Air University Review, July-August 1983

Flexibility: An Essential in Military Operations

Lieutenant Colonel W. Scott Phillips

There is scarcely a responsible position in society today where the incumbent can perform in an environment of total knowledge and control. Inevitably, there are instances of the unexpected to which the manager must respond. But as Carl von Clausewitz said so well so many years ago, war, particularly, is the realm of uncertainty. We will look at the reasons for this in some detail, but suffice it for now to say that military leaders face a special set of problems— extremely complex and not readily controlled. This is true at all command levels and in a wide variety of situations. Therefore, an essential ingredient in successful military leadership is flexibility.

The need for flexibility is probably most widely recognized as operational tactics are developed and employed. The fighter pilot must respond rapidly to changing circumstances in an air-to-air engagement. Similarly, armed reconnaissance sorties react to and destroy targets of opportunity. Ground forces also must adjust to real-time situations. Everything from a bridge found unusable for a river crossing to an enemy ambush creates situations in which flexibility is the key to success. Intelligence information can obviate some of these situations. Nevertheless, intelligence can never be flawless, and such situations will arise.

These tactical situations are ones in which history shows us responding quite well in general. Many times, courage and "good old American ingenuity" have saved the day in such situations. Yet even in tactical environments we have sometimes paid a severe price for lack of flexibility. An obvious example is the hostage rescue attempt in Iran. The loss of three helicopters created a situation in which the mission could not be accomplished. There was no remaining flexibility due to the lack of additional helicopters and the distances involved. It is not my intent to imply any judgment about the rescue attempt. That would be presumptuous of me and beyond the scope of this article. But the incident does illustrate the need for and sometimes the lack of flexibility in tactical operations.

Good planning and intelligence can reduce the number of unexpected situations but will never eliminate them. Clausewitz recognized this and described it as the "friction of war." He illustrated this concept by describing unexpected situations due to maintenance problems or rapidly changing weather.²

As we look in a broader context at national and military strategy, the picture becomes much more grim. We have (rightly so) forsaken any goals of territorial conquest. Rather, we have a goal of containing communism. This is appropriate but defensive in nature. It puts us in a reactionary mode. The initiative lies with the enemy, thus putting a premium on flexibility. Time and time again we have discovered aggression—overt or covert—somewhere in the world and have tried to respond. Initiatives on our part have been few in number and primarily diplomatic in nature. The most dramatic and effective initiative was probably our recognition of the People’s Republic of China. However, in the more frequent situation of trying to respond to Soviet actions, we face tremendous problems. The areas of involvement are worldwide, and the role of the Soviet Union is often obscured. Therefore, we are frequently faced with challenges to our national will, ability, and ingenuity. Flexibility is certainly essential. How well have we done? Iran, Afghanistan, Nicaragua, and many more constitute a litany of failure. These are certainly due to many more factors than just a lack of flexibility on our part. I do not mean to imply that these losses could have been prevented by a little fancy footwork. They do illustrate, though, our wide-ranging challenges and the difficulty in coping with them.

Clausewitz addressed another aspect of the problem that we face. He described war as theoretically involving the employment of maximum force to achieve total victory. But he then modified this pure form of war to describe the actual circumstances that prevail. Specifically, he said that the military means employed must be appropriate to the political ends, and since political goals can range from coercion to total conquest, the military professional must have a range of means at his disposal.³ It is intriguing to think of the relevance of Clausewitz, writing before 1832, to our experience in the Vietnam War. Aside from not clearly stating our objective, we amply demonstrated in Vietnam our inability to respond with means appropriate to the threat and our limited goals. In other words, we lacked flexibility.

Related to this is the need to respond to a wide range of types of threats. We could conceivably be involved in conflicts ranging from a strategic nuclear war all the way to acts of terrorism and coercion. A nuclear war is the least likely but most serious. Conversely, acts of terrorism are little more than irritants but are very likely. It is not sufficient for us to have the power to deter nuclear war. We must he able to deter or win at all levels of conflict. If we cannot do this, we will be reduced to the impotence of an elephant whose food is being stolen by mice. What I am leading up to, of course, is an affirmation of President Kennedy’s policy of flexible response. This is even more relevant today than it was twenty years ago. We must not let it become old-fashioned. The task of shaping the various types of combat forces is difficult but essential. Here, again, the hostage rescue attempt is illustrative. We did not have the proper combat forces in-being at the time the hostages were taken. Anything less than the ability to go anywhere at anytime to do anything is inadequate. A tall order? Yes. Achievable? Emphatically yes!

Flexibility is equally important in functions such as logistical support. A logistician in wartime is faced with a myriad of problems due to such things as the loss of an airfield, the mining of a harbor, or an urgent need for spare parts. Only a variety of capabilities and plans, supplemented by flexible decision-making, can meet such needs. The forming of shipping convoys saved Great Britain early in World War II. General George Patton expropriated fuel trucks to keep his armored forces on the move. History is replete with such examples.

In these times of rapid technological change, there is always the danger of a decisive enemy breakthrough in weapons capability. We work very hard at avoiding this by making comparable advances and by having reliable intelligence about the enemy. Nevertheless, the possibility of such a situation can never be totally ruled out. When such a situation arises, only flexible, innovative actions can prevent devastating losses.

These various situations can be somewhat ameliorated by good planning. It would be negligent to do less than thorough planning based on all available knowledge and good, logical assumptions. Nevertheless, unanticipated events will occur. The enemy cannot be counted on to cooperate. Neither can the weather. Often, the relative effectiveness of weapons is not known before combat begins. These factors and others ensure that "war is the realm of uncertainty."

Thus, flexibility is an essential adjunct to planning. It is the means of maintaining the initiative despite surprise.

It is important to stress, though, that flexibility is not an excuse for vacillating. In The Rational Manager, Charles Kepner and Benjamin Tregoe state that a "flexible approach to problem solving. . . does not mean a vacillating approach."⁴ Although they are referring to business situations, the same is even more true of the military. In other words, the flexibility I am describing is a positive quality, not a negative one.

What can be done to enhance the flexibility of the United States military? Is flexibility merely a genetically determined trait that we hope our leaders will possess? No, the problem is definitely soluble. There are many steps that can and should be taken.

My interest in this need for flexibility was heightened when it struck me that flexibility is not listed as one of the USAF principles of war! How can we consider flexibility to be any less important than mass, surprise, economy of force, or any of the other principles? Incidentally, the Royal Air Force includes flexibility among its principles of war, suggesting that the principles of war are not totally time-honored and sacrosanct. Rather, they are judgmental and evolutionary. I therefore recommend that, as a first step, flexibility be added to the USAF principles of war.

Having principles of war provides a foundation on which to build. But modern war is so complex that the mere memorizing of a list of words does not ensure inspired leadership. We continually attest to this fact by expending huge amounts of money and effort in technical training and professional military education (PME).

I also recommend that our excellent PME programs be reoriented to include emphasis on flexibility. It could be argued that flexibility is an attitude that cannot be taught. However, I maintain that it is a process of thought and action that can be learned and practiced. We routinely teach decision-making, which could similarly be thought of as a process of thought and action. There are many techniques available in our PME courses to teach flexibility. Lectures can provide a general awareness. In addition, seminar discussions, case studies, and war games can be structured to create invaluable learning experiences.

The next step in developing combat flexibility would be to conduct exercises with many more unknown elements. One side could employ tactics, weapons, or scenarios that were not prepublished. I realize that the ability to do this is hampered by safety considerations. However, at the very least, exercises should be conducted to maximize the learning experience, without regard to which side wins or loses.

Note that the cost of implementing these recommendations is negligible. The payoff would be great and is easily achievable.

Some additional steps are needed to achieve full combat flexibility. This is where the expense comes in. In order to respond rapidly and effectively to any challenge, we must have the full range of forces in-being. In the Iranian hostage situation, we did not have forces in-being with the requisite training and sustainability at the time the hostages were taken. If we have anything less than strong nuclear capability, conventional forces, counterguerrilla and counterterrorist units with worldwide mobility, we will continue to be humiliated. The best leaders cannot respond flexibly without flexible forces and logistics.

There is one further necessity. Each type of force must have flexible training and equipage. Examine the preparation needed for our counterterrorist forces, and the list would show that they must be able to overwhelm the defenses at any possible stronghold—anything from a cave to a high-rise office building; operate worldwide in any climate with any required foreign language skills; be capable of using any available airfields—dirt strips, aircraft carrier. And that list could go on and on. Suffice it to say that the next terrorist problem that we face is bound to be quite different in detail from the one in Iran.

The first result of the implementation of the proposals would be a heightened awareness of the need for flexibility. Second, we would develop a generation of leaders with the vital training and ability. Third, we would ensure the development and maintenance of the full range of combat capabilities.

This would be a major step toward regaining military preeminence while retaining our essential defense posture. We should start now to think and act with flexibility.

1. Carl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 101.

2. Ibid., pp. 119-21.

3. Ibid., pp. 78-81, 605-10.

4. Charles H. Kepner and Benjamin B. Tregoe, The Rational Manager (Princeton, New Jersey: Kepner-Tregoe, Inc., 1965), pp. 69-70.

Lieutenant Colonel W. Scott Phillips (B.A., University of Massachusetts; M.B.A., Golden Gate University) is Chief, Aircraft Systems Branch in the Office of the Assistant Chief of Staff for Studies and Analysis, Hq USAF. His previous assignments include combat crew training instructor navigator and various data automation positions. Colonel Phillips is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Industrial College of the Armed Forces, Air Command and Staff College, and Air War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor