Air University Review, November-December 1983

The Factors in the Soviet Strategy

As with any school of strategic thought, the Soviet school recognizes the need for a combined and balanced use of the classic elements of strategy. Tactical exercises show how those elements interplay. Up to this point, there would seem to be no significant differences between the strategic concepts of socialists and nonsocialists. That is precisely why students of this discipline make the mistake of comparing these two groups, using the same criteria to analyze the strategic styles of Marxist and of non-Marxist states.

The drive to simplify the intellectual content of strategic thought takes us unwittingly in the direction of error. At times, the same criteria are used to assess ideas that only appear to be similar. Naturally, the findings are unrealistic and bear little relation to the truth. To attempt to immerse oneself in a study of Soviet strategy without first understanding the principal foundations of Marxist-Leninist theory is the kind of rash impulsiveness that ends in confusion. Indeed, there is a very close and unyielding bond between Soviet strategy and Marxist-Leninist theory. Generally speaking, research into the official philosophical theory of the Soviet Union is not carried out properly with qualified experts and in appropriate institutions. As a result, some professionals use commonplace parameters to examine Soviet strategic thought.

The root of the differences between Soviet strategy and nonsocialist strategy is the way man’s nature and his value as an intelligent social being are perceived. This is reflected vividly in Soviet strategic thinking. It may be that the very close relationship between Soviet philosophy and Soviet strategy has scarcely any counterparts or precedents in other parts of the world, which in itself would be a very important reason to examine the substance of those relationships more closely.

Reduced to its most basic elements, modern general strategy is developed on the basis of space, time, and maneuver, with much creativity and an increasingly greater technological foundation. Strategy development relies increasingly on data sciences, electronics, communications, and other services that, little by little, are bringing strategy into a closer relation with the sciences. Despite these new circumstances, the traditional elements of strategy are just as important as ever. The Soviets are fully convinced of this, although it does not prevent them from adjusting the variants to their own patterns of behavior. For the socialists, strategy is meaningful only as part of a philosophy which gives that strategy its vitality and the means to express itself. This indissoluble bond makes Communist strategy unique; it is essential that we understand its distinctive nature merely to survive as free societies.

The accuracy of our knowledge will determine the probability of success against the basic enemy and give new meaning to the principle of strict economy in the use of available means. Our success in continuing the battle against Marxism-Leninism will in large part depend on how carefully we observe that principle. The philosophy developed by the Chinese strategist Sun Tzu in 500 B.C. is just as applicable today, despite its having been put to the test for more than 2000 years: "Know your enemy and know yourself, and you will win 100 battles without ever running any risk of defeat." This simple, wise maxim applies today to students of Soviet strategy.

Neither the social system nor the set of human values that Marxist socialism adopted is the same as ours in the nonsocialist world. Hence, they cannot be judged or evaluated by the same criteria. Some specific examples will help clarify this point: the concepts of democracy, freedom, and peaceful coexistence as defined by a Marxist would be completely at odds with the same concepts as defined by a nonsocialist. These differences repeat themselves in countless ways and ultimately establish the cosmography of two diametrically opposed worlds.

Why, then, would the strategic elements of time, space, and maneuver have the same meaning as in the nonsocialist world? Why wouldn’t they be used to denote something totally contrary to what we in our world usually understand them to mean?

Some countries comprehend the true nature of international Communist strategy, which spawns bloody confrontations that seriously jeopardize our lives as free nations. If these countries were able to withstand the initial onslaughts, it is because they have responded to that strategy adequately and effectively and have remained alert because they know the danger persists. Such is the case with my country, Argentina.

The time dimension of the prolonged offensive that the Soviet Union has undertaken tells us in advance how communism interprets the time element in strategy. Red strategy has been figuratively labeled a "strategy without time," but not because the time factor was not provided for in the technique. Marxist strategy measures time by other criteria that follow from the principle of dialectical materialism, which Marx adopted from the philosopher Hegel and adapted to his own particular perception of the cosmos.

Without entering into a critique, the cycle in Marxist theory established by the laws of "opposites" (theses), "negations" (antitheses), and "transformation" (synthesis) is repeated over the course of time as a function of the quantitative and qualitative changes that matter undergoes. Apparently, the repetition of this theoretical cycle is endless, although when applied to the case of "social matter," Marx believed that perfect communism would be achieved at some point, thus ending the cycle. That very special state, which is the utopian goal of political communism, governs the temporal dimension of the U.S.S.R.’s global strategy.

If this were true, what could possibly delay the achievement of that illusory objective when, according to Marx, the capacity of each individual will be evaluated so as to deliver to him goods that are commensurate with his needs? Our experience, logic, and the history of mankind show that that goal is beyond reach because it will never be possible to produce sufficient goods to satisfy the individual’s free needs. But what interests us in this case is the amount of weight given to time in achieving that very impracticable goal. Since the true Communist believes that perfect communism will indeed come about, he makes the time factor subordinate to the achievements of the objective and thus makes himself part of an a1most infinite process, i.e., a process that is moving toward a moment that cannot be foretold. If the period of time necessary to reach the ideal state "from each according to his capacity, to each according to his needs" can only be measured in theoretical terms, one can predict that the struggle being waged to achieve that ideal state will go on endlessly. The vagueness of the time element is very much in keeping with the "strategy without time" that the Soviet Union, as the leader of the socialist world, has kept intact and employed since 1917. A review of the 65-year history of the Red superpower is an invitation to reflect on the way the time factor has been dealt with when developing strategy and the importance that would have to be attributed to this modus operandi to preserve the security of the nonsocialist world.

How do the Soviets interpret the presence of the time factor that is such a substantial part of our strategy? Briefly, technically speaking, the search for utopian communism will go on without any preset time limit, so that it will last an indefinite number of years or generations. This fact, which is clearly evident in Communist strategy, is a source of concern to us since it leaves no room for a truce; the battle (praxis) has no foreseeable end. Where is genuine peace in this world that the Soviets force us to share and that they explain on the basis of their dialectical materialism? Is peace nothing more than an abatement of the intensity of a battle that has no end? The pax sovietica is the subjugation of all peoples to Marxism. Therefore, one cannot expect any political agreement between the U.S.S.R. and other states to lead to any real alleviation of world tensions, since the strategy being implemented does not allow for that option.

The endless battle to which the official policy line of the U.S.S.R. condemns the West makes no provision for any cease-fire until the basic goal has been achieved, which is very unlikely. This is a grim conclusion inasmuch as it indicates that the Yalta, Geneva, and SALT I and SALT II agreements, to mention some of the most salient, have only momentary importance in the Soviet Union’s strategic approach. Further, in an unmeasured time frame, defeats have no more importance than passing events. They represent a partial setback while the monstrous war continues to be waged, a war wherein time loses its practical dimension and has nothing whatsoever to do with time as routinely understood. It becomes an accidental circumstance that will unfavorably affect only immediate generations. What is important is to bring about that golden dream of all Marxists, one that systematically becomes more and more remote, slipping through their hands like some unattainable fantasy.

In the past, wars alternated with periods of peace that could be clearly identified by the absence of violent confrontations between nations. Today, the concept of war that communism has introduced—it is the center of Communist policy, according to Lenin; it is a policy with bloodshed, according to Mao Tse-tung— has put an end to any hope for a true and lasting peace. The strategy that is employed to transform such novel notions of war into fact is consistent. We can understand from that approach why all triumphs do not end in achieving the purpose of the war and why defeats are not considered final. The search for the Marxist paradise in which the Soviet Union is engaged feeds the maelstrom that its "strategy without time" produces, where time as a factor, so vital to a beleaguered world such as our own, takes on another dimension that serves dangerously to confound any attempt to develop suitable responses.

Thus far in history, no state or group of states has undertaken to conquer the world with such resolve and dedication as the U.S.S.R. Nevertheless, if so many difficulties arise in putting together reasonably happy national societies, it can be assumed that a political undertaking that involves the entire planet will automatically become something colossal.

But Marxist theory has shaped the intellect of Soviet leaders and has given them a heavy strategic responsibility: the ideological and physical conquest of a very divided and diversified world that has never achieved lasting agreements, shared common objectives, or established stable agreements to make for better understanding among nations. Nothwithstanding this apparent political madness, one must consider carefully the events that have happened since the Bolshevik machinery first went into operation in 1917, make allowances for the nonbelievers and remind them that the successes achieved through that course of action are proof of the efficiency of the Leninist revolutionary method which, moral judgments aside, has yielded positive results for Kremlin administrators.

