Air University Review, July-August 1984
Major General I. B. Holley, Jr.
IN HIS famous study on the art of war, Baron Jomini attempted to identify the essentials of Napoleon's military genius. In so doing, he wrote many pages defining such key terms as strategy, tactics, etc. Jomini grasped the fundamental notion that without uniform definitions that were understood clearly by all readers and analysts, any search for sound military practice was certain to be flawed seriously.1
Unfortunately, Jomini's good advice has been ignored all too frequently in recent years by military writers. Thus, some articles today equate doctrine with "the philosophy of war," while others refer to doctrine as "concepts and principles"--as if all three terms were interchangeable. This confusion extends to even such official promulgations as JCS Pub. I, Dictionary of U.S. Military Terms for Joint Usage, which has, at one time or another, identified doctrine as "a combination of principles and policies" or as "fundamental principles."2 At the very least, such definitions are confusing, if not downright erroneous. Much might be gained from a concerted effort to achieve precision and uniformity in employing key military terminology.
WHAT is a concept? To conceive an idea is to formulate it in words in the mind. In the mind, it is notional; it exists only as a theory, an idea yet unproved. To conceptualize is to devise a mental construct, a picture in the brain that can be expressed in words eventually. Whether it resides in the mind or is revealed verbally, it is speculative, tentative, and usually malleable.
To illustrate the notion of a concept, let us look back to World War I. In the earliest days of that war, pilots from opposing sides mostly ignored one another on chance encounters in the air. Later, they armed their airplanes with machine guns, but soon they discovered that it was very difficult to hit a high-speed target from a moving platform. We can readily visualize one of the more creative individuals among them reflecting on the problem: "If I were to attack from dead astern, the enemy pilot would be far less liable to see me approach and there would be no deflection, no relative motion of the target in my sights, so it ought to be easier to make a kill with fewer shots." This mental image or concept in the reflective pilot's mind is a hypothesis--a conjectural conception to be proved true or false by trial and error.
In contrast to a concept, what is doctrine? Doctrine is what is being taught, i.e., rules or procedures drawn by competent authority. Doctrines are precepts, guides to action, and suggested methods for solving problems or attaining desired results.
Clearly, there is a marked difference between concepts and doctrines. Concepts spring from creative imagination. A perceptive observer draws an inference from one or more observed facts. An individual observes the springiness in a bent bough and infers that the thrust might be capable of projecting a missile; eventually, this initial conception, this tentative idea, leads to the bow and arrow--a major advance in the weaponry of mankind. So, too, the World War I pilot who first thought of attacking from dead astern came up with an innovative idea, a hypothesis. In each instance, the concept or hypothesis had to be tried in practice to confirm or confute the inference drawn by the reflective observer.
Doctrine, on the other hand, is an officially approved teaching based on accumulated experience. Numerous recorded instances have led to a generalization. To generalize is to infer inductively a common pattern from repeated experiences that have produced the same or similar results. In World War I, as more and more pilots tried attacking from above, astern, and out of the sun, they found the probability of making a kill tended to rise rapidly. On the basis of such experiences, reinforced by repetition, those who instructed neophyte pilots generalized this common pattern of attack into informal doctrine. Eventually, this informal doctrine appeared in manuals bearing the official imprimatur as formal doctrine.
Whereas a concept is a hypothesis or an inference which suggests that a proposed pattern of behavior may possibly lead to a desired result, a doctrine is a generalization based on sufficient evidence to suggest that a given pattern of behavior will probably lead to the desired result. While a concept is tentative and speculative, a doctrine is more assured. Doctrines are akin to rules, precepts or maxims, or a set of operations or moves reduced to more or less uniform procedures for meeting specific types of problems. Of course, in actual military practice, no hard and fast rules or maxims can be followed slavishly and mechanically in every instance with complete assurance that the anticipated and desired result will ineluctably follow. Because there are so many variables and imponderables in any military situation, doctrines must never be regarded as absolutes. Perhaps the best definition holds doctrine as that mode of approach which repeated experience has shown usually walks best.
Just as concepts are not to be confused with doctrines, so, too, doctrines must be distinguished from principles. Principles, as Aristotle pointed out long ago, are truths that are evident and general. One can lay down a rule somewhat arbitrarily, based on observed experience: "When attacking, come out of the sun." On the other hand, one cannot lay down a principle arbitrarily; one can only declare it. Rules, and hence doctrines, are within the power of properly constituted military authority; principles are not.
Whereas doctrines are derived by generalization (taking many cases and finding the common pattern), principles are derived by abstraction. Abstraction involves taking a single instance and distilling out its essence. The essence or epitome is that part which typically represents the whole. For this reason, principles are commonly expressed as axioms. Axioms are universally accepted self-evident truths. The principles of war, or more accurately, the principles of battle, rest on close study of individual engagements. The process of abstraction has been carried to the point where such single words or brief phrases as surprise, concentration, initiative, or economy of force epitomize the principles discerned in the mass of detail. With doctrine, the thrust is on "how to do it." With principle, on the other hand, the thrust is to explain the underlying idea.
What, one may ask, is the principle of battle involved in the doctrinal injunction to attack from high astern and out of the sun? From astern, one's approach not only avoids a deflection shot but is less likely to be observed because of the limitations that human anatomy imposes on the craning neck of a pilot scanning the sky for potential enemies. Approaching from out of the sun further reduces the probability of being detected. By approaching from high above, the attacker acquires added acceleration from his dive, giving a margin of advantage by shortening the time of closing. But all of these factors are but means to an end. The essential principle involved is surprise. The attacker seeks to catch his prey unawares. Modern electronic means may alter the doctrine and suggest new patterns of attack, but the principle will remain unchanged. More than one principle could be involved in any single situation, but for purposes of illustration we need consider here only the principle of surprise.
BECAUSE concepts, doctrines, and principles are very different terms, they should not be used interchangeably. To simplify the task of mastering these words, the ideas explicated are presented in synoptic fashion in the chart.
Duke University
Durham, North Carolina
Notes
1. Brigadier General J. D. Hitler, USMC, Jomini and His Summary of the Art of War (Harrisburg, Pennsylvania: Military Service Publishing Company, 1958), p. 10.
2. Editions of 1949 and 1979.
Contributor
I. B. Holley, Jr.,
Major General, USAFR (Ret) (B.A., Amherst; M.A., Ph.D., Yale University) is a Professor of History at Duke University. He has been a Visiting Professor at the National Defense University and the U.S. Military Academy and has taught at the Industrial College of the Armed Forces. Professor Holley served as chairman of the Advisory Committee on History to Secretary of the Air Force and as Mobilization Assistant to the Commander, Air University. He is author of Ideas and Weapons (1953), Buying Aircraft: Air Materiel Procurement for the Army Air Forces (1963), and previous contributions to the Review.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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