Air University Review, January-February 1985
IN MY opinion, the U.S. Air Force does not teach its staff officers and future leaders what they need to know about the doctrine of conducting an air war.
In the development of superior air leadership, the education process cannot treat air doctrine as a set of abstract principles to be learned by rote like mathematical formulas and dutifully filed away for future reference. Air doctrine is made up not of abstractions, but of dynamic living truths forged in the heat of combat and tested in the crucible of war.1
I formed this opinion after completing two years of duty as the director of Team Spirit employment planning. Team Spirit is the annual joint/combined exercise in Korea. It involves more than 161,000 South Korean and U.S. personnel in a joint air-land-sea training exercise. During that time I worked with officers from all other services to plan these operations. Our contact included discussion, sometimes debate, about the associated doctrinal issues. These issues included such things as the control of air power in the airspace over an area where amphibious operations are under way, responsibilities of the joint commander for control of Marine airspace, USAF support of amphibious operations, support of a protracted land battle by United States Marine Corps and United States Navy air, and air support of ground forces under the AirLand Battle concept.
In a very short time, I found that I had many misconceptions about the employment of air power and that there were many concepts and practices necessary to managing the air side of a joint operation that I had never even heard about: e.g., the roles and missions of the various services; how these roles complement one another; and concepts of economy of force, unity of command, and fragmentation of effort. As I observed and compared myself and other Air Force officers to our contemporaries in other services (especially our Marine Corps contemporaries), I also perceived that this ignorance is the norm for Air Force officers. The Air Force simply does not educate its staff officers about the management of a joint air war, even though air operations are clearly a part of a joint land, sea, and air operation and such joint operations are not an unusual phenomenon, as these comments from General Dwight D. Eisenhower indicate:
Experiences . . . have indicated that in many operations, if not in the majority, the task was of necessity accomplished by contributions from two or three services acting under the principles of unified command . . .. The welding of the forces resulted in the greatest possible concentration of combat power at the decisive point while at the same time permitting the greatest economy of force.2
Specifically, I believe that two subjects are neglected in an Air Force officer's professional education. These are history (especially air power history) and joint doctrine. If we do not study how we did things in the past, then we will not know what worked and what did not work. Consequently, we shall be prone to repeat our mistakes, and each new generation of Air Force staff officer will do little more than spend his efforts relearning old lessons "the hard way" instead of advancing and improving air doctrine.
This was the way General Otto P. Weyland, Commander, Far Eastern Air Forces, put it when reflecting on the war in Korea:
An astounding facet of the Korean War was the number of old lessons that had to be relearned.... It appears that these lessons either were forgotten or were never documented––or if documented were never disseminated.3
If we do not teach air doctrine and its applicability in joint operations to our officers, how can they qualify as advocates of air power? Doctrine evolves from our assigned roles and missions and the unique characteristics of air power. In this day of limited funding, the competition for roles and missions is keen. If airmen do not understand doctrine, then roles and missions suited to air power could be overlooked or misassigned simply because airmen are unable to argue the merits of assigning them to air power.
I think that it is safe to say that a joint air force commander's staff, even though it will have representation from all services involved in the joint air operation, will be largely composed of Air Force officers. Under the concept of unified action as put forth in JCS Pub 2, the joint air force commander is responsible for the employment of all air power in a theater regardless of service. If Air Force officers on this staff do not understand joint doctrine, how can they properly plan the employment of this joint air force? If these staff officers do not know the doctrinal differences between the participating services, there will be disharmony and competition instead of cooperation throughout the joint air force.4 Moreover, any team member who is not at least familiar with joint doctrine and the specific responsibilities of air, land, and sea team members in a joint operation could jeopardize the contribution of air power to the overall theater operation.
We spend much time in our professional military schools teaching principles of management and the social, economic, and political factors behind war, but how much time do we spend teaching the conduct of war as a joint problem? In my two years with Team Spirit, I worked with graduates of all intermediate schools and found that, generally speaking, the Air Force graduates of these schools are not equipped to discuss doctrinal topics but that any Marine officer is.
Obviously, some Air Force officers are learning joint doctrine "in the crucible of combat" as they deal with other services daily on joint staffs. But it seems to me that there are many more of us who know nothing about it because no one has even told us that there is a body of knowledge called joint doctrine which is well worth knowing. Is there any Air Force school that teaches such doctrine, or is this instruction left to OJT? If this type of learning is relegated to an almost pure trial-and-error method, the probability of errors seems dangerously high. Mistakes made in this joint arena not only will cause the Air Force embarrassment but could establish a bad precedent by misaligning roles and missions best suited to air power. After an Air Force officer starts dealing with joint matters is not the time for him or her to begin learning about joint doctrine. Air Force officers need to be taught joint doctrine and the air Force interpretation of this doctrine before they begin these assignments.
I have seen Air Force action officers make concessions to other services in the interest of harmony and cooperation. These concessions have been made in the highest spirit of compromise. Unfortunately, they were inconsistent with Air Force doctrine and probably degraded combat power. The action officers were unaware of the doctrine that should have guided them, and the precedents set by their decisions caused or fueled more problems than their immediate compromises solved. Air Force leadership may argue doctrine, roles, and missions; but action officers implement the outcomes. If action officers do not know the doctrinal positions of the Air Force, how can they be expected to follow current doctrine correctly?
The conduct of war is the reason for our existence as a military service. If we are to consider ourselves warriors, we must strive to know as much as possible about the conduct of war. Air leaders, planners, staff members, and combatants must understand doctrine, or the combat power of the Air Force will be eroded by improper employment. This doctrine has come from the lessons that our predecessors learned in armed conflict and must not be put in a library to gather dust. This knowledge is needed today. We are constantly training our forces in joint/combined exercises such as Team Spirit. Are we training the way we plan to fight? Is the joint force achieving the greatest possible combat power with the greatest economy of force?
Joint doctrine, Air Force doctrine, specific roles and missions––all of the underlying principles of air power employment should be taught today. These are adequately addressed in Air Force One- and Two-series manuals, JCS pub 2, and official Air Force histories. But trying to learn these by trial and error or by simply reading these documents on one's own is not the way to do it. Understanding is called for, not fragmented knowledge or answers memorized by rote. Doctrine must be studied. It must be investigated, compared, and discussed, with history serving as its backdrop.
I believe that the Air Force needs to develop a formal doctrinal education program. Ideally, this program should be the primary emphasis of a school similar to the Air Corps Tactical School, predecessor of the Air War College. If establishing such a school is not possible, a specific air doctrine course should be created. This course could be separate from the present professional military education courses, or it could be included in them. Whatever program is developed, it must provide the time and expertise to develop doctrinal understanding in each officer, not just rote memorization of some basic concepts. Some of the subjects that should be taught are structure of the battlefield; fire support; combat support (logistics, engineering, and communications); relationships of air superiority, CAS, BAI, reconnaissance, airlift, and bombardment; interoperations of USAF and non-USAF air; and interoperation of air, land, and sea forces. I am not suggesting that all Air Force officers should be made doctrinal experts. I am suggesting that the Air Force needs to do a better job of equipping its personnel to work in the joint arena and that all Air Force officers should understand how joint and Air Force doctrine affects their functional areas. In short, more thorough schooling in Air Force and joint doctrine must be provided than that offered currently.
The creation of a separate Air Force nearly four decades ago was a monumental organizational decision based on the unique decisiveness of air power. The status of the Air Force of the 1980s and beyond should not be jeopardized because the doctrinal reasons for that decision are no longer understood by Air Force officers.
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Notes
1. AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force, 14 February 1979, p. iii.
2. Dwight D. Eisenhower quoted in AFM 1-1, 14 February 1979, p. 2-5.
3. "FEAF Report on the Korean War" 26 March 1954, p. 130; Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea 1950-1953 (New York: Duell, Sloan, and Pearce, 1961), p. iv.
4. AFM 1-1, p. 4-4.
Major John W. Fal (USAFA; M.A., New Mexico State University) is a faculty member at Academic Instructor School, Hq Air University. As a weapon systems officer, he has flown the F-4, F-111, and AT-38B. His assignments have included tours at Da Nang Air Base, Republic of Vietnam, and various training or operational planning positions in PACAF, TAC, and USAFE units. Major Fal is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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