Air University Review, May-June 1983

Whither National Defense?

As a professor of strategy at the U.S. Naval War College, Dr. Thomas Etzold is well placed to observe both the lesser and greater follies in current U.S. defense policy. Defense or Delusion? America’s Military in the 1980’s chronicles a number of them.* While the attempt to cover almost every defense issue in 259 pages results in some superficiality and stylistic problems, the book nonetheless makes an important contribution to the defense debate.

* Thomas H. Etzold, Defense or Delusion? America's Military in the 1980's (New York: Harper & Row, 1982, $14.95), 259 pages.

Its greatest merit is that Etzold looks beyond the question of the size of the defense budget to qualitative issues. He asks not just how much defense we need, but what kind. In doing so, he voices many of the concerns of the military reform movement—a loose group of both liberal and conservative members of Congress, civilian defense specialists, and (mostly younger) military officers who believe many current defense policies are conceptually flawed and will result in defeat no matter how large the defense budget. While Etzold may not view himself as a reformer, his book is de facto part of the literature of the reform movement.

Defense or Delusion? begins with a discussion of today’s defense environment: the emergence of the Soviet Union as a genuine superpower, competing effectively with the United States across the military spectrum; dramatic changes in military technology, recently illustrated in the fighting around the Falklands; and the rise of the military power of smaller nations relative to both superpowers. Although Etzold does not draw out this last point, its strategic importance is profound. Policies developed in the late 1940s, when there were two great powers and many power vacuums, cannot be extended indefinitely in an era where many small powers can defeat a superpower in the small power’s own backyard.

Etzold sets the stage for his reform diagnosis of our military ills toward the close of his first chapter. In discussing the Iran rescue mission, he notes, "the Iran raid did not show a military in the peak of condition doing its best against insuperable obstacles and odds. Rather, it portrayed a military in crisis, unsuccessful in small matters, unfit, perhaps, to attempt larger ones." Appropriately, he then looks at personnel issues, reflecting the reformers’ contention that people are more important than weapons for success in combat. He notes that the draft is not the central issue despite the heated arguments it generates. The main problem is not recruiting but retention: keeping people with seven to ten years of service whose technical and leadership skills are vital for combat effectiveness. Until the recent recession, they were leaving in droves, driven out in part by pay and benefit deficiencies but also by profound social and professional issues: family separation, constant moves from one duty station to another, and increasing subs titution of management for leadership.

Indeed, a stronger case than Etzold makes can be offered that the worst personnel problems are not among the troops but in the officer corps. Careerism, instances of institutional dishonesty (such as detuning the F-15’s engines without telling the pilots), and the bureaucracy’s demand that internal "ricebowls" be protected even at the expense of combat effectiveness are driving out the people with the character and talent for combat. None of this can be changed by a return to a draft or by increases in the defense budget.

Etzold begins his chapter on weapons by stating correctly that

America’s advanced technology, once the source of military advantage, is becoming a root of military malaise . . . . American military equipment has become so costly and so complex that training is difficult, maintenance demanding, and reliability doubtful. The inevitable result is a lack of readiness for war or crisis.

And, because our "high-tech" weapons cost so much, we cannot afford the numbers we need. As Senator Sam Nunn recently said, "We are pricing ourselves into unilateral disarmament."

The equipment chapter contains one of the book’s more shocking revelations. At a time when the Navy wants two additional nuclear-powered carriers—at up to $17 billion for each carrier task force—Etzold writes:

In the Navy’s war games an unwritten rule prohibits the sinking of any American aircraft carrier. The carriers are so few in number and the Navy’s tasks in war so great that to do without one is literally inconceivable. In more than five years of experience as an umpire and adviser in high-level war games, I have witnessed the unwillingness of senior naval officers to permit carriers to be sunk, even when taken under overwhelming attack . . . The carrier’s sacrosanct role in modern naval thought prevents, in many if not all cases, the realistic assessment of possible results of combat even in the Navy’s own internal games and analyses.

If the Navy’s own war games are rigged in favor of the big carriers, then the Navy’s advocacy of these ships comes into serious question. Are we being asked to build a grand fleet or a grand illusion?

As Etzold notes, nuclear weapons issues tend to raise intense emotions, and his chapter on the subject will probably do so. His discussion of the MX points out its major flaw—the inability to devise a satisfactory basing mode—though he dismisses the SUM alternative (putting the missiles on conventional submarines in coastal waters) too quickly. He advocates arms control, but he does not present them as a panacea, merely as useful components of our overall strategic deterrence policy, and that is a legitimate view. Overall, his treatment will probably prove too balanced for the hard-liners on either side, which suggests he is roughly on track.

The section on conventional—that is, nonnuclear— issues begins and ends on the right note: an emphasis on unpredictability and change as characteristic of war and therefore on the need to be able to improvise. Much of our defense planning today hinges on rigid scenarios, where the opponent is predictable and where his actions are repetitive. We strive for efficiency in set-piece situations, yet war demands agility: that combination of variety and rapidity which enables someone to turn uncertainty and change to his advantage, to see, decide, and act in war’s fog and friction more quickly than the enemy.

When he gets into specifics, Etzold shows he is unfamiliar with much of the reform literature on ground warfare. He misses the essence of both the NATO issue—the fact that by making more effective use of trained European reservists we can have conventional superiority at little additional expense—and the Rapid Deployment Force problem, where again we can have superiority if we focus on light infantry warfare in the Zagros Mountains. His call for more readiness spending is correct, but he could make his point more strongly. Current defense plans call for a much larger percentage increase in procurement spending than in funds for operations and maintenance, meaning we are budgeting for decreasing readiness, despite all the hoopla about building up the military.

Etzold may "loose the bubble" on a few issues, but his book will stimulate thought among both professionals and laymen. He avoids the usual "spend less/spend more" trap and focuses instead on how to produce a better military—one that can win in combat. In view of our questionable military performance over the last three decades, it is an issue that deserves some attention.

William S. Lind (A.B., Dartmouth College; MA., Princeton University) is Legislative Aide for Armed Services, Office of Senator Gary Hart, United States Senate. He previously served as legislative assistant to Senator Robert Taft, Jr, of Ohio. Lind has been a frequent contributor to the Marine Corps Gazette, U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, and the Review.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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