Air University Review, May-June 1983

Doctrine by Default

the historical origins of tactical airlift

Modern tactical airlift traces its origins to troop carrier units organized by the Army Air Forces (USAAF) during World War II. These units were created to carry airborne forces into combat, but they soon became a versatile theater airlift force to meet the U.S. Army’s growing demands for rapid logistics support. Today, this airlift force is a joint service resource that conducts airborne operations, aerial resupply, logistics transports, aeromedical evacuation, and numerous other tasks assigned by the theater commander. Its doctrine applies the principles of flexibility and responsiveness inherent in all forms of air power to meet airlift needs within a theater of operations.

The driving force behind tactical airlift has always been the Army’s need for battlefield mobility, and the lessons of combat provided the basis for tactics and doctrine that emerged with the growth of airlift forces. At the start of World War II, doctrine comparable to the well-developed theories for bombardment aviation was simply nonexistent. Air Corps preoccupation with strategic air power left tactical airlift to its own devices and to the demands of Army ground commanders. As a result, doctrine for tactical airlift developed more by default than by the efforts of foresighted airmen.

Doctrine developed as experience revealed the capabilities and limitations of tactical airlift forces. Lieutenant General James Gavin, former commander of the 82d Airborne Division, notes that in 1941 considerable debate focused on whether three aircraft could drop paratroops in close formation ¹ Yet his division was part of the 17,000 troops and equipment deposited on the east bank of the Rhine River in March 1945 as the Allies opened their final assault on the heart of Germany. For 2 hours and 37 minutes, a train of troop carriers 240 miles long—l595 aircraft and 1347 towed gliders—filled the sky over the gently rolling terrain north of the German town of Wesel.

During those war years, troop carrier leaders wrestled with and perfected the techniques of mass airborne operations, though not without disastrous failures along the way. By the end of the war, the highly accurate, mass daylight delivery of airborne forces was firmly established as doctrine. At the same time and to the dismay of troop carrier leaders, the requirement for logistics transport increasingly diverted troop carrier resources from their primary task of planning and conducting airborne operations. Control of tactical airlift had passed from airmen to theater commanders. The conflicts in Korea and Vietnam led to further refinements in doctrine as once-secondary airlift support roles rose to a level approaching airborne operations, and centralized theater control became the key to flexibility and responsiveness. Thus, our current doctrine is the product of four decades of experience in organizing and employing tactical airlift forces.

Early Troop Carrier Organization

The concept of parachuting troops into combat dates back to World War I. General Billy Mitchell had prepared to drop elements of the American 1st Division behind German lines to seize the town of Metz, but the armistice stopped him from testing his idea. He later demonstrated the concept by dropping a group of fully armed troops at Kelly Field, Texas. But more dramatic uses for military aviation in strategic bombardment eclipsed interest in air transport during the years prior to World War II. The few transport aircraft purchased by the Air Corps were intended for logistical support of air combat units.

The invasions of Holland and Crete by German airborne forces in 1940 sparked renewed American interest in the use of paratroops. Adhering closely to the doctrine of the Air Corps Tactical School for employing all air power, General Henry "Hap" Arnold and other air power enthusiasts began advocating deep penetrations by airborne forces to strike the enemy’s strategic nerve centers. Although the Army Air Forces never possessed the resources for such an operation, Arnold pushed throughout the war for a deep strategic insertion of airborne forces. The absence of doctrine for tactical airlift was evident in 1941, when he cautioned against too close an association with the Army: "Aviation will be frittered away on trivial assignments in the transport of foot troops when it should be engaged on other and more important missions."²

The Army responded to the German example with the creation of a parachute training school at Fort Benning, Georgia, in 1940. USAAF transport resources of slightly more than 100 aircraft were strained to support Army training requirements. In the absence of any development on a military transport, the Army was fortunate in that the civilian DC-3 airliner could be readily adapted for both logistics and troop carrier roles. Deliveries of new transports were slow, however, since the production of combat aircraft took priority. The USAAF received the first DC-3 (designated the C-47) in September 1941 and owned 500 of these aircraft by the following summer; production reached 100 per month by mid-1943. With a top speed of 150 miles per hour and a payload of 3 tons or 18 paratroopers, it had limited capabilities, but with sufficient numbers and organization, it met many unforeseen demands for troop carriers during the years ahead.

In March 1942, the Army consolidated its paratroop units into an airborne command, and in response to demands for better airlift support, General Arnold established the Air Transport Command the following month "to organize and train Air Transport units for all forms of Air Transport with special emphasis on the conduct of operations involving the air movement of airborne troops, glider infantry and parachute troops."³ In June 1942, the command was redesignated the Troop Carrier Command in what was a landmark in airlift doctrine: troop carrier forces were dedicated as theater resources responsible primarily for airborne operations, but they were also tasked with logistics support within a theater of operations. The same order transformed the old Air Ferrying Command into a new Air Transport Command responsible for air logistics between theaters—the predecessor of the Military Air Transport Service and, later, the Military Airlift Command.⁴ This division of airlift continued for three decades and gave tactical airlift the freedom necessary to develop its doctrine as a distinct arm of air power.

The creation of an airlift command charged with conducting airborne operations provided a focus for joint planning. Troop carrier and Army representatives formed the Airborne Operations Board to develop standard altitudes, airspeeds, and in-flight procedures for troop drops, but it gave little thought to planning or executing large airborne operations. Field Manual (FM) 31-30, Tactics and Techniques for Airborne Troops, published in May 1942, envisioned only small-scale operations to neutralize key objectives or to capture airstrips for landing reinforcements.⁵

When troop carriers went into combat in North Africa in November 1942, operations generally followed FM 31-30 as loosely assembled groups of 20 to 40 aircraft deployed paratroop units to seize airfields in the path of Allied ground forces. These operations met little or no resistance until the final troop drop of the North African campaign. In that operation, 530 paratroops readily seized two lightly defended airfields behind German lines near Tunis, but shortly thereafter, German fighter aircraft and tanks decimated the small, lightly armed force. Future operations would stress the need for greater concentrations of troops and more fire-power.⁶

The Invasion of Sicily

Troop carrier units received their first test under fire in operations over Sicily in July 1943. Allied plans called for a predawn drop of British and American airborne units to block access routes to beaches lest German reserves interfere with amphibious landings on the southeastern coast of the island. Although darkness would handicap the units in their efforts to assemble on the ground, it was deemed necessary to preclude interception by enemy aircraft. Newly arrived American Waco gliders would fly in the heavy equipment and artillery needed to survive until ground forces could move up from the beaches.

With neither prior experience nor a joint command or planning organization to guide this first large-scale assault, representatives of the troop carrier units and the 82d Airborne Division met to devise tactics most likely to concentrate the troops on the ground in platoon and company order. They agreed on tight V-shaped formations of 9 or 12 aircraft spaced one and one-half minutes apart to cross over the drop zone in the shortest possible time. Gliders would be towed two abreast in columns to their release points. Heavy demands for air logistic support prior to the invasion allowed the aircrews little time to practice these new tactics but troop carrier leaders were optimistic about performing what they considered simple noncombat maneuvers.⁷

Their optimism was ill-founded. Early on 10 July, the first mission of 226 C-47s carrying the 82d Airborne Division departed on a complicated low-level route to avoid over flying Allied convoys. All lights on the aircraft were extinguished with the exception of tiny position lights visible only within the formation; a quarter moon offered little light, and salt spray on the windscreens further reduced visibility. As a result, stragglers fell hopelessly behind since they could not see the dim formation lights to regain their proper positions. An unexpected 35-mile-per-hour crosswind caused inexperienced crews to make landfall far off course. Dust and smoke from the pre-invasion bombardment obscured the landmarks and drop zones and added to the confusion that left paratroopers scattered for 50 miles along the coast. A British glider infantry force towed by American troop carriers fared no better. Many of the British pilots, who had received an average of only four and one-half hours of training in the American Wacos released too soon because of darkness and unexpectedly strong headwinds. Only 12 of 137 gliders reached their landing zones, and 65 plunged into the sea with heavy loss of lives.

Two nights later, disaster befell troop carriers attempting a seemingly routine drop of reinforcements in friendly territory along the coast. As they approached the drop area, trigger-happy gunners, who had been under air attack all day, suddenly began firing from the shore and from ships at anchor and immediately shot down six fully loaded C-47s. Pilots broke formation, dumped their troops along the beach, and fled the scene. Of 237 aircraft, 23 were lost and 37 were heavily damaged. One wounded crewman noted wryly that he was "pleased our troops could shoot so well."⁸ On 14 July, Allied ships again fired on troop carriers transporting British paratroopers for an assault on the east coast near Syracuse; the formations scattered after several aircraft were destroyed and others were damaged.

The troop carrier operation at Sicily was a failure since scattered troops were unable to accomplish their assignments. Although General Omar N. Bradley noted that the operation reaped a secondary benefit in causing the enemy to overestimate Allied strength and panic,⁹ Army leaders in Washington were ready to scrap the idea of mass airborne assaults. Only the concerted efforts of General Matthew B. Ridgway of the 82d Airborne Division and other senior officers prevented resumption of small-scale employments described in FM 31-30. General Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Supreme Allied Commander in Europe, ordered a full investigation that pinpointed the need for improved troop carrier proficiency, more effective air-ground coordination, and better methods of identifying drop zones.¹⁰ The problem had been one of delivery rather than the concept of mass employment of airborne forces; the result was further training for troop carrier units.

Two months later, Troop Carrier Command gave a better performance in minor operations supporting the invasion of Italy. Although logistics flying again competed with training, troop carrier and airborne units received a week of joint training in North Africa. A major innovation was the development of small pathfinder teams equipped with marker panels, lights, and a new radar beacon known as Eureka to precede the main formation and mark the drop zones. The lead aircraft in the formations carried interrogator sets called Rebecca to receive signals from Eureka. The successful drops in Italy helped restore the Army’s confidence in troop carrier units and the airborne concept.

In the absence of well-developed doctrine for airborne warfare, troop carrier operations in the Mediterranean had been experiments in methods of delivering the Army’s airborne forces. The operation over Sicily had been planned by staff officers with no troop carrier or airborne experience, and troop carrier leaders quietly acquiesced because they either had no better proposal or misunderstood the difficulties involved. Experiences in Sicily emphasized the need for a joint airborne planning headquarters subordinate to an Air Force commander and responsible for the entire operation until the troops reached the ground. Obviously, the key to airborne warfare lay in concentrating troops and firepower on the ground, a function of thorough planning and proficient troop carriers. These lessons became the doctrinal basis for airborne operations in the invasion of Europe.¹¹

The Normandy Invasion

Army and USAAF leaders differed on the best use of airborne forces in the invasion of France. Training Circular No. 113 published by the Army in October 1943 stressed tactical use of airborne and troop carrier units in conjunction with ground forces. General Arnold, on the other hand, convinced Army Chief of Staff George C. Marshall to recommend a strategic airborne thrust deep into France to sever vital transportation links near Paris. General Eisenhower dismissed this suggestion, however, because he knew full well that he could not spare such a force and that it could not withstand heavy German firepower.¹²

Eisenhower’s staff prepared plans for three airborne divisions to secure bridges and road junctions against German reserves that might oppose amphibious landings on the Normandy coast. Fear of enemy interceptors and ground fire again dictated a night drop followed by glider landings of troops, artillery, and supplies. Additional glider missions would arrive later on D-day and the day following. So critical was the airborne task of isolating the beachhead that Allied leaders were willing to accept 50 percent casualties during the airborne assault.¹³

American troop carrier units in England were organized as the Ninth Troop Carrier Command under the Ninth Air Force, which had been designated the tactical theater air force. British and American theater forces were joined in the Allied Expeditionary Air Force commanded by British Air Marshal Trafford Leigh-Mallory. Coordination between troop carrier and airborne staffs focused in a joint planning committee also supervised by Leigh-Mallory. Joint practice began in March 1944, and pathfinder aircrews and ground teams received intensive training in navigating and establishing drop zones. In May, a dress rehearsal for 850 aircraft, 110 gliders, and 8400 troops led jubilant commanders to anticipate a 90 percent reliability for the airdrop and glider landings.¹⁴

The months of planning and training culminated on 6 June as 821 C-47s carrying the 82d and 101st Airborne divisions assembled in formations over their English bases and departed for France. Aircraft and gliders marked with black-and-white stripes on the fuselage and wings for identification by friendly surface forces flew in absolute radio silence. Pathfinders preceded the main force by 30 minutes to mark six drop zones around the town of Ste. Merè Eglise. All went well until the force arrived over the French coast and the lead section plunged into an unexpected cloud bank. Unwilling to break radio silence and warn subsequent groups, the formation began to break apart as section after section disappeared into the clouds. Three out of five crews had no navigator, and many stragglers could not find the drop zones through the patchy clouds. Although the Rebecca receiver had become standard equipment on all aircraft, it was inaccurate when it came near the ground transmitter, and enemy activity prevented several pathfinder teams from setting up lights and beacons on the drop zone. Of the 13,000 American troops dropped, less than 10 percent landed in their drop zones, but 60 percent landed within two miles of their zones. Despite great difficulties in assembling among numerous hedgerows in the dark, the troops suffered far fewer casualties than had been expected and were generally successful in seizing their objectives.¹⁵

The glider formations experienced similar difficulties. The two groups scheduled to arrive before dawn encountered the same weather, and clouds, darkness, and numerous landing accidents rendered the initial glider force only 50 percent effective in delivering its loads. Subsequent waves arrived during daylight on 6 and 7 June and achieved 90 percent effectiveness in reaching their assigned landing zones. Despite extensive damage to the gliders on landing, their cargo of jeeps, antitank guns, and ammunition arrived in serviceable condition. Thereafter, all troop drops and glider operations were scheduled for daylight hours because increased accuracy greatly offset the hazards of enemy aircraft and ground fire.¹⁶

Demands for airlift mushroomed after D-day. On 7 June, troop carriers began large-scale, preplanned resupply drops to the airborne forces in contact with the enemy. But each C-47 was capable of airdropping only one ton of cargo in small bundles pushed out the troop door or released from shackles under the fuselage, and poor aircrew techniques further limited recovery of supplies. Additional drops of supplies were made as necessary during the next six days. After the Allies broke out of the Normandy area, troop carriers were tasked to fly supplies, especially gasoline, into captured airfields and sod or dirt airstrips in the wake of advancing armies. Casualties were often evacuated on return flights as this effort swelled to 600 aircraft per day. Army commanders screamed for a greater airlift effort, while troop carrier leaders complained that they were distracted from their primary mission of maintaining readiness for an airborne operation.¹⁷ General Eisenhower set priorities in favor of supply, and, as a result, only a few troop carriers were released for training.

Thus, a doctrine for total theater airlift emerged with the Normandy invasion. Troop carrier resources were engaged in every conceivable airlift task—airdrop, resupply, logistics transport, and aeromedical evacuation—dictated by needs within the theater. And despite some errors and shortcomings, the operation firmly established the methodology for more ambitious airborne assaults.¹⁸

The Air Invasion of Holland

Field Marshal Bernard Montgomery’s plan to outflank German resistance by leaping the Rhine River in eastern Holland gave Air Force leaders an opportunity to demonstrate a more independent role for air power. The plan called for heavy Allied air attacks on enemy defenses followed by airborne assaults to capture key river bridges. The British 1st Airborne Division was assigned the primary objective of capturing the bridge over the Rhine at Arnhem, and the American 101st and 82d divisions were tasked with seizing bridges at Nijmegen and Eindhoven along the route leading to Arnhem 60 miles into enemy territory. Troop carriers would supply and reinforce the three airborne divisions until Montgomery’s 2nd Army could push through to relieve them. Army Air Force leaders eagerly welcomed this opportunity to use airborne forces in a decisive role.¹⁹

To streamline the planning and execution of airborne operations, British and American airborne and troop carrier units were consolidated in August into the 1st Allied Airborne Army commanded by USAAF Lieutenant General Lewis H. Brereton, but the limiting factor in Holland was the availability of troop carrier airlift. Three consecutive days of troop drops and glider missions were needed to deliver the entire airborne force. Their plan made no allowances for weather or other delays that might leave understrength units dangerously exposed on the ground.

The performance of the troop carriers was a model of perfection. Allied bombers had attacked enemy antiaircraft defenses for several days, and 1544 transports and 491 gliders met little opposition as they delivered the first contingent on 17 September. The pathfinders’ work had been precise, and troops and gliders landed with almost perfect accuracy: they lost only 35 aircraft and 13 gliders to enemy flak. Although fog and rain delayed takeoffs until noon the next day, a force of similar size repeated the successes of the first day. But the element of surprise was lost, and the enemy began to concentrate his defenses.

Understrength airborne forces on the ground came under increasingly heavy attack, and the operation fell even farther behind schedule on the third day, when troop carriers failed to reach their objective because of bad weather. Gliders proved especially unmanageable in turbulent, instrument-flight conditions, and many broke loose from their tow planes. Poor weather brought operations to a standstill on days four through six, and sporadic attempts to drop supplies resulted in heavy losses with little success. And Montgomery’s 2nd Army had been unable to reach Arnhem to relieve the British airborne division. The weather finally lifted on the seventh day, but further efforts at reinforcement were to no avail. Remnants of that decimated unit withdrew the next day.

Despite the successes of the 82d and 101st divisions in securing their bridgeheads, the overall operation ended in failure. Although troop carrier crews performed admirably, air power could not sustain the airborne force. In failing to allow for bad weather, the decision to spread the operation over three days unwittingly exceeded the capabilities of the troop carriers and forfeited the element of surprise before ground forces were prepared to withstand enemy counteractions. General Brereton wrote to Arnold that the error stemmed from dependence on the linkup with the 2nd Army and even suggested that an independent airlift operation into captured airheads would have been more successful.²⁰ But the need to defend fixed airheads would only have complicated a deteriorating situation on the ground. Further airborne operations would be less bold.

