Air University Review, March-April 1984
Colonel Kenneth J. Alnwick
| As a nation we don't understand it and as a government we are not prepared to deal with it... I believe that low-intensity conflict is the most important strategic issue facing the U.S. If we don't learn to deal with it we risk being isolated in an increasingly competitive world.1 |
PRESS reports of the duel between U.S. Air Commando AC-130 gunships and Cuban-manned antiaircraft guns at Point Salines, Grenada, demonstrate that the USAF Special Operations Force (SOF) has successfully weathered its transition from Tactical Air Command (TAC) to the Military Airlift Command (MAC) without losing its traditional zest for action and adventure. The use of special operations forces in Grenada was a manifestation of the resurgence of the U.S. defense establishment's interest in a class of military operations that many saw as another casualty of the Vietnam War. Spurred, in part, by our anguish over the abortive Iranian rescue operation and a growing awareness of the utility of special operations forces as exemplified by the British Special Air Service operations in the Falklands, some major reorganizations have taken place in both the U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force to redress years of benign neglect of our nation's special operations capability.
Within the Air Force, the First Special Operations Wing has shed its status as a stepchild of TAC and has become an air division within MAC's 23d Air Force on a coequal and cooperative basis with the Aerospace Rescue and Recovery Service. While this reorganization conveys many tangible and intangible benefits to Air Force special operations forces worldwide, it raises several questions about the future ability of the SOF to execute successfully some of its time-honored missions at the low end of the conflict spectrum.
Press reports from Grenada notwithstanding, a major shift in emphasis has been moving the Air Force SOF community away from traditional SOF missions in counterinsurgency, nation-building, and psychological warfare toward special operations behind enemy lines--more reminiscent of the World War II experience than the experiences of the last two decades. These two approaches to the employment of air power in other-than-conventional operations are the focus of this article, which emphasizes the importance of maintaining the USAF Special Operations Force with a capability to work hand in hand with local forces so that the inherent advantages of air power to counterinsurgent guerrilla tactics can be exploited as fully as possible.
The history of the use of air power against irregulars is as old as the history of military aviation. On 9 March 1916, Francisco "Pancho" Villa raided Columbus, New Mexico, and killed 17 Americans. The U.S. government ordered General John "Black Jack" Pershing to organize a force of 15,000 troops to pursue Villa into Mexico and "take him dead or alive." Six days later, the 1st Aero Squadron, commanded by Captain Benjamin Foulois, arrived in Columbus. The force consisted of 8 Curtiss JN-3s, 11 officers, 85 enlisted men, 10 trucks, and 1 "tech rep." The most important role of the squadron was to help General Pershing keep track of his dispersed forces and deliver messages. Thus, the first combat missions ever flown by U.S. military aviators were communications and visual reconnaissance missions for the Army.
The aircraft were ill-equipped for the rigors of combat in hostile terrain. Propellers cracked and flew apart in the dry heat of the desert. The airmen had to set up their own machine shops and build new props and test new designs--with the help of the tech rep. Nevertheless, despite the limitations of its equipment, the 1st Aero Squadron proved the utility of aircraft in support of combat operations. Through their experiments with aerial photography, mounted machine guns, and bombing, the Army gained its first glimpse of the vast potential of this new weapon.
Given that the war in Europe had been under way for two years, the Mexican expedition revealed, to all who cared to notice, the deplorable state of American military aviation. Never the less, some of the traditional features of unconventional warfare were evident in the fledgling airmen, who demonstrated flexibility and willingness to experiment. Logging more than 700 sorties in their "modified" aircraft, they even scored the first recorded American kill from the air against a guerrilla leader. Although General Pershing never caught Pancho Villa, the unique attributes of aircraft (elevation, range, speed) made visual reconnaissance and communication the most significant contributions to the punitive expedition, and human ingenuity was essential to what limited success the campaign did achieve.
While the bulk of aviation activities in World War I supported the "conventional" aspects of the war, one little-known aspect of the war was the use of aircraft to support Colonel T. E. Lawrence in his Palestine campaign. Lawrence is generally viewed as riding across the desert wastes on a camel; but during the latter stages of his warfare against the Turks, he exploited the mobility provided by both armored cars and aircraft. He used aircraft to maintain contact with his far-flung groups, provide visual reconnaissance, haul men and supplies, and attack Turkish communications. Basically, aircraft provided Lawrence with mobility to match the vastness of the desert. This unconventional use of aircraft helped set the stage for Britain's most innovative use of air power--a concept called "Air Control," which emerged shortly after World War 1. Some authorities claim that this concept preserved for the Royal Air Force (RAF) its right to an independent existence.
In the spring of 1920, an uprising in Iraq caught fire and began to spread. The British attempted to control the rebellion and protect friendly tribes but found that their efforts cost them more than 38 million pounds annually and accomplished little in the process. Sixty thousand British troops used age-old techniques of garrisons and fortified strong points complemented by flying columns to administer discipline, exact tribute, and then retreat to barbed wire enclaves. Critics viewed these activities as "butcher and bolt" tactics.
The Royal Air Force proposed to replace ground power with air power. Essentially, Sir Hugh Trenchard, with Winston Churchill's backing in the colonial office, was advocating gunboat diplomacy from the air. Both men felt that colonial forces could react more swiftly, attain superior firepower and mobility, and coerce far more humanely and cheaply by operating from the air. Their basic operational concept was "to interrupt the normal life of the dissidents to such an extent that continuance of hostilities becomes intolerable." The evolving doctrine of air control contained several distinct steps or phases:
Supported by effective intelligence and innate good sense, the British made great strides with air control. The cost-conscious British government, recognizing air control as an effective and relatively inexpensive technique, extended the idea to cover the northwest frontier of India, Trans-Jordan, the Aden Protectorate, and Palestine. It continued to use these techniques in Aden until the early 1960s. Critics were correct in claiming that use of air control techniques was the practice of colonialism on the cheap and that nothing could really be controlled from the air, but the techniques did furnish the necessary sanction of force behind civil authorities. Again, the essential characteristics of air power (elevation, speed, range flexibility, and destructive power) provided a strategic foil against the nomadic warrior's tactics.
While the British were achieving modest successes against the tribesmen of the Arabian Peninsula, U.S. Marines were confronting a far more difficult task in the jungles of Nicaragua. Between 1927 and 1933, General Augusto Cezar Sanditio and his followers fought and eluded the Marines who had intervened to resolve political strife in the country. The airplane, armored car, and machine gun had mastered the desert and the plains; but the new guerrillas avoided the open, operated in small groups always under cover, and massed for attack only when the odds were clearly in their favor.
The airplane quickly proved its value in the early U.S. counterinsurgency effort. In 1927, Sandino attacked a Marine garrison in Ocotal and was defeated decisively when five Marine de Havillands launched a timely aerial assault that thoroughly demoralized the inexperienced Sandinistas. This early defeat at the hands of Marine aviators and ground forces--the original air-ground team--convinced Sandino that his only hope lay in the now-classic techniques of the rural insurgent--hit, run, and hide.
For the next five years, Marines, such as Captain Lewis "Chesty" Puller, played a dangerous game of cat and mouse in the hills and mountains of northern Nicaragua as they sought to bring about a decisive engagement with the Sandinistas. In this effort, aircraft provided vital communications between far-flung remote outposts. Marine aviators also flew air cap for foot and mule patrols and attacked Sandinista bases, but they soon learned the limitations of conventional ordnance in thick jungles and the elusiveness of small, lightly armed guerrilla formations. Thus, Marine fliers never again achieved the spectacular successes they had scored in the early days of the fighting. Nevertheless, air power did help the Marines offset the worst effects of too few men attempting to control too much territory.
As U.S. involvement in Nicaragua dragged on, sentiment at home forced the Marines to conclude the police action, and Washington's primary concern became how to find a way to engineer a graceful withdrawal. Eventually, all Marine units withdrew to the cities as the Nicaraguan National Guard, officered by Americans and supported by Marine air, took the offensive. On 16 February 1934, the United States arranged a truce between Anastasio Somoza of the National Guard and Sandino. Four days later, Sandino was betrayed by Somoza and shot. Lacking Sandino's leadership and exhausted by years of fighting, the insurgent movement withered to a point where Somoza's National Guard forces were able to contain any remaining resistance, thus ending the need for active U.S. Marine involvement in Nicaraguan affairs.
Yet the legacy of this early episode in air power history is still with us. Many of the principles of air-ground cooperation hammered out by trial and error in Nicaragua are ingrained in Marine Corps doctrine. Furthermore, the patterns of conflict discernible in the Nicaraguan experience may still be found in the guerrilla wars of the post-World War II period.
The name special operations comes to us from one of the first organizations established to operate behind enemy lines in World War II. This was the British government's Special Operations Executive. The primary missions of this "department of dirty tricks" were to drop highly trained secret agents and their equipment into enemy-held territory and to resupply resistance groups and paramilitary forces in France, Italy, and the Balkans. The U.S. Army Air Forces joined the operation in March 1944, using B-24s and B-17s with special modifications, such as camouflage paint and covered stacks. Aircrews were specially trained in night operations; low level, long-range navigation; and precision air drops of men and materiel. Their ten-hour missions were usually flown on moonless nights, frequently in bad weather.
On the Eastern Front, the Soviets relied heavily on aircraft to resupply partisan bands and to retain political and military control of these essentially autonomous operations. Of course, weather and mountains were the worst enemies of these operations. For example, of seventeen aircraft lost in one area of operation, only one was lost to enemy action. Thus, special operations in the European Theater were primarily specialized airlift functions.
On the other side of the globe in the China-Burma-India Theater, two units engaged in special operations are of particular note: General Claire Chennault's Flying Tigers and General John Alison's Number One Air Commando Group. Chennault's unit is noteworthy because his crews, in some respects, performed like flying guerrillas. The Flying Tigers, originally civilian volunteers, operated from remote, roughly prepared airstrips. They tied up large Japanese air assets and, at times, attained 10-to-1 kill ratios. The Flying Tigers were teachers and fighters who accomplished seemingly impossible feats. On the other hand, General Alison's Number One Air Commando Group provided support for ground troops, specifically, Wingate's Chindit troops who operated behind Japanese lines in Burma. Alison's force consisted of 300 aircraft of various types, including gliders and experimental helicopters; the support element for this force consisted of 600 airmen. This ratio of maintenance men to aircraft is unheard of in most modern air forces; the difference was due to the careful selection of personnel from among highly talented volunteers. Furthermore, in Alison's units, there was great flexibility where aircrew training and checkouts were concerned. Pilots flew every type of aircraft: fighters, bombers, transports, liaison planes, gliders, and helicopters.
The specific mission of Number One Air Commando Group was to establish a landing zone or airhead deep in Japanese-held territory, build and operate an airfield, transport General Wingate's troops into the area, supply the operation, and provide the required close air support. There was nothing special about the aircraft used to support Wingate's operation, but General Henry "Hap" Arnold's parting instructions to these early air commandos ("to hell with administration and paperwork; go out and fight") gave them a license to steal. Throwing the rule book aside, they improvised tactics and modified aircraft on the spot, relying on their hand-picked, highly trained, and motivated personnel to overcome difficulties. The group gave Wingate the necessary mobility and provided support at the times and places he specified. The cooperative efforts between Alison's air units and Wingate's ground forces constituted combined operations in every sense of the term. Lessons learned from Alison's experience include: the importance of good delivery techniques, the need to know both the capabilities and the limitations of air power, and the need for dedicated units that can react more quickly than units controlled by remote higher headquarters.
Thus, the two classic roles of air power in unconventional operations were revealed. Before World War II, with the notable exception of Lawrence in Palestine, the preponderant role of aircraft in unconventional warfare operations was to support counterguerrilla operations. Gathering intelligence and providing mobility, presence, and firepower were primary functions (although the threat of firepower was often more potent than its actual application). During World War II, a new role for air power emerged--supporting the operations of partisans and small conventional units behind enemy lines. In this context, airlift, communications, and medical evacuation provided by air assets were paramount. Delivery of firepower played only a minor role.
After World War II, the pendulum swung back again to the counterguerrilla mission for air power. Its concomitant emphasis on nonlethal aspects continued and would not change until the beginning of full-scale U.S. air operations in Vietnam (1966). The Philippine struggle against the Huks and the French ordeal in Algeria illustrate air power used with good effect to counter guerrilla tactics. The British in Malaya and other contested areas used many of these same tactics effectively also.
During World War II, the Huks, a Communist organization, operated as the "People's Anti-Japanese Army." Following the war, the Huks attempted to overthrow the newly formed Philippine government. At that time, the combination of rural dissatisfactions, government inefficiency and corruption, and skillful Huk propaganda that drew on old anti-establishment themes had brought many areas of the Philippines to a state of near anarchy.
In 1950, Ramon Magsaysay was appointed Secretary of National Defense. With the help of U.S. advisors, such as Lieutenant Colonel Edward Lansdale, he removed many ineffective officials and reorganized both the military and the constabulary. This approach helped him win popular support, and the armed forces and police began building a system for collecting intelligence on which to base operational and political decisions. Liaison aircraft of the Philippine Air Force (PAF) commenced day-to-day visual reconnaissance flights over areas where the Huks were known to operate.
A system of informers was developed to work in conjunction with the reconnaissance flights. To keep the Huks from discovering the informers and intercepting the informers' information, special signals were developed. For example, the positions of haystacks, farm animals, plows, and other objects flagged the size and location of Huk units to PAF liaison aircraft flying overhead. Also, defectors were carried aloft to help locate Huk camps. Once a camp was pinpointed, leaflets and crude loudspeaker systems were used to wage psychological warfare against the camp's inhabitants. At other times, solid information on camp locations was used by government forces to mount concentrated air and ground operations against the camps. The net effect of these varied uses of air power was to confine the Huks to small-unit operations and deny them the use of fixed bases.
To support its operations against the Ruks, the Philippine Air Force used a squadron of C-47s, a mixed squadron of liaison aircraft, and some P-51 s and AT-6s. Most of the targets were such that the aircraft either made their strikes with 100-pound bombs or strafed with .50 caliber machine guns. Air attack and bombing were very carefully controlled. Attacks with heavy bombs were limited to large base camps located in the mountains, and these attacks were made only after commanders were sure that no government supporters lived in the area.
The air operations and tactics of the Philippine Air Force were not in themselves decisive factors in the Huk campaign, but they were vital elements of Magsaysay's integrated use of all the elements of national power to defeat the Huk insurgency.
As the Huk campaign wound down in the Philippines, the French were facing their own unique problems against rebels in Algeria. Several features of the French counterinsurgency effort distinguish it from other special operations. For example, although extensive fence systems or "barrages" were quite effective in sealing off Algeria's borders, they were difficult to maintain and patrol. Air power was a central element of French strategy to handle the problem: aircraft supported ground patrols, provided supplies to outposts, and flew strike missions against insurgents when they threatened sectors of the fences.
For internal defense, the French used a system called "quadrallage." They divided Algeria into areas of operation and then subdivided the areas into small sectors. Air units assigned to special operations maintained almost constant surveillance of the sectors and played a vital role in other intelligence-gathering schemes. Centralized control of air assets ensured that they would be employed in sectors where they were most needed.
A favorite French tactic was "netting." This involved locating an enemy force by aerial reconnoitering, identifying all access routes to the enemy's location, and selecting the best landing zone (LZ) near the enemy's headquarters. Having taken care of these preliminaries, the French launched a coordinated air-mobile attack, placing troops in the LZ immediately after preparatory fire. The air-mobile troops were deployed to confuse, disrupt, and demoralize the enemy headquarters and command structure while, simultaneously, more powerful ground forces closed in from all sides. In this way, the rebels were trapped like fish in a net. The keys to success in these operations were excellent intelligence and the ability to react quickly and effectively when the situation warranted--both of which relied heavily on air support.
Two pertinent conclusions can be drawn from the Algerian experience: Coordinated small unit actions supported by air were the most effective operations in this theater; and the most valuable assets that air power contributed to these operations were aircraft mobility and flexibility. But French political and military goals were not in harmony. Thus, despite their military success, the French found their efforts ultimately to be in vain.
This, then, was the body of knowledge and experience available when the U.S. Air Force began developing its own counterinsurgency capability in the early 1960s. In retrospect, we can see that it included these major tenets:
Shortly after President Kennedy took office, he confronted a challenge from peripheral or "brush fire" wars that could not be met adequately by the Eisenhower strategy of massive retaliation. Speaking to the graduating class of West Point in 1962, he said:
This is another type of war, new in its intensity, ancient in its origin.... It requires ... a whole new kind of strategy, a wholly different kind of force, and therefore a new and wholly different kind of military training.2
It was in the context of Kennedy's quest for a counterguerrilla warfare capability that contemporary USAF special operations came into existence. The first air commando units were formed in April 1961. These forces were deployed to Vietnam by November of the same year under the code name "Jungle Jim." Their specific mission included airstrikes, airlift, reconnaissance, and training of indigenous forces in unconventional warfare and counterinsurgency operations.
The aircraft assigned to the units were not the most advanced or sophisticated in the inventory, but they did have characteristics needed for special air operations. The old reliable C-47 was pressed into service in the airlift/troop delivery role, while T-28s and modified B-26s handled strike and reconnaissance missions. These latter two aircraft were selected because they were simple systems that could be maintained in an austere environment, they had the ruggedness and capabilities to operate from unimproved airstrips, and they were already in the inventories of many countries likely to experience guerrilla warfare and within the technological reach of other developing air forces.
From its activation strength of one composite squadron under the jungle Jim concept, the force grew rapidly to meet the demands of Southeast Asian and other contingencies. its designation changed as it evolved, becoming eventually the USAF Special Operations Force. At its peak, the force consisted of more than 500 aircraft of some 50 different types and configurations, together with more than 10,000 people. Major force components included the Combined Air Warfare Center (headquartered at Eglin Air Force Base, Florida) and three subordinate units: the 1st Special Operations Wing (at Hurlburt Field), the 4410th Special Operations Training Group, and the Special Operations School.
This structure enabled the Special Operations Force to provide more than 100 specialty configured mobile assistance teams to 28 different countries. Mobile training teams supported military assistance advisory groups and missions by providing expertise and instruction in air-ground operations and combat training. The SOF provided training to foreign aircrews in the continental United States and overseas, making a major contribution to the effectiveness of Third World air forces.
Mobile assistance teams were deployed to conduct civic-action programs also. These teams often played a major role in a nation's internal development because only the military possessed the organization, manpower, technical skills, and resources needed to accomplish various development projects. The teams helped developing nations by providing transport/utility aircraft to carry medical teams and supplies to remote areas, deliver supplies and equipment for disaster relief, and spray areas to rid them of disease-bearing pests. These projects were designed to improve the living conditions of the people, gain popular support for the government, and reduce the appeal of insurgents.
In November 1961, the first TDY element of the air commandos arrived in Bien Hoa with four B-26s, four C-47s, and eight T-28s--thus beginning a monthly TDY rotation of support personnel and crews that continued until 1964, when the units in South Vietnam were placed under Pacific Air Forces and given PCS status. Each month, until the changeover in 1964, a C-135 would land at Hurlburt Field, Florida, discharge 179-day veterans, and pick up a fresh contingent. In these early years, the air commandos were relatively carefree, naive "soldiers of fortune" who were looking for a piece of the action. They were advisors, but their clients were often Vietnamese aviation cadets ready to die with the Americans if luck ran out. And it ran out more often than most crew members cared to think about. During some of the rotations, as many as one-third of the crews were lost. The following excerpt from one airman's diary reflects some of the frustrations felt by these Air Force crews during that period:
The other day we lost another B-26 and reports are that the wing fell off during the pull up off the target. We expected all aircraft to be grounded but 2ADVON says "Keep flying" . . . We wouldn't think of giving India or Pakistan equipment in this poor shape.... Skimping on the facilities is bad enough and stupid regulations are bad too. . . but the loss of life is inexcusable when it is the result of improper planning.3
In 1964, the air commandos from Hurlburt Field turned their attention to Laos and Thailand when TDY rotations to Vietnam were no longer required. Commando forces operating in these areas followed procedures much more closely related to the original concept (espoused by President Kennedy) than did their SOF designated counterparts in South Vietnam, whose work was becoming more conventional. From a corner of a rice warehouse in Vientiane, Laos, a few American airmen operated behind the scenes to keep Laotian and Thai T-28s flying and to provide a link between the U.S. embassy and the combat forces of the Seventh Air Force. At Wattay Airport in Vientiane, for example, U.S. crews turned as many as five sorties per day per aircraft. Combat weathermen established a string of remote weather-reporting posts, supporting air operations over the north while controlling local air strikes on the side. Other commandos resumed their advisory role, helping Laotians master the use of the T-28 to conduct air strikes and mark targets for jet fighter-bombers.
As the war in Laos seesawed, air power was used extensively to prevent disintegration of Lao/Meo forces. Meo soldiers supported by airdrops and tactical air strikes held key hilltops against Pathet Lao forces.
Although our nation's efforts could save neither Laos nor South Vietnam from defeat, one should not conclude that nothing the Air Force tried to accomplish in Southeast Asia was effective. Today, the Air Force must come to grips with a legacy of that experience--the Vietnamese syndrome--and recognize the positive lessons learned as we now assess the role of air power in the "small wars" of the future. The recent trend in special operations activities, as illustrated by the Entebbe rescue, Desert One, the Falklands, and Grenada, is more toward single-event types of operations than toward the classic protracted campaigns of the past. This trend tends to confuse the distinctions among military operations at the low end of the conflict spectrum, the portion of the spectrum that is theoretically the responsibility of our special operations forces. Additionally, more recent special operations show an increasing reliance on sophisticated technology. These and other trends are summarized in Table 1.
| Classic | Contemporary |
|---|---|
|
|
How are these basic tendencies in special operations reflected in USAF doctrine? Official USAF doctrine on special operations has been nearly static since the late 1960s. It states that special operations involves three interrelated missions: unconventional warfare, foreign internal defense (counterinsurgency by another name), and psychological operations. The USAF Special Operations Force has had almost no experience in the latter two aspects of its stated mission in recent times and has concentrated almost exclusively on unconventional warfare.
AFM 1-1 (1979) defines unconventional operations as activities "conducted in enemy held or politically sensitive territory"--activities which include, but are not limited to, "evasion and escape, guerrilla warfare, sabotage, direct action missions, and other covert or clandestine operations."4 However, in the 1984 version of AFM I - I (to be published soon), the term direct action has been dropped. The draft now states that: "Special operations forces may conduct and/or support unconventional warfare, counterterrorist operations, collective security, psychological operations, certain rescue operations, and other mission areas such as interdiction or offensive counterair operations."5
Despite this somewhat broader charter, in practice, there has been a clear shift in Air Force thinking away from classic special operations of the past and toward a special operations force with a much more narrow focus. Thus, either by accident or design, a worldwide force of only some 60 aircraft means that the U.S. Air Force no longer possesses a strong institutional capability to conduct effective counterinsurgency or psychological warfare campaigns.
But in places like the remote reaches of the Arabian Peninsula, beleaguered Latin America, or the arid deserts and jungles of Africa, active guerrilla movements offer numerous opportunities for classic special operations under modern conditions. In deciding how the USAF might respond to these events, if called upon to do so, it is essential that we understand the traditional patterns of guerrilla activities, as well as the new conditions that prevail today. The USAF has a rich experiential base on which to draw in charting its future course of action, a base that extends back to 1916. While surface-to-air missiles (SAMS), helicopters, and modern communications and electronics have added new dimensions to the problems and solutions, the need for traditional commando skills and attitudes that have proved valuable over the years has not diminished. In many ways, the next shooting war involving the U.S. Air Force will probably bear a close resemblance to the guerrilla wars of the past. If the USAF is to live up to the old commando adage "Any Time, Any Place," we must study carefully the history of special operations and use the knowledge so gained to guide us in the application of the new technology available today.
Washington, D.C.
Notes
1. Lieutenant General [now General] Wallace H. Nutting, USA, "Nutting: Stand Fast," Newsweek, 6 June 1983, P. 24.
2. John F. Kennedy, Public Papers of the President, John F. Kennedy, 1962 (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1963), pp. 453-54.
3. An airman's personal diary, which I have been shown.
4. Air Force Manual 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force(Washington, 1979), pp. 2-19, 2-20.
5. Draft of Air Force Manual 1-1, Basic Aerospace Doctrine of United States Air Force(Washington, 1984), 3-5.
Colonel Kenneth J. Alnwick (USAFA; M.A., University of California at Davis) is a Senior Fellow at Strategic Concepts Development Center, National Defense University, Washington, D.C. His previous assignments include Director of the Air University Airpower Research Institute and Vice Commander of the Air University Center for Aerospace Doctrine, Research, and Education, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. He flew the A-26, T-28, OV-10, O-1, and C-47 in Southeast Asia; he was an Air Staff planner, working both force structure and regional policy issues; and he has taught history at USAFA. Colonel Alnwick is a Distinguished Graduate of Squadron Officer School and a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and Air War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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