Air University Review, November-December 1982

Aerospace Strategy in the Postnulcear Age

Two events in the twentieth century have profoundly changed the nature of warfare and the corresponding strategies and tactics developed to fight wars. The first event was the introduction of the airplane. The second was the development of nuclear weapons. The world is now poised on the verge of a third change that will, once again, significantly alter the way nations engage in battle. Quite simply, this third change will affect the combat environment as well as the lethality of the weapons used in combat. It is a change that will thrust the world into the postnuclear age of warfare. The characteristics of this age and how aerospace strategy must be structured to cope with it are discussed herein.

The scope of my analysis is purposely limited to aerospace strategy in this postnuclear age for three reasons. First, the major environmental changes will take place in the aerospace medium, specifically outer space. Second, it is quite likely that aerospace forces could suffer the most if they are unprepared for the postnuclear age. Conversely—and this is the third reason—aerospace forces appear to be able to profit the most in the postnuclear age if they properly exploit the characteristics of this new age with sound strategic and tactical doctrine.

The postnuclear age will not dawn on the world in a sudden or dramatic fashion. It will be an evolutionary, rather than revolutionary, occurrence. The seeds of this evolution were sown years ago when man first began the exploration of space, on the one hand, and began to think beyond nuclear weapons as the ultimate destructive force, on the other. These two distinct processes appear to be rapidly approaching each other, and their convergence will mark the true beginning of the postnuclear age.

The combat environment of the postnuclear age will be greatly expanded from today’s environment. No longer will armies, navies and, particularly, air forces be confined to land, sea, and inner space to fight wars. While used in only a very limited sense today—primarily as a medium through which intercontinental ballistic missile warheads travel and intelligence satellites orbit—outer space will become a battleground. Space will take on two very distinct characteristics when used in this manner. First, complete military campaigns, divorced from land, sea, or inner space campaigns, will be fought in space with a variety of weapons (and coincident strategies and tactics) not yet developed. Vast numbers of men and amounts of materiel will be involved in such campaigns. In addition, any nation with a technological advantage will be able to exploit this environment to its fullest. Yet these outer space battles and complete campaigns will have a profound effect on the overall course of the total war because of the second manner in which outer space will be used. Space will become a medium from which military campaigns can be launched against the land, sea, and inner space environments as well as serving as a monitoring platform to coordinate a nation’s overall war effort. Thus, if outer space is viewed as a force multiplier, the nation that wins the campaign in outer space in the first instance can control the multiplier effect of this environment in the second instance. In effect, the "victor" can deny an entire combat environment to an enemy and use that environment to its advantage.

In the final analysis, the expansion of the combat environment into space effectively expands warfare from three to four distinct environments. Failure to develop weapons, strategies, and tactics to cope with and beneficially exploit this new environment puts any nation at a decided disadvantage and forebodes disaster in the other three traditional environments.

The second major change that will characterize the postnuclear age is centered on the lethality of weapons. The harnessing of nuclear power for military purposes will no longer be seen as the ultimate weapon. An entire array of weapons exists beyond the nuclear realm, some of which (such as lasers) are just beginning to be exploited. In effect, many current, technologically advanced (by today’s standards) weapon systems will be rendered useless by heretofore unknown weapon systems that depend on technologies just now being or not yet discovered. This is not to suggest that warfare in the near future (at least this century) will approach that popularized by recent futuristic movies and books. What it does suggest, though, is a recognition that future weapon systems will be fundamentally different from today’s and that the lethality of these weapons will be of a magnitude that is currently almost incomprehensible. Destruction will be nearly instantaneous. No longer will several sorties be needed to destroy a crucial target; one accurately placed energy beam, free of the radiological side effects of nuclear weapons, will be all that is necessary. Charged-particle beams and killer satellites will become a reality. And this reality will radically alter what we now know as the modern-day battlefield. This, in turn, implies that the entire composition of force structures must change, requiring a massive redirection of human energy and material resources. So, too, must strategies and tactics change to cope adequately with these new force structures. One without the other will not suffice.

This, then, is what will characterize the postnuclear age. How each nation successfully exploits this age is of utmost importance to the future of the world. Yet this exploitation is dependent on the successful development and implementation of coherent and well-articulated national defense strategies. One crucial strategy is the one that will direct the procurement and employment of aerospace forces.

Aerospace strategy in the post-nuclear age must be formulated on several broad assumptions that are intellectually sound and realistic yet take into account the unpredictability of the future. Several of these assumptions are apparent today.

First, the aerospace arena of the postnuclear age will be inexorably linked to the land and sea environments. Thus, aerospace strategy cannot be designed as a self-contained, all-encompassing one that ignores its relationship to land and sea strategies. All three must interact harmoniously if the development of an overall American defense strategy is to be successful.

