Air University Review, November-December 1983
Dr. Jonathan R. Adelman
Perhaps the crowning achievement of the now-concluded Brezhnev era was the attainment by the Soviet Union of perceived strategic nuclear parity with the United States. When Leonid Brezhnev wrested power from Nikita Khrushchev in 1964, the United States held a decisive lead over the Soviet Union in this critical area. Brezhnev gave the armed forces a top priority, resulting in a long and sustained military buildup. During the 1970s, the Soviet nuclear arsenal surged forward dramatically in both a quantitative and qualitative dimension. By 1980 the Soviet Union’s 2500 submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), and bomber launchers represented more than a 60 percent increase from the 1500 launchers in 1970, not to speak of major improvements in quality. Soviet advances by the late 1970s had significantly degraded the value of America’s land-based ICBMs, opening a possible "window of vulnerability" in the 1980s. Significant funds had also been spent on such defensive measures as ballistic missile defense, antisubmarine warfare, and civil defense. By contrast the United States, far from engaging in its own buildup, had been content in the 1970s to exercise what Secretary of Defense Harold Brown aptly characterized as "strategic self-restraint." While the United States did MIRV its Minuteman and Poseidon missiles and double the number of nuclear warheads with increased accuracy in the 1970s, the total number of launchers in its triad was essentially the same in 1980 as in 1970. Between 1970 and 1978, cumulative Soviet spending on nuclear forces was three times that of the United States. Spending on defensive programs remained low, though, for the only American antiballistic missile site was dismantled, and civil defense stayed dormant.1
As a result of the Soviet momentum and American stagnation, the Soviet Union attained its long-sought goal of strategic nuclear parity with the United States in the 1970s. From this achievement flowed a number of benefits for the Soviet Union. Ideologically, it seemed to validate the leadership’s Marxist views of the inevitable rise of socialism and decline of capitalism, of history being decisively on the side of the Soviet Union. Militarily, the Soviet buildup forced the United States to cede claims of strategic supremacy and, for the first time, formally acknowledge the Soviet Union as an equal. This was reflected in the SALT I and II treaties, which gave the Soviet Union some leverage over American military development. Politically, the Soviet Union felt emboldened to stake out a position in the international political arena commensurate with its newfound military position. During the 1970s, the Soviet Union launched military transport efforts for its allies in Egypt and Syria, Ethiopia, Angola and Mozambique, and intervened directly in Afghanistan, the first Soviet move outside the Warsaw Pact since World War II. Perhaps Benjamin Lambeth has best captured this new Soviet attitude:
This mood of sublime self-assurance inspired by the growth of Soviet strategic power has perhaps been most confidently expressed in the widely-cited proclamation of Foreign Minister Gromyko that "the present marked preponderance of the forces of peace and progress gives them the opportunity to lay down the direction of international politics."2
The benefits flowing from the successful Soviet buildup did not come cheaply. During the early years of Brezhnev’s rule, continued economic growth allowed both guns and butter, easing the cost of the arms race. But in the 1970s the marked slowdown in Soviet economic growth sharply increased the opportunity costs of significant real conventional and nuclear appropriations increases. The fact that Soviet military spending continued to increase at the same rate even in the late 1970s came only at the expense of major decreases in the rate of growth of capital investment and lesser decreases in consumption growth rate. This clearly demonstrated, in Myron Rush’s view, that "the prolonged Soviet military buildup is relatively insensitive not only to changes in international climate and in U.S. military policies but also to changes in Soviet economic circumstances."3
By the late 1970s the relentless Soviet buildup, which seemed to threaten to go even beyond parity with the United States, began to alarm American defense policymakers. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979 brought these concerns to the forefront of American policy as did concerns about a "window of vulnerability" for American land-based ICBMs in the early 1980s. The Carter administration, especially in its last year, formulated plans for a major expansion in American military spending, including the nuclear arena. The Reagan administration, with its massive $1.6 trillion five-year plan for military spending, made a top priority of reversing the adverse trends of the l970s. Especially significant in Reagan’s view was a major program for strategic nuclear modernization that would give the United States a decided advantage in this key area by the end of the decade.
In October 1981, President Reagan set forth a major program of strategic nuclear modernization of all three legs of the triad. He called for the deployment of 100 powerful counterforce MX missiles by the late 1980s to replace the Minuteman land-based ICBM. At sea Reagan stressed the rapid deployment of the Trident II/D-5 SLBMs, which possessed real counterforce capability to destroy hardened targets. In the air he called for the replacement of aging B-52 bombers with 100 B-lB intercontinental bombers in the late 1980s and the development of the Stealth bomber (ATB) by the end of the decade. Some B-52s would also be modernized and used as launching platforms for 3000 cruise missiles on B-52s and B-1s. All this would be accompanied by increased spending on C31 and strategic defense programs. The net result would be by 1990 to give the United States a strong counter-force first-strike potential against hardened Soviet targets.4
The long-term impact of such a program, if carried out in its broad outlines, would be very considerable. Not since the Eisenhower administration has there been such a comprehensive review and program for strategic forces. Given the longevity of such forces (many B-52s are older than their pilots), the potential impact could be felt into the next century.
While the Reagan program clearly lacked an overall coherent policy on the role and future of strategic nuclear forces, and elements of it will probably be changed (as MX), the overall thrust of the program was relatively clear. As Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger reported to Congress in February 1982:
This Administration . . . does place the highest priority on the long overdue modernization of our strategic forces. While this modernization program is not designed to achieve nuclear "superiority" for the United States, by the same token, we will make every necessary effort to prevent the Soviet Union from acquiring such superiority to insure the margin of safety necessary for our security.5
Other Reagan spokesmen have gone even further to imply that the administration is aiming for nuclear superiority over the Soviet Union.6
The rhetoric and programs of the Reagan administration have genuinely alarmed Moscow. As early as June 1981, V. V. Potashov declared, "With the aid of the MX program, the Pentagon leaders are openly planning to secure strategic superiority to Soviet strategic forces."7 In October 1981, Georgi Arbatov, director of the Institute of U.S.A. and Canadian Studies in Moscow, averred that "a big step has been taken toward a Cold War" as "weapons systems are being developed which will further destabilize the balance or in any case create the illusions . . . that will increase the shakiness and the instability of the world."8 In June 1982, Krasnaya zvezda and Pravda articles stressed that MX and Trident represented a clear attempt by the United States to gain military superiority over the Soviet Union.9 In December 1982, Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov bluntly warned, "The point is that Washington has now set itself the goal of upsetting parity and achieving military superiority. A rough deadline for this—1990—is even being mentioned."10
In the Soviet view the United States possesses the economic resources, technological capability, and political will to carry out what they feel are dangerous programs. Although Soviet observers tend to emphasize the negative aspects of defense spending, they have little doubt that America’s $3 trillion economy could support the level of spending necessary for such forces. In 1982, strategic forces consumed only 13.3 percent of the defense budget ($16.2 billion), a figure scheduled to rise to 16.3 percent of that budget by 1985 ($33.2 billion).11 Technologically, Vernon Aspaturian has seen Soviet fears of an American reversal of the existing nuclear strategic parity between the two superpowers as grounded in a "deep and even awesome respect for the enormous economic, scientific and technological resources of the United States and realizable military potential inherent in them."12 Politically, they perceive that the hardline tone of the Reagan administration and presumed power of the military-industrial complex make the completion of the strategic program a distinct possibility. Raymond Garthoff has placed the Soviet view in perspective:
In the Soviet perception, the USA has continued, notwithstanding SALT and détente, to seek military superiority. Although some highly placed U.S. leaders and others are considered to have "soberly" evaluated the strategic situation and given up the pursuit of superiority, powerful forces are believed to continue to seek advantage and superiority in order to compel Soviet acquiescence in U.S. policy preferences. Moreover, actual U.S. military policy and programs are seen as seeking to upset or to circumvent the nuclear mutual deterrence balance.13
Clearly the comprehensive modernization program poses a serious military threat in the late 1980s to the Soviet Union, especially as it puts directly at risk the 70 percent of the Soviet nuclear arsenal deployed on increasingly vulnerable land-based ICBMs. Also, the asymmetry of force postures, with the United States deploying only 20 percent of its force posture in such a mode, works to the disadvantage of the Soviet Union. So, too, do the difficulties in altering such an orientation in a country with a strong military tradition of land power, weak access to open waters, and little history of strong offensive bomber power.
At the same time, it is important to stress the limitation of the impact of changes in the nuclear balance on the thinking of top Soviet leaders. Their view of the correlation of forces is far broader and more complex than the simple comparison of strategic nuclear weapons deployed on both sides or various forms of elevated bean counting. Even the military component of the correlation of forces would not focus solely on the strategic nuclear balance. Rather, viewing strategic nuclear forces as only one aspect of military power, it would integrate strategic nuclear forces, theater nuclear forces, and conventional military forces under one rubric. This diminishes the impact of the new strategic systems as changes in the strategic balance can be offset by Soviet conventional superiority (as in the 1950s) or by European theater nuclear advantages (as seen in the large-scale SS-20 deployment).
Furthermore, in the Soviet view military power has never been considered a central or autonomous factor in foreign policy. The Soviets do not emulate the American predilection for analysis of abstract force exchanges irrespective of the larger political goals or strategic context. Rather than simply representing the quantity and quality of men and weapons available to the armed forces, military power has been often seen as a function of other factors, such as political and economic causes. In this context new military challenges need not be met by military power at all. Robert Legvold has well understood this perspective in his observation of the Soviet Union in the l980s: "Her ability to integrate her economy into a larger order, beginning with the energy sector, for example, will have as much to do with her security, and perhaps even more to do with that of her allies, than any plausible erosion of the strategic nuclear balance."14
Indeed, there has been no clear correlation between Soviet foreign policy and the state of the intercontinental nuclear balance. Stalin made great gains in Eastern Europe after World War II in the face of the American nuclear monopoly. Khrushchev steadily advanced the Soviet cause in the Third World, proclaimed the inevitable victory of communism, and repeatedly (if unsuccessfully) challenged the United States over Berlin during an era of American strategic nuclear superiority. And despite the achievement of strategic nuclear parity, Brezhnev actually pursued a more conservative and less bellicose foreign policy than his predecessor, one emphasizing détente, East-West trade and SALT agreements, especially before 1979 and the freezing of Soviet-American relations.
Finally, the Soviet notion of correlation of forces is a very broad concept, in which the military balance is only one aspect of a very complex balance between the two sides. The correlation of forces includes long-term social, economic, and historical processes embedded in the "objective" course of history which will, they are convinced, witness the ultimate triumph of Marxism-Leninism. Great stress is placed on the growth of international movements, such as the peace movement and national liberation movements, and economic factors, such as the deep recession in Western capitalist countries. Domestic politics, allies, and classes are all given significant roles. So too are qualities of national leaders and national resolve. The anti-Vietnam War movement is cited as an example where internal class contradictions forced a change in American foreign policy. Most important, the Soviets are likely to see strategic modernization not simply in a military context but as symbolic of a broader political context. Vernon Aspaturian, writing at the end of the Carter administration, argued:
Widely prevalent in Soviet commentary is the view that the United States is not merely interested in reclaiming military superiority but yearns to restore itself to the apex of the international system as principal arbiter of the planet’s destiny, to renounce its agreement to accept the Soviet Union as an equal partner and to behave once again as if it were the world’s only authentic global power, with a self-asserted right to set the international agenda, resolve disputes and in general regulate and manage the international system.15
Everything that has occurred in the first two years of the Reagan administration has only intensified these Soviet views.
The new and threatening American strategic initiatives come at a particularly sensitive period in Soviet politics. The death of Leonid Brezhnev in November 1982 has intensified a sharp succession struggle already well under way before Brezhnev’s death at age 76. Historically, Soviet succession struggles have been protracted and even dramatic battles lasting several years. It took five years after Lenin’s death for Stalin to smash the left and right oppositions before gaining the undisputed mantle of leadership in 1929. The Stalinist succession struggle lasted four years before Khrushchev’s final ascendancy in 1957, highlighted by the liquidation of Beria in 1953, dismissal of Malenkov in 1955, and dramatic defeat of the "Anti-Party Group" Politburo majority in 1957. Even the relatively consensual ouster of Khrushchev in 1964 precipitated a moderate struggle that lasted several years between Brezhnev and Kosygin. Given the multiplicity of factions and groups, institutional rivalries, mobilization of peripheral groups, and complexity of issues, any fast and final resolution of the succession struggle and reintegration of the polity is rather unlikely.
This is especially true given the nature of personnel elite turnover on the agenda. While there have been four changes in the top leadership (1924, 1953, 1964, 1982), the elite leadership has changed only once—and that time (1937) did not coincide with a change in the top leader. While the Soviet elite from 1917 to 1937 was dominated by Old Bolsheviks, the Great Purges in 1937 decimated this group. A new, young postrevolutionary generation, with working class and peasant origins and technical education, rose to power in the wake of the purges. This generation (exemplified by Brezhnev, Kosygin, and Podgorny) is now rapidly passing from the scene. Seweryn Bialer showed in Stalin’s Successors that in 1978 the average age range of a full member of the Politburo was 66-70, 65 among members of the Councils of Ministers, and 65 among the high command of the Armed Forces.16 Thus a massive turnover at the elite level coupled with a change in top leaders will ensure true ferment and instability in the Soviet system. This is even truer since the advanced age of Yuri Andropov (69) ensures that, even if he consolidates his power, there will probably be yet another succession struggle at the top by the end of the decade.
Finally, intense internal struggle is virtually guaranteed by the large, complex, and often unpalatable agenda facing any new Soviet leadership in the 1980s. The last years of the Brezhnev era were marked by petrification and stagnation in Soviet policy abroad and at home. The growth rate of the overly centralized Soviet economy continued to drop inexorably from the 5 percent annual GNP rise of the 1960s to 4 percent in the 1970s to 1-2 percent in the early 1980s. Soviet agriculture suffered several disastrous years, energy production flattened out, and labor productivity growth dropped sharply.17 In foreign policy the Soviet Union found itself overextended and even floundering. In Eastern Europe massive Soviet military pressure and economic help were needed to defeat the Polish Solidarity trade movement. In the south more than 105,000 Soviet troops were still bogged down in Afghanistan with little prospect of gaining a decisive victory. In the east the Soviet Union has 43 divisions tied down along the Chinese border while its Vietnamese allies are still trying to complete their occupation of Cambodia. Soviet influence beyond its borders has dropped notably. In Latin America, Castro’s Cuba has become an expensive obligation while in the Middle East, Soviet impotence was highlighted in the recent defeats of its clients in Lebanon and subsequent exclusion from Lebanese and Arab negotiating efforts. And, finally, relations with the world’s other superpower, the United States, have deteriorated markedly in recent years.
These problems, however, will be discussed, debated, and analyzed against the policymaking framework created during the Brezhnev era, and that is where the difficulties will arise. Under Brezhnev the regime managed to provide both guns and butter. Consumers benefited from the doubling of national income during the first twelve years of his rule. A sharp increase in consumption of high-quality foods, a massive housing program, and a new expanded retirement system have all whetted consumer expectations.18 Similarly, all major central bureaucratic institutions received significant real appropriations increases yearly from the expanding economic pie. Brezhnev cemented the consensual con servative system of decision-making in 1973 when he added the Foreign Minister (Gromyko), Defense Minister (Grechko), and KGB head (Andropov) to the Politburo.
But in the l980s, the politics of economic stringency will not permit a continuation of politics as usual. The vast and important investment needs of European Russian reindustrialization, Siberian energy development, and Soviet agriculture will compete directly with consumer expectations and the wants and desires of the powerful military-industrial complex. This will lead inevitably to bruising political confrontations on a scale not seen in Soviet politics for two decades. All this will occur, too, against the backdrop of a rearming and more menacing America bent on a strategic nuclear modernization program that threatens to overturn hard earned Soviet claims to nuclear parity. Myron Rush has well captured the tenor of the coming political collisions when he observed:
By the mid 1980s defense may receive more than half the increment, leaving very little for additional civilian investment and for the consumer. Stepped-up increases in defense expenditures in a continuing arms race against an American economy that is roughly twice the size of the Soviet economy could be achieved only by making repeated cuts in consumption. Reducing Soviet living standards at a time of tight labor supply, however, could further weaken the economy, creating a downward spiral.19
In this context it is especially important to see the role rather likely to be played by the military and its allies in heavy industry in the succession struggle. The response of the Soviet leadership to the American military challenge is also likely to be significantly influenced by the military. As Arthur Alexander has cogently observed about the nature of the Soviet military decision-making process:
. . . the lengthy complex process of weapons acquisition and great inertia and sheer survivability of organizations and their behavioral patterns ensure that the outcome of that process will be heavily influenced by the organizations involved—by their goals and procedures. This influence derives from the organizations’ control over information, generation of alternatives and implementation of political choices.20
The Soviet military thereby enjoys key advantages in framing the military aspect of a response to American programs. With its almost total control of all aspects of national security affairs, from analysis and intelligence to production and deployment of weapons, the Soviet military enjoys a degree of autonomy not found in the American military. Its predominance in all spheres of military and strategic thought and monopoly of military expertise enable it to frame military problems and define the parameters within which those problems are to be solved.21
The military has historically played a significant role in succession struggles since the death of Stalin. It played a key role in the arrest and execution in 1953 of Beria, who led the secret police, a notorious enemy of the military. In 1955 military support of Khrushchev helped him to oust Malenkov, his chief rival. In 1957 Khrushchev prevailed over the "Anti-Party Group" Politburo majority with the aid of Defense Minister Zhukov, who used military transport planes to bring Central Committee members to Moscow to help Khrushchev. In 1964 Brezhnev was able to oust Khrushchev at least in part because of military disenchantment with his policies. And, as we shall see, Andropov’s rapid ascension to power after Brezhnev’s death in 1982 results in large measure from the backing of the military-industrial complex.
In addition, the military and its heavy industrial allies have made great strides over the last three decades. Under Khrushchev the military became a legitimate and significant political actor, a status denied it under Stalin. The size and power of its Strategic Rocket Forces expanded enormously. Khrushchev in his memoirs recounted how difficult he found it to withstand military pressures:
Unfortunately there’s a tendency for people who run the armed forces to be greedy and self-seeking . . . "Some people from our military department come and say, ‘Comrade Khrushchev, look at this! The Americans are developing such and such a system. We could develop the same system but it would cost such and such.’ I tell them there’s no money; it’s all been allotted already. So they say, ‘If we don’t get the money we need and if there’s a war, then the enemy will have superiority over us.’ So we discuss it some more, arid I end up by giving them the money they ask for."22
Under Brezhnev the armed forces flourished, receiving real appropriations increases of 3 percent to 5 percent a year and sustaining a powerful military buildup in nearly every sector.
But this is not to suggest, as Roman Kolkowicz has done, that the Soviet military will become a dominant political force in an increasingly militarized post-Brezhnev Soviet society.23 For the Soviet leadership throughout history has successfully prevented any military challenge to its power—and there must be serious doubts as to whether the military even would desire such a position. Stalin excluded the military from decision-making and ruthlessly and massively purged the officer corps in the late 1930s. Khrushchev ousted the popular Marshal Zhukov from the Politburo in 1957 and sharply reduced the size and influence of the ground forces. Even Brezhnev, closely allied with the military, overrode military objections to reach the SALT I and SALT II agreements in the 1970s, in the process reintegrating the military in the negotiating scheme. Brezhnev’s generous treatment of the military in terms of appropriations, personnel stability, and professional autonomy was in line with his treatment of other key central institutions, such as the secret police and government bureaucracy.
Furthermore, the military faces certain key problems in maintaining its position. Unlike in earlier battles, the military is now a satisfied, status quo power, seeking to defend its position. Given minimal growth and the rise of reformism in the succession struggle, it may become the object of wrath of other dissatisfied interest groups seeking a share of its large pie. Nor is the military homogeneous. Leaders such as Khrushchev demonstrated considerable success in playing one faction against another (as Zhukov versus Konev). Numerous internal splits, such as conservative ground forces versus radical strategic rocket forces, navy versus air force, and commanders versus commissars may provide ground for the political leadership to consolidate themselves at the expense of the military. Recent military setbacks suffered by the Soviet military in Afghanistan and Soviet clients in the Middle East (Syria at the hands of Israel in Lebanon, Iraq by Iran) may diminish its prestige and legitimacy. Overall, then, the military is likely to play a strong but hardly dominant role in a succession struggle in which it may find itself on the defensive.
The rapid ascension of Yuri Andropov to the post of Party General Secretary in the wake of Leonid Brezhnev’s death in November 1982 signaled the initial victory of the hardliners over the moderates. His background as Soviet Ambassador to Hungary during the 1956 crushing of the revolt and fifteen years as head of the KGB greatly appealed to the hardliners. His strong ties with the defense establishment were reflected in his declaration in November 1982 that "the Politburo has considered and continues to consider it mandatory, especially in the present international situation, to provide the Army and Navy with everything they need."24 In response in December, Defense Minister Ustinov praised the "complete clarity" of Andropov’s policies while Army General V. Varrenikov called Andropov’s speech "brilliant and deeply meaningful."25 Similarly, his strong ties with the KGB, which he had headed for 15 years, were seen in the promotions of his former associates to the Politburo (Geydar Aliyev), post of U.S.S.R. Minister of Internal Affairs (Vitaly Fedorchuk), and post of KGB head (Viktor Chebrikov).
Many factors promoted Andropov’s triumph over his moderate challenger, Konstantin Chernenko. The wave of deaths (Brezhnev, Suslov, Podgorny, and Kosygin) and incapacitating illnesses (Kirilenko and Pelshe) of the older generation in the last two years removed many of Brezhnev’s associates. In terms of experience, intelligence, and pragmatism, Andropov possessed the best qualifications for the post. His move to the Central Committee Secretariat in May 1982 defused fears of his secret police background. His support for arms negotiations and détente and ties to Georgi Arbatov have shown a moderation that lessens opposition to his rule, as well as the fact that at age 69 he is unlikely to rule for many years.
Finally his initial policies have shown a marked cautiousness in domestic policies and moderation in foreign policy. His stress on fighting economic corruption avoids challenging the interest of powerful economic institutions. His calls for arms negotiations with the West on strategic arms and theater nuclear weapons, coupled with appeals for negotiations over Afghanistan and China, show an attempt to defuse international crises and insulate domestic politics from their volatility.
The Soviet Union has with Brezhnev’s death entered into a period of intense political struggle over the future shape of Soviet politics. This process will undoubtedly be lengthened by the fact that Yuri Andropov is 69 years old. Even if he succeeds in consolidating his power, a new succession struggle to determine who succeeds him is likely by the end of the decade. Given the centrality of the Soviet-American relationship in Soviet eyes, moves made by the United States will affect the succession. Moderate American moves can, under certain circumstances, help beget moderate Soviet responses. Similarly, hardline American moves can provoke hardline Soviet responses. For, as Uri Ra’anan has astutely argued,
The fractional nature of Soviet leadership, if borne in mind, presents options to other powers—as a potential "brake" upon adventurous tendencies that appear to be surfacing in Soviet actions…Certain elements in the Soviet elite may be beginning to feel that there are actions in the international arena of a bold and militant nature, which, basically, no longer "pose risks" that would prove really costly to the USSR. Consequently, it could prove advantageous for other powers to be able to "manipulate" factional strife at the apex of Soviet leadership, if only by supplying political "ammo" to those who, in their own interests, would wish to demonstrate that their domestic rivals really are "adventurists." Groups in the Kremlin raising "the banner of caution" could show that actions proposed by these rivals might involve very high international costs and that these were Western signals, not necessarily of a declaratory nature, intimating the gravity with which such ventures would be viewed.26
Given the threat that American strategic nuclear modernization poses to the major and expensive Soviet attainment of achieving perceived nuclear parity with the United States, it will surely become a major issue in Soviet politics. Soviet hardliners and moderates would agree that the American program, if carried through, would pose a serious danger to the Soviet position in international politics. But Soviet hawks will see it as a harbinger of an overall attempt to dethrone the Soviet Union as a superpower. In this view only a "hard" Soviet response, in the form of competition with the West and use of force, would deter the West. Conversely the doves, seeing the American strategic program as more purely military in scope and denigrating the military factor in the correlation of forces, will argue for détente and arms control agreements to restrain an economically and technologically superior enemy. Interestingly the more moderate position was previously adopted by both Khrushchev and Brezhnev after they had gained power with the support of the hardline camp. For as George Breslauer has perceived:
Both Khrushchev and Brezhnev presented their collaborative designs at a time when they perceived themselves to be in a position of "effective strategic parity" with the United States but when they greatly feared that unless the parity relationship were codified and regularized, the United States could make a technological burst forward and leave the Soviet Union behind once again.27
The Soviet perception of the overall context of the American program thereby becomes quite important. If it is perceived as the dominant feature of an overtly hostile American policy seeking to revive the Cold War, it will strengthen Kremlin hardliners. This policy would confirm traditional Marxist-Leninist views on the irradicable warlike, aggressive, and hostile tendencies of capitalist states. If they felt that America had adopted this policy, it would revive deep-seated historical fears of capitalist encirclement and foreign invasion. There will be a strong "rallying around the flag," patriotic reaction in which consumer concerns will be shelved for an ongoing Soviet buildup. This would weaken the moderates who have argued for greater contact and trade with a West which seemingly had accepted Soviet strategic parity. There would seem to be little to lose from an outright renewal of the Cold War. The worst fears of Soviet military and civilian leaders will have been confirmed. Soviet hardliners will be able to use the American program to further their own ends.
If American policy helps to promote a new, hardline post-Brezhnev leadership, the consequences will be considerable. During the last two decades the decline of the Cold War has led to the emergence of a new and tenuous Soviet-American relationship, symbolized by the signing of two SALT agreements and the Helsinki Accord. As a result, China has replaced America as the most immediate threat to Soviet security. Now, if partly through American actions, the United States were to be restored to its old status of the Soviet Union’s major enemy, the impact will be immediate and possibly military in nature. The Soviet Union lacks the ability to compete on a global basis with the United States in either the economic or cultural realms. Economically, far from being an economic superpower, the Soviet Union imports high technology goods and industrial products while exporting natural resources (gold, gas, and oil), the classic pattern of an underdeveloped country. Culturally, Soviet-style communism has long since lost its appeal in Europe and the Third World. Therefore, any hardline Soviet response to the American buildup must be military in nature since this is the only arena in which the Soviet Union is truly globally competitive and even enjoys some marginal advantages.
The first Soviet response might be to launch an increased arms buildup of its own to match the American program and maintain parity. Although this would harm key domestic interests, it would be readily sustainable over a short run of several years. The trillion dollar Soviet economy, already far more militarized than the American economy, would find it easier than the American economy to step up military production.28 The visible American threat would allow the Kremlin leadership to contain domestic dissatisfaction arising from the downgrading of consumer spending. The Soviet leadership could also doubt the long-term commitment of the United States to such a course, given the volatility of American politics, frequent electoral changes in leaders, economic difficulties, and strong nuclear freeze movement.
A further Soviet response could be for them to use their military forces in a much more aggressive fashion than heretofore. Since World War II the Russians have deployed their forces outside the Warsaw Pact area only once (Afghanistan)— and that time in a neighboring country with no possibility of direct Western intervention. A more aggressive Soviet policy could take advantage of several favorable conditions. The attainment of strategic nuclear parity with the United States has freed the Soviet Union from the fear of having to back down (as in Cuba in 1962) in the face of American threats and countermeasures. By a number of measures, Soviet ground forces possess means substantially in excess of those necessary for the defense of the homeland. Geographically, as a massive Eurasian power, the Soviet Union has a unique ability to intervene quite easily in Europe, Asia, and the Middle East. And even if the Reagan administration succeeds in a major strengthening of American conventional forces, this is a protracted process requiring a number of years to complete. In the interim Soviet conventional superiority could be exploited in a number of areas of opportunity. In short, the real "window of vulnerability" in the 1980s might well lie not in nuclear weaponry (whose use is highly unlikely) but in conventional weaponry.29
The Russians could find a number of areas around the world where it might be profitable to use, or threaten to use, forces by themselves or through surrogates. In Asia they could stage maneuvers or border incidents along the Chinese border. The Chinese, intent on pursuing their ambitious Four Modernizations program, would then have to choose between some form of accommodation with the Russians or building up their forces at the cost of development. In the Middle East, the Soviet Union could contemplate resolving its own future energy problems through pressure or actual force on the weakly armed emirates. Or it could massively supply Syria with enough advanced weapons to ignite another Arab-Israeli conflict in which the Soviet Union could hope to demonstrate that it is the only reliable Arab ally against Israel. Throughout the Third World, from Central America to southern Africa, there are numerous areas where the Soviet Union might profitably contemplate direct or indirect military intervention.
This is not to say that there are no positive benefits to be derived from American strategic nuclear modernization. Indeed, there are important benefits to be gained. For if the United States were to continue to allow the Soviet Union to alter the military balance in its favor, this would undoubtedly-aid the hardliners in the succession struggle.30 The potential benefits from the threat or actual use of force would soon outweigh possible costs. Given the enormous economic, political, and social problems facing Russia in the 1980s, the temptation would arise to resolve them partially through the now attractive conventional military option. With the vast Soviet nuclear capabilities inhibiting any likely use of American nuclear assets, the Soviets could more freely utilize their conventional forces. It was in America’s interest to redress the balance so as to help push the Soviet Union away from such a military solution to its problems.
But if the American strategic modernization program were coupled with positive American proposals (as serious trade and arms negotiations), they will strengthen the moderate position in the succession struggle. For as Alexander Dallin perceptively observed about the interdependence of the two superpowers:
The mutual perceptions of the superpowers are shaped, in large measure, by each other’s behavior along with domestic pressures and constraints. The United States is thus an unwitting participant in internal Soviet arguments and reassessments, and this is likely to be the case particularly at times of genuine debate and uncertainty in Moscow-- times which are once again upon us.31
In this context moderate American actions can show the potential benefits from dealing with the United States while the strategic modernization program demonstrates the futility of the Soviet hardline position of pursuing a military option vis-à-vis the West. Such an American position would show that the United States is not intent on depriving the Soviet Union of its hard-won status as a superpower.
The key to the moderate position will be the credibility of the proposals offered to the Soviet Union. The Soviet leadership believes that the United States in the 1970s undermined détente by not keeping its promises. Militarily, the United States initialed the SALT II Treaty—and the Senate never ratified it. Economically, the United States never granted the Soviet Union "most favored nation" trade status—while China and Romania were granted the status. Trade between the two superpowers never rose above the paltry level of several billion dollars a year. Politically, America accepted the centrality of the Soviet-American relationship—and then actively played the China card. Constant American policy flip-flops and temporary restrictions on the Soviet-American relationship during the Carter and Reagan administrations undermined American credibility.
Three areas are most important for such a moderate policy. The critical problems facing the Soviet economy in the l980s and the dominant role of domestic policy in resolving the succession struggle ensure the primacy of economic issues. Although the eagerness of America’s Western European and Japanese allies to trade with the Soviet Union has somewhat diminished the value of American trade, it still remains important. The United States, even today, remains the economic engine of the non-Communist world and provides its direction. Especially in the l980s, the Soviet Union needs American wheat, nonmilitary high technology, and capital investment to overcome domestic economic difficulties. Both direct and indirect American involvement could be vital to such massive projects as the development of Siberian energy resources and European Russian reindustrialization. Such projects would also aid the ailing American economy and suffering major trade deficits. Overall, then, heightened Soviet-American economic relations would be mutually beneficial, especially to a Soviet economy suffering from low productivity and technological backwardness.
Similarly, the United States, as the world’s other superpower, is seen by the Soviet Union as holding important cards in the military sphere. Arms control agreements provide public confirmation of the great power status of the Soviet Union. They can provide a cap (albeit a high one) on the arms race, which would allow limitations on the growth of military expenditures. By easing tensions between the superpowers and decreasing the possibility of accidental nuclear war, they serve the interests of both sides. As Leonid Brezhnev reflected this view in June 1982, five months before his death, "The destinies of war and peace largely depend on whether there will be reached a Soviet-American accord on the limitation and reduction of strategic armaments, an honest, fair accord which infringes the interests of nobody."32 Perhaps most concretely, by providing contact and dialogue between the two sides, arms talks provide a positive climate for economic and political relations.
Finally, the United States holds important political cards as well. The Soviet Union, with a vulnerable 4700-mile border with China, is eager to avoid American modernization of the obsolete but large Chinese army. In the Soviet view, any final resolution of the crises in Poland and Afghanistan requires American noninterference in areas vital to Soviet interest. As reflected in Soviet inactivity in Lebanon in 1982, the Soviet Union continues to seek to avoid direct confrontation with the United States in areas of competition in the Third World. Overall, then, the centrality of the Soviet-American relationship offers considerable opportunities for significant political negotiations between the two sides.
Finally, it is important to stress the limitations on the development of such relations. For as Seweryn Bialer has perceptively argued:
The difficulties in U.S.-Soviet relations do not have as their source mutual misperceptions of the two powers by each other. At the heart of the conflict is the real diversity of their interests, a real difference in their evaluation and perception of the international situation, a real diversity of their priorities in approaching the world system, and a real asymmetry in the development of their international appetites and their consciousness of what is possible and obtainable for their respective countries in the international arena.33
If Western observers have often perceived Soviet politics as a riddle wrapped up in an enigma, then Soviet observers of American politics have often been equally puzzled. This unease has only been partially reduced by the academic work of Georgi Arbatov’s Institute for the Study of U.S.A. and Canadian Politics. The very chaotic, volatile, decentralized, and media-oriented nature of American politics seems alien to the highly centralized, disciplined, and controlled practitioners of Soviet politics. What is a Soviet observer to make of the role of "gypsy moths" and "boll weevils," Jerry Falwell and the Moral Majority and nuclear freeze activists, Tip O’Neill and Jesse Helms (the "Six Million Dollar Man")? How could any system generate no fewer than six presidents in the last twenty years, including a Texas rancher, California red baiter, Michigan All-American football player, Georgia peanut farmer, and a fading Hollywood movie actor? Finding a thread that can explain (or worse, predict) American politics must seem a Herculean task to the Soviet leaders.
Mirroring the American image of a dualism in Soviet politics, the Soviet leaders possess a similarly dualist view of American politics. They see a contest between hardliners and moderate "sober realists" within the capitalist camp. Their initial concerns about Reagan’s hardline rhetoric were tempered by relief at the demise of Jimmy Carter and positive recollection of the last Republican President who had espoused hardline rhetoric (Richard Nixon). But Reagan’s massive defense buildup, continued strong anti-Communist rhetoric, and slashing of domestic social programs are now seen by many in the Soviet leadership as the work of an unregenerate hardliner. His arms control proposals are perceived as one-sided and propagandistic, reflecting the interests of the powerful military-industrial complex. Moscow hardliners thereby see Reagan as demonstrating the innate correctness of their position.
Others perceive the Reagan administration as being forced into a more realistic, moderate position by a series of domestic and international pressures. Perhaps the most important impetus are the dangers arising from a superpower arms race, dangers directly threatening the American position. For an unstable arms balance increases the dangers of war rather than enhancing American security. For as Georgi Arbatov wrote in April 1982:
Actually, armaments programs, rather than correcting the strategic disproportion, destabilize the military balance. Attempts to gain unilateral advantages, to threaten some particular elements of the other side’s defense capability, inevitably lead to countermeasures and rebound on the initiators. The stockpiling of armaments for more effective use of arms, instead of making deterrence stronger, adds to the probability of a global confrontation.34
Furthermore, an arms race with strengthened first-strike capability on both sides increases mutual suspicions and enhances the possibility of an accidental war. In July 1982, Defense Minister Dmitri Ustinov obliquely warned that the Soviet Union might be forced to resort to a launch-on-warning system to counter an enhanced American threat.35
A series of domestic factors will also, in this Soviet view, push the United States away from a hardline position. The severe American difficulties, which Pravda has highlighted by reprinting American unemployment figures monthly by key states, will be intensified by unproductive military expenditures. The massive nuclear freeze movement, reflecting the broad progressive aspirations of the masses, will restrain American militarism. So, too, will the sharp internal contradictions within American society, such as intense racial problems.
Foreign pressures will also play a role. Strong Soviet pressure for arms control agreements will combine with the Soviet capacity to match any American buildup. As P. G. Bogdanov wrote in May 1982:
. . . if the government of the U.S.A. and its allies in NATO would create a real additional threat to the security of the Soviet nation and the allies of the USSR, this would force the Soviet Union to take such responsive measures which would place in analogous position the other side, including directly the U.S. and its territory.36
Large-scale European nuclear freeze demonstrations will push European governments, already favorable to détente, into pressuring the United States against a new arms race. According to V. Kovalev in June 1982:
There has also been pressure on Washington from its Western European allies in NATO who in turn are forced to come to terms with the mood of the societies of their own countries, disconcerted by the absence in the White House of preparedness to carry on real negotiations with the USSR.37
Finally, the changing nature of world politics, which is shifting in favor of socialism, will influence American policies. As A. K. Slobodenko has recently written, "The strongest influence on the development of U.S.A. military strategy at the contemporary stage is the relation of forces in the world arena."38 Overall, then, many forces will reinforce a new realism in Washington.
In his first year in control, Yuri Andropov has moved cautiously to consolidate his power. While promoting his former KGB associates (Geydar, Fedorchuk, and Chebrikov), he has avoided domestic initiatives except for a relatively safe campaign against economic corruption. Abroad he has sought to ease tensions in Afghanistan and China along the long Soviet border. Andropov has made major arms control proposals at the strategic and theater nuclear level in an attempt to insulate domestic politics from volatile international politics. As a hard-liner, he has little to lose from such moves.39
Although domestic policy issues and actors will decide the future shape of Soviet politics, the American strategic nuclear program will certainly have an impact. By threatening to upset the existing strategic nuclear balance in favor of the United States and render vulnerable the massive land-based Soviet nuclear rocket forces by the end of the decade, the American program endangers hard-earned Soviet nuclear parity with the United States. This American buildup, coming during the sensitive period of the Brezhnev succession struggle, threatens the Soviet Union in the only arena in which they are truly a global superpower—the military arena. If American policy is perceived as part of a new hardline, it will strengthen the position of Soviet hardliners. If seen as integrated with new moderate initiatives, it may deter the hardliners and reinforce the moderates on the Soviet side. To this extent American policies may make a difference in the Soviet succession struggle.
University of Denver
Notes
1. For details of the experience of the 1970s, see Richard Burt, "Reassessing the Strategic Balance," International Security, Summer 1980, pp. 38-40; and Kurt Lewis, "The US-Soviet Strategic Balance in the 1980s: Missing the Trees for the Leaves," Survival, May-June 1982, pp. 110-15. Joseph Nye has attributed the relative decline in American power in the 1970s to the short-run effects of the Vietnam syndrome, Soviet military growth, American energy vulnerability, and declining economic productivity growth. He also cited the long-run problems of an increasingly dispersed world economy and complex international political environment in which the role of the United States has declined. For his interesting article, see Joseph S. Nye, Jr., "U.S. Power and Reagan Policy," Orbis, Summer 1982, pp. 391-411:
2. Benjamin S. Lambeth, "The Political Potential of Soviet Equivalence," International Security, Fall 1979, p. 33.
3. Myron Rush, "Guns over Growth in Soviet Policy," International Security, Winter 1982/1983, p. 174. It is important to note that strategic nuclear weapons account for only a relatively small proportion of total military spending. Conventional weapons and manpower Costs tend to be a more significant part of military spending.
4. For a good summary of the Reagan plan, see the International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 1982-1 983 (London, IISS, 1982), p. 3.
5. Weinberger’s testimony is reproduced in Survival, May-June 1982, p. 132.
6. As, for example, the remarks of Presidential counselor Edwin Meese in Los Angeles in August 1981.
7. V. V. Potashov, "Arms Race in the United States—Threat to Peace," SShaA:Ekonomika, Politika, Ideologiya, June 1981, p. 37.
8. Quoted in Leon Gouré and Michael Deane, "The Soviet Strategic View," Strategic Review, Spring 1981, pp. 43-44.
9. See Krasnaya zvezda, June 4, 1982, and Pravda, June 4, 1982.
10. Pravda, December 7, 1982.
11. See Herschel Kanter, "The Reagan Defense Program: Can It Hold Up?" Strategic Review, Spring 1982, p. 24.
12. Vernon Aspaturian, "Soviet Global Power and the Correlation of Forces," Problems of Communism, May-June 1981, p. 8.
13. Raymond Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence, Parity and Strategic Arms Limitations in Soviet Policy," in Derek Leebaert, editor, Soviet Military Thinking (London, 1981), p. 111.
14. Robert Legvold, "The Concept of Power and Security in Soviet History," Adelphi Papers No. 151, p. 10.
15. Aspaturian, p.8. Form a particularly telling analysis in this area, see Lambeth, pp. 25-38.
16. See Seweryn Bialer, Stalin’s Successors (London, 1980), chapter 5.
17. For a useful overview of the subject, see Morris Bornstein, editor, The Soviet Economy: Continuity and Change (Boulder, Colorado, 1981).
18. See Bialer, pp. 149-51.
19. Rush, p. 175.
20. Arthur Alexander, "Decision-Making in Soviet Weapons Procurements," Adelphi Papers Nos. 147, 148, p. 2.
21. For further analysis, see Stanley Sienkiewicz, "SALT and Soviet Nuclear Doctrine," International Security, Spring 1978, p. 90.
22. Khrushchev Remembers, translated and edited by Strobe Talbott (Boston, 1970), pp. 519-20.
23. Roman Kolkowicz, "Military Intervention in the Soviet Union: Scenario for Post-Hegemonial Synthesis," in Roman Kolkowicz and Andrzej Korbonski, editors, Soldiers, Peasants, and Bureaucrats (Winchester, Massachusetts, 1982), pp. 109-38.
24. Pravda, November 22, 1982.
25. Krasnaya zvezda, December 8, 1982 and Izvestiya, December 16, 1982.
26. Uri Ra’anan, "Soviet Decision-Making and International Relations," Problems of Communism, November-December 1980, p. 47.
27. George Breslauer, "Political Succession and the Soviet Policy Agenda," Problems of Communism, May-June 1980, p. 48.
28. See Jacques Gansler, "Can the Defense Industry Respond to the Reagan Initiatives?" International Security, Spring 1982, pp. 102-21.
29. Unlike in the nuclear arena, the Soviet Union has traditionally enjoyed a strong quantitative superiority over the United States in conventional weaponry. Given the deterioration of the defense industry, high cost of a conventional buildup, and serious problems with manpower, changes in the conventional balance are likely to proceed far slower than in the strategic nuclear balance. This creates possibilities for the Soviet Union in the conventional arena where the initial stakes are far lower than in the nuclear arena.
30. It is important to keep in mind that the new American strategic modernization program was a bipartisan effort which started well before the Reagan administration in the last two years of the Carter administration.
31. Alexander Dallin, "The United States in the Soviet Perspective," Adelphi Papers No. 151, p. 20.
32. Pravda, June 4, 1982.
33. Bialer, p. 435.
34. G. Arbatov, "The Strategy of Nuclear Madness," Kommunist, No. 6, April 1981.
35. Pravda, July 12, 1982.
36. P. G. Bogdanov, "Klyuchevoi vopros’—predotvrashenie yadernoi voiny," SShaA, May 1982, p. 51.
37. Krasnaya zvezda, June 4, 1982.
38. A. K. Slobodenko, "Formirovanie voenno-politicheskoi strategii administratsii Reigana," SShaA, June 1982, p. 125.
39. Hardliners often have unusual room for political maneuver. Charles de Gaulle was able to extract France from Algeria. Richard Nixon was able to create a new relationship with the People’s Republic of China. Menachem Begin was in a position to sign a peace treaty with Egypt while withdrawing from Sinai.
Contributor
Jonathan R. Adelman
(B.A., Columbia College; M.A., Ph.D., Columbia University) is an assistant professor in the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of Denver and serves as senior research analyst for the Foreign Systems Research Center of Science Applications, Inc. Dr. Adleman is the author of The Revolutionary Armies: The Historical Development of the Soviet and the Chinese People’s Liberation Armies (1980) and editor of Communist Armies in Politics.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor