Air University Review, July-August 1983

Base Rights Agreements

The Soviet Union today is gaining in both its capability and its will to project power into areas vital to United States interest. This growing capability, coupled with potential Soviet encroachment into crucial oil sources adjoining Afghanistan and growing turmoil in the Persian Gulf area, poses a major threat to U.S. security. Thus, it becomes essential that the United States improve its ability to project forces into these distant regions to protect national interests.

To accomplish this projection of power, the United States uses a series of agreements granting access and base rights. Necessary arrangements include guidelines governing U.S. utilization of bases; the extent of U.S. participation in mutual defense efforts; and the delineation of any compensation to make U.S. presence more palatable to consenting nations.

The task of achieving beneficial arrangements has become increasingly difficult in recent years. In general, the United States has less to offer allies in terms of either mutual defense or security assistance in return for increasing U.S. requirements.

This article examines the little known but important realm of base rights agreements. It reviews procedures, existing agreements, and recent trends and provides a framework to enhance the future value of base rights agreements to the U.S. government.

Where Are We Today?

U.S. military assistance to allies, including stationing U.S. forces on allied soil, expanded rapidly after the close of World War II. This was motivated primarily by U.S. desires to assist allied countries in resisting aggression and to further U.S. policy of global Communist containment. Communist aggression was a visible threat to allies who perceived the United States as willing to act on their behalf.

In the 1950s, the United States had an extensive system of air bases around the world, including 26 air bases with U.S. aircraft or major support units outside of NATO and Korea. By 1976, this number had shrunk to 10, with 3 of these in Spain, 6 in the Western Pacific, Japan, and the Philippines, and 1 in Cuba.² A combination of many factors--including high costs of maintaining overseas bases, technological advances making the need for some bases obsolete, increased resistance to U.S. military presence, improved military capabilities of allies, and a changing political environment--has been responsible for these drawdowns.

Today, however, the United States is seeking new overseas bases and is actively involved in negotiating several base rights agreements. For example, the United States has recently completed base rights agreements with Turkey and Spain and is currently negotiating with Greece, where we maintain an extensive network of facilities. Now the United States has a keen interest in increasing force presence in the Middle East and Persian Gulf regions. This interest has led to discussions with Somalia, Kenya, Oman, and Egypt for use of ports, airfields, and other facilities. A matrix is provided that gives a brief summary of existing base rights agreements along with some proposed arrangements that are being discussed in the press.³

How Does the
Negotiation Process Work?

In order to develop a framework to improve the future value of base rights agreements, it is helpful to be aware of some of the steps taken and items considered in preparing for negotiations. Normally, the process of negotiation begins long before country representatives convene at the bargaining table.

There is a natural tendency initially to request the ultimate position the market will bear on key issues, knowing full well that interagency reviews and subsequent bargaining will gradually deteriorate the going-in position. Early preparations and in-fighting among government agencies frequently have a major bearing on the resulting agreement.

Government agencies must consider major questions, which include:

• What are the costs and possible liabilities of having an agreement? Should we proceed with negotiations?

• What format should be used for the agreement? Should we seek to renew the existing agreement or start with an all-new concept? Should the agreement be in the form of a treaty, or can we be satisfied with a less formal executive agreement or some combination, which might not require congressional approval and can be more readily amended?

• What are the preconceived views (if any) of Congress and the White House on this agreement?

• Should the U.S. ambassador to that country be the U.S. chief negotiator, or should a special emissary be chosen to avoid creating an adversarial relationship for the ambassador that would diminish his later effectiveness?

• What political objectives does the United States hope to achieve in this agreement? Will a military force presence in this country have value beyond that of its military capability (e.g., as a "trip-wire" strategy, display of U.S. commitment, etc.)?

• What are the facility and operational requirements for the U.S. military?⁹

• What are the political, economic, and military needs and expectations of the ally in this negotiation? What discontent has the ally expressed with the previous agreement?