Regardless of which country they live in, Marxists are convinced of the viability of expanding the Red internationalist project to the most remote corners of the planet and work relentlessly to achieve that ideal goal. While the classic schools of strategic thought give more moderate weight to the space factor, Marxist-Leninist strategy puts the space factor on a global scale. In other words, the space factor is on the same colossal dimension as the time factor, whose philosophical horizon is the practical fulfillment of perfect communism. Although the breadth of the space factor is beyond the comprehension of nonsocialist orthodox strategists, it has been patiently analyzed by the first Communist power to find a strategic modus operandi that will enable it to keep that factor under control. In this respect, the Soviets have already achieved decisive territorial and political successes that are visible to any observer. More than one-fourth of the world’s population is governed by socialist rules which, though not completely uniform among all countries, are in keeping with the general principles of the Communist philosophy. This fact shows us clearly that the techniques that Soviet communism has used are sufficiently effective to make us question whether it is indeed impracticable to operate strategically within a worldwide spatial framework. The ups and downs experienced over the course of the prolonged world ideological offensive that the Soviets have led may misguide those who do not have an in-depth understanding of Marxist-Leninist doctrine. A rapid reading of the official theory prevailing in the Soviet Union shows how its disciples are obligated to make every effort to obtain the seemingly unobtainable.

Logically, expansion of the strategic space to include the entire planet is unrealistic. However, when that factor is coupled with discretionary use of time, the image of the fabulous undertaking that both strategic elements entail again becomes a matter of serious concern. In Western terms, the likelihood of conquering and subjugating the entire world, without correcting for the diversity of races, religions, and cultures that now coexist, is a plan that is in the realm of the psychedelic, one that is impossible to accomplish within reasonable time periods. However, the Marxist-Leninist concept of "strategy without time" could, if it encounters no adequate opposition, work the alchemy that we now regard as pure fantasy.

In any event, control over the space factor under the Soviet Communist conception would have been much more difficult had the enormous theater of war created thanks to the existence of the Marxist philosophy not been ingeniously compartmentalized. The systematic division of the world into large-scale operational sectors keeps the uniqueness of the various regions and countries that make up each region intact. This is a priority, the means to deal separately with the questions that arise in each geopolitical unit.

The Soviet Union has already selected its global strategy model for spreading communism beyond its borders, in accordance with the dictates of "proletarian internationalism." It has opted for the indirect strategy, where face-to-face confrontation between the major protagonists in this human drama is a very remote possibility. On the other hand, the entire organization and all forces have been harnessed to develop revolutionary war worldwide—expansion of the fraternal internationalism by way of actual deeds— as a well-integrated modus operandi directed at defeating the external monster that capitalism supposedly represents within the traditional class struggle that Marxists hold sacred.

Using this practical definition of their indirect strategy, the Soviets decided without exception that their theater of revolutionary war would cover the entire world. However, for that political undertaking to be controlled by the Soviets using their available means or resources, they set up as many theaters of operation as there were Communist parties in the various countries. If it is acknowledged that at present there are 91 parties that under various names adhere to Marxist-Leninist philosophy, we must suppose that there are 91 theaters of operation that are kept fully operational, even though one might not detect warlike acts or even the presence of organized violence.

In those 91 theaters that have been set up in the countries around the world that harbor within their territory, knowingly or unknowingly, legal or clandestine Communist parties, the strategic method employed is that of subversive warfare. This is a perverse offshoot of revolutionary war, often silent but in some instances fraught with violence, when the opposition of those who refuse to allow themselves to be subjugated is forceful and effective. In each of those theaters of operation, under the zonal responsibility of the Communist party established in the area, the subversive warfare is fitted to the specific national circumstances like a glove to the hand. Each of those political centers of subversive operations is supervised from the headquarters of international operations headed by prominent leaders who are little known publicly; Yuri V. Andropov, for example, was little known in his role as Director of the KGB, as is Boris N. Ponomarev, Chief of the International Department of the Secretariat of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union.

Some recent examples of that subversion are reflected in the current situations in Afghanistan, Somalia, Namibia, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and El Salvador, to cite only a few countries where the presence and activity of the so-called local Communist parties have achieved various stages of Marxist-Leninist domination.

Thus, the Soviets are moving ahead in the world. They are achieving consistent gains and are confusing the nonsocialist politicians and military men who are neither accustomed to nor professionally educated in the strategy of macro-dimensional factors. The solution that has been found to put the space factor into practice has brought splendid results to the Soviet Politburo, without its having had to exert efforts that could not be sustained with the resources available. This type of warfare (i.e., subversive warfare) is one of the most economical and least prone to verifiable indictment by other states because by preference the leaders resort to local human and material means to carry out their superior tactics. When outside assistance is needed from socialist countries, the support required is relatively small and at little cost. What at the outset would seem to be a utopian objective becomes much more realistic with this administrative and operational division of labor, and the probabilities of success increase significantly.

Thus far in history there has never been a strategy where the space factor was on such a massive scale. Not even the insane machinations of Adolf Hitler were organized and carried out in such a way as to pose any real threat except to the European countries that had already been invaded. The British, Spanish, Romans, and Mongols saw huge empires collapse before their very eyes, but none of them ever attempted the physical and ideological expansion to which the Soviet leaders now aspire with manifest determination and aggressiveness. What differences do we detect between the earlier empire builders and those who now aspire to world conquest?

