Air University Review, September-October 1982

Israeli Military Strategy Up to the Yom Kippur War

It was on 7 October 1973, the second day of the Yom Kippur War, when Israeli Minister of Defense Moshe Dayan said:

We are in the most critical hour since the day we reestablished the new nation. The war is almost lost for us.¹

The day before at 1400 hours, the Egyptians and Syrians had staged surprise attacks on Israel’s two main fronts, the Suez Canal in the south and the Golan Heights in the north. Israeli fortifications and the forces that manned them to protect the borders were no match for the invading forces and collapsed under classic Soviet tactics. The initial assault relied heavily on artillery and air-delivered weapons, both forms of heavy firepower, followed by a rapid advance of massed armor.

Morale among Israeli pilots in the fighter squadrons that day was not much better than that of their leaders. In the morning of the preceding day, it was already known that war would break out that afternoon. The young pilots were eager to prove their skill in real combat. They had heard much about the achievements of the more experienced pilots during the previous wars. On the morning of 6 October, the chief topic of discussion: Who in the squadron is most likely to become the "ace" of the predicted war?

Bad news describing the situation along our own front lines penetrated the "warfog" and spread everywhere. Attempts early in the conflict to support the ground forces with elements of the Air Force seemed to us a desperate measure. The enemies’ various surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) were to cause us many casualties, and we could not be optimally effective under these combat conditions. Actually, we had planned to support the ground battle at a later stage of the action, but not until we had already cleared the area of operation of hostile SAM sites. The Israeli Air Force Commander at that time, Major General Benjamin Peled, described it after the war:

Instead of carrying out air defense suppression operations in an ordinary manner, we rightly preferred to break them in the period between other things more important at that time.²

Thus, it was definitely clear that our fundamental strategic concepts developed as a direct result of the failure of the Six-Day War. The "Deterrence Strategy" and the "Static Defense Strategy" proved to be inadequate for the new politico-military situation facing Israel on the eve of the Yom Kippur War. As General Giulio Douhet wrote in 1921:

Victory smiles upon those who anticipate the changes in the character of war, not upon those who wait to adapt themselves after the changes occur.³

My examination here is of the evolution of these two incompatible strategic concepts that led Israel to the brink of disaster in the Yom Kippur War, without engaging in a full discussion of the turning point that occurred later on, when the strategy was changed, and, as Douhet said, "Victory smiled" again for the Israeli leaders and the pilots as well. I will concentrate mainly on the Israeli Air Force’s part in the development of the military strategy process.

The Israeli War of Independence in 1948 did not provide Israel with strategic depth. The war was conducted in its primary stages in a predominantly defensive mode to break the enemy attacks without significant loss of Israeli territory. Logic would have dictated that this primary stage be followed by an offensive mode designed to destroy enemy forces and occupy additional territory for a subsequent political negotiation. Such was not the case, but this is hindsight. The war left Israel lacking in strategic depth and thus vulnerable to attack. Israeli leaders became progressively concerned in the 1950s that Arab forces might mount a preemptive strike. Such a strike could cut the ten-mile-wide nation into two parts before forces could deploy for defense. This assessment dictated a new philosophy that adopted the strategy of the offensive in the initial stages of conflict, relying on approval of the resulting borders among members of the international community. The offensive stage would have to be carried out by preemptive Israeli strike whenever an enemy showed any intention and willingness to attack. Defense would thus have a secondary nature under this new strategy. In addition, the purpose of such a preventive war would be to fight it on the enemy’s own territory rather than ours. In this period the international community could and would accept such a realistic scenario in which Israel would attack first. It is interesting to read the observation of Mohammed Hassaning Haykal, the editor of Al Ahram (Cairo):

The limited depth of Israel does not allow the broad freedom of movement which a modern war demands. Moreover, the socio-economic structure of Israel, still at the development stage, cannot withstand the battle wounds or painful strikes on Israeli soil. The war must be a blitzkrieg. Israel’s potential in manpower, as well as her economic potential cannot withstand a protracted war.⁴

As a result of this strategy, a revolution in the structure of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) took place. The major change was an increase in the strength of the offensive elements in the force structure. Aircraft, armored units, and parachute troops were added, and the warning system— the intelligence agency—was strengthened. IDF commanders in those days accepted Montgomery’s adage that you must first win the battle of the air before starting a land engagement. Furthermore, they realized the significance of full domination of the air over enemy territory for close air support and interdiction missions as well.

The importance planners gave to the Israeli Air Force (IAF) caused a revision of its strategy. Top priority was given to air superiority, and a new doctrine was adopted. Actually, it was based on a very important part of General Douhet’s 1921 philosophy in which he emphasized the preemptive strike:

Everyone agrees that the characteristics of the air arm make it the one weapon which will go into action first, in fact perhaps even before war is formally declared. For this reason the air arm should always be ready to mobilize and to deploy.⁵

The paucity of resources at Israel’s disposal dictated that the backbone of the IAF must be multipurpose fighters, for such aircraft are capable of undertaking both air combat and bombing missions. This concept has been followed since that time in acquiring aircraft for the Israeli Air Force.

The Sinai Campaign in 1956 and especially the Six-Day War in 1967 proved that for national and military strategies, the IDF and IAF doctrines were fitted together to carry out the national objectives of those years. Unfortunately, we cannot say the same about the strategic evolution that took place in the period following the Six-Day War and leading up to the Yom Kippur War.

The expansion of the Israeli borders as the result of the 1967 war provided her for the first time with real strategic depth, particularly with regard to Egypt. This resulting depth caused decision-makers to conclude that a preemptive war for protecting the country was not necessary, at least against Egypt. In addition, the political climate in Israel at that time would not support a preemptive strike. The world community that had been accustomed to regarding Israel as the "brave little David" had come to see us as the "bad Goliath" who keeps neighbors’ occupied lands. The Israeli national objective in those days was to retain all the territories until the Arabs would agree to negotiate with us on a peace agreement.

Those conditions and objectives brought decision-makers to the conclusion to reverse the military strategy from offensive-defensive to defensive-offensive. According to the new strategy, defensive forces were to dig in on the front lines in order to break any enemy attack. The second stage would come later by reserve forces mobilized in order to carry out the counterattack. A new term crept into Israeli military jargon: stiff static defense, which was defined as protecting the borders from static positions on the front lines themselves, without giving up any territory to the enemy.

During the War of Attrition between 1969 and 1970, Israeli forces operated under this stiff defense strategy. The nature of the strategy iself obliged us to build shelters and fortifications along these lines so the territory could be protected without suffering too many casualties. Later, when the number of casualties had increased beyond what had been anticipated, the IAF was factored into the equation as airborne artillery, targeted against Egyptian artillery batteries, shelters, etc.

With full domination of the air, which could be maintained because of the weakness of the Egyptian pilots and Egyptian lack of sophisticated surface-to-air missiles, the IAF could support the ground forces very effectively. The appearance of various SAMs at the end of the War of Attrition added a new dimension to the air command campaign and changed the scenario entirely. Nevertheless, the basic idea remained the same as in 1921 when General Douhet wrote:

The command of the air provides whoever possesses it with the advantages of protecting all his own land and sea territory from enemy aerial offensives and at the same time of subjecting the enemy’s territory to his own offensive.⁶

Now a new term came into the IAF jargon: fighters versus missiles dogfight.

Since the SAM had to be attacked from the air, this negated IAF participation in the stiff static defense. In such a situation, the defense must necessarily rely on the ground troops and mobilization of reserve forces. Thus, our military strategy became inflexible and our ability to respond conditioned by others’ actions. Lacking a more original alternative, Israel adopted the concept of deterrence. This entailed the acquisition of many aircraft and other offensive weapons integrated to form the elements of deterrence.

Thus, we felt strong, but did our efforts at deterrence really affect our enemies’ perceptions? As we can see in Professor Henry Kissinger’s "deterrence formula,"

Deterrence requires a combination of power, the will to use it, and the assessment of these by the potential aggressor. Deterrence is a product of these factors not a sum. If any part is zero, deterrence fails.⁷

Although we had a strong military force structure, we lacked the other necessary components of the formula: offensive objectives, a comfortable political situation, and the will to use the power. We know for certain that the Israeli deterrence concept was denied when we read Egyptian President Anwar el-Sadat’s statement:

The Israeli enemy has opted, as we can see, for a policy based on intimidation, on claiming a superiority, which the Arabs could never hope to check. This is the Israeli security theory, which relies on psychological, political and military deterrence.⁸