• What quid pro quo might we be able to offer to achieve U.S. objectives in light of congressional and administration policies and other existing and future agreements? What agreement will be most effective and likely to be approved in terms of bargaining—foreign military sales (FMS) credits, Military Assistance Programs (MAPs), if available, economic aid, defense-industrial cooperation, special projects, or sweeteners, etc.?

In the next step, an interagency working group seeks to discover a logical pattern emerging from the various agency positions. Eventually, the group begins to plan tactics for negotiations, when tactics, objectives, and policies converge, the State Department drafts a document called a Circular 175, which furnishes negotiators with their broad guidance for conducting negotiations.

By this time there probably have been several informal and formal discussions between various government officials. Public statements made by high-level officials also bear heavily on the impending talks. It is frequently difficult to decipher which positions are posturing and which positions are hard and fast.

Eventually, formal talks begin, initially to discuss protocol and procedures and finally to exchange draft positions on major issues. At this point, the tedious yet all-important bargaining and compromise processes begin. These processes may well bring about a document suitable to govern the relationship between our two countries for the term of the agreement.

What Trends Affect
Base Rights Agreements?

By tracing the trends in U.S. and allied basing agreements since World War II, we gain a better perspective of what we can hope to achieve in future agreements. United States strategy for stationing forces overseas evolved from the World War II strategy of "global containment" to one of "regional partnership."¹⁰ This latter strategy was implied in President Nixon’s Guam Doctrine (26 July 1969) and later refined and restated on 18 February 1970 in the President’s Report on Foreign Relations.

The strategy of "regional partnership," in my opinion, was aimed at diminishing a predominant American role in regional affairs, while assisting individual nations to develop their capabilities to assume their own political, economic, and military burdens. However, few visible signs of redeployments or increased aid have resulted from this change in strategy. Although the Carter administration appeared to be following this strategy when forces stationed in Korea were to be withdrawn, recent events in Afghanistan and the Persian Gulf area (as well as later force decisions for Korea) attest to a strategy closer to "global containment" being followed once again.

The relatively recent basing agreements with the Philippine, Korean, Turkish, and Spanish governments and the trends seen thus far in preparation for the Greek talks serve as useful examples for a more detailed analysis of negotiating trends. First, we find that Congress continues to rule out committing the United States to mutual defense pacts with allies. This is exemplified in the Spanish-American Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation signed in Madrid on 24 January 1976. The Spanish government at that time wanted to join NATO (which proved impossible because of certain NATO members’ assured rejection of a Franco-led Spain) or arrive at a mutual defense pact with the United States (which members of Congress indicated would be rejected early on). However, five years later, we found NATO willing to allow a somewhat-more-reluctant Spain to join her numbers. Fortunately, Spain’s entry into NATO removed the necessity for a bilateral defense pact with the United States.

Congressional budget concerns and the desire to weigh in heavily on all monetary issues have brought about a virtual end to the multiyear commitments of security-assistance funds to allies. These commitments are eagerly sought by allies as terms for successful base rights agreements. In their place we find, as evidenced in the Korean, Philippine, Turkish, and Spanish agreements, what are referred to as "best efforts" agreements.

In these instances, the United States is committed to use its "best efforts" to provide defense and economic support (economic aid, defense materials, services, and training) for the government involved, subject to the annual authorizations and appropriations contained in United States Security Assistance Legislation. These "best efforts" agreements contain no pledge of specific economic or military assistance, although it is recognized that assistance levels in effect at the time of the signing of the agreement are expected to be met or bettered in subsequent years. In fact, President Carter acknowledged this expectation in his letter to President Ferdinand Marcos, following the signing of the Philippine Agreement; this letter listed assumed levels of assistance for future years.

The "best efforts" agreements are clearly based on trust between the United States and the country involved—trust that the United States will sincerely honor its obligations to assist in the ensuing years of the agreement. However, failure of the United States to allocate funds at the level the ally perceives as being our "best effort" would probably lead to abrogation of the agreement or at least to restrictions on previously agreed-on U.S. rights. Concern for satisfying allied expectations is evidenced in a recent news article that stated:

Both administration and congressional indicators point to a greatly reduced grant aid program for allies. Although economic aid grants might be possible in the future, the military grants, formerly highly effective in winning support from allied military establishments for U.S. base rights concessions, appear to be politically unsavory. These Military Assistance Program (MAP) funds, although only a fraction of the security assistance extended to countries, have allowed recipient allies additional benefits, such as free access to surplus defense materials.

Other trends affecting base rights agreements strike at the operational flexibility and utility of overseas facilities. U.S. desires to move troops rapidly into distant areas such as the Persian Gulf have highlighted what many believe is an inadequacy in most base rights agreements with NATO allies. Present agreements with our allies generally grant the United States the right to use facilities only for purposes in support of alliance missions, unless we are granted permission on a case-by-case basis. In instances where oil-producing nations are involved in our usage desires, allies have become increasingly circumspect in granting approval, fearing reprisals that might greatly harm their oil-dependent economies.

Countries with which the United States conducts base rights negotiations tend toward an increasing adversarial relationship. These countries are strongly motivated by growing economic problems and rising public concerns over national sovereignty. These concerns, coupled with comparisons of U.S. proposals to agreements with other nations, have led countries to seek greater compensation in base rights agreements. Compensation is manifested in various forms, including a greater concern for the growth of national defense industries. Countries wish to escape from heavy dependency on the United States for assured defense-supply support. This goal weighed heavily in the U.S.-Turkish negotiations, where the Turks sought to ensure that they would never again find themselves in the supply predicament in part resulting from the U.S. arms embargo. Growing from this is the Supplementary Agreement (Number 2) on Defense Industrial Cooperation between the United States and Turkey, which appears to have set a pattern for future negotiations with other allies.

Hosting nations are increasingly motivated to scrutinize the types of activities that the United States wishes to perform. There is greater concern that U.S. activities not endanger relations with third-party nations, on whose economic and political goodwill allies may depend. National constraints have run the gamut of being cosmetic in nature (e.g., limiting the display of the U.S. flag on bases) to placing ceilings on the number of troops and weapon systems allowed in the country. However, the United States similarly places restrictions on allies, which further hamper relations. In a recent news article, Lars-Erik Nelson shows how the United States will often make it difficult for a potential ally to be our friend:

With the Soviet Union, it all seems much simpler. An Arab leader who casts his fate with the Kremlin can count on arms supplies that do not depend on his observance of human rights. He will undergo no scrutiny in congressional hearings or have an Israeli lobby opposing his requests. And, if he declares himself to be a Communist, as have the leaders of South Yemen, he can bank on Soviet armed support to keep him in power.¹²

A recent Library of Congress Report emphasizes the need for an improved approach to base rights negotiations. This report states an all-important first step:

. . . changing circumstances, combined with declining military manpower and strong budget pressures, pose, a tremendous challenge. The Executive Branch and the Congress must work together to insure the development of a base policy which recognizes and deals with the new political realities of the world, and makes the best possible use of our available military resources. We must be prepared to examine all of our deployments to make certain that we are prepared to deal with a new decade which will be fraught with challenge.¹³

U.S. efforts should be focused on creating a mutual alliance spirit, planning ahead, thinking big, and seeking a better quid pro quo.

How Do We Create a
Mutual Alliance Spirit?

First, the United States must cultivate a greater mutual alliance atmosphere with those countries on which we are dependent for base rights. We must be particularly careful to build up trust in the negotiation process and avoid abrasive posturing and overly constraining language in our agreement texts. We should be aware that allies are very knowledgeable of what we are doing with other nations. We must seek fair and consistent policies.

The point which Roland Paul makes in his book American Military Commitments Abroad needs to be impressed on U.S. allies—that the stationing of American troops in another country is a far more visible and credible security guarantee than any written document.¹⁴

In my opinion, those nations that have served us well should be visibly rewarded as a matter of policy. Assistance should be viewed as an outgrowth of concern for an ally’s need, not as a requirement imposed by an agreement which must be followed but never exceeded. This policy favors continuing the "best efforts" approach to defense and economic support; however, the United States must dutifully honor these commitments in subsequent years. Our aid must be timely in assisting before situations requiring more funds and before animosity over U.S. inaction have grown. The United States needs to create a history of good-faith bargaining both to strengthen existing alliances and to enable us to establish new alliances that will benefit U.S. interests.

How Do We Plan Ahead?
—Think Big

Once a basing policy has been resolved between the Executive Branch and Congress, defense planners must begin the arduous implementation of this policy into future plans. A large number of factors affecting basing and facility requirements must be considered. These factors include technological developments in long-range airlift capabilities and new means of accomplishing intelligence surveillance.

Justification for operational requirements must be based on future, not historic, needs and must correspond to the accepted basing policy. This does not imply that only operational requirements will be considered when evaluating basing needs. An abrupt U.S. withdrawal of forces, for example, could give dangerous signals not only to our allies but to threatening nations as well.

Planners should evaluate basing requirements by looking at the needs within an entire region and not focus on the singular negotiation at hand. Investigating requirements in a larger forum might disclose economies of scale that could lead to more effective accomplishment of missions with long-range cost savings. Development of a major training range in one country might resolve an irritating training problem in a neighboring country; too visible forces in one nation might be eagerly sought by neighboring countries desiring United States presence and the associated economic benefits. Flexibility lost through diminution of some facilities might easily be compensated for by an ability to concentrate U.S. resources in those countries which truly want our forces stationed there and whose support can be relied on when needed.

Planners should develop primary and backup patterns of access and overflight rights that will correspond to contingency needs. Then the United States should be willing to commit itself to those allies who are key to ensuring our major interests.

How Can the United States
Obtain a Better Quid Pro Quo?

Congress and the Executive Branch have been frustrated over the means to provide compensation required to consummate base agreements with an ally. Both economic and security-assistance funds are frequently offered in hope of effecting a resolution favorable to U.S. interests. These interests have sometimes failed to be met because of our past inabilities to furnish timely or sufficient aid. At the same time, it is important not to consider this aid as rent, a term that both the Executive Branch and our allies find politically inappropriate when dealing with an agreement governing mutual defense needs. Countries, such as Turkey, while suffering severe economic upheaval, still fail to meet congressionally imposed criteria for approving military grant aid (a valuable form of compensation that we have dispensed more freely in previous years). In such cases, extending foreign military sales credit to financially burdened countries merely heaps future debts on the country, further encumbering the economy.

Some reward could take the form not only of military and economic grant funds (under a more liberal qualification criterion) but could also consist of debt forgiveness, no-interest loans, or increased defense-industrial cooperation. In all likelihood, this latter form of compensation (defense-industrial cooperation) will be more actively pursued in upcoming negotiations, particularly in the more industrialized countries of Europe. However, the probability for sufficient industrial cooperation is not likely, and allied interest will soon dwindle unless U.S. policies and laws regarding "buy national" and arms transfers are changed, especially for those countries outside of NATO.

The United States should consider a broad set of measures to enhance defense-industrial cooperation efforts, including establishing incentive programs for U.S. businesses encouraging more capable allies to join with us in assisting less industrially developed allies. The United States should examine existing restrictive policies and laws affecting the procurement of supplies and equipment from allies and review present policies governing third country transfer of products made with U.S. components. (This latter issue has been pointed out as a substantial obstacle to cooperation in the development and production of weapon systems for NATO.)¹⁵ With these improved means of compensating for allied concessions, we would greatly increase our tools for designing better base rights agreements.

"Rights" Action—Right Now!

