Air University Review, November-December 1984

Beyond Deterrence:
the Strategic Defense Option

FOR the first time in more than thirty years, U.S. officials at the highest levels are giving serious consideration to a new strategic concept, one that would carry us far beyond the idea of deterrence by the end of this century. As President Reagan expressed in an address to the nation on 23 March 1983, "What if a free people could live secure in the knowledge that their security did not rest upon the threat of instant U.S. retaliation to deter a Soviet attack, that we could intercept and destroy strategic ballistic missiles before they reached our own soil or that of our Allies?" While acknowledging the formidable technical tasks involved, he concluded by announcing a long-range research effort toward making that security goal a reality. Soon after, a high-level Pentagon executive committee was set up to oversee administration efforts, headed by Deputy Secretary of Defense Paul Thayer.¹

Predictably, the reactions to the President's announcement were mixed. The address itself was quickly dubbed his "star wars" speech. One editorial cartoonist portrayed Mr. Reagan with Artoo Detoo and E.T. at his side, saying ". . . and we've assembled a crack team of experts to advise on the project." Another commentator claimed that the President had "alarmed our foes, baffled our allies, and bewildered our friends, while political opponents suggested that the proposal was the child of expediency, intended to rescue a beleaguered defense budget, regain momentum in Congress for the MX, preempt nuclear freeze efforts, or cover for the lack of results in the strategic arms reduction talks (START) and intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) negotiations.²

Other observers have suggested that more is involved. Reportedly, the President has a deep personal commitment to the full exploitation of our growing capabilities in space.³ To him and others, the proposal for a space-based ballistic missile defense represents an attempt to break out of the "balance of terror" philosophy that has overshadowed public life for more than thirty years. "Mutual assured survival" has a powerful psychological appeal; it strikes the imagination at the same time that it allays our fears. A former State Department official was quoted as observing, "A president ought to see the national interest in broad perspective and set positive goals. If he correctly senses the national need, the experts can be put back to work solving the technical problems."⁴

Currently, the U.S. political and military community is not committing the nation to anything beyond a serious look at the options. Strategic deterrence, as it has been generally understood, will remain recognizably the same organizing concept around which U.S. forces and planning will be designed for the rest of the 1980s. But what about the end of the century, the specific timeframe mentioned in the President's speech?

Two deep-seated historical imperatives converge in the answer to that question. The first is the age-old oscillation between offense and defense as the dominant military characteristic of a given strategic era. No weapon, from the crossbow to the battleship, has ever enjoyed more than a brief period of tactical hegemony; and strategies too tightly wedded to such systems risk rapid obsolescence themselves if not adapted to changing conditions. The second imperative is the inveterate if regrettable tendency of humankind to carry its conflicts wherever it goes. With the launching of Sputnik, the world stepped over the threshold into outerspace. Predictably, military theorists and strategists began to look to space for military purposes, including combat.

Both tendencies find concrete expression in the President's idea of a space-based defense against ballistic missiles, or DABM, as it has come to be known in Pentagon shorthand. Thus it is not too early to consider in greater detail some of the implications of this departure from the models and assumptions that have shaped U.S. defense policies since the end of World War II.

The Short-Run Issues:
Treaties and Mind-Sets

The first questions that planners must consider when contemplating a shift in any strategy concern its impact on the status quo. Thus one of the early issues raised about DABM was whether the President's proposal ran afoul of current U.S. treaty obligations. Specifically, critics have voiced concern that a space-based antimissile defense would violate the 1967 Outer Space Treaty and the 1972 ABM Treaty (SALT I).⁵

Charges that DABM research constitutes a breach of U.S. international obligations appear on closer examination to lack foundation. The only limit that the Outer Space Treaty places on orbiting stations of terrestrial origin is that they cannot carry weapons of mass destruction, a term which does not extend to lasers, particle-beam or directed-energy systems, or high explosives.⁶ Similarly, the ABM Treaty was never intended to straitjacket either side into an unrealistic strategic situation. The primary purpose of SALT I was to provide a breathing space and create a better negotiating climate for continuing discussions on strategic offensive weapons limits. Indeed, in a formal statement printed with the treaty, the head of the U.S. delegation declared that a failure to achieve such an agreement within five years would in itself constitute a basis for withdrawal from the agreement.⁷ To the extent that the ABM Treaty has succeeded in maintaining some degree of stability for the past ten years, the treaty deserves high regard. But the real worth of that accomplishment depends on what the signatories do with the time purchased. If continuing strategic developments render it obsolete in another five or ten years, and if it cannot be modified in ways satisfactory to the two signatories, it could then be decently laid to rest without great regret. From the beginning, it was seen by its drafters as simply one step in a long process. It was never intended to bind for all time.

