Air University Review, May-June 1983

Air Force Fighters

simple or complex?

Our commitment to the pursuit of advanced technology and quality fighter-weapon systems is one of the boldest steps ever undertaken toward modernizing tactical air power. The U.S. Air Force has chosen to follow this course, aggressively exploiting rapidly expanding civilian technology. Lessons learned since the advent of air warfare and analyses based on threat assessment and requirements for force manageability allow no other alternative. Although some would disagree, proponents of sophisticated fighters making use of advanced technology state that technological improvements are imperative to ensure predictable lethality and prevent the recurrence of past mistakes in future combat.

Many proponents of a quantity force question the pursuit of sophistication, however bold and justifiable. They fear that fighter complexity has already eroded USAF credibility and readiness and may do so increasingly in the future. They suggest that a large force of simple, unsophisticated fighters would provide a more effective fighting force. This view is reflected in a report by the House Armed Services Committee:

Instead of looking at aircraft that are more complex, more expensive, and more difficult to support and maintain, the committee believes the Air Force should expend some effort looking at less complex, less expensive aircraft concepts that will increase readiness and increase number.¹

Rationale for
Sophisticated Fighters

The Vietnam conflict provided a test case for the cumulative knowledge of air power gained in World War II and Korea, and the lessons made a profound impact on future tactical requirements. Planners labored throughout the conflict with constraints imposed by adverse weather and limitations in U.S. fighter-weapon systems. In the air-to-ground role, American fighters initially lacked all-weather/night capability to ensure round-the-clock interdiction of vital targets (the Navy’s A-6 Intruder attack aircraft was an exception that underlined the benefits of all-weather capability). Particularly in the Hanoi area, visual acquisition of vital targets was limited to approximately five days during the northeast monsoon. Similar problems were experienced during night interdiction missions because U.S. fighters lacked the radar target definition required for precise bombing. Generally, the only way to conduct vital interdiction missions during adverse weather and at night was to operate below overcasts and in flare-lit skies. Moreover, excessively large numbers of fighters were necessary to destroy critical targets, such as bridges, with unguided munitions. To achieve acceptable accuracy, pilots had to bomb at low altitudes and within predictable weapon release parameters, both undesirable from the standpoint of survivability. In air-to-air engagements, pilots normally could not rely on electronic identification systems (IFF) or precise ground radar control (GCS) to permit the use of long-range radar-guided missiles. As a result, rigid rules of engagement required positive visual identification before firing; this severely limited the use of the potent AIM-7 Sparrow missile. Statistics compiled by the USAF in 1962 reflected an unimpressive kill rate (enemy aircraft kills for missiles expended) of 10.6 percent and 12.9 percent for the AIM-7 Sparrow and AIM-9 Sidewinder missiles. Moreover, the relatively low ratio of enemy-to-U.S. fighter losses, approximately 2.2 to 1, was due, in part, to limited U.S. radar coverage in North Vietnam.² In both the air-to-air and air-to-ground roles, the lack of all-weather/night capability often constrained U.S. fighters in performance of their missions.

Another justification for sophisticated fighters is the nature of the potential threat. The growing numbers of Soviet aircraft showing greater sophistication and firepower constitute a potent argument for technologically advanced fighters. The Soviets have upgraded older fighters, such as the MiG-21 and early models of the MiG-23, with new engines, avionics, and weapon capabilities. Some sources speculate that the Foxhound will be able to track four targets simultaneously and, with the AA-9 missile, be able to shoot down penetrators as small as the cruise missile. Predictions are that the Soviets will modernize their offensive aviation and air defense forces with 5800 new sophisticated aircraft by 1983.³

Included in the modernization effort are the Foxhound, an upgraded version of the Foxbat, formerly called Super Foxbat; MiG-29 Fulcrum, similar to the F-18; and the Su-25, a small ground-attack aircraft designed for close air support. Weapon systems and ordnance will probably include a look-down, shoot-down radar system on the Foxhound, and missiles in the AIM-7E or Sparrow category on the Fulcrum. The Soviets have evidently chosen complexity in their aircraft development programs and favor sophisticated, all-weather fighters. Furthermore, their new fighter weapon systems have significant growth potential.⁴ Thus, one can argue logically that the growth potential of sophisticated American aircraft offers the greatest promise for lethality and air superiority in future conflicts.

Air Force planners must also address force and support requirements. The probability of limited forward operating locations in future combat zones suggests that fewer aircraft incorporating the latest technological advances will offer significant operational advantages in at least three areas: Such aircraft will require less communications support from controllers (AWACS and GCI, for example) because of their long-range radars, electronic identification systems (IFF), and autonomous combat capability. The result will be less confusion, less direct and indirect jamming of radios, and a higher probability that communications problems will not compromise the mission. A smaller force of fighters will require less ground support, to include refueling, servicing, and rearming between sorties. Finally, smaller numbers of aircraft will entail fewer recoveries and launches at forward operating locations; this will be particularly important if airfield facilities and runways are damaged or lost and aircraft diversions become necessary. In other words, a small force of sophisticated fighter aircraft will, in a number of important ways, be more manageable under austere battle conditions than a large force of simple aircraft.

Air Force planners have sought to procure weapon systems and fighters that will be lethal and effective throughout the full range of tactical employment and in all combat conditions. To offset the inaccuracies of unguided air-to-ground munitions, they draw from the smart-bomb technology used in Vietnam to develop and test more accurate precision-guided munitions, such as the IIR Maverick.⁵ Improved delivery and accuracy of new air-to-ground munitions will severely hamper enemy freedom of action during adverse weather and night conditions. To offset enemy advantages in air-to-air combat, U.S. fighter technology emphasizes accurate and dependable IFF systems, nonjammable UHF radios, and dependable air-to-air homing missiles. These improvements will minimize enemy advantages in future conflicts and improve the survivability and lethality of our tactical forces. Technological improvements are paramount in the development of future weapons and fighters because superior accuracy improves chances of destroying ground and aerial targets and reduces exposure of friendly aircraft. Technological improvements also force the enemy to redress his own weaknesses and thus serve as powerful deterrents not only tactically but economically as well.

Both the F-l5 and F-16 can accomplish almost all combat missions because they have the ability to adapt to changing air-to-air and air-to-ground scenarios. They can be used against enemy aircraft flying at virtually any altitude or airspeed and in scenarios ranging from intercepts to high-G dogfights; software changes in their avionics allow for rapid and inexpensive improvements in response to new munitions requirements or hostile threats. Armed with advanced medium-range air-to-air missiles (AMRAAMs), these fighters will have a significant beyond-visual-range standoff capability.

The F-16 has proved that it is a formidable aircraft in the roles for which it was designed.⁶ In one competition it achieved a 14:1 kill ratio against simulated adversaries and took first place in low-level bombing.⁷ Pilots readily learn to apply its 9-G capability, high thrust-to-weight ratio, and point-and-shoot missile—the AIM-9L—to achieve quick and decisive results. These features, combined with relatively small size, excellent air-to-ground performance, and adaptability to modern software and ordnance, are vital capabilities against current and future threats.

The F-l5 has achieved similarly impressive results in air-to-air combat and should be just as effective in other roles. The tradeoff for its large size is the radar and avionics capability to differentiate and neutralize enemy aircraft formations at extremely long ranges. Advanced long-range air-to-air missiles (ALRAAMs) promise significant improvements over the firepower predicted for AMRAAM. Some sources state that appropriate weapon technology will enable the F-15 to perform as a "satellite killer." ⁸ Such roles will optimize the advantages of its radar, missiles, propulsion, and airframe against future threats. A contractor-proposed air-to-ground variant (Strike Eagle) of the F-l5 promises significant improvements in all-weather bombing. Its large stable platform and bombing computer should combine exceptional accuracy with exceptional weight-carrying capabilities. Its synthetic aperture radar (map display generated by radar) and highly capable bombing computer should enable the F-l5 to employ unguided munitions at moving targets in almost all weather conditions.⁹ Since the Strike Eagle computer incorporates turn and g-load factors, it will incorporate an enhanced ability to deliver ordnance in high-threat areas while maneuvering. Thus, the Strike Eagle’s high-technology systems promise significant improvements in air-to-air and air-to-ground capabilities, representing simultaneous increases in both survivability and lethality.

The Air Force relies on technology to offset the Soviet advantage in numbers. However, some defense thinkers argue that complex weapon systems possess inherent disadvantages that abrogate their theoretical capabilities. There is some truth to these assertions; reliability has undoubtedly suffered to a degree because of maintenance problems in areas where avionics, airframe components, engines, and weapon systems have been pushed to the limits of technological capability. In the words of one critic:

Designers have pushed technology as the solution to American military problems, without distinguishing between . . . innovations that simply breed extra layers of complexity and those that represent dramatic steps toward simplicity and effectiveness.¹⁰

Furthermore, complex support equipment required to maintain sophisticated aircraft also requires complex repairs. Complex aircraft have more expensive spare parts, and problems in reliability have led to lower mission-capable rates and more maintenance man-hours per sortie. The result at least initially, a point not lost on critics of technologically advanced weaponry, has been decreased sortie rates and a degradation in overall combat readiness. ¹¹

Despite problems in managing the complex maintenance and support tasks associated with sophisticated fighters, recent improvements in readiness and sortie rates are evident, particularly in the F-15 fleet. For example, innovative management and emphasis on spare parts acquisition have brought tangible improvements in the combat readiness of F-15s at Bitburg, Germany. The core and turbine blades of the Pratt & Whitney F100 engine used in the F-l5 posed a critical problem, but recent improvements have led to a compressor stall rate of less than one per 1000 hours of operation. Cannibalization rates declined from 18.3 percent in 1980 to 11.4 percent in May 1981, and fully mission-capable rates averaged 72.4 percent during August 1981. F-15s elsewhere have shown similar improvements in readiness indicators: fully mission-capable rates have steadily improved from roughly 50 percent in 1979 to 53 percent in 1980 and 58 percent in 1981.¹² Sortie rates have also shown a steady rise, and, at current levels, they are competitive with the rates of less sophisticated aircraft, such as F-5s. During a deployment to Europe, F-15s flying under the constraints of daylight hours imposed by host countries still averaged more than three sorties per day over a ten-day surge.¹³

Continuing improvements in sortie rates and other quantitative indicators of combat readiness are ample evidence of improved reliability. This trend should continue as breakage patterns are established and adequate spare parts stocks and black-box replacements become available.¹⁴ Major General John T. Chain, Jr., Director of Operations and Readiness, stated in August 1980 that:

. . . the Air Force has had to choose between buying entirely new weapon systems. . . or buying sufficient spare parts to maintain the ones it already had. We couldn’t buy both. We made a conscious decision to buy the new airplane. . . We made a conscious decision to put more money into spare parts in the current and projected budgets.¹⁵

Despite continuing problems with the F-l5, determined management and an improved supply system have resolved many difficulties.

Rationale for Simple Fighters

Simple aircraft offer the advantages of low cost, high maneuverability, small size, and lethality based on the AIM-9L missile. These advantages favor use of simple aircraft in a "pure" air superiority role because they suffer from all-weather munitions limitations in the air-to-ground role compared with the F-16, F-4, F-111, and A-7 aircraft. In addition, however, they do have the capability to augment combat forces under conditions that would limit the effectiveness of large sophisticated aircraft. Such conditions will occur when positive visual identification of aircraft is a prerequisite to firing missiles and when the merging of large forces of enemy and friendly aircraft or other factors inhibit reliance on IFF capabilities for aircraft identification. Under these conditions, small fighters armed with potent AIM-9L heat-seeking missiles would offer three advantages: First, they would allow F-15s to concentrate firepower on long-range threats entering the battle arena; second, they would allow us to withhold F-15s from areas where their size might threaten survivability; and, third, smaller, less visible fighters could maintain firepower against enemy air-to-air threats in dogfights involving a number of F-15s and other allied aircraft.

Evidence seems to indicate that one aircraft, the F-5G, might be ideally suited for this air-to-air role. It promises significant improvement over the older F-5E/F models, including projected higher reliability, greater thrust, and improved avionics. In the air superiority configuration, it might carry as many as six AIM-9 missiles and, with its improved radar, should be ideal for augmenting the existing F-15 air-to-air mission and providing a potent air-to-air threat of its own.¹⁶ The older F-5s have achieved remarkable air-to-air records in such large-scale exercises as Red Flag, Maple Flag, and AIMVAL/ACE VAL. Because of their small size and excellent maneuverability, even large forces of F-5s are extremely difficult to acquire and track. And since they concentrate only on the air-to-air mission—in part an inherent limitation of the aircraft—F-5 pilots consistently receive excellent training. They also have the benefit of highly trained and extremely competent GCI controllers to compensate for the F-5’s limited radar capability. These factors argue for the utility of simple aircraft in conditions that do not permit use of long-range missiles.

If one assumes that simple fighters have a vital air-to-air mission, what would their future impact be? The mission of simple aircraft would depend for success on at least two factors: adequate AWACS and/or GCI support and clear weather. Without AWACS or GCI support to identify enemy aircraft entering the battle area, simple aircraft would be forced to rely on visual methods—of limited use against small MiG-2l class aircraft—and their limited radar systems. In ideal circumstances (AWACS, GCI, visual, and on-board radar capabilities), simple aircraft could achieve successful results because of their size, high maneuverability, and the AIM-9L missile. But if communications jamming or other enemy countermeasures impaired AWACS and GCI capabilities, they would be operating at a severe handicap. Additionally, adverse weather severely limits the usefulness of these fighters. Since they are not equipped with radar missiles, F-5-class aircraft cannot perform their mission in thick multilayered clouds, and substantial cloud buildups that prevail during the winter in Europe would present a problem.

In coping with future threats, simple fighters will be at a disadvantage because they lack a long-range air-to-air missile capability. This may not be a factor after large numbers of enemy and friendly aircraft have merged, when positive visual identification is established. But prior to the merge, advanced Soviet fighters, like the Foxhound with its AA-9 missiles, will be able to engage our less sophisticated fighters without having to worry about the threat that F-l5s and F-16s with AMRAAM or other radar-guided missiles would pose.

In the area of force manageability, additional communications and ground support required by a large force of simple aircraft could easily result in confusion during large-scale scenarios. Without long-range radar capability, simple aircraft would depend heavily on AWACS and GCI support and require a proportionally higher share of information on enemy aircraft formations. This requirement could cause degraded communications as several aircraft "wait in line" for radio frequencies to transmit and receive vital information. In extreme instances, it could seriously impede the missions of other air-to-air and air-to-ground aircraft.

Problems inherent in the supply and maintenance of greater quantities of simple aircraft would not be insurmountable. However, the advantages of predicted higher reliability, fewer aircraft systems, and less complex maintenance must be weighted against the disadvantages of increases in maintenance, supply, and servicing transactions at base level. As in AWACS and GCI support, the use of large numbers of simple aircraft might contribute to a significant deterioration in turnaround capability, particularly in combat conditions; smaller quantities are always more manageable. Also, runway utilization and shelter requirements favor limited quantities of fighters. For example, additions of fighter aircraft to European bases will require construction of more facilities and structures, Particularly shelters. Thus, in terms of force manageability one reaches the inescapable conclusion that small, rather than large, increases would be better for the tactical force structure.

This conclusion is based in part on the inherently limited communication capabilities and support facilities at forward bases. But even more significant are the implications of a cost analysis conducted by the BDM Corporation. In response to a congressional request for "less complex, less expensive aircraft concepts that will increase readiness and increase numbers," the company examined the affordability of pursuing this course. The objectives of the study were to:

estimate the numbers of aircraft that could be obtained by making trade-offs among procurement costs, personnel costs, and maintenance costs, considering historical budget constraints and assess the implications that increased numbers of aircraft could have in planning future.¹⁷

The study was concerned with the number of A-l0s (low complexity) or F-l6s (medium complexity) that could have been procured, operated, and manned with the money spent on the F-15 (high complexity). It considered options of equal procurement costs, equal life-cycle costs, and constrained manpower to illustrate the effects of trading complexity for simplicity. For purposes of the analysis, the A-10, a specialized attack plane, was treated as a low-complexity general-purpose fighter.

With constant procurement costs, the study found that 72 A-10 squadrons or 48 F-16 squadrons could have been procured for the cost of 24 F-15 squadrons, a 3:2:1 ratio. These larger forces of simpler fighters would increase total requirements for manpower by 22,000 for the A-10 and 12,000 for the F-l6; the number of pilots required would increase by 1600 for the A-10 and 760 for the F-l6. Thus, the money saved in initial procurement costs would be more than consumed by the growth in total life-cycle costs in operations, support, and manpower.¹⁸

The study next held the total life-cycle cost constant to determine the quantity of fighters of low- or medium-complexity that could be procured and operated for the total life-cycle cost of the F-15. In absolute terms, $7 or $4 billion, respectively, would shift from research and development to operations and support, and manpower requirements would still exceed the requirements of the F-15 by 12,000 and 7000 extra authorizations, respectively, for the A-10 and F-16. In this option, a significant reduction would occur in the numbers of squadrons: A- 10 squadrons would be reduced from 72 to 54, and F-l6 squadrons would be reduced from 48 to 39. Thus, when the total life-cycle costs were held constant, manpower would still increase, and the ratio of simple and medium aircraft would drop significantly from 3:2:1 to 2.25:1.63:1.

The study next considered modest reductions (seven or three percent) in squadron manpower to determine how many squadrons of low- or medium-complexity fighters could be manned with the manpower limits of the F-15. Under this option, pilot authorizations would still increase by 240 for the A-10 and 117 for the F-16. Substantial reductions would occur in the numbers of squadrons: A-10 squadrons would be reduced to 30, and F-16 squadrons would be reduced to 27. Thus, when manpower was constrained, the ratio of aircraft of low- and medium-complexity would be reduced from 3:2:1 to 1.25:1.13:1.

If the cost of a simple, unsophisticated fighter proposed by quantity advocates approximates the cost of an A-10, one can reasonably assume that a ratio of approximately 1.3 simple fighters to one F-l5 could be procured, operated, and manned within congressional budgetary constraints and authorized manpower levels.¹⁹ Although this option could save $15 billion, the obvious disadvantage is the small number of "simple" fighter squadrons: approximately 30 versus 24 F-15 squadrons.

In light of this study, the idea of procuring a large force of simple fighter squadrons loses much of its attractiveness and validity. Under the option of equal life-cycle procurement costs, drastic increases in the budget and in manpower would be necessary to procure and operate an adequate number of simple fighters to match the potential of the F-15; and we are not even considering the operational problems posed by increased servicing and command and cargo support requirements noted earlier. The life-cycle option shows a substantial reduction in simple fighter squadrons, and manpower requirements would still be well above authorized levels. And under the option of constrained manpower, simple fighter squadrons would be reduced to such a low level that, despite the saving of $15 billion, tactical credibility would be a significant problem.

One might still argue that a small increase in simple aircraft to augment the current tactical force structure would be better than no increase. But would it? Despite certain advantages inherent in the F-5G, for example, one particular disadvantage stands out: it will probably lack long-range radar and AMRAAM capability. Therefore, pilots flying the F-5G would be at a serious disadvantage fighting planes like the Foxbat and Foxhound equipped with AA-9 missiles.²⁰

Future wars will certainly require that our aircraft be capable of destroying enemy air and ground forces during adverse weather and night conditions. A force of sophisticated aircraft will assure the capability of inflict heavy damages on the enemy and deny him the advantage of choosing combat conditions that preclude use of simple aircraft. Once in the combat arena, his forces will be vulnerable to sophisticated U.S. aircraft employing all-weather, long-range, standoff weapons in the air-to-air and air-to-ground roles. Obviously, simple aircraft will be vulnerable to the most advanced Soviet fighters (and advanced fighters produced in other countries and sold to potential enemies, such as the French Dassault Mirage 2000), which the enemy employs under engagement conditions that he can, to a large degree, select. Conversely, the simple fighters would lack both the lethality and survivability to function effectively in the totally modern combat environment in absolute terms, let alone in terms of dollar for dollar effectiveness, to justify turning our back on sophisticated, high technology fighters. The highest probability for achieving our tactical goals, therefore, rests with employing the full capabilities of sophisticated aircraft able to operate throughout the full spectrum of the combat arena with only minimal quantitative supplementation in several critical categories.

1. Extracted from "House Armed Services Committee Report, 96-166," 15 May 1979, p. 87.

2. General William W. Momyer, USAF, Air Power in Three Wars (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1978), pp. 948-80. Many different bombing methods were tried in Vietnam, including long-range radio navigation system (LORAN) and radar bomb directing central (MSQ). Others included F-111 all-weather, low-level strikes, B-52 saturation bombing, and numerous "smart" weapons, such as laser munitions. The MSQ system, in particular, caused strike aircraft to be "extremely vulnerable" to antiaircraft artillery and enemy SAMs because of predictable run-in headings and altitudes. Often, U.S. pilots turned their identification, friend, or foe systems off to avoid detection by enemy ground radar, with the result that friendly aircraft could not identify each other.

3. Clarence A. Robinson, "Soviets to Field 3 New Fighters in Aviation Modernization Drive," Aviation Week & Space Technology, March 26, 1979, p. 14; and John W. R. Taylor, editor, Jane’s All the World’s Aircraft 1981-82 (New York: Jane’s Incorporated, 1982), pp. 206 and 220.

4. "Industry Observer," Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 3, 1982, p. 9.

5. "Maverick Scores Seven Bullseyes, One Miss," Defense Week, August 17, 1981, p. 2. During the first phase of testing, the Maverick scored direct hits in seven of eight firings. One miss was blamed on loading error. The IIR Maverick (AGM-65D) is an imaging infrared (IIR), air-to-ground munition "that senses a thermal image of a target area and projects a television-like picture on a cockpit display." The aircrew simply locks the seeker head on the selected target and fires.

6. Erwin J. Bulban, "F-l6s Deployed to Norway for Environmental Tests," Aviation Week & Space Technology, May 11, 1981, p. 69. During the Coronet Falcon deployment to Norway by 12 F-16s of the 4th Tactical Fighter Squadron, Hill AFB, Utah, high sortie rates were achieved and a high degree of weapon accuracy was maintained throughout the deployment. Of 268 sorties, only six were aborted prior to takeoff for mechanical reasons.

7. "U.S. F-l6 Wing Captures Bombing Crown in Scotland," Defense Week, June 29, 1981, p. 11. The 388th Tactical Fighter Wing, Hill AFB, Utah, scored more than 1000 points in bombing ahead of Jaguars, Buccaneers, and F-111s at Lossiemouth, Scotland. Air-to-air competition was flown against F-4s and British Lightning interceptors.

8. See "Launch Pylon for Antisatellite System Tested," Aviation Week & Space Technology, January 18,1982, p. 19. A modified F-l5 will be used to launch a two-stage missile in an antisatellite role.

9. Hughes Aircraft Company estimates that, in conjunction with the advanced long-range AN/APG-63 radar, the Strike Eagle equipped with synthetic aperture radar and other modifications for navigation, target acquisition, and weapon delivery could operate about 95 percent of the time in a central European winter.

10. James Fallows, "America’s High-Tech Weaponry," Atlantic Monthly, May 1981, pp. 21-33.

11. Major Earl H. Tilford, Jr., "The Limits of Superiority: Air Power in Vietnam," lecture to the Air Command and Staff College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 10 February 1982.

12. David R. Griffiths, "F-15 Pilots Cite Need for New Air-to-Air," Aviation Week & Space Technology, November 2, 1981, p. 52; Information was also extracted from a USAF paper entitled "Request for Backup Information for the Defense Science Board 1981 Summer Study Panel" and other USAF point papers.

13. Coronet Eagle Executive Summary, USAF Point Paper from "Backup Information." The Coronet Eagle deployment of F-15s from Eglin AFB, Florida, to Bremgarten AB, Germany, achieved the following objectives: The AIS averaged 94.7 percent fully mission-capable, and at no time during the deployment was an aircraft grounded because of a lack of intermediate avionics support. A 3.0 sortie rate was sustained for 10 days. The readiness rate of 79.4 percent (MC) during Coronet Eagle was greater than the FY80 home-station performance of 69.3 percent (MC). All goals were exceeded.

14. Caspar W. Weinberger, "Where We Must Build—And Where We Must Cut," Defense 81, December, pp. 2-10; General Lew Allen, "The Premium on Quality," Air Force, September 1980, p. 82.

15. See John Ginovsky, "Chain: Spare Parts Getting Higher Priority," Air Force Times, August 25, 1980, p. 4.

16. Richard Barnard, "Paris Air Show," Defense Week, June8, 1981, p. 8. The F-5G will be powered by a single General Electric F-404 engine, allowing for a thrust-to-weight ratio of 1.06 to I.

17. BDM/W-80-847-TR, prepared by the BDM Corporation of McLean, Virginia, in response to House Armed Services Committee Report, 96-166, p. 5.

18. Ibid., p. 36.

19. Ibid., p. 66. The trend in personnel has been a gradual reduction in pilots from 42,000 to 25,000 since 1968. BDM concluded that the 1800 to 3600 additional pilots required to support the equal procurement and life-cycle options would "constitute a significant increase in the current and projected UPT rates" reviewed annually by Congress and that "it appears that manpower has been constrained and will remain so."

20. Griffiths, p. 52. Bitburg pilots are concerned about Soviet MiG-21/23/27 fighters and the capability of the current radar missile, the AIM-7F. The AIM-7F requires F-15 pilots to remain predictable for as long as 25 seconds after firing. In contrast, AMRAAM radar missiles will permit longer-range, "launch-and-leave"-type tactics in all-weather and night combat conditions.

Major Herbert W. Johnson (BA., University of Montana: MS., Webster College) is assigned to the 51st Combat Support Group, Republic of Korea. His previous assignments include flying the F-15 at Holloman AFB, New Mexico, and squadron commander at Laughlin AFB, Texas. Major Johnson is a graduate of Air command and Staff College. Class of 1982, where the present article was written.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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