United States government requirements for a stable structure of overseas basing rights have increased greatly in the last year. Growing Soviet encroachment, coupled with Middle East upheaval, severely threaten U.S. vital interests. We must improve our overall approach to base rights agreements if we are to satisfy future as well as existing basing demands for U.S. forces overseas. Long-range regional evaluations could disclose future economies for the U.S. basing structure. U.S. negotiators have been disarmed by congressional decisions to eliminate further grants of military aid to our allies. We must develop assistance packages which can be used to help persuade skeptical allies that it is in their self-interest to allow the United States access to facilities within their country. This persuasion can only be accomplished if our allies are convinced of sincere U.S. concern for their national security. We must demonstrate this concern not only in words but also in monetary-security assistance. Increasing allied desires for building up their own defense industries must be dealt with in defense-industrial cooperation agreements with the United States. We must scrutinize current U.S. laws and arms-transfer policies toward ridding them of self-serving restrictions and making them truly cooperative in nature.

Any recommendation to enhance future base rights agreements is doomed to failure without the Congress and the Executive Branch’s first agreeing on a positive basing policy for the United States. If agreement is achieved and support for this policy is forthcoming, then progress in basing agreements can follow. As previously stated, what is primary to any agreement is the attitude of governments. We must have consistent foreign policies that focus on the long-range needs of our allies. With such policies, we can correct the perception of diminishing U.S. commitment and thus combat resultant allied reluctance and satisfy U.S. requirements.

1. Statement made by U. Alexis Johnson before the Symington Subcommittee hearings on Japan, January 1970.

2. P. M. Dadant, "Shrinking International Airspace as a Problem for Future Air Movements—A Briefing," Rand Report, R-2178, January 1978, pp. 1-2.

3. Most of the information provided is found in the report "United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations," prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Divisions, Library of Congress, April 1979.

4. Department of Defense, Comptroller’s Office, Table P309A, "Active Duty Military Personnel Strengths by Regional Area and by Country," June 30, 1980.

5. Many benefits accrue to both the United States and the host nation which might not be specifically mentioned in a base rights agreement. These benefits can be political, economic, or military and may or may not be designated in separate documents such as Memorandums of Understanding, Trade Agreements, and less formal understandings.

6. "Portugal: U.S. Base Negotiations," Defense and Foreign Affairs Daily, September 17, 1980, p. 1.

7. Gary L. Maris, "International Law and Guantanamo, "Journal of Politics, March 1967, p. 262.

8. George C. Wilson, "Egypt Base Could Cost $400 Million," Washington Post, August 26, 1980, p. 1.

9. The complexity of determining facility and operational requirements is expressed in the report, "United States Foreign Policy Objectives and Overseas Military Installations," prepared for the Committee on Foreign Relations, United States Senate, by the Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Library of Congress, April 1979, p. III:

Overseas facilities must be constructed over long periods of time and tend to become self-perpetuating. On the other hand, US foreign policy is evolutionary, and capable of dramatic change to reflect international developments. Accordingly, without regular and comprehensive review, there is a danger that US foreign bases will reflect historic, rather than current and emerging needs. The result, at worst, could be a facade of military power which was, in fact, no longer relevant to American foreign policy objectives and even, in some cases, counterproductive.

10. Ibid., pp. 2-3.

11. Henry Fairlie, "America’s Alliances: The Issue We Ignore," Washington Post, October 19, 1980, p. Cl.

12. Lars-Erik Nelson, "In the Persian Gulf, U.S. Hunts for Allies," New York Daily News, October 19, 1980, p. 33.

13. Foreign Affairs and National Defense Division, Library of Congress Report, April 1979, p. III.

14. Roland A. Paul, American Military Commitments Abroad (New Brunswick, New Jersey: Rutgers University Press, 1973).

15. "NATO and Western Security in the 1980’s: The European Perception," Report of a Staff Study Mission to Seven NATO Countries and Austria (January 2-18, 1980), to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, U.S. House of Representatives, Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, April 9, 1980, p. 36.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas C. Suter (BA., William Jewell College; M.B.A., Missouri University) is Defense Exchange Officer in the State Department’s Office of European Security and Political Affairs (EUR/RPM). He has held positions as Special Assistant for Southern Europe, Office of Secretary of Defense, and research associate at the Institute of War and Peace Studies, Columbia University.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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