The interests that motivated some of the leaders of the past—Genghis Khan, Julius Caesar, Alexander the Great, Philip II, Victoria, and even Hitler—were basically the classic ambitions of political and economic power. The interests that move the Soviet Marxist-Leninists to revolutionary action have much more deep-seated and durable roots than any of these others because the conquests to be made were no longer confined to the realm of material power. Rather, the priority target is the total takeover of the human mind so that men will learn to obey the doctrine that forcefully imposes egalitarianism and ideological slavery on the masses ("from each according to his capacity, to each according to his need").

In the face of these disturbing facts, the nonsocialist world has the obligation and responsibility to ponder carefully and calmly the threat that the Soviet Communist strategy poses through the manipulation of its time and space factors. The apparent absurdity implicit in the content of the strategy is no cause to abandon its analysis because if that attitude were to be adopted, our freedom and independence would be handed over to Soviet forces because of our own naiveté and ingenuousness. The evidence compiled in the last forty years is sufficient to arouse our intellectual and moral defense.

In Soviet strategy, the notion of the ploy is in no way inconsistent with what we have said with respect to the utilitarian exploitation of the time and space factors. On the contrary, civilian and military leaders, in a close political communion born of identical indoctrination, have understood the need to standardize the practical interpretation of these instruments so that together they may faithfully serve the final and lasting ends obscurely described in Communist philosophy.

For these reasons, it should come as no surprise to us that Soviet strategic ploys involve political, economic, social, and military forces indiscriminately when this is in the interest of the ends established. We should not forget that the Soviets are conducting a revolutionary war; by any yardstick it is an unconventional conflict because of the heterodox means and type of tactics used. The important point to remember is that the complex Soviet strategic activity is aimed solely at achieving a political objective, represented in the theory by the triumph of Marxist dogmas. Hence, the strategic ploy does not identify with any one camp in particular but rather feeds on any of them indiscriminately and tends to be stronger where opposition is weaker. The reason for this phenomenon is that Marxism-Leninism is a totalitarian doctrine intrinsically weakened by its internal contradictions and lacking in natural powers, thereby forcing solid defenses used to oppose it by those who know its congenital weaknesses. That is why this doctrine thrives only in regions where defensive barriers are ideologically tenuous.

In the meantime, the Soviets continue to deploy a strategy that has no temporal limit and is mapped out on a worldwide spatial dimension; they keep the maneuvering factor flexible so as to adapt it to suit the conditions that evolve as the battle progresses. For example, let us cite one of the most conflict-ridden strategic ploys that the leaders in the Kremlin planned and conducted behind the scenes during the last decade, with the complicity of the French, Italian, and Spanish Communist front. Although that ploy did not achieve the desired success, it at least served to promote more than one polemic among the democratic European sectors.

The so-called Eurocommunism, or communism assimilated by Europeans who are under democratic regimes, sought to hide the wolf in sheep’s clothing. Had Eurocommunism rejected the dictatorship of the proletariat, had it played its part fairly in pluralistic elections and on an equal footing, had it accepted democratic coexistence without harboring messianic political ambitions, it simply would have ceased to be communism and would have become a pseudo-socialist hybrid that had reneged on the Marxism of Marx. But the Eurocommunists betrayed themselves for what they were when they refused to condemn the international policy of the Politburo which, under the pretext of proletarian brotherhood, intervenes in the internal affairs of other sovereign nations.

Another example of a Soviet irregular strategic ploy typical of the Soviet revolutionary doctrine is the relaunching of the concept of so-called peaceful coexistence, a scheme for political advancement totally lacking in peaceful intent. The peaceful coexistence that the Soviets foster is fully in keeping with Leninist dogma which states that coexistence between two different societies is impossible. Peaceful coexistence rules out open confrontation between the United States and the U.S.S.R. merely in order to avoid the holocaust that the indiscriminate use of the world’s biggest nuclear arsenals would mean and which would not in any way be to the advantage of Soviet communism. In this kind of "catch-as-catch-can" that admits coexistence, the only thing prohibited is the generalized use of atomic weaponry; all other methods and means of political, economic, social, and military combat are legitimate and hence usable, according to Soviet strategic thought.

Ploys of this type suggest that the means of confrontation are frequently mingled among various fields of human activity, where subversive warfare is an undeniable fact and operations take on strange forms that defy the conventional understanding of nonsocialist leaders. The use of one type of variant or another (be it political, economic, social, or military) is a response to the specific circumstances prevailing in each theater of operations—each state where a Communist party exists—and therefore the examples must be evaluated with particular care since they are not always useful as experience in other theaters. The solutions applied in the United States-Vietnamese conflict are of little use in the Salvadorian-Guatemalan-Honduran case, since it must be recalled that each theater of operation where a subversive war is being conducted with the intervention of local Marxist-Leninist organizations backed by the Kremlin is unique. Hasty comparisons in this area lead to dangerous and irreparable mistakes.

It is no wonder that nonsocialist strategists feel somewhat disconcerted because of the odd mixture of ingredients that the Soviet operators bring to their strategic ploys, parading a considerable political-military agility. The best means to detect in advance strategic situations that are likely to crop up in the context of a total world confrontation is to make an in-depth study of the theory of subversive warfare as the most advantageous political-military scheme selected by the U.S.S.R. to carry Marxist-Leninist doctrine beyond its borders. When war compulsively becomes the center of policy, separate and isolated study of each one of the instruments that is being manipulated in the gigantic confrontation is totally meaningless because one runs the risk of losing sight of the real center of gravity that the Soviets have established to unleash their strategic offensive; even more so when countries under attack are targets of an insidious and well-orchestrated psychological campaign conducted with the support of the social communications media and organizations associated with Communist parties. What happened on the United States domestic front between 1965 and 1975 is a crude example of what can happen when. On one side there are strategists who are experts in subversive warfare, and on the other side an attempt is made to respond to the attack by using classic and conventional means. The result of that campaign, which was so well planned, was a corrupting sense of national frustration, whose side effects have only recently begun to dissipate.

Just as the space and time factors of Soviet strategy are consistent conceptually and in terms of dimension, a pattern repeats itself in the ploys. It continues when it yields positive effects over the course of time and is interrupted only when it has achieved its objective or when there is evidence of failure. It is not subject to either time or space; there are no outside pressures or limits, only decisive success or decisive failure. These operational criteria apply in manipulating the strategic factors; they give the leaders of the Soviet Politburo significant freedom of action, which they know how to use to support novel initiatives and ethical-moral standards that are contrary to man’s nature.

What is the material purpose of the huge global Soviet strategy? In summary, it is to organize a double claw or set of pincers with colossal arms that will enable the Soviets to surround, via exterior lines (outflanking maneuver), the heart of its most difficult enemies: Washington and Peking. In the meantime, interior lines (local subversive wars) rush upon each one of the geopolitical units in succession. These are the countries that, when combined, form the arms of the pincers that will make that deadly embrace possible. How long will the maneuver in. that global strategy last? Its importance is relative; what is vital is to make the idea set forth in Marxist-Leninist theory a reality. Is what we have said a gross exaggeration? To those who think so, we invite you to look at any political map of the world and affix red flags to those countries that at the present time are threatened by or governed by Marxist socialist regimes and pseudo-Marxist regimes, and either supported by or looked kindly upon by the U.S.S.R.; then draw a line to connect those red flags. You will see with surprise that the lines take on the shape of rudimentary pincers that hovers over the two capitals mentioned earlier.

No one can honestly deny that there are gaps in those lines that indicate fissures caused by a variety of reasons such as the so-called European arm that so gallantly took on the Berlin blockade (1949), the Portuguese fiasco in 1974, the freezing of the Eurocommunist campaign, which has caused a persistent atrophy. However, one must not fail to recall that the political-geographic gaps have not appeared because of the absence of subversive action but rather because of the momentary triumph of peoples and governments that refuse to become new "popular democracies." In this particular regard, it is wise to recall that the defeats of the Marxist-Leninist praxis are temporary. The fact that the Soviets still cling to this concept should alert the nonsocialist world to the fact that it must cease to be so easily trapped by the temptations of a false security.

This interpretation of the strategy of the most aggressive Communist-spreading center of our time indicates that mankind has a critical period ahead, during which we will have to fight off the domination of the Red wave. The seriousness of the situation described here should not transform us into incurable pessimists who assume that all is lost. Nevertheless, a solid and united response to the offensive strategy that the Soviet Union is conducting is essential to neutralize the freedom of action with which it currently operates. To accomplish this, it is essential that we begin by knowing every detail of the enemy that threatens our lifestyle and our basic freedoms. What hangs in the balance is nothing more and nothing less than the security of our world.

Comodoro José C. D’Odorico, Argentine Air Force retired, is Director of Aeroespacio, Argentine national journal of aeronautics and space and Professor of Revolutionary War in the Argentine Air War College, where he also serves as an advisor. Comodoro D’Odorico attended the Interamerican Defense College, Washington, D.C. in the class of 1970.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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