If, for the present, DABM does not offend against our treaty obligations, what about its clash with the rationale underlying the status quo? Certainly, in terms of the orthodoxy of deterrence, DABM is clearly heretical.

This second issue can be most succintly described as a variant on the old problem that "No man puts new wine in old wineskins, lest they burst and split asunder." Our imaging of the unknown future is always conditioned by the known present. This gap means that we have many wrong ideas about the military role of space--or, rather, ideas that were valid in the old context but are less so in the new.

Since a changed future plays havoc with an established present, the peddlers of new wine are often viewed with suspicion by those with a significant investment in old wineskins. In the 1920s, General William "Billy" Mitchell first perceived the impact of air power on naval war, much as Major Charles de Gaulle came to appreciate the importance of tank forces in changing the conduct of future land war in the 1930s. Both became virtual pariahs within their respective defense establishments on account of these correct but heterodox views.

It is tempting to dramatize the conflict in terms of meanspirited but well-entrenched villains versus farseeing heroes, but doing so would be less than just to both sets of players. The problem is that the advocates of a new advance, the full outlines of which can be but dimly perceived, are necessarily tentative (or near-hysterical) in articulating how it will make sense in terms of the old matrix; for it is precisely the change in context that enables the new ideas to come into their own. The defenders of this status quo, on the other hand, may well be persons of vision and liberal spirit, but in a given military establishment it is they who must bear the responsibility for maintaining the nation's present security until that broadly beaming future comes.⁸

In other words, new wine is seldom worth it from the context of those currently holding the old wineskins. Even when possible payoffs can be suggested, they are more easily refuted or dismissed than accepted. Embracing the revolutionary innovation requires a good deal of faith on the part of its backers, even when they are correct--and they are not always correct.

Herein lies the problem for the present set of managers, and it is difficult not to sympathize with their apparent obduracy. At the same time, it could be perilous to let that mind-set prevail.

The Midrange:
Politics and Issues

The midrange period (1985-95) is likely to be most influenced by political considerations if the DABM concept takes hold, as publics and governments become widely aware that a major new development is at hand. We shall need to pay particular attention to the reactions of the Soviets, of our allies, and of American domestic opinion.

Of the three, the Soviets will be the least surprised. Highly active in the military applications of space themselves, they are fully aware of the unfolding reality of a U.S. space effort and the possibilities of the medium in general. Their main reaction may be bewilderment about why it has taken the United States so long to grasp the obvious military implications of a long-standing but largely civilian space effort.

The Soviets took the success of the Apollo moon landing program much more to heart than did the American public. They saw our space feats as evidence of what a far wealthier and technologically more advanced United States can do, once it puts its mind to it. But the Soviets also believe that U.S. strategic thinking, lacking the scientific basis of Marxism-Leninism, is hopelessly muddled and self-contradictory, in contrast to the rigorously objective quality of their own military and political doctrine. The American government, they believe, while powerful, is hardly able to follow consistent, long-term policies--a result of the inevitable contradictions that doom capitalist society to eventual failure in the competition with socialism.

Thus a "turtle and hare" model of American decision making tends to color Soviet thinking. The military potential of the West is not underestimated, nor are its economic and technological strengths; like the rabbit in the fable, it can run faster. But the West is also more scatterbrained and, unless prodded, will not be able to pull itself together to make a serious national effort to save itself. The best strategy for the turtle, then, is to keep plodding away, at the same time doing as little as possible to stimulate the competition to more strenuous effort.

If this interpretation of the Soviet view is accurate, then we may expect them to try to do as much as they can to head off a full-blown U.S. space defense effort. Soon after the Reagan speech, Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko approached the U.S. government to suggest discussions on DABM but indicated that the Soviets wanted to focus on the dangerous aspects of a new "arms race in space."⁹ While escalating their anti-U.S. propaganda effort, particularly in Europe, the Soviets will try at the same time to allay U.S. fears. To this end, they could prove quite willing to explore or even demand space arms control negotiations.

The Soviets will no doubt reappraise their own considerable military space program as we move into that arena, and we may well see some increase in their effort. It is reasonable to expect that they would give particular attention to the elaboration of new strategic offensive systems in an effort to stay ahead of any defenses we might deploy and that they will also give high priority to increasing their antisatellite (ASAT) and related capabilities. These areas already command a substantial investment of Soviet resources; they will probably not mount a sudden surge effort or crash program. On the other hand, at the highest levels of Soviet leadership there will certainly be both a keen appreciation of the importance of these programs and a corresponding desire to exploit fully the gains that result.¹⁰

This whole relatively nonthreatening "business as usual" scenario might suddenly grow much more ominous, however, if the Soviets came to believe that they had a commanding lead over U.S. space efforts. At that point, the Soviets might consider imposing a unilateral space disarmament regime on the United States, by force if necessary, particularly if it appeared that they were in danger of being overtaken. Already the buildup of Soviet "killer satellites," combined with an increase in international tension, leaves our space capability quasi-dependent on the goodwill of a hostile adversary. The diplomatic consequences or risk of strategic retaliation from what would amount to an undeclared war in space would be much more manageable for the Soviets than would the consequences of any interference with U.S. ground installations or forces, particularly if no American lives were lost. Indubitably, the Soviets would try to rally world opinion behind them by claiming to be acting in the interests of global peace.

It is less easy to generalize about the reactions of our allies to DABM. European leaders were caught off balance by the President's 23 March speech but generally interpreted his announcement as a setback to hopes for stabilizing the arms race. Some worried that DABM would be ineffective against Soviet tactical nuclear weapons, while others feared that a Soviet counterpart would work only too well, canceling out British and French retaliatory capabilities. In either case, Europe would be left exposed, reinforcing the perennial anxiety as to how far the United States would go on behalf of its European allies.¹¹ The continuing furor over cruise missile and Pershing II deployments in Europe adds to the unsettled state of intra-alliance relations.

We should not expect DABM to counter the long-term drift toward greater European independence, which is essentially a generational phenomenon. While it could be argued that a system which protects the United States would make Washington more willing to stand up for alliance interests, Europeans tend to feel that the only reliable guarantee of U.S. backing is a continued partnership in risk, in which we see Europe's vulnerability as an extension of our own. In addition, Europeans would be concerned about the commercial implications of a new U.S. space effort, given their own growing interest in commercial exploitation of space.

European governments will face a multitude of choices within three broad options: they can support the United States in this effort, in exchange for a share in the benefits but at an unwelcome political cost; they can pursue space enterprises on their own, possibly more along civilian/commercial lines than military application, as a component of a "Europe first" policy; or they can decide to do without space endeavors, thereby avoiding the political and economic costs associated with either of the first two options.

The actual choices within those three broad patterns will, one suspects, often be at cross-purposes within and among governments. We can thus expect that specific reactions to DABM will vary widely from country to country and over a span of time. Whatever the eventual outcome, DABM will represent another fertile source of European exasperation with the United States in the meantime.

Japan may wish to go shares with the United States, participating in a partnership to which Japanese technology, resources, and geography would have much to contribute. Japanese industry would benefit in having access to the resulting know-how, particularly where it might have commercial applications. Conversely, Tokyo could decide that a realistic missile defense is not possible, given Japan's proximity to the national territory of the Soviet Union and China, its two most likely adversaries, and so remain uninvolved.¹²

As with allied reactions, it would be foolhardy to predict the mood of the American public five to ten years hence. Despite the current stridency of the peace lobby, the inward-looking, antimilitary attitude of the 1970s has begun to change. The year-long drama of the embassy hostages in Iran drove home the wisdom of Machiavelli's precept that it is better to be feared than loved. If the Soviet leadership carries through with the late Premier Andropov's threat to station Soviet missiles close to U.S. borders if no agreement can be reached on intermediate-range nuclear forces, American opinion could shift quite rapidly and dramatically in favor of DABM. Spectacular Soviet achievements in space, particularly if their military implications are clear, and attempts by the Soviet government to capitalize politically on that potential would also spur public support for a comparable U.S. effort.

On the other side, the realignment of force structures associated with a shift from deterrence to strategic defense will be tremendously expensive, perhaps the most costly single undertaking the United States has ever attempted.¹³ Current estimates for a space-based defense run from $50 billion total, which most observers see as unrealistically low, to upward of $500 billion, over the life of the program.¹⁴ Those who are opposed to increased government spending in general, or defense spending in particular, will be quick to mobilize forces in opposition to DABM.

How the matter is handled among the military services will also affect the potential for public and congressional support. The dispute need not follow strict service lines. Within the traditional military services, those who feel DABM will come out of their hides will oppose it, while those who see it as enlarging their turf will support it. If a significant group of dissenting military leaders should emerge, their voices would add important legitimacy to the antistrategic defense case.¹⁵

The creation of a unified command for space, on the other hand, would give DABM supporters a much needed institutional and conceptual coherence. According to unofficial reports, the Joint Chiefs of Staff have already sent such a recommendation to the President, but only after the Navy obtained a two-year delay in implementation in order to give their own newly established space command time to develop. As the Washington Post reported, "A unified command would represent a victory for the Air Force, which would probably take the lead in its formation. Air Force officials have argued that a unified command could lobby more successfully for funds in Congress and would clearly establish space as a significant arena for military research and operations."¹⁶

Above all, much will depend on how our top political leadership conceives and articulates the place of DABM in the sweep of current history. Two days after his initial speech on the subject, President Reagan gave some indication of the potential strength of his position in a news conference, in which he commented:

The quicker we start the better. But it is inconceivable to me that we can go on thinking down the future--not only for ourselves in our lifetime but for other generations--that the great nations of the world will sit here like people facing themselves across a table each with a cocked gun, and no one knowing whether someone might tighten the finger on the trigger.¹⁷

The Long-Range Outlook:
Strategy and Vision

To think through the strategic concepts according to which we might evaluate DABM's technical possibilities is also necessary, or else, once again, technology will drive strategy--which has been a recurring major problem in U.S. defense policy. Two issues here are paramount: the impact of "assured survival" on strategic stability and the possible contribution of DABM to the emerging international order and security of the twenty-first century.

The conventional wisdom for the last decade and a half has held that strategic stability rests on the ability of either superpower to guarantee that, no matter what the other side did, it would be able to strike back. As long as both parties possessed this capability, the resultant potential for mutual assured destruction (MAD) would stay the hands of both.

When an effective ICBM defense is introduced into the calculus, it can be argued that MAD would no longer be viable or, more precisely, that the threat of destruction would no longer be mutual: the side with the shield could strike with impunity.

In this kind of strategic environment, the effect of strategic defense depends on what targets are protected and the symmetry of the two opponents' defensive capabilities. If the defense system protects only the country's strategic offensive forces while both sides have roughly comparable offensive and defensive capabilities, we are in effect back to MAD, though at a more sophisticated level of hardware. However, if we are talking about a more comprehensive antiballistic missile defense in depth--one that protects population centers as well as strategic targets (presumably any system that has the former capability can also perform the latter job)--the situation is different if both sides have it. Then we have moved to a far safer situation than MAD. The balance is stable, and, more important, the threat of ICBM attack is lessened.

The circumstance provoking serious problems is that in which one side develops an effective ICBM defense earlier than the other side does. To begin with, the technological lead would be highly precarious, for whichever side lacked such a defense would give high priority to catching up. Yet to argue that DABM will lead to an arms race in space assumes that the Soviets are not already concentrating significant efforts in this area. In reality, a stepped-up U.S. effort will not "force" the Soviets to do much more than they are already doing. If the United States were in the dominant strategic position, we could expect the Soviets to compensate in other areas, such as increasing their conventional forces as they did in the post-World War II years or in deploying missile-carrying submarines off U.S. coasts.

This situation also suggests the possibility of striking a bargain, in which we would share some of our expertise in exchange for some degree of negotiated limits or timetables controlling deployment on both sides.¹⁸ The incentive for the Soviets to join such a phased agreement would be access to more advanced U.S. technology, on a selective basis, and the assurance that the United States would not get ahead of them; the quid pro quo would be an agreed schedule of space defense development and deployment, subject to verification, designed to ensure that each side proceeds more or less in parallel with the other. One advantage of space arms control measures is that verification should be relatively easy, in that objects in near space are difficult to conceal for long, and on-site inspection by probes or astronauts of either side is increasingly feasible.

The danger of this negotiated approach is that we might become too reliant on its political component as a cheap way out of building as much hardware as we really need. Thus we should make sure that any arms limitation agreements we enter to stabilize the transition period are strictly limited to the DABM deployment phases. Were we to place permanent reliance on paper limits to contain Soviet efforts, we would lay ourselves open to nasty surprises in the case of Soviet breakout. Once deployed, DABM must be able to perform the job on its own, apart from any negotiated limitations.

The matter of deployment brings us back to the question of whether DABM is technically feasible.¹⁹ Although no one can say for certain how effective it would be, few today believe that we can develop a totally impermeable defense. But even a partial DABM capability would offer several strategic advantages. Even if not leakproof, DABM could vastly complicate a potential attacker's calculations. He might be sure that, say, half of his warheads would get through; but which half, in what sequence, on what targets? The increased uncertainty would itself discourage risk-taking; it would also raise the level of forces needed before an attack could even be contemplated. Furthermore, if an attack were launched, a defense would blunt the blow; the converse of the argument that even a partially successful attack could cost millions of lives is that even a partially effective defense could save millions of lives. More important, DABM would widen the nuclear firebreak. If it could successfully intercept anything less than an all-out saturation attack, a space-based defense would limit possibilities of graduated escalation from tactical-level nuclear engagements or local crises peripheral to the vital interests of the two superpowers.

The argument between the proponents of MAD (or some updated version thereof) and those proposing a space-based missile defense is analogous to the debate occasioned in Great Britain by German rearmament in the 1930s. British planners, including most of the Royal Air Force, were especially concerned about the Luftwaffe. As Churchill described the situation in 1935, "Ministers had to imagine the most frightful scenes of ruin and slaughter in London if we quarrelled with the German Dictator." They were no less aware that the ports, dockyards, and technical installations on which the fleet depended were equally vulnerable from the air. The Air Ministry's position was that there could really be no defense; the well-entrenched official view held that "the bomber will always get through."²⁰

The government's response was to meet the threat of the "unstoppable" German air weapon by building as many British offensive fighters and bombers as possible. Against this trend, Churchill led the drive to base Britain's defense on beam warfare, or radar as it came to be known, even though the technology and the strategy for putting it to use were both unproved at that point.

The lesson of the outcome was not that one party was right and the other wrong, but that both were right: victory in the ensuing Battle of Britain would not have been possible without both sufficient fighters and radar. The parallels with our own situation are obvious. Neither MAD alone nor DABM alone can do the whole job, but a mix of modernized strategic offensive systems and new defensive capabilities offers the best guarantee of continued U.S. security.

The possibility of a global security system, developed within a context of shared technology and negotiated international agreement, gives rise to a further set of considerations. While the United States may decide to press on with an antimissile defense of its own, the global system we need might, with more profit, reflect and nurture global cooperation. Though its realization would require a substantial political evolution, the idea is basically the same concept as that institutionalized in the United Nations Charter in 1945. In the Security Council, the great powers were to assume a special responsibility for the military security of the world, unencumbered by the voice of the multitude in the General Assembly. Even the players are similar: the United States, the Soviet Union, China, Britain, and France; only the addition of Japan and perhaps Germany is necessary to complete a current list of potential DABM participants. The substantial degree of U.S.-European cooperation in the recent Space-lab mission provides a good precedent from which to expand.²¹

As in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community negotiated in the 1950s, such a cooperative international regime would use national enmities, not assume them away. The idea of a U.S.-Soviet joint venture in space (or linked, parallel ventures) has much to commend it in terms of starkest national interest. First, it would help solve each government's main security problem, increasing the protection afforded to each society against the other's ICBMS. Second, it would provide a meaningful vehicle for integrating China constructively into a stable world order, a primary Soviet goal and only slightly less important to the United States. Third, it could help discourage n-country nuclear proliferation, which appears likely to be a serious problem by the end of the century if unchecked. Security Council members would have means to limit Third World strike capabilities. Fourth, a cooperative DABM would neatly end-run the will-o'-the-wisp of strategic disarmament, which we have pursued with little success for over a generation. If the antimissile system worked as expected and was protected against independent veto or sabotage by one of the partners, nations could at least afford a considerable reduction from present levels of strategic offensive forces without feeling that they were jeopardizing their security. Finally, and perhaps most important, the system could provide a new global vision--one that would harness technology, strategy, and politics to the cause of world survival and harmony.

The chief objection to this pleasing prospect is that it would require an almost unforeseeable transformation in the Soviet outlook. Though the scheme would offer the Soviets numerous benefits, including access to the West's more advanced technologies, a solution to the China problem, and worldwide prestige as a guarantor of the peace of the planet, the idea of partnership with the West on a basis of long-run equality, as we have noted, runs against the central thrust of Marxist-Leninist thinking.

A shock could provide the impetus for cooperative efforts. The whole rationale in support of DABM is that somehow, somewhere, nuclear weapons will once again be used. If that grim eventuality were to occur on a small scale (probably in a Third World conflict) and if the superpowers could manage to avoid being drawn into the abyss of destructiveness, the trauma of the experience might be sufficient to make an unlikely idea of partnership seem suddenly plausible. In any event, we should start laying the groundwork now. If great power cooperation proves feasible, so much the better; and if a climate of hostility persists, DABM will be all that more necessary.

Can we succeed? There is of course no way to tell. But let the last word again be Churchill's. Summing up the British experience with strategic defense in the early days of World War II, he noted:

The Germans would not have been surprised to hear our radar pulses, for they had developed a technically efficient radar system which was in some respects ahead of our own. What would have surprised them, however, was the extent to which we had turned our discoveries to a practical effect, and woven all into our general air defence system. In this we led the world, and it was operational efficiency rather than novelty of equipment that was the British achievement.²²

Strategic security can be achieved by the United States in the 1980s and 1990s, not simply in the narrow terms of systems engineering, the integration of technical components into an operationally effective anti-ICBM defense, but in the larger, political realm also: integration of that system into an emerging political order could well offer increased security for all nations of the world.

Notes

1. President Reagan, "Peace and National Security," televised address to the nation, 23 March 1983; reprinted as Department of State Current Policy Bulletin No. 472,23 March 1983, P. 7; Charles W. Corddry, "Weinberger Says Total Defense Is Sought for U.S.," Baltimore Sun, 28 March 1983; Russell Warren Howe, "Weinberger Appoints 'Star Wars' Panel," Washington Times, 4 April 1983; "Reagan for the Defense," "The Risks of Taking Up Shields," and "High Tech on the High Frontier," Time, 4 April 1983, pp. 8-22.

2. Philadelphia Inquirer, 30 March 1983; Marvin Stone, "Confusing the Defense Issue," U.S. News and World Report, 11 April 1983, p. 82.

3. David Hoffman and Lou Cannon, "President Overruled Advisors on Announcing Defense Plans," Washington Post, 26 March 1983.

4. Seymour Weiss, former Director of the Bureau of Politico-Military Affairs, ". . . But Let's Not Overlook the Hurdles," Wall Street Journal, 8 April 1983.

5. Serge Schmemann, "Soviet Sees a Treaty Violation in Arms Proposal by Reagan," New York Times, 25 March 1983; Charles W. Corddry, "Goal Seen as Threat to Treaty," Baltimore Sun, 5 April 1983.

6. U.S. Government, Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, Texts and Histories of Negotiations (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, August 1980), p. 52; United Nations document S/C.3/32/Rev. 1, reprinted in The United Nations and Disarmament 1945-1970 (New York: United Nations Publication, Sales No. 70.IX.7, 1970), p. 28.

7. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, p. 140.

8. For a leading statement of the new approach, see Major General Daniel O. Graham, High Frontier: A New National Strategy (Washington, D.C.: High Frontier, 1982); for a more critical view, see Thomas H. Karas, The New High Ground: Systems and Weapons of Space Age War (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1983). A good summary of the current official view can be found in U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Hearings before the Subcommittee on Arms Control, Oceans, International Operations, and Environment on S. Res. 129, 97th Cong., 2d sess., 20 September 1982, testimony of the Honorable Richard D. DeLauer, Under Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, esp. pp. 36 ff.

9. Charles W. Corddry, "Soviets Seek Talks on 'Star Wars' Plans," Baltimore Sun, 18 June 1983: Charles Mohr, "U.S. Receptive to Space Weapons Talks with Soviets," New York Times, 18 June 1983; "A Step Closer to Star Wars," Time, 12 December 1983, pp. 28-30.

10. George C. Wilson, "Reagan Speech Seen Forcing Reappraisal in Soviet Military," Washington Post, 4 April 1983.

11. Elizabeth Pond, "European Reflections on Reagan's 'Star Wars' Defense," Christian Science Monitor, 11 April 1983; Peter Osnos," ABM Plan Spurs European Concern over Timing, Defense Implications," Washington Post, 30 March 1983; Michael Feazel, "Europeans Support U.S. Space-Based Systems," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 October 1983, p. 59.

12. Joseph Kraft, "Anchoring a Newly Assertive Japan," Washington Post, 28 June 1983.

13. "Weinberger Certain on ABM Work," Washington Post, 30 March 1983; Charles Corddry, "Weinberger Says Total Defense Is Sought for U.S.," loc. cit.; Clarence A. Robinson, Jr., "Panel Urges Defense Technology Advances," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 17 October 1983, pp. 16-18, and "Study Urges Exploiting of Technologies," Aviation Week and Space Technology, 24 October 1983, pp. 50-51.

14. Daniel O. Graham and Gregory Fossedal, "A Defense that Defends . . ." Wall Street Journal, 8 April 1983; George C. Wilson, "Pentagon Official Advised against Extra Laser Funds," Washington Post, 1 April 1983.

15. Richard Halloran, "Military Divided over Space Policy," New York Times, 3 July 1983.

16. Fred Hiatt, "Joint Chiefs Endorse a Unified Space Command," Washington Post (National Weekly Edition), 5 December 1983, p. 32.

17. "Reagan Says Plan on Missile Defense Will Prevent War," New York Times, 26 March 1983.

18. Bernard Gwertzman, "Reagan Forces Offering to Share Antimissile Arms," New York Times, 30 March 1983.

19. For a brief sampling of the debate, we Charles Mohr, "Scientists Dubious on Missile Plan," New York Times, 25 March 1983; Michael Getler, "Science Adviser Sees Lasers and Mirrors as a Missile Defens," Washington Post, 26 March 1993; Charles Mohr, "Space Lasers Might Stop Half of Missile Attack, Expert Says," New York Times, 31 March 1983; "Can Reagan's 'Star Wars' Plan Really Work?" U.S. News and World Report, 11 April 1985, pp. 24-25; Kosta Tsipis, "Laser Defense Is off the Beam," Los Angeles Times, 30 March 1983; "A Step Closer to Star Wars," Time, 12 December 1983, pp. 28-30.

20. Winston S. Churchill, The Second World War, Vol. I, The Gathering Storm (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1948), pp. 148-50.

21. "A Giant Workshop in the Sky," Time, 28 November 1983, pp. 73-74.

22. Churchill, p. 156.

Lieutenant Colonel John E. Lawyer, Jr., USAFR (Ret) (M.P.A., John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard; Ph.D., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts University), is Professor of Political Science and Chairman of the Political Science Department at Bethel College, St. Paul, Minnesota, currently on sabbatical as a Resident Fellow at the Center for Ecumenical and Cultural Studies, St. John's University, Collegeville, Minnesota. Previously, he was a civilian policy analyst in the Office of the Secretary of Defense and a mobilization augmentee assigned to the Directorate of Plans, Hq USAF. Colonel Lawyer served eight years on active duty with the Air Force and is a previous contributor to the Review.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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