On the eve of the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli deterrence concept was more an illusion than a reality. The stiff defense strategy was overly optimistic as well. It was based on perfect and fully credible intelligence and very rapid reserve mobilization. There were no viable contingencies to fall back on if any element in the strategy failed to function less than perfectly. Israeli military commanders were quite simply locked into this strategic mode that had worked reasonably well in the War of Attrition. Nevertheless, this stiff static defense strategy no longer fit the Israeli force structure, which under the deterrence concept was now structured primarily to operate in an offensive mode. This lack of congruence between the stiff static strategy and that of deterrence was bad enough. Add to this the enemies’ acquisition of various multiple sophisticated SAM systems and the situation for Israel had become potentially disastrous. As Major General Haywood S. Hansell so aptly said:

No greater or more dangerous mistake could be made than to assume that the same policies and practices that won one war will be sufficient to win the next one.⁹

These two mistakes in strategy placed Israel in its most difficult and dangerous hours since the reestablishment of the Jewish state. Recovery from this terrible situation could come only when we changed our strategy during the war to one that fit our force structure and potential for action.

As we have seen, the deterrence concept on the part of Israel in the period leading up to the Yom Kippur War was not quite realistic, essentially from a political point of view, and, therefore, failed. We can also conclude that the stiff defense strategy of positioning defensive forces on the front lines was no longer suitable to the Israeli force structure in light of the newer deterrence concept. This concept in itself was flawed because it lacked credibility in the eyes of those it was intended to deter. On the other hand, the stiff defense strategy was itself too complex, requiring the perfect functioning of each element: a timely, credible intelligence warning, a rapid mobilization of the reserves, and integration of air power in support of ground forces. This had to occur at a time when the air arm was facing a technologically advanced high-threat environment.

Retrospect shows that deployment of the Air Force in the stiff defense strategy was no longer a viable way to use this primarily offensive weapon. In the situation facing the air arm during the War of Attrition, prior to the appearance of the various multiple SAM batteries, the Air Force operated with relative efficiency. The appearance of this new counterair threat revealed the inefficiency of integrating the Air Force in the stiff defense strategy unless the SAMs are destroyed. More than this, assuming that the Air Force had successfully destroyed the SAMs, it still would not have been quite so effective if this action were not combined with the ground battle. In other words, it is worthwhile to grind your Air Force down against SAMs to gain air superiority only when it opens new opportunities for the ground battle. Our shifting from these fundamental principles in the beginning of the Yom Kippur War caused us to become confused and even bitter toward the decision-makers.

What should have been done? Probably three things would have helped:

• Increasing strategic flexibility by planning and training for some more alternate contingencies,

• Changing the stiff defense strategy along the border with Egypt to one of mobility in which ground forces could utilize the strategic depth to wage an agile, maneuverable defense,

• Giving the Israeli Air Force sufficient time and ground support to accomplish the air superiority objective after the decision had been made about the ground offensive in the north against Syria.

Finally, the primary conclusion drawn from the Yom Kippur War is that the principles of air power employment remained as valid as at any time before, but the strategies and doctrines to carry them out should have been sufficiently flexible to contain a "bank of solutions" for the changing situations a modern war brings.

The future will certainly present more difficulties in the employment of air power, mainly a result of the enemy’s employment of mobile and highly maneuverable air defense missile systems. Only those ready to change strategies and doctrines during the ebb and flow of a fast-paced, intensely technological modern war will have any expectation of coming out as the winner.

Notes

1. Hanoch Bartov, Daddo, Mariv, vol. 2. (Hebrew) (Tel-Aviv, December 1978), p. 63.

2. Lieutenant Colonel Giora Goren, Israeli Air Force, "Air Supremacy and the Principle of War," Air War College paper, 1980, p. 2.

3. Giulio Douhet, The Command of the Air (London, 1973), p. 19.

4. Mohammed H. Haykal, "The Arab War Aims," New Outlook, October-November 1973, p. 20.

5. Douhet, p. 113.

6. Ibid., p. 82.

7. Henry Kissinger, The Necessity for Choice, Prospects of American Policies (New York, 1961), p. 18.

8. Anwar el-Sadat, In Search of Identity (New York, 1977), p. 326.

9. Haywood S. Hansell, "US Air Doctrine and Strategy, World War II, Pacific," lecture delivered at the Air War College, Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 11 January 1977.

Lieutenant Colonel Amnon Gurion, a native of Israel, has been in the Israeli Air Force since 1964. He is a fighter pilot with F-4 and Kfir C2 experience. Colonel Gurion has flown in every Israeli conflict since 1967 and served as a squadron commander, Colonel Gurion is a graduate of the Israeli Command and Staff College and a Distinguished Graduate of the USAF Air War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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