Air University Review, May-June 1983
Sino-Soviet relations and their relationship to the United States in the western Pacific are the subjects of two new publications. The first, a historical study, Soviet-American Relations in Asia, 1945-1954 by Russell D. Buhite, examines the United States’ redefinition of its interests in Asia in the decade following World War II.* Buhite’s study, based on recently released documents, focuses on China, Taiwan, Japan, Korea, and Indochina, which have been the objects of Soviet-American competition. The U.S.S.R. is portrayed as an aggressive and expansionist power whose aspirations included not only control of the Kuril and Sakhalin islands but also domination in Mongolia, Sinkiang, Manchuria, Korea, and Japan. Although Southeast Asia was beyond the reach of Soviet power, Stalin’s objectives there included the eventual expulsion of the Western European colonial regimes.
* Russell D. Buhite, Soviet-American Relations in Asia, 1945-1954 (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1981, $14.95), 256 pages.
The United States refused to accommodate some of these aspirations. To the dismay of Stalin, the United States retained control of Japan and tried hard to achieve a non-Communist decision in the civil war in China because Washington assumed a Communist China would become a Soviet client state. Following the Communist victory, the State Department determined to keep Taiwan free of Communist control. In Korea and Indochina, the United States, out of fear of an ever-enlarging Soviet Empire, employed military force to contain Communist advances.
Buhite, answering the critics of American policy during these crucial years, contends that Washington was not intellectually bankrupt, paranoid, or imperialistic. The United States read Soviet intentions accurately; however, the United States must bear heavy responsibility for the intensification of the Cold War in Asia. In underestimating the willingness of the Chinese, Koreans, Indochinese, and others, to defend their interests and in overestimating Soviet capabilities and U.S. military strength, American officials, Buhite contends, made unsound judgments concerning where and how to restrain Soviet advances. Compounding this was the unconscious acceptance of generalizations concerning Soviet behavior and the Cold War mentality. Thus, "Post war American policy in Asia is the story of the flight of thoughtful and able men to the unquestioning acceptance of . . . ‘credibility,’ ‘domino theory,’ and ‘ideological imponderable,’ and to a theory of interest largely predicated on these intangibles." (p. xii)
In applying the historical record to the future, Buhite asserts "major interests must not be militarized and that imponderables like credibility and prestige are not adequate grounds for military intervention. Even in this era of intercontinental missiles, multiocean navies, and global economic dependencies there must surely be geographic and dollar limits on American interest." (pp. 234-35)
Editors, Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, of China, the Soviet Union, and the West consider the strategic and political questions confronting the West in the 1980s.* The relationship between the Soviets and Chinese is of importance for security considerations in the coming decade. This volume is a collection of original articles by many respected Sinologists and Sovietologists and is based on a conference on Sino-Soviet relations held during May 1980 in Garmisch, West Germany. The various articles provide viewpoints, oftentimes conflicting, concerning the subjects of determinants of Chinese and Soviet foreign policy behavior, military determinants, regional competition, and policy considerations for the West.
* Douglas T. Stuart and William T. Tow, editors, China, the Soviet Union, and the West: Strategic and Political Dimensions for the 1980s (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982, $30.00 cloth, $13.95 paper), 320 pages.
In considering determinants of Chinese and Soviet foreign policy behavior, key background factors such as history, culture, and ideology were examined. Such factors have an indirect influence on policy, by structuring elite and mass public opinions and setting outer limits of political experimentation. Sources of the Sino-Soviet dispute would include the geographic factor (the long border and disputed areas), the ethnic element (with a profound anti-Chinese feeling on the part of the Russians), and ideology differences. During the Khrushchev period, the most important of all the issues inflaming Sino-Soviet relations were differences concerning the United States. Moscow had no direct conflict of national interests with the United States comparable to Beijing’s resentment over U.S. protection of Taiwan. The Cuban missile crisis, relations with the Third World and relations between the Soviet and Chinese Communist parties also contribute to the dispute. "Earlier, the Chinese had been the more militantly anti-American of the two Communist powers; now the opposite was the case. The Soviet threat was beginning to drive China more or less into the arms of the Untied States." (p. 14) As a result, China strongly supports NATO and opposes Helsinki-type détente in Europe because it does not want Moscow to feel confident in transferring military assets from its European to its Far Eastern front. With the advent of Nixon and Carter and normalization, the United States was ready to "play the China card" against the Soviet Union. This normalization "gave Moscow some reason to fear the emergence of a triangular anti-Soviet détente among the other major Far Eastern powers." (p. 20)
In the concluding section of the work, insight was provided into future policy considerations for the West. Drew Middleton, military correspondent of the New York Times, noted the "virtual impossibility" of establishing and following a coherent foreign policy in the United States. The new condition exposed by the various fluctuations of U.S. foreign policy is the perceived decline in the international position of the United States. What the United States does in the future will be critical in relations with China and the Soviet Union.
An analyst at the Rand Corporation, Jonathan D. Pollack, concluded that "the Sino-Soviet rivalry ranks among the most enduring conflicts of the post war era." (p. 275) What began as a personalized and ideological dispute has evolved into a heated and bitter debate over the extent to which contemporary political and military conditions compelled or allowed accommodations with the West. The result is that China is now searching for a security that relies to a significant extent on close ties with the United States and the West. Three key concerns will dominate China’s quest for enhanced security: the long-term competition with the Soviets, the domestic development tasks (the four modernizations), and the task of becoming modern in the area of national defense.
On the other hand, the Soviets seem optimistic that the dispute with China will end and normalization of relations will be achieved. Whether this "strategic triangle" continues depends on the future relationship between China and the Soviets. Such an event could provide tangible benefits for both China and the Soviet Union. "This observation presents the West with a major dilemma, especially in the context of the present U.S. willingness to depart from a policy of evenhandedness between Moscow and Beijing." (p. 290) As a result, the West must maintain flexibility in their planning of foreign and security policies in order to continue to "play the game."
Howard Payne University
Brownwood, Texas
Contributor
Dr. Robert G. Mangrum
(BA., Hardin-Simmons University; M.A. and Ph.D., North Texas State University) is Chairman of the History Department at Howard Payne University, Brownwood, Texas, and a captain in the U.S. Army Reserve. Dr. Mangrum is author of Route Step March: Edwin M. Stanton’s Special Military Units and the Prosecution of the War, 1862-1865 (1980) and a graduate of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor