Air University Review, May-June 1984
AIRLAND Battle is the U.S. Army's new fighting doctrine. The name implies cooperation and agreement between the U.S. Army and Air Force, but, in fact, AirLand Battle doctrine has been a unilateral development of the U.S. Army. Only recently has the Air Force become actively involved with the doctrine. A Memorandum of Understanding, signed in April 1983 by Generals Edward C. Meyer and Charles A. Gabriel, has been hailed throughout much of the Army as full Air Force endorsement of AirLand Battle doctrine. However, to the more critical observer, the agreement represents only an official agreement for the Air Force and Army to cooperate in "joint tactical training and field exercises based on the AirLand Battle doctrine."1 It does not acknowledge AirLand Battle doctrine as the sole governing principle for joint training and exercises, nor does it concede unequivocal primacy of AirLand Battle doctrine over established Air Force doctrine.
The advent of the U.S. Army's AirLand Battle doctrine has forced land commanders to broaden their battlefield perspective--which, in turn, has increased Army interest in the availability of tactical air (TACAIR) to support Army combat efforts. From the Army commander's viewpoint, controlling allocated TACAIR is the best way to ensure that TACAIR will be available to support his combat operations. On the other hand, the air forces required to support ground forces operate under Air Force doctrine that calls for centralized control of air assets to ensure their effective use. From the airman's viewpoint, air assets must be concentrated first to win the battle in the air and then to carry out strategic operations and operations in support of the land battle. Obviously, this divergence in outlook needs to be understood and reconciled.
Basic Air Force doctrine is contained in Air Force Manual 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force, which describes the fundamental principles governing the application of air power. Among the more important of these principles are centralized control and decentralized execution. The exceptional flexibility of air power (its ability to transport personnel and equipment and to project firepower at greater ranges and speeds than traditional land- and sea-based systems) suggests that its application can best be viewed from a theater perspective. Centralized control allows the air component commander to employ air power effectively throughout the theater by focusing it on specific theater objectives when necessary. To accomplish the mission effectively, the air component commander delegates to his subordinate commanders responsibility for detailed mission tasking, planning, and execution.
Because of the capabilities arising from the air weapon's flexibility, air power has become a major factor in warfare. Often it has provided the extra shock and extra firepower that were vital to success in ground combat operations. Because air power has proved so valuable in supporting the ground battle, ground commanders frequently have sought greater control over air assets.
Perhaps the most often cited example of the difficulties involved in ground commanders' controlling air assets is the North African Campaign of 1942-43.2 Here, air units were attached initially to ground commanders in support of their individual operations. Among the difficulties that emerged were a lack of coordinated use of air assets and needless loss of aircraft when small, dispersed air units encountered larger, concentrated enemy units. Later, by centrally directing the air effort, commanders were able to win the battle against enemy air power and support the ground battle.
From the standpoint of air operations, the North African experience indicated that "there must be a command structure to control the assigned air power coherently and consistently and to ensure that . . . air power is not frittered away by dividing it among" various other commands.3
A point worth emphasizing is the battlefield perspective resulting from operations in North Africa: air power must be viewed and employed as a theater asset. It is the theater perspective, arising out of combat experience, that leads the Air Force to hold that air power must be centrally controlled to be effective. Thus, centralized control of air power is a basic element of Air Force doctrine; it reflects what combat experience indicates is fundamental to the success of theater air operations.
Air Force doctrine further identifies nine basic operational missions for air forces. Of these, three are the primary responsibility of tactical air forces: close air support, air interdiction, and counterair operations.4 In conducting those three theater missions, the air component commander controls the employment of TACAIR forces through the tactical air control system (TACS).
The heart of the TACS is the tactical air control center (TACC), which is the focal point for all air-related command, control, communications, and intelligence (C3I) activities. (Depending on the total number of forces employed in a theater, there may be more than one TACC.) Furthermore, the TACC's intelligence capabilities and its access to national intelligence gathering systems make it the theater focal point for near-real-time information on the enemy. This access to intelligence data, plus the concentration of communications capabilities, makes the TACC the logical command and control center for effective theaterwide application of tactical air power. The TACC also includes liaison elements from other services in the theater, facilitating closer integration of air operations with the activities and operations of the other services.
In most established theaters, the Army liaison element in the TACC is the battlefield coordination element (BCE). As the land component representative, the BCE provides to tactical air planners a clear perception of the land component's plans, operations, and requirements for TACAIR support. Being collocated with the TACC, the BCE can provide feedback on the current ground situation and TACAIR support efforts and facilitate the crossflow of other operational data between land and air forces. It provides a means for the air component commander, through the TACC, to react, replan, reorganize, or redeploy air assets quickly and correctly to support ground operations.
Thus, Air Force insistence on centralized control of air resources rests on two key points: the necessity for a theater perspective in applying tactical air power to decisive points on the battlefield and the fact that the established, communications and intelligence capabilities of the TACC facilitate the rapid and effective application of TACAIR to these decisive points.
Field Manual 100-5, Operations, is the basic document describing how the U.S. Army intends to fight in future conflicts. The approach to combat outlined in this manual is what is known as AirLand Battle. "It emphasizes tactical flexibility and speed as well as mission orders, initiative among subordinates, and the spirit of the offense."5 According to this manual, modern conflict presents the Army with these challenges: the nonlinearity of future battlefields, the development of imaginative and flexible leadership, maintenance of unit readiness, and unit and individual training. To operate on the modern battlefield, the Army must be ready to fight as a team in joint and combined operations, for only by coordinating all available military forces in pursuit of common objectives can the United States hope to win.
AirLand Battle doctrine relies on complementary actions by combat forces of all services. By carefully synchronizing the various organic and supporting fires, the ground commander can create the synergism necessary for him to engage and defeat numerically superior foes. TACAIR provides a large part of the ground commander's fire support and therefore has assumed a high priority in his planning for offensive actions.
For the Army, the corps is the focal point for AirLand Battle. To fight the battle and give coherence to overall control of battlefield operations, the corps will fight the enemy in an assigned "area of influence." (See Figure 1.)
This area normally contains enemy forces whose actions can affect the corps' close-in battle; its boundaries are assigned by higher land headquarters. In a multicorps situation, these boundaries ensure that the operations of one corps will not interfere with those of an adjacent corps. Adjacent corps are required to coordinate on operations that cross or may cross into another corps' area of influence.
To acquire the necessary intelligence to support its attacks on the enemy, the corps monitors activities in an area called the "area of interest," which extends beyond the assigned area of influence. (See Figure 2.) Of special note is that while areas of influence do not overlap, areas of interest often do.
The actual geographical size of these areas is determined by various situational factors6 and the reaction time that a particular unit needs to counter new battlefield developments. For a corps, the normal reaction time is 72 hours. Thus, the normal corps area of influence extends to 72 hours, while the area of interest ends at about 96 hours. These time guidelines are translated into distances based on enemy movement capability, terrain, etc., resulting in nominal corps boundaries of 150 kilometers beyond the forward line of own troops (FLOT) for the area of influence and 300 kilometers for the area of interest.
In executing AirLand Battle doctrine, corps commanders will integrate the actions of all organic and support combat elements to achieve their battlefield objectives. They will attempt to extend combat operations to the maximum depth of the opposing enemy formations. In so doing, they will be guided by several fundamentals of AirLand Battle doctrine. These fundamentals stress indirect approaches, speed and flexibility, offensive initiative, clearly defined objectives and operational concepts, a clearly designated main effort, rapid follow-up, and deep attack. The last of these fundamentals is perhaps the most controversial element of the Army's new doctrine, for it is "deep attack" that many equate to AirLand Battle doctrine.
The central importance of deep attack to AirLand Battle doctrine is clearly established in FM 100-5: "Deep attack is neither a sideshow nor an unimportant optional activity; it is an inseparable part of a unified plan of operation."7 Deep attack refers not only to actual attacks against enemy formations at greater distances from the FLOT than that traditionally associated with organic fire support capabilities but to operations planned in depth of time, distance, and resources. To the ground commander, this means that he must carefully plan all of his actions (logistics, maneuver, fire support, etc.) as far in advance as possible. The corps commander's principal assets for deep attacks are artillery and TACAIR support.8 He is expected to orchestrate the use of these and other available assets to delay, disrupt, divert, and, when possible, destroy selected enemy forces to accomplish specific goals in support of his operation.
Doctrinally, deep attacks are carried out for four basic reasons that give them slightly different forms.9 In the first form, firepower is used to disrupt enemy forces and delay their entry into the main battle area. (See Figure 3.)
This firepower should permit the corps commander to isolate and defeat enemy forces in detail (i.e., to isolate small groups of enemy forces and attack them with locally superior friendly forces). An added benefit is the confusion, delay, and deterioration of command and control that should occur in the enemy formations because of the deep attacks. As shown in Figure 3, the corps commander conducts this form of deep attack with his own organic fire support in coordination with the TACAIR effort.
In the second form of deep attack, firepower is directed against enemy forces in depth not only to prevent them from reinforcing committed enemy units but also to prevent them from interfering with friendly offensive actions against the flank or the rear of close-in battle forces. (See Figure 4.)
The third form of deep attack is more complex and difficult to carry out. (See Figure 5.) It involves engaging enemy forces far to the rear, using both firepower and maneuver ground forces, while concurrently fighting the close-in battle. These operations prevent the enemy from massing his forces and destroy his combat momentum by subjecting his entire force to attacks by friendly firepower. This form of deep attack requires combined arms fighting in close coordination with supporting forces (i.e., the Air Force).
The fourth form of deep attack is carried out to destroy or neutralize particular enemy threats or advantages. (See Figure 6.) Examples of these might be enemy nuclear-capable weapons systems or enemy bridging units and equipment. Such deep attacks focus narrowly on the destruction of specific targets to achieve the stated objective.
AirLand Battle doctrine puts ground commanders, especially corps commanders, in the position of being extremely interested in the use and control of air interdiction to accomplish their deep attack objectives, for they have only limited organic assets with which to attack enemy forces far beyond the FLOT. Army doctrine requires that these commanders plan operations so as to anticipate and take advantage of opportunities that these deep attacks will create in the close-in battle. From their perspective, they can best do that by "calling the shots" themselves in the conduct of deep attacks.
However, to allow each corps commander the luxury of "calling his own shots" with air interdiction would fragment the theater air interdiction effort. The theater perspective would be replaced by several narrow, possibly competing, corps perspectives. The success of air interdiction missions in support of ground operations would rest heavily on personalities and the individual "bargaining" power of each corps commander. In at least some ways, such a situation constitutes a return to practices that proved unworkable during the North African campaign. The result? TACAIR's ability to mass forces to meet and defeat the enemy at the critical time and place would be eroded.
AirLand Battle doctrine has indeed broadened the perspective of ground commanders. However, FM 100-5's emphasis on corps operations and the Army's general reluctance to acknowledge more than logistical and support responsibilities for echelons above corps create an imbalance in perspective of the two major components of joint warfare. The air component commander concerns himself with air operations across the theater, while the Army's corps emphasis in ground operations tends to splinter the land perspective in the theater.
To remedy this situation, the Army needs to recognize an operational responsibility for Army echelons above corps (e.g., Field Army, Army Group) to function at the theater level, providing overall guidance and continuity to ground operations through planning and directing long-range land campaigns.10 This approach would give the Army and the Air Force equivalent air and land command levels and permit planning campaigns from a common theater perspective. Such a common perspective would ensure that air and land efforts would complement one another.
How would such a conceptually balanced approach to theater warfare be applied in practice? To begin with, combat operations within a theater of operations would be viewed in terms of "stratified responsibilities." (See Figure 7.)
Broadly speaking, the theater commander is responsible for developing a unified strategy involving achievable objectives, given available logistical support and political constraints applicable to his particular situation. Through the air apportionment process, the theater commander establishes priorities for the air effort. The air component commander then knows how he must distribute air assets among his different missions. In a process similar to air apportionment, the theater commander assigns available ground forces and logistical support for the land campaign. The land component commander then knows what resources he will have for his portion of the theater campaign.
At the next level, using the guidance of the theater commander's strategy and his allocation of resources, the air and land component commanders plan specific campaigns and establish priorities of effort for the forces under their command. Based on the air apportionment and the assignment of ground assets, the land component commander identifies specific objectives and sets priorities for available TACAIR, fire, and logistics support for each of his corps.
At the next level of responsibility, command and control elements monitor and direct day-to-day operations to achieve campaign objectives. Working within the priorities established by the land component commander, the corps commanders communicate directly with the BCE at the air component commander's TACC to coordinate their TACAIR support, ensuring that any newly developed targets are identified, prioritized, and integrated into the air support effort.
At the lowest level, tactical combat units execute specific missions and fight battles to accomplish their assigned objectives.
In effect, this model assigns to the theater and component commanders responsibility for establishing "priorities of effort," which include a list of approved targets/target types. The TACC and corps and division headquarters are responsible for developing and refining specific target lists. Combat elements of the wings, squadrons, corps, divisions, brigades, and battalions then attack selected targets.
How might this "stratified responsibilities" model be applied in providing TACAIR support to AirLand Battle deep attacks? Again, the four forms of deep attack demand some variations.
In the first form of deep attack, TACAIR would assist in restricting the presentation rate of enemy forces primarily by air interdiction missions controlled and directed by the TACC. (See Figure 3.) Targeting based on the broad objectives of the planned ground operation would be planned by the TACC, in consultation with the BCE. Although these objectives would stem initially from the land component commander's guidance, they would be refined subsequently by each corps. Corps objectives would then be transmitted to the BCE/TACC, and the corps could nominate targets for attack to the BCE/TACC when those targets appeared to be beyond the attack capability of organic systems and the corps' close air support sorties.
The execution of the second form of deep attack would be much like the first, with the added responsibility of flank/rear protection of friendly forces. (See Figure 4.) Again, this could be accomplished by broad objective guidance for air interdiction support (e.g., "protect 3rd Infantry Division's southern flank"), coupled with corps direction for specific close air support attacks when and where needed.
The fourth form of deep attack (Figure 6) is perhaps the least complicated. Operations to destroy specific enemy capabilities, by their very nature, could be orchestrated entirely at the component level, much as major air interdiction campaigns and joint suppression of enemy air defenses (J-SEAD) campaigns are structured now to be carried out.11 They require only that the separate air and land attacks be coordinated in timing and purpose.
It is the third form of deep attack that requires the highest degree of air and land coordination for success. (See Figure 5.) The extent of such operations demands long lead-time coordination and planning by the staffs of the air and land forces involved. The broad spectrum of air and land operations to support such a battle plan may require rapid and effective shifts of emphasis in attacks both deep in the enemy's rear and close to the FLOT. Also, such jointly complementary operations may demand the expenditure of considerable additional air assets to establish localized air superiority over decisive areas of the battlefield and enable the corps to use close air support and attack helicopter assets in deep attack operations. Thus, the air component's major contribution to the deep attack may be in the air-to-air arena. At the same time, J-SEAD operations would be needed to support both the air interdiction effort and the close air support sorties flown in support of the maneuver ground forces.
FOR air and land forces to function together effectively in joint operations, it is imperative that the Air Force and Army have equivalent command levels and a common perception of objectives and the actions required to support those objectives.
If AirLand Battle doctrine is adhered to, each corps commander will have planned his operation well in advance. By providing land campaign plans to his BCE early in the planning stage, the land component commander can inform the air component commander of the future main ground effort, allowing him sufficient time to plan and apply air support for that effort throughout the Army planning period, as well as during the battle. Even if the main ground effort is known only in general terms, early knowledge of that effort allows TACAIR to disrupt, delay, divert, or destroy enemy forces as they move toward the objective area, while concurrently protecting or isolating friendly approach avenues to the battlefield area. By the time the operation begins, air interdiction missions will have already been flown to support the operation. Additional air-to-air sorties can be provided, if necessary, to allow Air Force CAS and Army attack helicopter assets to conduct operations free from the threat of enemy fighters. Thus, TACAIR will be supporting the ground operation from inception throughout execution.
During operations similar to the third form of deep attack, each corps undoubtedly will detect, identify, and select targets for attack that it feels are crucial to its battle plan. Providing the BCE with these targets will allow the TACC, in consultation with the BCE, to adjust air interdiction (or battlefield air interdiction) missions effectively to support the main effort of a particular corps, a division, or other ground unit. Decisions on where to apply available air interdiction missions would be based on knowledge of each corps' operational plans, the current ground situation, and the priorities and objectives of the land component commander. At the same time, the corps will be employing their organic and other supporting assets against targets developing as the battle unfolds. Thus, the corps would have the flexibility to direct their more immediately available firepower assets (close air support, artillery, and attack helicopters) to decisive areas of the battlefield, if necessary under a "protective umbrella" provided by the Air Force.
Deep attack operations planned and conducted in such manner do not allow each individual corps commander to "bank" on a predetermined number of air interdiction sorties in support of his operation. However, this coordinated approach does ensure that the main ground effort in the theater will receive an appropriate weight of the theater air support effort. Likewise, should the need arise, the theater air support effort could be rapidly concentrated and redirected to support any individual corps operation, gaining the full advantages of the flexibility of air power. By sharing the responsibility for locating, identifying, and developing deep attack targets, corps can focus their intelligence collection efforts on those areas of the battlefield that are of immediate concern to their advancing, engaged, or forward deployed forces. Closer-in targets could be attacked with minimum delay by organic corps assets or close air support assets while air interdiction missions would attack deeper targets identified by the corps or the TACC/BCE, based on the corps' battlefield objectives. Thus, TACAIR would have the flexibility to concentrate forces effectively to meet decisive developments in the enemy disposition across the entire battle front.
IN SPITE OF the acknowledged need for close coordination between air and land forces on the modern battlefield, there is often considerable discord as each service tends to adhere to its own unique doctrinal position. But success in future wars demands that the U.S. Air Force and Army achieve procedural harmony on the battlefield. The "stratified responsibilities" model outlined here is one possible way to reconcile our differences to ensure battlefield success.
Air-Land Forces Application Agency
Langley Air Force Base, Virginia
Notes
1. Department of the Army, Department of the Air Force, Memorandum of Understanding on Joint USA/USAF Efforts for Enhancement of Joint Employment of the AirLand Battle Doctrine, 21 April 1983.
2. Arthur W. Tedder, With Prejudice: The War Memoirs of Marshal of the Royal Air Force, Lord Tedder, G.C.B. (Boston: Little, Brown and Co., 1966). The section "Middle East, November 1940-May 1943" contains an excellent account of the air power struggle in North Africa.
3. General William W. Momyer, USAF(Ret), Air Power in Three Wars: WWII, Korea, Vietnam (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978), p. 39.
4. Department of the Air Force, Air Force Manual 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1979). Chapter 2, "Functions and Missions of the United States Air Force," lists the nine basic operational missions as: strategic aerospace offense, strategic aerospace defense, space operations, airlift, close air support, air interdiction, counterair operations, surveillance and reconnaissance, and special operations.
5. Department of the Army, Field Manual 100-5, Operations (Washington: Headquarters Department of the Army, 1982), Preface, p.i. Subsequent explanations of AirLand Battle doctrine and deep attack were developed from chapters 1, 2, and 7.
6. Ibid., p. 2-2. These factors are described as mission, enemy, terrain, troops and time available (METT-T).
7. Ibid., p. 7-2.
8. Ibid., p. 7-13.
9. Ibid., pp. 7-16, 7-17.
10. In all fairness, the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC) and Army War College are presently working on a "Theater Operations Concept" to fill the doctrinal void for Army echelons above corps.
11. USREDCOM Pamphlet 525/3, Training and Doctrine Command Training Text 100-44-1/Tactical Air Command Pamphlet 50-23, Joint Suppression of Enemy Air Defense (J-SEAD) Operations, 11 June 1983, contains details of the concept and procedures for J-SEAD operations.
Contributor
Major James A. Machos (B.A., East Texas State University; M.A., University of Utah) is a Joint Air Operations Staff Officer with the Air-Land Forces Application (ALFA) Agency. He has an extensive background in operational flying (F-4) and has served as an exchange officer with the German Air Force. He is author of an article recently published in the Military Review. Major Machos is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, Defense Language Institute (German), and the National Security Management Course.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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