Final Battles of World War II

As Allied armies advanced in Europe, their logistic needs forced troop carriers more and more into the role of theater airlift and steadily eroded General Brereton’s concept of the 1st Allied Airborne Army as a "strategic reserve force" to be employed only by the Allied High Command.²¹ The versatility of airlift was too great for it to sit idle between airborne operations. Christmas of 1944 found an American Army surrounded in the Belgian town of Bastogne during the Battle of the Bulge. Inclement weather precluded close air support of the beleaguered force, but C-47s made 1000 airdrops of food and ammunition. And troop carrier pilots successfully landed 48 of 61 gliders attempting to deliver medical supplies and reinforcements. This mission was a precursor of far more sophisticated resupply operations in Korea and Vietnam.

Following the Battle of the Bulge, the Allied High Command released much of the airlift force for joint training in preparation for the final push into Germany. Less experienced units and units equipped with the new C-46 transport received the bulk of the training that preceded the airborne assault across the Rhine near Wesel in March 1945. In this final and most complex operation undertaken in a single day, aircrews of the 1st Allied Airborne Army demonstrated the great strides that had been made in troop carrier tactics over the course of the war.

The elements of successful airborne warfare were proven concepts: surprise, air superiority, and, failing all else, rapid delivery of the force in tight concentration at any cost. One-third of the transports and more than half of the gliders over Wesel were damaged by intense antiaircraft fire. General Gavin underscored a disquieting tendency of the new C-46 to burst into flames when he recalled a sky full of burning troop carriers,²² but less than 5 percent of the force was destroyed. The formations maintained their ranks, made highly accurate deliveries, and achieved overwhelming success in the operation. The ragged little formations over North Africa and utter confusion in Sicily had become things of the past.

The lessons of combat in every theater of the war underscored the role of troop carriers as a versatile airlift force. American Air Commandos in Burma made successful glider assaults into jungle clearings, airdropped supplies to British army units, and operated from hastily prepared airstrips deep in Japanese territory. Small-scale paratroop operations against lightly contested objectives in the Southwest Pacific demonstrated the capability of airborne forces to take objectives inaccessible to ground troops. The unorthodox paratroop assault on tiny Corregidor Island in February 1945 demonstrated the flexibility of properly employed airborne forces. Although General Brereton and other leaders of the troop carrier force continued to advocate huge fleets of transports dedicated to strategic airborne divisions,²³ the war had led to the broader concept of versatile, responsive theater airlift. True to General Arnold’s fears in 1941, the Army had come to expect and demand air transport to enhance its tactical mobility, and, by 1945, "troop carrier" had already become a misnomer.

The Postwar Era

Close identification of the troop carriers with conventional ground forces almost led to their demise in the postwar era of hard budget cuts and nuclear strategy. The Army advocated larger and more sophisticated aircraft to support the decisive (strategic) airborne role proposed by Generals Arnold and Brereton throughout the war. General Gavin, the most prolific postwar spokesman for airborne warfare, wrote that flexible airborne armies could avoid the risks of nuclear attack on the battlefield by quickly converging on objectives, neutralizing them, and dispersing.²⁴ The Army pushed for a joint airborne forces command organized along the lines of the 1st Allied Airborne Army, but the USAAF was more interested in gaining its independence from the Army.

In its bid for autonomy, the Air Force was quick to eschew any ties that conflicted with the independent and decisive role of strategic air power. Lieutenant General Lauris Norstad, Chief of Air Staff planning for postwar reorganization, remarked in 1945: "Although the conception of a tactical air force was one, of the greatest developments of this war, it is now as old-fashioned as the Maginot line."²⁵ Army and naval forces and their supporting aviation had suddenly become obsolete. No troop carrier organization higher than a group existed after 1946, and existing airlift forces were viewed as necessary only to support deployments of strategic air units. Few wartime troop carrier leaders remained in service to advocate their mission, and the Air Transport Command almost won a bid to incorporate the remaining troop carrier units into a single transport organization. In a surprising decision for the times, General Arnold opted to retain the troop carriers as part of a small tactical air command.²⁶

Ardent Army support of the airborne concept and the appearance of modern troop carrier aircraft kept troop carrier units alive. The shortcomings of the C-47 prompted work in 1942 on an aircraft specifically designed for airdrop, and, in 1945, the first C-82 Packet—forerunner of the C-l19 Flying Boxcar—entered the airlift force. It revolutionized troop carrier airlift with its capability of airdropping large pieces of equipment and supplies formerly limited to glider operations. The Air Force reluctantly continued development of military cargo gliders only at Army insistence.²⁷

The creation of an independent Air Force in 1947 permanently severed any organic ties between the troop carriers and airborne units. The role of troop carrier units in theater airlift and the distinction between theater and strategic airlift became blurred, and the overlapping capabilities of the two branches of airlift added to the confusion. During the Berlin Airlift of 1948-49, troop carrier units augmented the newly formed Military Air Transport Service in a classic example of a round-the-clock strategic flow of supplies. Interest in troop carrier activities waned as airlift came to be seen in terms of ton-miles hauled and firm scheduling—"the doctrinal legacy of the Berlin Airlift."²⁸ The next conflict, however, rekindled interest in responsive theater airlift.

the Korean War

The outbreak of hostilities in Korea compelled the Air Force to respond to the unpredictable and diverse airlift needs of the entire theater, including the needs of its own deployed tactical air units. Army leaders sought a joint troop carrier-airborne organization similar to the wartime organization in Europe to support their needs. But the Air Force had too few transports to dedicate any to a single user. Instead, it created a single airlift force, the Far East Air Force Combat Cargo Command (later, the 315th Air Division) headed by Major General William H. Tunner, who had directed the Berlin Airlift and World War II operations over the "Hump" into China. General Turnner assembled the troop carrier units of the Far East Air Force as a "composite all-purpose fleet and let the tactical situation dictate the employment of the aircraft for a particular period."²⁹ He relied on techniques adopted from the Berlin Airlift for aerial port operations, scheduled maintenance, and command and control of a fleet that averaged only 210 aircraft.

Cargo Command allocated airlift based on priorities set by the joint theater command in an operation that became known as "Flexible Air Transport" designed to provide airlift for all users. General Tunner maintained a contingency plan for conducting airborne operations on 72 hours’ notice, but only two troop drops were made in Korea;³⁰ Both drops were essentially reenactments of World War II operations designed to cut off retreating Communist forces in contact with United Nations ground forces. Ideal conditions and total lack of opposition offset any shortcomings in aircrew proficiency. Flexible air transport proved far more significant in resupplying troops along the ever-fluid front. When Chinese "volunteers" pushed United Nations troops out of North Korea in 1950, retreating elements of the 1st Marine Division and 7th Infantry were totally dependent on airlift. C-46s and C-ll9s airdropped supplies to isolated units, and C-47s operated into dirt- and snow-covered airstrips to move up reinforcements and evacuate the wounded. For their efforts, troop carriers received the first distinguished unit citations awarded to any Air Force units in Korea.

The Korean experience led to a refinement of theater airlift doctrine in the sense that it equated logistics resupply and aeromedical evacuation with airborne operations. The concept of theater control was further enhanced by assigning all airlift to a central agent responsible to the theater commander. No longer could the Air Force afford the luxury of airlift organically assigned to airborne units and not used to maximum advantage. As part of its first effort to write doctrine since gaining independence, the Air Force incorporated its Korean airlift experiences in Air Force Manual (AFM)1-9, Theater Airlift Doctrine, published on 1 July 1954.

Korea also demonstrated the need for more efficient aircraft to operate into forward airstrips and even unprepared terrain near front-line troops. The Army began experimenting with helicopters to provide its own organic battlefield mobility, and this challenge to the Air Force’s central role in air power prompted it to maintain an active, albeit small, interest in theater airlift after the war. Success with a powered version of the rugged, all-metal CG-20 assault glider in the late 1940s offered the Air Force a practical way to compete. This hybrid became the C-l23 Provider, an assault transport capable of delivering troops and cargo to short makeshift runways in a combat zone.³¹ Theater airlift thus became better able to fulfill its doctrinal commitments for logistics resupply to the battlefield and moved into the hotly contested role of shuttling troops between points within a battlefield. Entry of the four-engine C-130 Hercules into the airlift fleet in 1956 gave theater airlift true versatility with greater speed, larger payloads, and intertheater range.

The Air Force returned full scale to the concept of theater airlift under the doctrine of "flexible response" in the 1960s. The Army had a force of 5500 aircraft of various types by 1960 and seriously challenged the Air Force for the air role over the battlefield. In 1962, the Army won approval to develop its "airmobile" concept for an entire division deployed and supported in battle by organic Army aviation. The Air Force responded by improving the capability of the C-130 for shortfield landings and pinpoint aerial delivery of cargo with low-level methods of extraction. The Air Force rewrote its basic doctrine in 1964 and, for the first time, specifically differentiated between strategic and tactical airlift and emphasized the theater role of tactical airlift.³² In a series of joint exercises, each service tried to demonstrate primacy in the role of battlefield mobility. Compatibility between centrally controlled theater airlift and the Army’s organic airlift resources waited in time-honored fashion for the demands of combat.³³

the Vietnam conflict

The conflict in Vietnam led to further refinements in the concept of centrally managed theater airlift and resolved the Army-Air Force controversy over the division of labor in battlefield mobility. Some of the first American units deployed to Vietnam were U.S. Air Force transports, which comprised the Southeast Asia Airlift System under the United States Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. In 1965, the newly arrived 1st Cavalry Division (Airmobile) rapidly exceeded its organic resupply capability during large-scale operations in the Central Highlands. The Army became dependent on the C-123s and C-l30s for a steady stream of fuel and supplies to the division’s base camps located adjacent to small, typically unsurfaced airstrips. From these bases, Army helicopters lifted the supplies to troops in contact with hostile forces. This pattern of "wholesale" distribution allowed both services to optimize their resources, and the Air Force transports performed numerous other duties when they were not supporting Army tactical operations. In addition to logistical resupply, the Army came to rely on theater airlift to move entire units between forward bases more than 50 miles distant and in other situations dictated by lack of surface transport or security.³⁴

The two services cemented this new relationship in 1967 with publication of AFM 2-50/FM 100-27, US Army/US Air Force Doctrine for Tactical Airlift Operations. The Army recognized the Air Force’s preeminence in fixed-wing transport and relinquished its C-7 Caribou aircraft, and the Air Force withdrew from the helicopter airlift role in favor of the Army.³⁵ In the same year, the Air Force redesignated its troop carrier squadrons and wings as "tactical airlift" units to reflect the broader airlift role that had evolved since 1942, when troop carrier units were created to transport paratroops.

Airborne operations were only a small part of the tactical airlift mission in Vietnam. The single paratroop drop of the war occurred in 1967 to augment an Army helicopter (airmobile) assault along the Cambodian border. A much larger airdrop task in Vietnam was the aerial resupply of isolated outposts, such as Khe Sanh in 1968 and An Loc in 1972. All modes of delivery aimed at providing tactical mobility within the theater. In the insurgent-plagued environment of Vietnam, the lack of secure rear areas and surface transportation made tactical airlift a critical element of American ability to operate outside the major cities and inland from coastal ports.³⁶

The Vietnam experience led to a formalized, efficient working relationship between tactical airlift and organic Army air transportation. AFM 2-50/FM 100-27 placed tactical airlift into the Tactical Air Control System to which the Army forwards all its requests for air support. Under this system, the Airlift Control Center—known as "Hilda" during the Vietnam years—directs airlift operations for the entire theater. This arrangement for responsive, centrally controlled theater airlift to the very edge of the battlefield is current Air Force doctrine.

Modern Theater Airlift

The consolidation of all airlift resources under the Military Airlift Command (MAC) in 1974 represents the final step in the evolution of tactical airlift, and, as such, it ends the airlift dichotomy created in 1942. The cry for greater efficiency and economy in the post-Vietnam era propelled tactical airlift further in the direction of centralized control. But tactical airlift did not become smothered in a global logistics system, for, at no other time in its history, has tactical (theater) airlift been so firmly established with an accepted doctrine. Although the Military Airlift Command became a specified command in 1977, tactical airlift remains a theater resource responsible directly to the joint commander. Control is exercised through a commander of airlift forces who directs all MAC forces committed to a theater.³⁷ The issue of overlapping capabilities and equipment once blurred the distinction between tactical and strategic airlift forces, but, today, it is a benefit in the sense that each force can augment the other without redundancy in effort or command structures. Once tactical airlift had achieved compatibility with the Army on the battlefield, the final act of consolidation was a simple streamlining of the Air Force logistics network. In the course of three wars, tactical airlift has emerged as the vital link between the strategic flow of supplies and the user in combat. No other form of airlift has experience in this role.

Tactical airlift began with the creation of troop carrier forces to deliver the Army’s airborne units, but it quickly assumed a variety of transport roles commensurate with its versatility in meeting the Army’s needs for battlefield mobility. The doctrine for this theater airlift came after the fact on the basis of lessons learned in combat. Its essentials have always been flexibility and responsiveness to the needs of theater commanders. Better equipment and tactics have greatly enhanced the capabilities of tactical airlift since the era of the C-47, but the prerequisites for its successful employment are the same.

Examination of the historical role of tactical airlift reveals constraints and limitations that very much affect future operations. The air superiority so vital to Allied troop carrier formations in Europe and the Southwest Pacific was equally vital to every airlift operation in Korea and Vietnam. The same is true of the need for surprise and close air support to neutralize enemy ground defenses and allow slow, unarmed transports to reach their objectives. Sophisticated enemy air and ground defenses may very well preclude future large airborne operations, even though conditions may favor small-scale troop insertions and resupply operations that make enemy detection and interception more difficult. However, an airborne assault against an unsophisticated enemy in a limited war scenario remains a powerful weapon. To this end, the Army retains one airborne division, and MAC units maintain proficiency in methods to airdrop brigade-size forces. The tactics have changed since World War II to match changes on the battlefield, but the doctrine that evolved remains intact.

