Air University Review, July-August 1983

Normandy in a Different Key

Best known for his already classic book, The Face of Battle, John Keegan has now shifted his attention to the Normandy campaign of 1944. The result, while not as broad in coverage as his earlier work, is nonetheless equally impressive. By combining an imaginative approach and penetrating insights with an elegant writing style, Six Armies in Normandy will undoubtedly be heralded a classic in its own right, though this time within the genre of campaign histories.* Because Keegan’s novel approach, organization, and interpretations should evoke considerable comment among the military and academics alike, the book obviously warrants an extended critique.

* John Keegan, Six Armies in Normandy: From D-Day to the Liberation of Paris, June 6th-August 25th, 1944 (New York: Viking Press, 1982, $17.95), 385 pages.

His approach is deceptively straightforward. In the Foreword he states: "It seemed to me worth finding some episode through which the varying status of national armies might be exemplified. And in the Normandy campaign of 1944 I believed that I had stumbled upon it." Rather than treating the subject in normal fashion—presenting first the military strategy and planning of both sides and then the operations itself—Keegan takes a different tack. Initially, he looks at eight individuals who played roles in the strategy and planning phases and uses them as a vehicle for understanding the preliminaries to the invasion. In like manner, while dealing with the actual operation, he focuses on seven divisions that represent various national armies and weaves their actions into the eleven-week campaign as it unfolded. In this way, the landings, eventual breakout, and liberation of Paris take place within a unique yet familiar setting.

Even Keegan’s prologue does not conform to the usual format. Normally a campaign history starts with a dramatic episode in an attempt to catch the immediate interest of the reader. Keegan, however, begins by describing his personal experiences as a young boy during the war— evacuation with his family to the peaceful English countryside, his patriotic feelings, his encounters with foreign individuals (including American GIs), his recollections of D-day. While he admits it is a nostalgic look at his youth, the effect is more compelling than if he had concentrated on the usual eye-catching event.

The heart of the book consists of eight chapters. Chapter 1 examines eight leaders—Generals Stilwell, Wedemeyer, Eisenhower, and Marshall; Field Marshals Montgomery, Alan Brooke, and Rommel; and Foreign Minister Molotov—and their roles in developing the strategy (and counterstrategy) for Operation Overlord. The list is interesting from a number of standpoints. It contains decision-makers whose roles in the campaign are well known, others whose roles are much less familiar. Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, for instance, is included because of his trip to Washington in May 1942 to plead for a "second front," and the author leaves no doubt as to its significance when it came to formulating Allied strategy. When Keegan discusses Allied commanders, he reflects the current assessments of British historians in being very pro-Eisenhower (as well as pro-Marshall) without being anti-Montgomery. In fact, he depicts Eisenhower not only in his role as Supreme Allied Commander but also for his part in the planning process in early 1942. By stressing the personalities involved in crafting the Overlord strategy, Keegan effectively sets the stage for the operation that follows.

The seven remaining chapters focus on the seven specific divisions but still within a recognizable chronological framework. As might be anticipated, Keegan first highlights the airborne contribution and features the renowned U.S. 82d and 101st Airborne Divisions. He next covers the seaborne assault and concentrates on the exploits of the 3rd Canadian Division as it came ashore on Juno Beach. He then turns to the battles beyond the beachhead and focuses on the 15th Scottish Infantry (as it undertook a preliminary operation before the taking of Caen on 8 July); the 11th British Armored (involved in the costly armored offensive—codenamed Goodwood—after the capture of Caen); the 21st German Panzer (in the equally costly Mortain counteroffensive of early August); General Stanislaw Maczek’s heroic 1st Polish Armored (in the heavy fighting astride the Falaise gap); and the equally heroic General Leclerc’s 2d French Armored (in the politically motivated dash to liberate Paris).

In all of these instances, the battle scenes are clearly etched, and perhaps even more important, Keegan brings out the very human side of conflict and its many ironies. For example, when describing the German reaction to the l01st’s night airdrop at Ste. Mère-Eglise, he writes:

The readiness of the German defenders of Normandy to observe the normal routines of military life throughout the events of June 6th is one of the stranger features of that extraordinary day. Soldiers are incurably fond of sleep; air raids had become commonplace along the Normandy coast; but the parachuting was a novelty which makes the German’s adherence to domestic convention inexplicable. Nevertheless [after an initial fire-fight] back to bed the garrison of Ste. Mere-Eglise went. . . . Thirty Germans were captured in or next to their beds, eleven were shot on the run, rather more made it into the countryside. (p. 94)

The author ends the narrative with an epilogue that includes a brief summary of operations in the West in late 1944 until the surrender along with a vivid description of conditions in Normandy after the war. He then concludes with an analysis of Overlord’s results and significance. Adding to the book’s completeness are appendixes of the Allied and German divisions, an order of battle of the divisions featured in the text, and a number of excellent photographs and battle maps.

Keegan’s interpretations are solid and usually in accord with recent scholarship. He acknowledges the significance of Ultra intelligence in winning the Normandy battle, particularly during July and August. He accurately depicts how the rapid Allied advance across France took its planners by surprise, causing an autumn logistics bottleneck in the process. Equally valid is his discussion of the reasoning behind Eisenhower’s decision to adopt the "broad front" strategy (for both strategic and political reasons) and Stalin’s abandonment of the offensive along the Baltic in February 1945 (to secure portions of the Balkans instead). Keegan also gives an excellent picture of the disparate elements in France and its empire, which were eventually, if incompletely, brought under the control of General Charles de Gaulle.

Keegan’s ideas often transcend the limits of his subject. He correctly points out that Britain was not "seeking a focus" in the eastern Mediterranean, a misconception that many American scholars ascribe to even today. He also reminds us that while armies resemble one another in purpose and authority, each mirrors its own society and values. This is an extremely important point, for a country’s traditions may well be the determining factor in its outlook toward war. Most telling of all, at least as it relates to Normandy, is his assertion that the Allies’ 1944 logistics crisis was not the sole reason that fighting continued into 1945. It was also because of "the continuing ability of German industry to produce" war goods and "the extraordinary resilience of the German army." (p. 319)

Despite the brilliance of Six Armies in Normandy, it is subject to some general and specific criticisms. Many of the general criticisms center around the individuals and formations he chose to emphasize. For instance, was the selection of General Stilwell necessary? To be sure, Stilwell personified the confused situation in the United States—even among the military—immediately after Pearl Harbor. But certainly other military leaders who were more directly involved (General Sir Frederick Morgan, Overlord’s initial chief planner, comes to mind) would have been more appropriate.

With regard to the units selected, Keegan singles out those divisions whose primary task was to fight the land battles. Is this justified, given the nature of joint and combined operations? While he does not neglect the role of air and naval forces, his failure to treat any specific air or naval units extensively is particularly glaring in the case of air power. A week after the invasion, German Generalleutnant Baron Geyr von Schweppenburg declared that the Allies in his sector had achieved not "air superiority" (Lüftuberlegenheit) but rather "air mastery" (Luftherrschaft). Moreover, Keegan seems to accept the notion that before the Normandy landing, Germany was pursuing primarily a land war on a single front, whereas; as he is well aware, during 1941 the Wehrmacht became involved in a multifront war on a number of fronts including air and sea as well as land dimensions.

One further criticism relates to Keegan’s use of comparisons. No doubt historical parallels can be instructive, but his use of them was at times strained and unconvincing. His comparison of the survival of Poland’s 1st Armored Division in the west with the destruction of the Home Army in Warsaw somewhat later in 1944 has only limited validity (except to explain the situation in Poland) as does his comparison of the Normandy campaign with the Central Front in Europe today. In addition, while Keegan is undoubtedly correct in arguing that the Normandy undertaking ranks as a monumental military setback for Hitler, to contend that it was an even greater disaster than Stalingrad requires more substantial support.

The book also contains occasional factual errors. Most flagrant is Keegan’s discussion of Molotov pressing for the "second front" at the end of May 1942 on the grounds that the Germans were beginning their advance toward Stalingrad. (p. 60) The main thrust of the 1942 German offensive (Operation Brunswick) did not commence until a month later. Keegan is also inconsistent when detailing the number and disposition of forces. The 55 Wehrmacht divisions defending Normandy on 6 June (p.61) is changed correctly to 58 in a later chapter. (p. 313) The scattering of Army Group G after the French Riviera landing on 15 August (p. 283) is more accurately described later when Keegan writes that many in the Army Group were able "to escape up the valley of the Rhône." (p. 313) (Slips such as these will undoubtedly be rectified in subsequent editions.)

These criticisms aside, Six Armies in Normandy deserves a wide readership. What the late Cornelius Ryan did for one day of the Normandy battle in The Longest Day, John Keegan has now done for the entire campaign. It is truly an original and thought-provoking work.

Air War College

Alan F. Wilt (B.S.. DePauw University; MA. Ph.D., University of Michigan) is Professor of History at Iowa State University. In 1982-83, he was visiting professor of military history at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama. His books include The Atlantic Wall: Hitler’s Defenses in the West, 1941-1944 (1975) and The French Riviera Campaign of August 1944 (1981). Dr. Wilt is a previous contributor to the Review.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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