Air University Review, September-October 1984

How Secure is NATO's Northern Cap?

WESTERN policymakers and the media, in their assessment of the military balance between the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the Warsaw Pact, inevitably focus on the so-called Central Front--the area near the border separating West Germany, East Germany, and Czechoslovakia. While the balance of power in the Central Region is no doubt crucially important to the United States and its allies, the two European flanks also demand more than occasional attention. The Southern Flank, largely because of the well-known Greco-Turkish disputes, receives appropriate publicity occasionally, but the Northern Flank, in which Norway is the key NATO member, has yet to receive all the attention it deserves.

Europe's "northern cap" is usually defined as the northern one-third of the Scandinavian countries (Norway, Sweden, and Finland), the Soviet Union's Kola Peninsula, and the Svalbard Archipelago in the Barents Sea north of Norway's mainland.¹  This area's critical relationship to the rest of NATO should not be overlooked. Its unusual geography, the size and strength of the Soviet military in the area, the Norwegian forces available to counter the threat, the destabilizing political problems of the region, and the ability of NATO to assist northern Norway--all combine to suggest that the situation in the northern cap is a potentially volatile one.

NORWAY'S northern location and unusual topography contribute to the country's security but, at the same time, present problems for rapid reinforcements by NATO. Norway, a large, elongated country, stretches over 1000 miles in length and ranges in width from 250 miles to slightly less than 4 miles at one point. Fifty thousand islands dot its 1500-mile western coast, which is lined with numerous narrow inlets that wind between extremely high banks or steep rock walls.² These inlets, called fjords, make amphibious landings extremely difficult or, in some cases, impossible. In western Finnmark, Norway's northernmost county, there are large mountains, many fjords, and numerous islands. Eastern Finnmark's gently rolling plain contains wide valleys with many lakes and soft marshes.³ Most of the year, without the use of special equipment, this area is nearly impassable to ground troops. Military maneuvers on this rough terrain are inhibited also by the cold and snow.

Low temperatures in the north could affect military operations significantly. Even in the summer, the temperature in Finnmark seldom rises above 480F.⁴ Finnmark averages 230 frost nights a year, with strong winds or heavy fog much of the time.⁵ Proper clothing and equipment are essential in this environment. The harsh landscape, snow and ice, and extremely cold temperatures make northern Norway a hazardous area in which to conduct military operations. As one previous commander of NATO's Allied Forces Northern Europe, Sir Walter Walker, even suggested, "The severity of winter operations, especially on the plateau of Finnmark, is such that survival could surpass military operations in importance.^"6

The Svalbard Archipelago, including the island of Spitsbergen, is approximately 400 miles north of Norway's mainland. Desolate Svalbard remains the northernmost area of human inhabitation an earth.⁷ The whole archipelago lies much farther north than Alaska, and some of Svalbard's islands are within ten degrees of the North Pole. Yet despite this arctic location, the Gulf Stream (called the North Atlantic Drift there) keeps the water between Svalbard and Norway's mainland open for shipping and fishing.⁸ Even more important, this "warm" water allows access to the Atlantic Ocean for the Soviet Union's Northern Fleet, which is stationed on the Kola Peninsula at Murmansk.

Soviet Strength
in the Northern Cap

Since World War II, the population of the Murmansk Oblast--an administrative subdivision of a republic in the Soviet Union--and the Kola Peninsula has nearly tripled, now approaching one million people. Murmansk, a city of 300,000, has doubled its population since 1939 and is the world's largest city within the Arctic Circle.⁹  More significantly, a very impressive concentration of military might in the Arctic region is situated on the Kola Peninsula, only 100 miles east of Norway's northern cape.¹⁰

Murmansk is the home of one of four Soviet naval fleets, the Northern Fleet, second in size only to the Soviet Pacific Fleet. It consists of approximately 500 surface combatants and nearly 175 submarines (more than 90 of which are nuclear-powered).¹¹ In fact, an estimated 50 percent of the Soviets' submarines are with the Northern Fleet.¹² The fleet receives its submarines from a huge shipyard near the city of Severodvinsk.¹³ Furthermore, the Soviets are modernizing this formidable northern force. The first Typhoon-class nuclear-powered ballistic-missile submarine is now with the Northern Fleet, and a second was recently launched at the Severodvinsk shipyard.¹⁴ The Soviets' first aircraft carrier, the Kiev, is also with the fleet, and two more will join the Kiev in 1985.¹⁵

Northern Fleet naval aviation has grown considerably also. An estimated 405 aircraft are assigned to the fleet.¹⁶ Of these, 125 are bombers and reconnaissance aircraft, and another 110 are antisubmarine aircraft and helicopters.¹⁷ Contributing further to the Soviets' growing air power in the Kola Peninsula are approximately 200 shore-based aircraft that support the Northern Fleet, plus 450 more in the Murmansk Oblast that are distributed over forty airfields. Modernization of this force is evident, with the new MiG-23 Flogger, MiG-25 Foxbat, and Tu-22M Backfire aircraft replacing older weapon systems. ¹⁸

Supporting the Soviets' naval and air arms in the region are seven army divisions (70,000 men) and two special mobile divisions (25,000 men). In addition, a 2000-man naval regiment and a 4000-man brigade occupy the region.¹⁹ The Soviets have paid special attention to the peculiar needs of their northern ground forces, even to the extent of fielding a special troop carrier, the GT-T, designed to operate over marshy ground or snow.²⁰

Dr. Marian Leighton, who has spent more than twelve years studying Soviet strategy, believes that the Soviet military buildup on the Kola Peninsula far exceeds the requirements for a strictly defensive role:

Norway's Military Posture

Norway's national character provides a foundation for her military strength. A parliamentary democracy, Norway has a king who governs the land and also serves as the symbolic head of her armed forces.²² Norwegians proclaim that their foreign policy is characterized by the "desire of the people to live in peace and friendly cooperation with others." This desire is supported by two themes: protection of human rights and preservation of democratic ideals.²³ Not surprisingly, then, Norway's military forces are defensive. Although Norwegian economic constraints dictate a small armed service, public opinion generally supports the military. All able men are required to serve in the military for twelve months if service is performed in the Norwegian army, or fifteen months if in the air force or navy.²⁴ Approximately 64 percent of Norway's forces are conscripts; therefore, with only 36 percent of her military force as "professional" servicemen (those inductees who stay on beyond their required time), Norway's military has a continual training problem.²⁵ Indeed, by the time the recruit becomes fully trained, he is eligible for release from active duty.

Norway's peacetime force consists of approximately 40,000 men. A recall of past recruits would summon another 300,000.²⁶ Norway's reserves (members of the "Home Guard") number about 80,000, but since these men get only fifty hours of training a year,²⁷ their value in combat may be limited. As might be expected, most of Norway's active forces are based in the northern one-third of the country. One infantry brigade of 6500 men is in place there, and several more could be mobilized.²⁸ Also located in the north are one fighter squadron, one fighter-bomber squadron, a few reconnaissance and antisubmarine warfare aircraft, and a few naval vessels.²⁹ Of these northern forces, only the 500-man Norwegian Frontier Battalion mans the Norwegian-Soviet border.³⁰ Although reputed to be highly motivated, these men face a formidable threat to the east.

The Norwegian-Soviet border's natural features provide little protection for the country. The 150-mile-long border is marked for most of its length by the Pasvikelv River, which freezes solid in winter. A dam for a small hydroelectric station is located on a bend of the river where both banks are in Soviet territory. It is surely no accident that this particular dam was designed wide enough to allow tanks to cross.³¹ Realizing that the Soviets would have little difficulty crossing the border in the north with considerable forces, Norwegians feel that maintaining stable political relations with the Soviet Union is an imperative.

Norway's Political Pressures

Although Norway joined NATO in 1949,³² its relationship to the alliance continues to be a "marriage of convenience rather than one based on passion."³³ Norway supports the West, but she attempts to reassure the Soviets of her military restraint by adhering to the following policies:

• No foreign troops or bases on Norwegian soil in peacetime.

• No nuclear weapons in Norway's territory in peacetime.

• No allied maneuvers in the county of Finnmark.

• No allied naval or air activity east of 24 degrees east longitude (near Hammerfest, Norway).

• Warsaw Pact observers invited to military exercises.

• Upcoming maneuvers announced, even if the 25,000-man threshold (of the Helsinki Accords) is not exceeded.³⁴

Norway's Foreign Minister asserts that these policies take "account of the Soviet Union" in Norwegian foreign policy and are unilateral "confidence-inspiring measures."³⁵ Norway believes that her allegiance to NATO and her attempt to avoid antagonizing the Soviets are both crucial to her security. Norwegians also believe that a balance of attitudes among her Scandinavian neighbors adds to the region's security.

Finland and Sweden continually receive pressure from the Soviet Union and are therefore pleased with Norway's membership in NATO. Sweden's nonalignment policy agrees with that of Finland, and Finland's geographical location and military strength are viewed by Norway and Sweden as buffers between them and the Soviet Union.³⁶ This intricate balance of attitudes contributes to Norway's overall security and is important to Norwegians. Not fully confident of NATO's desire or ability to protect her, Norway contributes less money to NATO each year, preferring instead to use her limited funds to increase her own defense budget.³⁷ But only a few Norwegians believe that NATO's increasing inability to counter Moscow's growing harassment campaign brings diminishing returns on her investment in NATO and that, consequently, the benefits of membership in the alliance may not outweigh the risks.³⁸

Problems in the North

Whether or not Norway's membership in NATO is a "risk" is debatable, but continual pressures by the Soviets in the northern region may indeed drive NATO to provide the security that Norway wants for her participation in the alliance. Over the years, numerous Soviet actions in the northern cap have irritated Norway. If these annoyances continue, Norway may request increased assistance from NATO to ensure regional stability. Aware that such stability is critical to Norway's survival, NATO might respond with the additional assistance needed, which could range from political support to the stationing of equipment or even troops on Norwegian soil.

One area where continual political disagreements between Norway and the Soviet Union occur is the Svalbard Archipelago. The Spitsbergen Islands were placed under Norwegian protection by a 1920 treaty, which granted Norway and thirty-nine other signatories the right to exploit the area commercially. However, of the forty, only Norway and the Soviet Union have inhabited and explored the area, primarily for the purpose of mining coal.³⁹ The Soviet Union's Arktikugal Company has mining units at Barentsburg and Pyramiden, and Norway's sole company is located at Longyearbyen. The coal production for the countries is nearly equal (450,000 tons monthly), despite the fact that there are 2000 Soviet coal miners and only 1000 Norwegian coal miners in the region. Why are there twice the number of Soviets as Norwegians to produce about the same amount of coal? The Norwegians contend that the Soviet Union has alternate reasons for the number of miners--that is, the Soviets do not really need the coal but use the mining foothold to maintain a presence on Spitsbergen for some future use.⁴⁰ Regardless of why they are there, at times the Soviets have antagonized the Norwegians in the area.

A few years ago, Aeroflot was granted use of the Svalbard Airport. Six Soviets are permanently based there to service only one monthly flight, while Norway adequately services her weekly airline flights with only one attendant. The Soviets then brought the wives of four of the attendants to live on the island, an action openly defying the established policy of not allowing the wives of the miners to live on the island. The 1920 treaty also prohibits militarization of the archipelago, yet the Soviets have established what some observers have called a military colony at Barentsburg, complete with electric fences and security guards. Also, the Soviets have begun basing their civilian version of the Mi-8 Hip attack helicopter on the island. Norwegians allege that these helicopters are fitted with armament racks for future military use. Finally, the Soviets persist in paying lump-sum taxes for the Russians living on Spitsbergen, rather than individual tax payments as the treaty specifies.⁴¹ These (and other) harassing actions are not limited to the islands; they extend to the Barents Sea.

A continental shelf extending from the land mass of Northern Europe to the north of Spitsbergen forms the seabed of the Barents Sea. Norway claims that the ocean floor is an extension of her sovereign territory, which gives her full economic rights to the entire shelf. The Soviets contend that the political boundary between the two countries should be defined as a "sector line" drawn from the North Pole to the mainland's Norwegian-Soviet border, dividing the seas appropriately. This sector-line issue is closely related to the issue of the Disputed Area. Norway wants the region's political boundary determined by a "median line" drawn equidistant from sovereign lands. The difference in the area established by a sector line or a median line amounts to nearly 60,000 square miles of ocean, called the Disputed Area.⁴² Soviet ships taunt Norwegian shipping vessels in this area, and the Northern Fleet conducts exercises there. This Disputed Area issue continues to cause political unrest for the Norwegians, as does the issue of the Grey Zone.

North of Norway's mainland is an area called the Grey Zone, set aside through bilateral protocol for Soviet and Norwegian fishing. Provisions of the protocol allow other countries licensed by Norway or the Soviet Union to fish in this area. However, in 1978, the Soviets turned away two British trawlers licensed by Norway.⁴³ Other similar incidents have caused increasing tension in the area, and observers speculate that it may be only a matter of time before an incident occurs in which Norway might need NATO's assistance. That is an important issue, as Norway questions NATO's ability to respond and support Norway's defense of the northern cap.

NATO's Ability to
Defend the Northern Cap

Norway does have some valid concerns about NATO's ability to defend the northern region. Norway's policy of not allowing foreign bases on her soil hinders NATO's ability to keep the area secure or to ensure rapid reinforcements. Assuming that NATO agreed to support Norway militarily, what forces are available to deploy to Norway and what factors would make rapid, effective reinforcement difficult?

The Standing Naval Force, Atlantic (STANAVFORLANT), normally positioned off the northwestern coast of Europe, is the world's first permanent international naval squadron and is tasked to defend the north Atlantic.⁴⁴ Five NATO countries, including Norway, provide forces for STANAVFORLANT.⁴⁵ However, the fleet is relatively small and does not compare in size with the Soviets' Northern Fleet. Supporting STANAVFORLANT in the defense of northern Europe is the Allied Command Europe (ACE) Mobile Force. Eight NATO nations provide these Central Region air and ground forces, which could deploy to northern Norway rapidly, provide a "show of force" demonstrating NATO's resolve, and counter a Soviet thrust until reinforcements arrive.⁴⁶ Essential to the makeup of the ACE Mobile Force are marine forces from several allied nations, including the United Kingdom, Holland, and the United States.⁴⁷ These forces must be deployed as early as possible because rapid seizure of Norway's northern cap by adversary forces would create severe difficulties for allied reinforcements seeking to reestablish NATO's security in the region. Related to this necessarily rapid decision to deploy are questions regarding adequate reception facilities, prepositioning of stockpiles, and proper training for allied forces.⁴⁸

Host nation support and adequate seaports in the north are lacking; these matters need immediate attention.⁴⁹ Early positioning of supplies and equipment is crucial, and the land-based prepositioning program the United States Marine Corps is conducting currently in Norway is an excellent beginning.⁵⁰ However, although U.S. Marines train at two sites, the facilities, equipment, and support at these sites are inadequate. Recognizing that amphibious assaults need to be practiced constantly because of the difficult terrain and terrible weather, one Marine commander, who trained at these sites and then participated in several northern Norway exercises, expressed his concerns. For example, he indicated that amphibious landings were extremely difficult in the fjords and, even after landing, one unit progressed only thirty meters through deep snow after more than one and a half hours of intense effort because of the lack of proper snow-removal equipment. He concluded that much better equipment is vital if the Marines are to be successful in northern Norway.⁵¹

THE security of Norway's northern cap is essential to NATO's security. The alliance cannot afford to let Soviet harassment of Norway and the growth of Soviet forces in the northernmost Norwegian areas go uncontested, as the political and military ramifications of Soviet gains in the northern cap are tremendous. For example, if the Soviets seized Spitsbergen and NATO did not help Norway, other alliance members would have serious doubts about NATO's effectiveness. Militarily, the Soviets would gain significant strategic benefits from this improvement of their geographic position: Backfire bombers could reach the entire United States refueled;⁵² SS-20 missiles could operate as intercontinental missiles against North America;⁵³ and, the Northern Fleet would have unchecked, access to the Atlantic and would be able to interdict sea lines of communication between America and Europe easily.⁵⁴ Thus, quite apart from concerns regarding the alliance, the United States has substantial strategic interests in the situation in northern Norway.

It is imperative that NATO remain vigilant and continue to monitor the area very closely. NATO must continue to work with the Norwegian government to conduct more exercises in the area for the advantages these exercises offer in the realm of realistic training, to preposition crucial supplies, and to improve seaport facilities. The United States and other NATO members need to ensure that sufficient well-trained, well-equipped forces are available to deter Soviet encroachments and that these forces can be deployed rapidly if deterrence fails.

NATO bases its security in the north on a policy of deterrence designed to persuade the Soviets that an attack on Norwegian territory would incur costs greater than the potential gains they might obtain. However, Soviet analysts might decide that an attack on northern Norway would not mean automatic NATO involvement and could be limited to a Norwegian-Soviet confrontation. Accordingly, NATO must ensure that it can stand by its policy of reassurance.⁵⁵ To reassure its allies, NATO's future actions regarding the northern cap must be positive and convincing. The significance of maintaining security in this region and the resulting consequences if NATO ignores this strategic area cannot be overstated. One international relations expert emphasized the region's importance and placed the issue in the proper perspective when he observed: "World War III may not be won on the northern flank, but it could definitely be lost there."⁵⁶

1. Nils Orvik, Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1963), pp. 8-9.

2. Ola Veigaard and Elin Krog, editors, Facts about Norway (Oslo, Norway: Aftenposten, 1979), pp. 3-4.

3. Colonel Max B. Scheider, "The Significance of North Norway to NATO Military Strategy," Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania: U.S. Army War College Essay, 21 February 1973, p. 5.

4. Veigaard and Krog, p. 5.

5. Scheider, p. 6.

6. Colonel Gordon M. B. Livingston, The Political-Military Impact of a Soviet Naval Strategy upon Norway as a Member of NATO, Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College School of Naval Warfare Thesis, 15 April 197 1, pp. 15-16.

7. Kenneth A. Myers, North Atlantic Security: The Forgotten Flank? (Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1979), p. 45.

8. Frank Brenchley, Norway and Her Soviet Neighbor: NATO's Arctic Frontier (London: Institute for the Study of Conflict, 1982), p. 2.

9. Marian K. Leighton, The Soviet Threat to NATO's Northern Flank (New York: National Strategy Information Center, 1979), p. 7.

10. Patrick Wall, "The Svalbard Challenge," Sea Power, September 1982, p. 20.

11. Ibid., p. 20.

12. Myers, p. 31.

13. Leighton, p. 8.

14. Soviet Military Power, Second Edition (Washington: GPO, 83), p. 7.

15. Leighton, p. 9.

16. Soviet Military Power, p. 8.

17. Myers, p. 31.

18. Brenchley, p. 8.

19. Ibid., p. 8.

20. Myers, p. 30.

21. Leighton, pp. 6-7.

22. Veigaard and Krog, pp. 11 - 12.

23. Ibid., p. 18.

24. Ibid., p. 24.

25. Ragnhild Sohlberg, Defense Manpower Policy Anaylsis: NATO Ground Forces (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1980), p. 30-34.

26. Veigaard and Krog, p. 24.

27. Ibid., p. 26.

28. Sohlberg, pp. 58-59.

29. Wall, p. 24.

30. Brenchley, p. 8.

31. Ibid., p. 2.

32. NATO Handbook (Brussels: NATO Information Service, 82), p. 64.

33. Leighton, p. 53.

34. Ibid., pp. 5-6.

35. Ibid., p. 6.

36. Falk Bomsdorf, Norway's Northern Policy and the Soviet Union [originally Norwegens Nordpolitik und die Sowjetunion], contract translator (Washington: Navy Intelligence Support Center Essay, 1980), p. 4.

37. The 1980s: Decade of Confrontation? (Washington: Proceedings of the Eighth Annual National Security Affairs Conference, 81), pp. 180-81.

38. Leighton, p. 54.

39. Bomsdorf, p. 5.

40. Leighton, p. 15.

41. Ibid., pp. 13-19.

42. Captain Dale Daniel Devlin, Soviet-Norwegian Relations: Norwegian Reactions to Soviet Pressures (Monterey, California: Naval Postgraduate School Thesis, December 19791, pp. 54-57.

43. Devlin, p. 63.

44. NATO Handbook, p. 36.

45. Scheider, pp. 22-23. See also the information contained in the NATO Handbook to get a better idea of the NATO structure, allocation of forces, and command and control (STANAVFORLANT is referenced on p. 80 of the handbook).

46. Ibid., pp. 22-23.

47. Wall, p. 26.

48. Myers, p. 23.

49. United States Military Posture--FY 1984 (Washington: Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, 1983), p. 33.

50. Report of the Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1984 Budget, FY 1985 Authorization Request, and FY 1984-88 Defense Programs (Washington: U.S. Congress, GPO, 30 November 1983), p. 216.

51. Major Donald E. Mears, "The Cold Realities of Combat Service Support in Norway Winter Operations," (Norfolk: Armed Forces Staff College Major Writing Exercise, 3 May 1982), pp. 2-8.

52. Soviet Military Power, p. 25.

53. The World at Risk: A Year-end Assessment (Arlington: Association of the United States Army Special Report, 1982), p. 16.

54. NATO Troop Withdrawals (U.S. Congress. Hearing by the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Washington: GPO, 30 November 1982), p. 36.

55. Sohlberg, pp. 150-51.

56. Stanley R. Sloan, "NATO and Northern Europe: Perspectives on the Nordic Balance," NA TO Review, June 1981, p. 12.

Additional References

Furlong, R. D. M. "The Strategic Situation in Northern Europe: Improvements Vital for NATO," International Defense Review, June 1979, pp. 899-910.

O'Rourke, Major Rober J. "Marine Air Operations in Northern Europe," United States Naval Institute Proceedings, November 1980, pp. 53-59.

Orvik, Nils. Europe's Northern Cap and the Soviet Union (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Center for International Affairs, 1963).

        . NATO and the Northern Rim," NATO Review, April 1980, pp. 9-14.

Vaerno, Grethe. "Norway and the Atlantic Alliance 1948-1949." NATO Review, June 1981, pp. 16-20.

Lieutenant Colonel Robert E. Russell (B.S., Colorado State University; M.A., Troy State University) is Chief, Studies and Analysis Branch, Threat Analysis Division, Intelligence Center, Pacific. His previous assignments include F-15 instructor pilot, flight commander, public affairs officer, and Chief, Operational Plans Division, Bitburg Air Base, West Germany. Colonel Russell is graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Armed Forces Staff College.

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