Air University Review, September-October 1984

Informal Doctrine and the
Doctrinal Process: A Response

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew

WHEN one reads Major General I. B. Holley's article one begins to understand the enviable reputation of this remarkable man.* General Holley retired recently from the Air Force Reserve after a long and distinguished military career. But there is more to I. B. Holley than meets the eye. He holds the title "Professor," which accurately indicates his standing as a teacher at the highest academic level. But Professor Holley is also Doctor Holley, a scholar of the highest rank, known for his original research and numerous publications. In all three roles, he has been an inspiration to those in the military-academic community.

His well-thought-out article is concisely constructed and elegantly written. More important, he is absolutely correct: throughout the literature concerning military doctrine, semantic problems confuse readers and muddle issues. In Clausewitzian terms, semantic inaccuracies form a linguistic fog of war. Professor Holley's article clears away much of the fog and makes a significant contribution to our understanding of doctrine and related subjects.

I believe, however, that Professor Holley does not place enough importance on what he calls "informal doctrine" and its place in the doctrine development process. Informal doctrine is the result of repeated experiences that produce similar results and subsequently produce beliefs--sometimes personal, sometimes broadly held--about what usually works best. One would assume, given the state of Air Force doctrinal publications, that these informal doctrinal beliefs are much more ubiquitous than officially blessed doctrines. One might also assume that these informal beliefs are more timely, more accurate, and more useful than officially sanctioned doctrine, which must suffer through the travails of bureaucratic coordination and compromise before publication.

On the other hand, informal doctrinal beliefs may not be accurate and useful. Those who hold such beliefs may have an experience base that is shallow (i.e., repetitions too limited to draw accurate generalizations). The experience base might also be too narrow (e.g., combating only one kind of enemy aircraft) to be generalized. Unfortunately, those who hold informal doctrinal beliefs based on insufficient data will rarely realize the shortcomings of their beliefs until too late--a situation that can lead to excessive combat losses and eventual defeat.

This dual nature of informal doctrine (easily developed, but with a high possibility of error) puts the process of developing official doctrine and the importance of official doctrine in a new light. The doctrine development process must evaluate informal doctrine and separate the wheat from the chaff. Well-founded informal doctrinal beliefs must be sorted out from the plethora of half-baked ideas that permeate large and diffuse organizations. The official doctrine that results from the development process becomes the vehicle for inculcating well-founded beliefs throughout the force. Everyone must know, in Professor Holley's words, what "pattern of behavior will probably lead to the desired result." Thus, those who develop and publish official doctrine face a difficult task and bear a critically important responsibility.

Inherent in the process of turning informal doctrine based on field experience into official doctrine is the notion that official doctrine should "bubble up" from below rather than be imposed from above. I have argued elsewhere that there are various levels of doctrine, which are distinguished and defined by their levels of abstraction.¹ Although it is difficult to translate field experience and the doctrinal beliefs derived therefrom directly into the more abstract levels of doctrine, operational doctrine should issue directly from generalizations based on field experience.² To base it on anything else is to run the risk of producing ineffective and perhaps fatal dogma rather than doctrine.

How does one let doctrinal beliefs bubble up to be evaluated and officially blessed? The dynamic changes of German tactical doctrine during World War I provide an excellent model.³ The development of elastic defensive methods in 1916-17 and the development of the so-called Hutler offensive tactics in 1917-18 were the direct result of the German High Command's solicitation of ideas from battlefield units. Although Germany was strategically unsuccessful in the war, both of these doctrinal changes were masterpieces of successful doctrine at the tactical level.

All of this leads us to a set of difficult questions. Do we recognize the pervasiveness of informal doctrine? Does our official doctrine bubble up from informal doctrine? Do we actually ask our warriors in field units for their beliefs about what usually works best? How do we sort out sound beliefs from those that are unsound? Who does the sorting, and what biases do they bring to the task? When our doctrinal beliefs are based on exercises, maneuvers, and war gaming rather than on actual combat, do we understand and consider the assumptions, biases, and limitations of those simulations that may have colored the results? Do we recognize that although our exercises have considerable value they are always poor imitations of actual combat--or do we seduce ourselves into thinking that mock combat portrays reality accurately? The answers to these questions will cast considerable light on the Air Force doctrinal development process and on the value of the official doctrine developed by that process.

Professor Holley has made a significant contribution to our understanding of a very complex subject. However, his greatest service has been to raise additional questions of considerable importance. Indeed, there is more to Professor Holley--and more to his article--than meets the eye.

*Major General I. B. Holley, Jr., USAFR (Ret), "Concepts, Doctrines, Principles: Are You Sure You Understand These Terms?" Air University Review, July-August 1984, pp. 90-93.

1. For a more complete explanation, see Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew, "Of Trees and Leaves: A New View of Doctrine," Air University Review, January-February 1982, pp. 40-48.

2. Although the Air Force calls this level of doctrine "operational doctrine," the term "organizational doctrine" is used in "Of Trees and Leaves" (see note 1).

3. Timothy T. Lupfer, "The Dynamics of Doctrine: The Changes in German Tactical Doctrine during the First World War," Leavenworth Papers, No. 4, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth, Kansas, July 1981.

Colonel Drew is Deputy Director for Research, Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Air University.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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