Notes

1. James M. Gavin, Airborne Warfare (Washington, 1947), p. 84.

2. H. H. Arnold and Ira C. Eaker, Winged Warfare (New York, 1941), pp. 120-23; H. H. Arnold, Global Mission (New York, 1949), p. 521.

3. Cited in USAF Historical Studies: No. 74, Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean, 1942-1915 (Washington: USAF Historical Division, September 1955), p. 3.

4. Arnold, Global Mission, p. 294.

5. Ernest F. Fisher, "Evolution of U.S. Airborne Doctrine," Military Review, May 1966, p. 71.

6. Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945, pp. 18-19.

7. Ibid., p. 28.

8. Maxwell D. Taylor, Swords and Plowshares (New York, 1972), p. 50.

9. Omar N. Bradley, A Soldier’s Story (New York, 1951), p. 127.

10. Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945, p. 54; Taylor, p. 52; Wesley F. Craven and James L. Cate, editors, The Army Air Forces in World War II, Vol. II (Chicago, 1951), p.456.

11. Airborne Missions in the Mediterranean, 1942-1945, pp. 111-12; Craven and Cate, p. 456,

12. Fisher, p. 72.

13. Samuel T. Moore, "Tactical Employment in the U.S. Army of Transport Aircraft and Gliders in World War II" (Typewritten, Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, File No. 546.04, 1941-1945, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, n.d.), Chapter 4, p. 8.

14. USAF Historical Studies: No. 97, Airborne Operations in World War in European Theater (Washington: USAF Historical Division, September 1956), p. 22.

15. Ibid., p. 59.

16. "A Review of Airborne Operations," prepared by the Evaluation Staff of the Air War College (Mimeographed, Air University, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1954), pp. 45, 50.

17. Lewis H. Brereton, The Brereton Diaries: The War in the Air in the Pacific, Middle East and Europe, 3 October 1941—8 May 1945 (New York, 1946), p. 339; Airborne Operations in World War II, European Theater, p. 86.

18. The methodology was validated in a daylight airborne assault during the Allied invasion of southern France in August 1944. See "A Review of Airborne Operations," pp. 51-56.

19. Airborne Assault on Holland, An interim Report, Wings at War Series, No. 4 (Washington: Hq Army Air Forces, n.d.), pp. 1-2.

20. Brereton, p. 365.

21. Ibid., p. 339.

22. Gavin, p. 135.

23. See John C. Warren, "Troop Carrier Aviation in the USAF, 1945-1955" (Typewritten draft, Albert F. Simpson Historical Research Center, File No. 106-134, 1945-1955, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, n.d.), pp. 8-10.

24. Gavin, p. 140.

25. Quoted in Perry M. Smith, The Air Force Plans for Peace, 1913-1945 (Baltimore and London: Johns Hopkins Press, 1970), p. 100.

26. Ibid., p. 99; Jimmie L. Jay, "Evolution of Airlift Doctrine" (Unpublished Air War College thesis, Air University, March 1977), pp. 12-13; Warren, p. 35; Robert F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force, 1907- 1964 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University, 1974), pp. 93-94.

27. Warren, p. 31.

28. Jay, p. 19.

29. Flexible Air Transport, Headquarters 315th Air Division (Combat Cargo), 15 November 1951, p. 1.

30. Robert F. Futrell, The United States Air Force in Korea, 1950- 1953 (New York: Duell, Sloan, Pearce, 1961), p. 524.

31. Colonel Ray L. Bowers, "USAF Airlift and the Airmobility Idea in Vietnam," Air University Review, November December 1974, p. 3.

32. See AFM 1-1, Aerospace Doctrine—United States Air Force Basic Doctrine, 14 August 1964, pp. 4-3, 5-2.

33. Bowers, p. 8.

34. Ibid., p. 13.

35. AFM 2-50/FM 100-27, US Army/US Air Force Doctrine for Tactical Airlift Operations, 1 January 1967, p. 2-2.

36. Lieutenant Colonel Horace E. Wood, Jr., "Airlift—A Balanced View," Air University Review, May-June 1972, p. 64.

37. See MACR 55-130, Operations—C-130 Tactical Airlift Operations, 10 October 1979, p. 2-1.

Major Ronald G. Boston ( USAFA; M.A. University of Washington) is a Plans and Force Policy Officer on the Japan desk at Headquarters CINCPAC/J-5. Camp Smith, Hawaii. He has had tactical airlift assignments as a C-130 pilot in Hq Pacific Air Forces, Tactical Air Command, and Military Airlift-Command, and he is a former faculty member of the Department of History, USAF Academy. Major Boston is a Distinguished Graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air Command and Staff College.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor