Air University Review, May-June 1983

Toward A Rearmed Force

President Regan’s trillion-dollar defense buildup is under way with an imposing array of programs proposed or promised. Not unexpectedly, public comment had centered on cost-benefit ratios and basing strategies--questions of national import stimulated by gargantuan undertakings like the B-1, MX ground-launched cruise missle (GLCM), or the Space Transportation System. Even as they following this debate, Air Force planners are struggling with another, more mundane matter--how to protect these invaluable defense and space systems. Security may lack the cannonball impact of the "big issues," but its bird-shot effect can produce costs that cut into operational capability.

Until now, the Air Force has successfully protected its weaponry with concentric rings of sensors, barriers, policemen, and alarms. Four new factors, however, are complicating security planning for tomorrow’s systems.

• First, there is ample, documented evidence that terrorist groups and superbly trained unconventional Warsaw Pact and North Korean forces will menace one or another of these systems.

• Second, resources that terrorists have ignored in the past are now threatened and must be protected. For example, $45 million worth of lightly protected Air National Guard A-7s were destroyed at Muniz ANG Base, Puerto Rico. Extending minimum security to similarly configured active duty and Air Force Reserve ramps will require some 4000 additional authorizations.

• Third, the hope that technology would replace some sentries with hardware failed to materialize when terrorist firepower and mobility necessitated the reinforcement of security police response forces supporting nuclear weapons.

• Fourth, security policemen have become exceedingly expensive to recruit, train, and maintain, costing about $21,000 per person in 1982.

Factor one establishes the immediacy of the security issue. Factors two and three make the security police career field, already the USAF’s third largest, one of its fastest growing, and factor four makes this growth a costly experience.

If anything, this trend promises to accelerate. Recognizing the threat to their resources, tactical commanders have not hesitated to recommend the deployment of a new sensor system here and a supporting police post there. Although often small, these increases quickly add up to staggering Air Force-wide totals. The 4000 new sentries proposed in the post-Muniz survey represent only two new posts on active duty nonalert ramps and three on those belonging to Air Reserve Forces. An additional 1500 security policemen are projected for the GLCM, 3700 for MX, 275 for the Space Transportation System, and 1166 for other programs.

Where will these people come from? Will the recruiting pool of the late eighties and early nineties support these numbers? Even the most parochial security police leaders admit a new approach is needed. The Air Force cannot continue to throw manpower at every security problem.

In a search for options, an examination of how our allies have coped with similar difficulties offers some clues. Britain’s Royal Air Force (RAF) divides its security and law enforcement responsibilities between two organizations, the RAF Regiment and the RAF Police. Both units are highly professional, reserve the most difficult tasks for themselves, and depend heavily on other base personnel to protect their stations.

Base defense, including short-range air defense, is the principal mission of the Royal Air Force Regiment. Additionally, this 2500-man organization is responsible for small-arms training, chemical and biological defense, and fire-fighting. However, the entire base is involved in these operations. Virtually every person on the station has an additional duty assignment within the base security structure. When an exercise is initiated, the readiness state increases, or an actual emergency occurs, these augmenters draw their weapons and man close-in defensive positions, key points, and lines of communication. They are fully trained in the limited tactics that they are expected to employ and have rehearsed their roles many times. They do the same job, in the same place, under the guidance of the same RAF Regiment personnel, every time. Meanwhile, the highly trained, mobile Regiment "gunners" screen the perimeter, block enemy access routes, and seek and destroy attackers within the base’s tactical area of responsibility.

The RAF Police provide day-to-day security of sensitive resources and basic law enforcement services. In emergencies, policemen supervise those augmenters assigned to defensive positions protecting the flight line and storage areas in an effort integrated with that of the Regiment.

This extensive augmentation program is not considered extra duty in the American sense but an essential wartime job. The British have accepted the fact that this deployment will involve long hours and might delay personnel actions, limit mess hall menus, or postpone road construction. When asked about the morale impact of this program, the Commander of RAF Wildenrath explained, "We are an armed force not a business enterprise. Our people expect to bear arms in defense of our mission." The group captain went on to quote Winston Churchill: "Every airfield should be a stronghold of fighting air-groundsmen and not the abode of uniformed civilians in the prime of life protected by detachments of soldiers."

The size of the RAF Police force is further limited by the substantial assumption of law enforcement responsibilities by station noncommissioned officers (NCOs) and officers. There are a few police patrols, but routine discipline, vandalism, domestic disputes, parking violations, and other minor offenses are matters these leaders handle within their squadrons. This allows the RAF Police to concentrate on serious crime in the manner of the Air Force Office of Special Investigations. Most British NCOs and officers view an increased police role as a usurpation of their traditional authority and prestige. By emphasizing the specialist nature of the missions assigned to the Regiment and the RAF Police, and by defining general sentry and law enforcement tasks as "military duties," the British have succeeded in limiting the manpower devoted to security operations.

Most allied, Soviet, and nonaligned air forces adhere to the British model. The USAF seems unique in its attempt to out-perform civilian police departments in the range of law enforcement services provided, and we alone try to spare our people the burden of bearing a weapon. While the difference in size between the RAF and the USAF dictate some managerial variances, our apparent inability to restrict the growth of our security force suggests the need for a second look at how we are doing business.

Could we expand the USAF security police augmenter program? Assuming two conditions were satisfied, the answer would seem to be yes. First, we must limit the scope of the duties assigned to these augmenters so the necessary skills can be mastered in short, intense training periods. Assigning a certain position to an augmenter and then providing specialist leadership appears to be as workable in the USAF as the RAF. The efficiency and enthusiasm of Red Horse squadrons operating in their base defense role argues powerfully in support of this premise. Second, Air Force personnel must accept that business cannot proceed as usual when the base goes on a wartime footing. Many support functions must be curtailed while the medics, civil engineers, and security police are reinforced.

Could base personnel assume additional security and law enforcement responsibilities? A better question might be, "Have we a choice?" The threat will not go away, and security must be enhanced. Adding more security policemen, however, entails a Hobson’s choice between an increase in the Air Force strength or a transfer of authorizations from some other career field. On the other hand, if a limited number of maintenance supervision, communications, fuels, and munitions personnel were routinely armed and their presence obviated a need for more security policemen, the Air Force might be able to satisfy some of its security needs while adding to its maintenance, fuels, communications, or munitions forces (or at least avoiding losses).

The security responsibilities assigned to these augmenters might detract from their principal occupation, but this could be minimized. On a day-to-day basis, only a few would be involved, perhaps three or four on any given ramp or one or two in a petroleum, oil, and lubricants area. Since these people are already responsible for security alerting and reporting, all that is added is a supporting role in a security police response to an incident. How an adversary views a security system—as strong and alert or weak and preoccupied—plays an important role in that system’s ultimate success. Although the presence of armed augmenters will not produce perfect security, it will raise the ante for anyone wishing us ill. That perception could cause a terrorist to seek another target.

On the law enforcement side, if squadron-trained officers and NCOs were to perform minor investigations such as those involving petty theft and disorderly conduct, the growing demand for police services could be reduced. Yes, the assumption of greater investigative and disciplinary responsibilities by Air Force NCOs and officers would turn back the clock and place a substantial burden on their shoulders. But it would also reinforce the military command structure and certainly reverse any nine-to-five orientation within a unit’s leadership.

In the end, these questions will be answered according to one’s philosophical view of the Air Force. If a communicator, personnel clerk, or maintainer views him or herself primarily as a specialist, this proposal will be seen as a significant threat. Conversely, if those same people see their service in traditional military terms, they will welcome the chance to bear arms and assume an increased leadership role. Put simply, the USAF faces a Churchillian choice between existence as an armed force or as a group of uniformed civilians.

This question of dual utilization goes beyond the immediate concerns of any single individual or career field. There is a general national consensus that a stronger defense is needed, but that consensus is under assault and is fragile. It will not survive unless everyone enlists in the battle for greater efficiency and productivity. Adding thousands of security policemen without diligently searching for alternatives is a shot fired in behalf of those who would sacrifice the defense budget for other more politically attractive alternatives.

Argonne, Illinois
and
Seoul, Korea

Colonel Larry J. Runge, USAF (Ret) (MS., Michigan State University). retired in March 1982 as the Air Force Chief of Security Police and is now Security Manager for the Argonne National Laboratory in Argonne, Illinois. In his 22 years of security police service, Colonel Runge served at all levels: unit, numbered air force, major command, and Air Force Headquarters. He is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Armed Forces Staff College, and the Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

Lieutenant Colonel Jon M. Samuels (B.S., University of Southern California; MA., University of Oklahoma) is the Deputy Provost Marshal, United States Forces Korea. He is a career security police officer, having served as Deputy Director, Department of Security Police Training, Lackland AFB, Texas. a squadron commander, major command action officer, and the Executive Officer for the Air Force Office of Security Police. Colonel Samuels is a Distinguished Graduate of the Armed Forces Staff College and a previous contributor to the Review.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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