Air University Review, July-August 1984
MILITARY surprise is an intriguing phenomenon. It is easily identified, it is highly prized, but it is not always easily available. Many historical accounts and theories of military surprise support this opinion. They include graphic accounts of past exploits, glowing reports of success, but only incomplete advice on how to achieve this dumbfounding action.
The advice takes one of two main approaches. First, we are told that military surprise is nothing that leadership, professional military education, and career broadening assignments cannot handle, i.e., that special training in military surprise is not needed. Such may be the case for the operational geniuses of U.S. military surprise from George Washington to George Patton. However, without specialized training, the typical operational commander will obtain surprise infrequently and usually by chance.
Second, we are told that if a set of principles, maxims, or commandments are followed, military surprise cannot be far behind. This approach is effective, when based on past accounts of military surprise. But it does not address how to handle novel and unique situations with characteristics that cannot be influenced or understood by a "tried and true" approach. Like the purveyors of books on how to succeed in business, sports, or life itself, our maxim makers offer some good information, but we are still not ready to set the world on fire.
In contrast to these two approaches, there is a psychological approach. It is based not only on historical accounts and theories of military surprise but on research and descriptions of surprise as a human experience in all walks of life. It also presumes competence in the vital tools of achieving any military victory--logistics, intelligence, and operational savvy. Using this approach, it is possible to develop a definition and planning considerations for military surprise. Although these may not ensure success, they should reveal the kind of specialization needed to do it right.
Military surprise is a combination of three psychological experiences: one of thought, one of emotion, and one of behavior.
First, a gap between what is real and what is thought to be real arises in the mind of the enemy; a "reality gap" occurs. How can we cause such a reality gap or maintain one that already exists? In low- or high-intensity military conflict, it is easiest to strengthen what the enemy already thinks and then to act contrary to it. In low-intensity conflict, the enemy has little need to question preconceptions; in high-intensity conflict, there is little time to do so. In moderate-intensity conflict, however, it is sometimes more beneficial to reverse or radically change the enemy's preconceptions, and then act contrary to these. Here, the enemy has both a need and the time to consider alternative views of reality.
Along with a reality gap, an emotional experience arises in the enemy. Usually, it consists of fear, anxiety, or anger; occasionally, boredom or apathy. These emotions are expressed bodily by changes in many hormone and nervous system functions. Mentally, they are expressed by changes in the speed, quality, and content of thought. These expressions, along with a reality gap, contribute to poor decision making. The enemy will tend to make decisions either too suddenly or too hesitantly. Historical accounts of military surprise reveal both types of reactions.
With poor decision making arises the sine qua non of military surprise: the enemy behaves in a manner more beneficial to us than to his own interests. Usually, this behavior involves a misallocation of operational, logistical, and intelligence resources- a reaction that may be only temporary as the enemy closes the reality gap and reduces the harmful effects of emotion on mind and body. However, by then, victory may already by ours tactically and/or strategically.
To surprise the enemy, we need to create or maintain both a reality gap and some emotion leading to poor decision making by the enemy. Doing this is an example of psychological influence. It can be accomplished through speed of maneuver, concentration of forces, security, or a separate deception plan.
As with any attempt at psychological influence, we must plan a coordinated sequence of operational actions that convey information to the enemy. These might include operational security (OPSEC) measures, cover and concealment, and anything else in the realm of human behavior, from writing a bogus letter to not moving a squadron.
Obviously, which sequence to develop depends on the scenario at hand. However, all scenarios have basic similarities. (See the accompanying diagram.)
Basically there are three classes of "players" in any scenario: S, the initiators of surprise; Tp, the primary targets of S; and Tx, other targets. S, Tp, and Tx, may be any combination of people, groups, and organizations. For example, Tp can be the leader of a nation-state, a segment of a military planning staff, an entire tactical intelligence system, or all of these.
From my analysis of historical accounts, I have found that military commanders and planners have had an intuitive feel for who or what Tp should be. On the other hand, they seem to ignore or only superficially consider Tx, which can be either inadvertent or intended. Tx might be any or all of the following:
Having identified the players, we can now examine the playing field.
S, Tp, and Tx interact within a context (the oval in the diagram). In analyzing historical accounts, I have found it useful to segment this context into five dimensions (politico-military, economic, sociocultural, psychological, and physical) and three levels (global, regional, and local). The resulting fifteen types of information are interdependent and affect the enemy's behavior, as well as our own.
Instead of quibbling about the exact number and nature of these information types, note that nonmilitary (e.g., sociocultural) factors can significantly affect attempts at obtaining military surprise. Such factors may have played a large part in our being militarily surprised by the People's Republic of China in Korea during November 1950, for example. Also note that while many commanders and planners focus on surprising Tp and perhaps Tx (the solid lines in the diagram), in reality, all players may be trying to surprise the others (the dotted and dashed lines in the diagram). Thus, with the many webs of surprise and countersurprise, many arrows might emanate from and be directed toward S, Tp, and Tx simultaneously.
WITH these thoughts in mind, let us consider a planning sequence that can facilitate obtaining military surprise. Six sequential considerations seem to be necessary.
What is our goal? First, we must decide what we ultimately want to happen. For what purpose should we attempt military surprise? Usually, this comes down to the specific operational goals or national objectives we wish to support. Too of ten, however, commanders and planners start right in, developing ways to surprise the enemy without being sure of what they want to achieve. The "give me ten pounds of military surprise" approach is not the way to go-
What are our objectives? Next, we must determine the targets (friend and foe). Who are they, and what should they do so that we realize our goal?
In general, anyone or anything that can influence the goal is a potential target. For example, facing a "cultlike" totalitarian adversary, we might select a single individual decision maker as the primary target. More often, however, we would like to influence some combination of leaders and operational/planning staffs.
Once we have chosen a target, how should we influence the target's behavior to help achieve our goal? There are many possibilities, all involving the misallocation of target resources--personnel and materiel. We might influence when a target behavior will occur, what the behavior will be, where it will occur, how it will be carried out, how frequent or intense it will be, and what purpose the adversary will hope to fulfill. In short-term situations, we would usually seek to affect the target's operational, support, and intelligence actions during battle. In long-term situations, the target's order of battle during a series of skirmishes may be the object that we wish to influence.
What are the psychological parameters? We must next consider how our targets must think and feel so that our objectives will be achieved. What reality gap and emotions will lead to poor decision making and the target behavior we desire?
To identify these parameters, it is imperative that commanders and planners empathize with the target, seeing the world as the target does. Too often, we tend to ascribe our motivations, our way of looking at things, to those who see the world differently. For example, "acceptable losses" may mean one thing to U.S. infantry commanders but something quite different to Iranian clergy who influence revolutionary followers. Our intelligence community has been making significant progress in collecting, analyzing, and disseminating psychological parameters in recent years.
What story should we devise? Here, we must develop the pieces of information that the target must have so that the relevant psychological parameters arise. We must consider both denial and communication of information. The information package must fit together like a story or a script in the mind of the target.
Often, commanders and planners think that this story should be simple, clear, and identical with what they wish a target to think and feel. That is not necessarily the case. If we want an enemy commander to believe we are planning to attack at Point A, there may be many different stories to cause this belief. One such story might even be that we appear ready to attack at Point C. Another might have nothing to do with an attack. The only requirement is that the story should help establish the psychological parameters.
What are the techniques of surprise? Somehow we must convey the information making up our story. Commanders and planners are usually good at this--at working up coordinated sequences of actions, at setting up execution schedules--but often they underestimate bureaucratic inertia that may preclude an exact carrying out of orders. So too, they tend to intensify OPSEC procedures so much that the enemy knows "something is up."
How will we get feedback? We need indicators to tell us--once we have implemented our plan--whether the actions and reactions we outlined in our planning are tending to occur as we desire. (From historical accounts of military surprise, I have found it useful to classify indicators as either covert or overt, long-term or short-term, direct or indirect.) According to the dictates of our feedback, we may fine-tune, modify substantially, or abort an attempt at military surprise. We should also recognize that indicators or clear feedback may be unavailable sometimes. Here we might decide to press on nevertheless, well aware of our risks in going ahead blind.
FOR future considerations regarding techniques and tactics for military surprise, there are three main contributions that the psychological approach has to offer:
In our modern era, we have many implements to enhance the war-fighting skills of our armed forces. By applying psychology along with the other vital tools of the military profession, we can approach the ideal of having military surprise available when we need it for victory.
Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center
Fort Detrick, Maryland
Contributor
Captain Richard W. Bloom
(B.A., Columbia University; M.A., New School for Social Research; Ph.D., Kent State University) is Medical Intelligence Program Manager at Armed Forces Medical Intelligence Center, Fort Detrick, Maryland. He is a graduate of Squadron Office School and Air Command and Staff College. Captain Bloom has written psychological journals and the Review.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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