Air University Review, January-February 1984
DR. Valentine J. Belfiglio's article, "The Soviet Offensive in Southern Africa" (July-August 1983), strikes me as offering very bad advice to the United States. He would have us cooperate with the South African government in opposition to presumed Soviet inroads in the region even to the point of deploying peacetime military forces to that country. The advice is unsound for two reasons. First, his estimate of the importance of South Africa is exaggerated. Second, he grossly underestimates the difficulties his proposals would generate both domestically and in other regions of Africa--in fact, in the entire Third World.
Belfiglio offers up the good naval bases and airfields in South Africa as being assets to American national security. He further says that the Cape of Good Hope is vital because it is near the oil line of communications from the Persian Gulf to Europe and America. That notion does not stand up to careful analysis. It is unlikely that the Soviets would cut off the oil at the Cape when it would be much cheaper and safer for them to do it at the head of the Persian Gulf or at its outlet. By striking at the source of the oil flow, the Soviets could do twice the damage--they would simultaneously stop the flow of oil to the West and Japan--with less than half the effort. Thus, the questions become: Airfields on the way to where? Naval bases on the way to where? Moreover, Belfiglio overlooks the negative impact of his proposal in that U.S. support of South Africa might offend black African states to the point where they halt the flow of strategic materials from Africa itself. Nigeria is now one of America's chief oil suppliers, and her government has avowed that it will cut off oil to the United States were we to support South Africa. Some of the other sub-Saharan states possess mineral deposits that rival those of South Africa in importance--Zaire, for example.
In my opinion, Dr. Belfiglio also overestimates the lasting effects of Soviet activities in sub-Saharan Africa. After nearly four decades of frustration with foreign aid programs, Americans should know better than anybody else that gratitude on the part of the recipient is seldom very profound and never very persistent. The prevailing attitude seems to be: What have you done for me lately? The Soviets are already experiencing some of this. Third World states seem to know that when guns are needed for a revolution, they are more readily available from the Soviets than from Americans. But after the revolution has been won, then butter becomes more important than guns, and butter is more easily secured from the United States. Not only must the dictators of black Africa have the security forces to sustain themselves in power but also they must deliver on their earlier promises that decolonization would bring their supporters to the economic promised land. Many of the leaders have discovered that the economic aid necessary to develop their economies is much more readily obtained from the United States and Europe than from the Soviet Union. Thus, though the Soviets and Cubans certainly did provide vital aid to the winners in the Angolan struggle, lately the Angolan government has been cozying up to the United States in hopes of winning economic help from us. Thus, we see the spectacle of Cuban troops standing guard over Gulf oil refineries on Angolan territory. The foreign exchange provided by those refineries is simply too vital for the government to risk in the name of ideology.
It seems to me that Dr. Belfiglo's figures are open to question on various grounds. First, he says that 51 percent of South Africa's exports go to EEC and that 55 percent of her imports come from Europe as though that should be significant to the American decision-maker. Stated in those terms, the figures seem large, but they really are an unimportant fraction of the total trade of the Common Market and still less important as a factor in U.S. overseas trade. It is true that some minerals received from South Africa are quite important, but many of them could be obtained elsewhere at a somewhat higher price. In any event, a power that took control of South Africa would still have to find markets for her goods. This being so, the United States need not pay any price at all or run any risks to maintain access to South African resources. Belfiglio also asserts that 25 percent of U.S. oil needs to come around the Cape of Good Hope, but that seems impossible since we import but a quarter of our total consumption and very large portions of that quarter come from Venezuela, Nigeria, and Mexico.
Some years ago, George Kerman, in Cloud of Danger, asserted that only Japan and Western Europe were regions of vital interest for the United States. The only other area possibly worth a fight would be the Middle East. As for the rest of the world, he argued that they will never love us, we cannot solve their problems, and all we can really hope for is their respect. It appears to me that this is still a valid analysis, at least where southern Africa is concerned. The loss of South Africa, were there any real chance of that happening, might be inconvenient, but I doubt that it would be a "major setback." Furthermore, such a loss might not be permanent. Moreover, in the economic sense, some of the countries of sub-Saharan Africa are economic basket cases. Their loss to the U.S.S.R. might even constitute a net loss for the Soviets and a gain economically for the United States. For example, some believe that fully a quarter of the Cuban gross national product is provided by Soviet aid. Without the Cuban drain, that money might well have been spent on Soviet military forces and other things more dangerous to us than the presence of the Cuban mercenaries in Angola and Ethiopia. Afghanistan is costing the Russians dearly, and they cannot feed their own people as well as they desire. It seems to me that we ought not assume that every Soviet presence in the Third World is a gain for them and a loss for us anymore than our ten-year presence in South Vietnam was a loss for the U.S.S.R.
The weakest point in Dr. Belfiglio's article in the ease with which he dismisses the domestic difficulties his proposed policy would generate. Even if no other group in the United States objected to it, there would probably be strong opposition to the policy among American blacks. Though they constitute only about a tenth of the electorate, they are a swing group that in political candidate can ignore. On top of that the majority of American voters are registered a Democrats, and insofar as they are motivated by ideology, that factor would certainly operate strongly against Belfiglio's program--in my opinion so strongly that it would be well beyond the bounds of practical politics.
His notion that Americans could "persuad South African officials gradually to initiate majority rule," presumably to quiet ideological concerns of U.S. citizens, seems unfounded. While white South Africans are but a 20-percert minority in their own country, they are a hard lot. They are further hardened by examples of blood and mayhem that have followed the coming of majority rule in Zimbabwe--and thing there are not getting any better. Many of their people were among the mercenaries in Zaire who witnessed the numerous massacres that took place there in the process of decolonization. To build a policy on the expectation that white South Africans will ever willingly make meaningful reforms in the area of civil rights is unwise. They look upon the granting of majority rule as suicidal for whites, and on matters of personal survival no man is likely to compromise. Vietnam taught us that U.S. policy cannot succeed without majority backing or at least majority consent. This means that U.S. decision makers should reject any idea of cooperating with South Africa for any purpose if it entails the deployment of forces to the area or even faintly implies condoning apartheid.
Niceville, Florida
Lieutenant Colonel David R. Mets, USAF (Ret), (USNA; Ph.D. University of Denver) is Professor of History and International Relations, Troy State University, Florida Region.
I AM pleased that Dr. Mets took the time to pen his thoughful critique of my article, "The Soviet Offensive in Southern Africa." However, upon reflection, I see little in his comments to dissuade me from the views I expressed.
Professor Mets doubts that the Cape sea route is important to Europe and America because "it is unlikely that the Soviets would cut off the oil at the Cape when it would be much cheaper and safer for them to do it at the head of the Persian Gulf or at its outlet." Should we now sit back and relax, safe in the knowledge that the Soviets would never interdict oil shipments along the Cape route because Mets says so? I think not. A document published by the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), entitled United States Military Posture for FY 1983, clearly points out that the African continent "is circumscribed by vital sea lines of communications." According to this document: "In 1980, about 50 percent of the Arabian Gulf oil shipments passed around the Cape of Good Hope; hostile forces anywhere on the African periphery could threaten the Western oil lifeline." (p. 8) The Cape route will continue to remain vital to the Western world for the remainder of this century for the transport of both oil and crucial strategic materials.
Another problem I find with the Mets critique is an indication that he may not have read my article closely enough. For example, he asserts that "Belfiglio overlooks the negative impact of his proposal in that U.S. support of South Africa might offend black African states to the point where they halt the flow of strategic materials from Africa itself." In fact, I specifically address this matter in the article on page 85.
Mets misreads my article a second time when he asserts that I overemphasize "the lasting effects of Soviet activities in sub-Saharan Africa." No one can be certain what the lasting effects of Soviet activities in sub-Saharan Africa will be. My major concern is that current Soviet adventurism "in southern Africa poses a clear and present danger to the national interests of the United States in that part of the world." (p. 84) The JCS document already cited supports this contention. It points out that:
The rapid expansion of Soviet influence in Africa during the past decade constitutes the second general threat to US and Western interests in the region. Marxist regimes in Angola and Mozambique depend heavily on support by the Soviets or their surrogates, and in turn provide footholds from which the Soviet Bloc may attempt to deny military access and resources critical to the West. (pp. 8-9)
In September 1982, the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Judiciary Committee of the United States Senate conducted a thorough investigation of the Soviet threat. The subcommittee report, entitled "Soviet, East German and Cuban Involvement in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa," noted that available evidence showed that the Soviets continue to support terrorism "under the guise of aiding struggles for national liberation." (p. 28) Furthermore, the report supports my position, not that of Mets, with regard to the strategic importance of Africa, noting the significance both of southern Africa's proximity to "the strategic sea routes around Africa" and Africa's "growing importance as a source of critical minerals." (p. 1)
Where strategic minerals are concerned, Dr. Mets does admit that "some minerals that are received from South Africa are quite important. " However, he believes that "many of them could be obtained elsewhere at a somewhat higher price." Mets implies, but he does not openly admit, that other strategic minerals could not easily be obtained elsewhere. A report to the U.S. Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, entitled "U.S. Minerals Dependence on South Africa" and dated October 1982, argues that "The Western industrial world depends heavily on South Africa for chrome, manganese, vanadium, and platinum." This report also asserts:
The United States is almost completely dependent on imports of chromium, manganese and platinum, either in the form of ore or ferroalloys. It is particularly dependent on South Africa for imports of chrome and ferrochrome and platinum. . . . South Africa has a highly sophisticated minerals processing industry, particularly when compared to developing country minerals producers such as Zambia and Zaire. For a variety of reasons, the U.S. capacity to process various ores is decreasing. . . . As our capacity to process ore deteriorates, our ability to shift from South African sources of processed minerals to other developing country sources of unprocessed ore will correspondingly decrease. (pp. 2-26)
In the area of trade statistics, Dr. Mets asserts that my figures for trade between South Africa and Europe and America, which are based on data supplied by the U.S. Department of Commerce, "are open to question on various grounds." But he offers no recognized source for challenging these figures. He then claims that "a power that took control of South Africa would still have to find markets for her goods." Mets fails to demonstrate conclusively why the United States could not be excluded from a list of market nations. Then he makes a very curious statement: "The loss of South Africa, were there any real chance of that happening, might be inconvenient, but I doubt that it would be a 'major setback.' " This premise conflicts with the findings of U.S. congressional committees which allude to "the economic and strategic importance of southern Africa to the United States and the free world."
In one other major respect, Mets seems to have misunderstood my position, although I believe it is clearly stated in my article. He states: "The weakest point in Dr. Belfiglio's article is the ease with which he dismisses the domestic difficulties his proposed policy would generate. Even if no other group in the United States objected to it, there would probably be strong opposition to the policy among American blacks." Yet on page 85 of my article I state: "closer South African-American relations would antagonize many Afro-Americans."
Finally, Professor Mets doubts that the United States and its allies can "persuade South African officials gradually to initiate majority rule." I remain unshaken by this unsupported opinion.
While I am flattered that Dr. Mets took the time to prepare his response to my article, I do not believe that he has seriously challenged the basic ideas and conclusions it contains.
Denton, Texas
Dr. Belfiglio is Associate Professor of Government at Texas Woman's University.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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