to lose Arab support, are always attempting to improve their respectability. In the specific realm of nuclear weapons, the PLO has revealed an interest in the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Arab states in response to Israel's supposed nuclear capability. However, the Palestinians publicly regard reports that they themselves might somehow acquire a nuclear weapon as unrealistic and as intended to bring harm to their cause.
It is difficult to distinguish terrorists who use force for political gain from people who seem to receive a perverted pleasure from violence. Groups such as the Japanese Red Army, participants in the Lod Airport massacre, and the radical Baader Meinhof Gang resemble criminals and psychopaths more than they do political groups like the PLO and the IRA. Terrorist groups who are interested in attacking society in general rather than in altering the political order in a specific manner and who therefore lack a constituency appear to have little to lose from a destructive nuclear detonation. Assuming that the group views deliberate killing and suicidal missions as moral acts when directed toward overthrowing "corrupt" existing societies, one might think that these groups would, in fact, welcome mass annihilation.
However, that these groups have extremist goals does not mean that they will attempt to obliterate mankind; they may wish to crush society as we know it, but they also want to have people left with which to build a new society. Generally, they hope that the violence they carry out will gain them publicity, avenge specific "wrongs," or rally others to their defiant course of action. Mass murder is not necessary for achieving any of these objectives. Practically the only situation in which mass destruction might be contemplated by even the most fanatical group is the imminent dissolution or destruction of the group. However, such a retaliatory death-throe action would need to be prepared in advance, when group members were rational enough to anticipate their possible demise and to plan the contingent procedures, yet irrational enough to elect mass destruction as a deliberate recourse.
Admittedly, the small extremist group, particularly when in desperate circumstances, has less to lose from initiating nuclear terror than the larger political group does. However, since extremist groups have virtually no constituencies, they are less likely to be able to recruit the talent necessary to acquire a nuclear capability. Similarly, groups that are opposed by virtually all national governments would find it extremely difficult to gather the materials and equipment necessary to build nuclear weapons, and their efforts to do so would be subject to extensive surveillance. Thus, the groups most likely to contemplate nuclear terror seem also to be those least likely to succeed in achieving the capability.
More likely than groups inspired toward indiscriminate violence are individuals with pathological motivations. A person motivated by revenge or paranoia might seek a nuclear capability. Some of the low-level breaches of security that have occurred at nuclear facilities as well as the nuclear hoaxes that have been perpetrated are probably the products of such people. However, for a crazed person to acquire a mass destruction capability, he or she would have to find people with the appropriate skills who would be willing to assist the person's efforts: one person probably could not do the job alone.
An act of nuclear terrorism would be a terrible thing. We should be happy that the possibility of its occurrence is not what many doomsayers would have us believe. That is not to say that the possibility can be ignored. But instead of instilling fear and a sense of helplessness in the public, those studying the subject should be working to isolate those areas in which the possibility is real. Given present conditions, an act of nuclear terror is highly unlikely.
St. Martinville, Louisiana
Notes
1. Theodore B. Taylor and Mason Willrich, Nuclear Theft: Risks and Safeguards (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger, 1974), pp. 20-21.
2. R. W. Mengel, "Terrorism and New Technologies of Destruction: An Overview of the Potential Risk," in Studies in Nuclear Terrorism, edited by Martin H. Greenberg and Augustus R. Norton (Boston: G. K. Hall, 1979), pp. 214-15.
3. Ibid., p. 215.
4. Robert K. Mullen, "Mass Destruction and Terrorism," Journal of International Affairs, Spring/Summer 1978, p. 80.
5. Ibid., pp. 80-81.
6. Ibid., pp. 81-82.
7. Brian M. Jenkins, "The Potential for Nuclear Terrorism," in Studies in Nuclear Terrorism, pp. 170-71.
8. Ibid., p. 169.
Stanley P. Berard
is a junior at the University of Southwestern Louisiana (USL) majoring in political science. He is studying under a USL Academic Scholarship--one of the school's most prestigious undergraduate awards.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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