Air University Review, September-October 1984

The Indian Air Force of the 1980s

modern clout in Southwest Asia

THE Indian Air Force (IAF), the largest air arm in non-Communist Asia, is engaged in an extensive modernization effort. For example, advanced combat aircraft, including the Soviet MiG-23 and 27 Flogger, Anglo-French Jaguar, and French Mirage 2000 are being assimilated by the IAF or soon will be added to its inventory. As a consequence, India will have the capability to overwhelm the Pakistani Air Force (PAF), despite the PAF's acquisition of forty F-16s; gain local air superiority in a conflict with China along their common border; and inflict significant damage on the navies of extraregional powers operating in waters adjacent to the subcontinent.

Command Structure

The IAF headquarters, located in New Delhi, consists of four principal branches: Air Staff (led by an air chief marshal designated as Chief of the Air Staff), Administration, Plans and Policy, and Maintenance.¹

Operational and support elements are organized into four geographic commands (Southwestern, Western, Central, and Eastern) and two functional commands (Training and Maintenance). The area commands direct some forty-five fixed-wing squadrons, fourteen helicopter units, and more than thirty SA-2/SA-3 squadrons.² The IAF's fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft inventory numbers 1400, of which approximately 635 are combat aircraft. Indian Air Force personnel strength is 113,000.³

Missions

The IAF has been tasked with the following responsibilities: air defense, long-range interdiction/counterair operations, close air support, reconnaissance, transport, and heliborne support.⁴

The Soviet MiG-21 is the numerically predominant interceptor in the IAF. Currently, India is replacing its MiG-21 FL Fishbed-D assets with the more advanced MiG-2 1bis Fishbed-N. The IAF has integrated the Matra 550 Magic close-combat missile with the "bis" variant and is endeavoring to upgrade this aircraft's radar, avionics, and vertical acceleration.⁵ India now is manufacturing the MiG-21bis under license; the production run of 150 units will be completed in the mid-1980s.

The MiG-21 fleet is being supplemented by variable-geometry MiG-23MF Flogger air superiority fighters. These aircraft are armed with the AA-7 Apex AAM, the AA-8 Aphid, and 23-mm cannon. Reportedly, the IAF will employ Floggers and Fishbeds in groups of six: two MiG-23MFs will attempt to down incoming aircraft with air-to-air missiles; and intruders eluding these Floggers will be met by four MiG-21s.⁶

Air defense resources will be augmented materially by the impending acquisition of forty Mirage 2000 multirole fighters. Early in 1985, IAF pilots will start ferrying the forty aircraft from France to India, with the last delivery scheduled for December 1986. New Delhi retains the option to assemble/coproduce an additional 110 aircraft, although it is unlikely that this option will be exercised.⁷

The Indian Mirage will be fitted with internally mounted electronic support measures (ESM) and electronic countermeasures (ECM) equipment. The aircraft will carry two 30-mm Defa cannon, along with two Matra 550 short-range and two Matra Super 530-D medium-range air-to-air missiles (AAMs). Alternatively, it can be loaded with 11,000 pounds of ordnance on nine external stations.⁸

The Mirage 2000 will be powered initially by the SNECMA M53-5 engine rated at 20,000-pound thrust, but later it will be retrofitted with the 22,000-pound-thrust M53-P2. Similarly, the Thomson-CSF RDM (multifunction Doppler) radar will be superseded in 1985 by the Thomson-CSF/Electronique Serge Dassault pulse-Doppler radar designated RDI.⁹ The RDI radar, mated with the Matra 530-D AAM, gives the Mirage 2000 a look down/shoot down capability.

In endeavoring to justify Mirage 2000 expenditures, government spokesmen have argued that Pakistan's acquisition of sophisticated American aircraft alters the balance of air power in the subcontinent. Therefore, it is necessary to procure the Mirage 2000 to serve as a counterpoise to the F-16. However, it is doubtful that the IAF leadership fully embraces this proposition.

The IAF is aware that, among air forces in the region, it enjoys an overwhelming superiority (both qualitative and quantitative) in virtually all categories of air weaponry and equipment. Indeed, this marked power asymmetry allowed the IAF to advocate conclusion of the Mirage 2000 agreement (while the aircraft still was under development) in the face of a late 1982-early 1983 F-16 delivery date. If F-16 deployment had been perceived as affecting Indo-Pakistani power relationships significantly in the near term, then the IAF probably would have supported one or more of the following policy alternatives: prompt off-the-shelf acquisition of an existing interceptor capable of carrying long-range AAMs and guns with a high rate of fire, significant expansion of the MiG-23MF procurement program, immediate purchase of advanced AAMS, and/or greatly accelerated upgrading of ground-based air defense systems.

Manned interceptors, in conjunction with SA-2/SA-3 squadrons, form one component of India's Air Defense Ground Environment system (ADGES).¹⁰ Other constituent elements include static and mobile radars, tropospheric scatter and microwave communication links, and regional air defense centers tasked with threat assessment and determination of appropriate responses. The ADGES, to be completed by the end of this decade, suffers from a number of shortcomings. First, the system may prove vulnerable to low-flying aircraft, especially those employing ECM. Second, terrain masking may prevent radar detection of intruding aircraft in hilly areas along the northern border. Third, there is insufficient redundancy in the ADGES communications network.¹¹ Nevertheless, the ADGES will furnish an air defense capability far exceeding that of any neighboring state.

In the event of hostilities with Pakistan, the IAF reportedly plans to attack command and control centers, all Pakistani Air Force main bases, and segments of the communication/ transportation infrastructure. The resulting immobilization of Pakistan's armed forces would be followed by strikes against major ground units.¹² The Jaguar, India's principal deep-penetration/ all-weather interdiction aircraft, would perform many of these missions. Two Jaguar squadrons now are operational; this force will expand to five squadrons by 1987.

Approximately 60 percent of the Jaguars to enter IAF service will be assembled in India. These aircraft will incorporate Adour Mk811 turbofan engines (affording 15-25 percent greater thrust than the original power plant), the Sagem Uliss 82 second-generation navigation/attack system, and two Matra 550 Magic AAMs carried on overwing pylons (thereby freeing the one fuselage and four underwing stations for a variety of ordnance options, including bombs of up to 1000 pounds, cluster munitions, and rocket pods). The Jaguar also may be fitted with the French Agave radar in order to increase its maritime interdiction capabilities.¹³

Indian planners anticipate that any future war with Pakistan will be a high-intensity, short-duration affair (partly because of likely diplomatic intervention by third parties). Consequently, the IAF is developing a powerful tactical strike force to facilitate rapid advances by ground elements. Offensive air support will be furnished by at least three MiG-23BN and eight MiG-27 squadrons, augmented by the MiG-21M Fishbed-J and Ajeet (an upgraded version of the British Gnat).¹⁴ Aging Hawker Hunter Mk 56, Sukhoi Su-7, and Hindustan Aeronautics Limited HF-24 Marut fighter-bombers are being removed from the inventory.

The MiG-23BN, already operational in the IAF, has a centerline GSh-23 cannon and six fuselage and underwing hardpoints, which can be loaded with a variety of ordnance ranking from iron bombs to ASMS. The MiG-27 Flogger-D, a dedicated ground-attack variant of the MiG-23, will be assembled (and, eventually, produced under license) in India. April 1984 is the target date for the assembly of the first MiG-27 by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited (HAL), a public-sector firm. In addition to a 23-mm cannon, the MiG-27 can carry up to 7716 pounds of external ordnance, including a mix of air-to-air and air-to-surface missiles.¹⁵

New Delhi's desire to enhance its information-gathering capabilities (especially concerning Pakistani and Chinese military installations and troop disposition in border areas) led to the 1981 purchase of Soviet MiG-25R Foxbat reconnaissance aircraft. Reconnaissance tasks also are discharged by Jaguars fitted with photoreconnaissance pods, Canberra PR Mk 57s, and camera and sensor-equipped HS-748 Avros. Maritime reconnaissance responsibilities were transferred to the Indian Navy in the mid-1970s.¹⁶

The multiplicity and obsolescence of transport aircraft types, along with concomitant difficulties in spare parts procurement, have served to degrade IAF operational readiness in the airlift area. The IAF transport fleet in the main consists of 1940s-vintage C-47 Dakotas; Fairchild C119Gs (nicknamed "flying coffins" by Indian aircrews), which entered service in 1952 and were to have been retired in 1967; An- 12 Cubs, scheduled for retirement in 1975, but which will remain in the inventory until the late 1980s; Caribous; and Otters. Serviceability rates of these aircraft are quite low. For example, in 1982 all C-19s and many C-47s were grounded because of metal fatigue and wing spur cracks.¹⁷ Few Caribous are airworthy at any time. These circumstances, in turn, have placed a considerable burden on the two An-12 squadrons. Intensive use of the IAF's thirty-odd Cubs (e.g., transporting supplies to troops in Ladakh and lifting paramilitary forces to assist in suppression of domestic violence) has resulted in availability levels as low as 20 percent.¹⁸

The IAF is attempting to remedy this situation by procuring appreciable numbers of modern transport aircraft. The Air Force has ordered approximately 100 Soviet An-32 Cline medium transports to replace the C-119s and Caribous. The An-32 is a rear-loading STOL aircraft able to paradrop men and equipment. The An-12is to be superseded by the Soviet I1-76 Candid heavy transport. Finally, a defense committee has selected the Dornier Do 228-200 light transport to assume communication, liaison, and utility duties presently handled by C-47s and Otters.¹⁹

Some airlift support is provided by IAF rotary-wing aircraft, such as the Soviet Mi-8 Hip. The Mi-8, which can lift twenty-eight troops or as much freight as the C-47, plays an important logistic support role in northern and northeastern India. Further, many of the more than sixty Hips in service are armed with 57-mm rocket pods to provide close air support for army units.

The IAF helicopter inventory also includes the SA 316B Alouette III (renamed Chetak) and the SA 315B Lama (renamed Cheetah)--French helicopters manufactured under license in India. A number of the approximately 150 IAF Chetaks are fittedwithAS-11 antitank guided missiles. In addition to its antitank responsibilities, the Chetak is tasked with communication and liaison missions. The Cheetah performs a variety of activities in mountainous areas and, organized into airborne observation post flights, assists in directing Indian Army artillery fire.²⁰

The IAF has a requirement for a multipurpose advanced light helicopter (ALH). Such a helicopter was to be designed and produced by Hindustan Aeronautics Limited; however, changes in IAF design parameters, inadequacies of HAL's engineering staff, and a generally dilatory approach to project decisionmaking have slowed ALH development for a decade. Consequently, India is purchasing Soviet Mi-24 Hind gunships as an interim step.²¹ However, rather than being an interim step, the Hind purchase may indicate termination of indigenous helicopter design/ fabrication efforts.

Relationship with Other Services

Indian Air Force interaction with the Indian Navy and Army is marked by both conflict and cooperation. Protracted jurisdictional battles have been fought with the Navy over maritime patrol and interdiction. In the mid-1970s, the following compromise was reached: the Navy assumed responsibility for reconnaissance missions, while maritime interdiction remained under IAF control. However, IAF control of this interdiction mission may prove nominal at best, as the Navy's air arm rapidly is augmenting its inventory of advanced antishipping weaponry by procuring such systems as the Sea Eagle longrange missile (to be carried by Westland Sea King helicopters). In addition to this clash with the Navy, the IAF is engaged in a dispute with the Army about helicopters. The Indian Army is endeavoring to bring IAF helicopter assets within its organizational purview, arguing that most rotary-wing aircraft perform ground force support functions. Furthermore, its leaders suggest that their service's combat effectiveness would be enhanced greatly by integration of attack helicopters with mechanized infantry, armor, and heliborne troops. The IAF rejects the "major user" principle, asserting that all air activity must be coordinated by one service.²²

Despite these policy disharmonies, the military leadership recognizes that India's strategic environment demands increased interservice cooperation. As a result, the number of joint service exercises has increased dramatically. For example, a large amphibious warfare exercise was held in the Nicobar Islands during April 1983. Indian Air Force participation included preinvasion strikes by Canberra medium bombers, evaluation of damage levels by photoreconnaissance, and rocket attacks against enemy positions by Mi-8 helicopters.²³ More significantly, the first triservice command has been established in the Andaman and Nicobar Island chain. Headed by a naval officer reporting to Eastern Naval Command, this organization has been assigned several ships, an army brigade, and, in the future, a fighter squadron.

IAF Capabilities

Traditionally, Indian defense planning has focused on the threats presented by Pakistan and China. The IAF appears capable of fulfilling its combat missions against either of these potential adversaries.

In an Indian-Pakistani conflict, there would be a pronounced disparity in IAF-PAF strength levels. For example, India enjoys a substantial numerical advantage in sophisticated fighters and fighter-bombers. In contrast, the obsolescent F-6, a Chinese version of the MiG-19, forms the major part of Islamabad's interceptor/ground attack force. Beyond this, the IAF surpasses the PAF in virtually all operational and support areas, ranging from command, control, and communications (C³) and electronic warfare (EW) to logistics. If India and Pakistan engage in a fourth war, it is likely that the IAF would defeat the PAF in short order.

Indian Air Force weapon systems and equipment also are qualitatively superior to those of the People's Republic of China, but China's combat aircraft far outnumber those of the IAF. Nevertheless, in a Sino-Indian conflict, China probably would not be able to apply all her air resources against the IAF. First, few Chinese airfields are close enough to the Indian border to permit effective operations. Second, those bases that are near India have not been upgraded in terms of support facilities, and this deficiency would impede Chinese efforts to reposition units. Finally, aircraft deployed to Tibet would be hampered by high-altitude takeoffs, which would decrease munitions loads and increase fuel consumption. In contrast, New Delhi has been assiduous in concentrating air and ground forces against China. Thus, many IAF squadrons are located within striking distance of the China-India frontier. Assuming meteorological conditions in the Himalayas do not preclude flight operations, the IAF should prove able to gain local air superiority in an Indian-Chinese conflict.

In addition to security concerns generated by Pakistan and China, New Delhi is disquieted both by the presence of extraregional powers in waters contiguous to India²⁴ and by the vulnerability of its island possessions. While the Navy must assume primary responsibility for defense of offshore areas, the Air Force will perform significant duties as well. Thus, a fighter squadron is to be stationed in the Andamans, and a squadron also may be placed in the Lakshadweep chain.²⁵ Island-based units probably will consist of Jaguars fitted with advanced antishipping weaponry. IAF maritime interdiction resources, along with the Indian Navy's Sea Harriers and Sea Kings armed with third-generation Sea Eagle missiles, will constitute a formidable threat to forces operating in the Indian Ocean.

Future Procurement Activity

If India's civilian leadership maintains or increases present IAF funding levels, Air Headquarters is likely to seek further force modernization, including acquisition of the following systems: an airborne early-warning system to provide look down acquisition and integrated battle management capabilities; precision and standoff munitions to ensure high kill ratios and minimize exposure of costly strike aircraft; sophisticated ECM equipment;²⁶ a "Wild-Weasel"-type electronic defense suppression system; a state-of-the-art air superiority fighter, such as the Soviet MiG-29 Fulcrum (reportedly, New Delhi has purchased a number of MiG-29s, which may enter the IAF inventory by the end of 1984); a domestically manufactured light combat aircraft to replace the Ajeet and Hunter; and an advanced remotely piloted vehicle to deliver ordnance in hostile air defense environments.²⁷

THE IAF has become one of the world's strongest air forces, a fact that must be appreciated by any of India's potential military adversaries. India's increased air power, in conjunction with the ambitious modernization programs of her Army and Navy, not only will reinforce India's national security but enhance her ability to attain foreign policy goals. For example, it affords New Delhi the means to impose stability on island-states in the Indian Ocean-an important option for India, given the recent communal violence in Sri Lanka. It also permits New Delhi to assist threatened Indian nationals, or citizens of Indian descent, in countries along the Indian Ocean littoral.²⁸ Further, as part of India's overall arms buildup, IAF modernization provides a military underpinning for Indian claims of middle-power status in the context of global interaction.

Notes

1. A. W. Grazebrook, "'The Armed Forces of the Asia Pacific Region: No. 5--Why Is India's Big Navy Still Expanding," Pacific Defense Report, August 1983, p. 11.

2. The Indian Air Force and Its Aircraft (London: Ducimus Books, 1982), p. 5. Hereafter referred to as The Indian Air Force.

3. "The Military Balance 1982-83," Asian Defense Journal, January 1983, pp. 40-41.

4. The Indian Air Force, p. 5.

5. Ibid., pp. 6, 54; G. C. Katoch, "Defense of the Skies: No Room for Half Measures," Statesman (Calcutta newspaper), 1 June 1983, p. 4.

6. Ravi Rikhye "The F-16 Again," Indian Express (Bombay newspaper), 12 January 1983, p. 1.

7. "Air Force to Begin Introduction of Mirage 2000 Fighter," Statesman, 5 September 1983, p. 11.

8. Ibid.

9. Jeffrey M. Lenorovitz, "France, India Complete Mirage 2000 Buy," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 26 April 1982, pp. 24-25.

10. The Army, which is responsible for air defense under 5000 feet, controls SA-6, SA-7, Tigercat, and AAA assets.

11. Katoch, p. 1.

12. Ravi Rikhye, "New Pak Threat to India's Security," Times of India (Bombay newspaper), 7 January 1982, p. 4.

13. "Supply of Jaguars from UK Completed," Asian Defense Journal, February 1983, p. 87. India is the first country to integrate successfully an air-to-air missile on the overwing pylon of a fighter aircraft.

14. Rikhye, "The F-16 Again," p. 1.

15. "India Gets Equipment for MiG-27 Production," Patriot (New Delhi newspaper), 6 June 1983, p. 4.

16. The Indian Air Force, pp. 7-8.

17. "Air Force Grounds Dakota, Fairchild Aircraft," Times of India, 14 February 1983, p. 5.

18. Shekhar Gupta, "Distress Signals," India Today, 31 August 1983, p. 88.

19. "India Selects Do 228 Again," International Defense Review, August 1983, p. 1030.

20. The Indian Air Force, pp. 10, 52, 61.

21. Ibid., p. 10.

22. H. K. Dua, "Government Drags Feet on Army Air Wing," Indian Express, 1 April 1983, p. 7.

23. R. S. Bhandari, "Amphibious Warfare," Sainik Samachar (military journal published in New Delhi), 28 August 1983, pp. 22-23.

24. India's desire to exclude both U.S. and Soviet forces from the Indian Ocean is suggested by a statement in the most recent annual Report of the Ministry of Defense: "The intense and rapidly growing military activities of the Major Powers in the Indian Ocean have serious implications for us." Government of India, Ministry of Defense, Report: 1982-83,1983, p. 2.

25. "Lakshadweep Being Developed as Defense Base," Newsmag, 16 April 1983, p. 31.

26. IAF doctrine reportedly calls for two ECM-equipped aircraft, along with four other escorts, to accompany fighter-bombers on strike missions. Typical missions will involve sixteen aircraft, attacking targets in waves of four at thirty-second intervals. Rikhye, "F-16 Again," p. 1.

27. Ashley J. Tellis, "IAF's Tasks for Tomorrow," Times of India, 11 June 1982, p. 4. In recent years, New Delhi has acquired weaponry from a number of West European states. However, the Soviet Union remains India's principal arms supplier. Given Moscow's willingness to offer highly favorable terms in arms transactions (e.g., payment in Rupees, at concessionary interest rates, over seventeen years following an initial seven-year grace period), this pattern probably will continue.

28. Grazebrook, p. 25.

First Lieutenant Jerrold F. Elkin (B.A., Temple University; J.D., Columbia University; M.A., Ph.D., University of Pennsylvania) is a Political Science Instructor at the U.S. Air Force Academy. He has served as an analyst in the Directorate of Research, Defense Intelligence Agency, Washington, D.C., Lieutenant Elkin's earlier writings have been published in the Air Force Law Review, Biochimica et Biophysica Acta, and the Review.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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