Air University Review, July-August 1984
The situations arising out of war are infinitely varied. They change often and unexpectedly and can rarely be foreseen in advance. Often it is precisely those factors that cannot be measured that are of the greatest importance. One's own will is confronted by the enemy's independent one. Friction and errors are everyday occurrences.
"Command of Troops," 1936 German Army Manual,
quoted in Martin van Creveld, Fighting Power: German
Military Performance, 1914-1945, p. 30
IF ONE is interested in discovering how America makes war, he can find no better place to begin his investigation than with Dr. Russell Weigley's The American Way of War. Weigley tells us that Americans tend to use a direct approach where strategy is concerned--the equivalent of a fullback plunge from the one-yard line. We define for ourselves the enemy's center of gravity and strike directly at that center with massed power. Such a strategy isn't subtle, but it worked for Grant against Lee and against Festung Europa in 1944-45.
We also tend to place great emphasis on technology in our approach to war. In America's formative years, we stressed the use of machines to overcome manpower shortages, in war no less than in peace; and we continue to do so. Indeed, it may not be far wide of the mark to say that a major element in America's national style in war is the view that superior technology is the key to military victory.
A third element in our approach to war is an image of war as a predictable, mechanistic phenomenon. War is reduced to a target system that can be destroyed by x number of rounds and bombs that require y number of guns, tanks, and planes to deliver. Given a specific, predicted improvement in weapon systems, the force structure can be reduced by a specific amount. This process seems to overlook the fact that in the hands of soldiers and airmen in the heat of battle, weapons seldom perform exactly as predicted. While the mechanistic image of war may be of some value in preparing for war, we must be cautious that it does not control the way we fight, lest we become too predictable and unimaginative in waging war. To ensure that we keep our minds and eyes open, we might remember Clausewitz's description of war as a contest in which force is aimed at an animate object that reacts. Not only will an enemy react, but he will act to disrupt and/or destroy our own forces and plans.
Still another element of America's style in war is somewhat related to the mechanistic view of war and derives from our national emphasis on counting. Patricia Cline Cohen has pointed out that Americans are A Calculating People, as the title of her l982 book puts it. In tracing the rising influence of quantification in American society, Cohen presents several interesting observations. While noting the increasing emphasis that americans have placed on numbers in their efforts to understand social developments, Cohen observes that Americans came to believe that "something that was counted or measured was known. Someone else could count it and get the same result. The exactness and objectivity of numbers meant that quantified information was a more truthful form of information than opinion, intuition, or judgment." (p. 219)
Yet Cohen also spends considerable time discussing the difficulties one encounters in quantifying social phenomena, observing that what one counts and how one counts it are frequently indicative of bias and preconceptions--one tends to count what one thinks is significant. This explains the American idiomatic expression "what counts," meaning what is important or significant.
Furthermore, the idiom suggests another connection between numbers and what we consider important. What counts is what counts--what is important is what one can count: sorties, tanks, tons of bombs, howitzers, high-school diplomas, etc. The danger in military affairs of this national proclivity for counting becomes obvious when one stops to think about the nature of war.
War's atmosphere is composed of "danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance." Within such an environment, the most important factors, the things that "count" most, are moral or nonquantifiable ones, such as discipline, morale, the genius of the commander, the quality of the officer corps, and plain old luck. At the most critical point in the officer's professional career, in the white heat of battle, counting may be the least important skill in his kit bag.
Several articles in this issue of the Review should help to increase our awareness of the importance of war's intangible aspects. Noting that the character of the commander is one of the most significant moral factors, General Raymond Furlong uses his knowledge of Clausewitz's On War to show how war games might help identify and develop officers with the qualities required in a successful commander. He points out that the best war game would be "unfair," in that it would be impossible to win because it places the would-be commander under great pressure, presents him with inaccurate data, and confronts him with totally unexpected events. Professor Roger Beaumont's article focuses on surprise and how its adverse effects on military organizations can be reduced. Surprise is also the theme of Captain Richard Bloom's article, which analyzes surprise and discusses the things one should do to achieve it.
Articles such as these help us remember the things that count most in war--the moral factors. Our national style in war must be based on the idea that the most important moral factor in war is an intellectually superior officer corps which fully understands modern warfare, appreciates its intangibles, and is prepared to outthink and outperform any other officer corps in war's demanding environment of "danger, exertion, uncertainty, and chance."
D. R. B.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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