The second and third assumptions are based on the fact that the aerospace medium contains two submedia—inner space and outer space. The distinction between the two is critical. Inner space refers to what is commonly thought of as today’s aerospace battleground where conventionally powered aircraft operate. Outer space refers to an area beyond the stratosphere where aircraft behave according to the laws of orbital dynamics. The second assumption, then, is that aerospace strategy must be designed to successfully exploit both submedia, while the third assumption is that an overall aerospace strategy must incorporate the interaction between the two submedia. In this way, while different medium strategies can be developed, they will be successfully integrated to allow for an aerospace strategy that exploits the entire spectrum of the aerospace environment.

Fourth, technology will continue to play an important role in any future military strategy. History is replete with examples of technology supplying the winning margin of victory in battle. Even today the United States relies on technology a great deal—some say too much— to offset the sheer numerical superiority of the Soviet Union in both conventional and nuclear arms. While it is not altogether clear that superior technology can compensate for numerical inferiority, it is clear that a nation’s failure to exploit technology at all, whether numerically inferior or superior, is a grave error that can only lead to disaster. What this means for aerospace strategy is twofold. First, strategy must consider the effect technology will have on its implementation. Second, strategy must attempt to anticipate future technological advances and be flexible enough to incorporate these advances over the long run. Failure in either will mean that strategy is out of touch with technology, and ignorance of major technological breakthroughs could have a profound effect on warfare. Yet one word of caution is needed: the development of advanced weapon technology solely for technology’s sake must be avoided. Needed technology is what must be developed.

Finally, no military strategy of any type will ever be totally divorced from political coloration. Quite simply, politics, on both the domestic and international levels, must be considered when formulating military strategy. The reasons are quite obvious. Especially in a democracy, the use of military force is but one instrument of a nation’s overall arsenal of weapons, weapons that are used as a means to achieve a definite set of national political objectives. These objectives are the bedrock on which the strategies that direct the employment of various military weapons are based. Therefore, it follows that none of these strategies should conflict with these national political objectives but rather should be designed to help meet them. This can occur only if political considerations are taken into account when formulating military strategy.

If it is to be useful in the postnuclear age, future aerospace strategy should have several specific characteristics. Foremost among these is flexibility, which takes three distinct forms.

First is the need for aerospace strategy to be able to adapt to changing conditions in the aerospace environment of both inner and outer space. The exploitation of both and the interaction between the two can occur only if changes in the media are recognized and incorporated into aerospace strategy. No longer can a new capability in one medium be divorced from its effects in another medium. Thus, overall aerospace strategy must be flexible, not just that part of the strategy dealing with one medium or a new capability.

Second, aerospace strategy must be politically flexible. This is not to suggest that every change in the political outlook of the various parts of our national government must be immediately reflected in aerospace strategy. Rather, strategy must be responsive to the political climate of the nation and reflect this in its design. Obvious parts of this climate include budgetary constraints, both in relation to other defense organizations as well as nondefense parts of the government, bureaucratic constraints, and public opinion. This is important because, as a military instrument of the national will, the Air Force is simply a servant of the American people and their government. It follows that the service must be responsive to the people’s needs, and this can best be accomplished by incorporating these parts of the political climate into future aerospace strategy.

Finally, aerospace strategy must be technologically flexible, embodying needed technological changes to enhance the employment of aerospace forces. Yet here one must be careful not to allow technology to dictate strategy. The distinction is crucial. If every technological advance is immediately built into a weapon system or a totally new weapon system is built, then the Air Force might find itself with a system that has no use in current aerospace doctrine. Given the budgetary and political pressures present in American society, the choice of not using the new system or designing a modified strategy to include the system is really no choice at all. The latter course would ultimately be followed but could be nonbeneficial for a number of reasons. The most important is that, taken over a period of time, the modification of strategy to incorporate several technologically advanced weapon systems could produce a strategy lacking in coherence, with each system having its own ministrategy to justify its existence but no overall strategic "game plan." Instead, strategy should be flexible enough to incorporate needed technological changes. In this way, strategy will continue to dictate the judicious use of technology rather than vice versa.

This concept of the judicious use of technology leads to the second characteristic—a technologically advanced aerospace strategy. A technologically flexible strategy refers to strategy being adaptive enough to incorporate needed technological advances and changes. A technologically advanced strategy refers to the fact that the technology chosen for use in aerospace strategy be advanced enough to prevent technological surprise (by a potential adversary) or technological backwardness (on our part). Thus, the first concept is one of ability; the second, one of degree.

Just as technology should not dictate strategy, so should strategy not ignore technology. No aerospace strategy will be successful if it fails to incorporate the contributions of technology, the reason being that potential adversaries will exploit their technology for all it is worth. If the United States fails to do the same, it will find itself running a distant second, even to an adversary whose technology is not as advanced as ours. Thus, aerospace strategy must remain a dynamic force that takes into account advanced American technology.

A third characteristic should be the integrative nature of aerospace strategy. This manifests itself in two ways. There must be this crucial integration of aerospace strategy with the strategies of the other services as well as integration with America’s overall national security strategy, plans, and goals. No future war will be fought in a single environment or part of an environment. No future war will call on the resources of only a single service or part of that service. In effect, each service must be supportive of the others with all the services working toward the same goal, victory. This can be accomplished only if the services’ strategies are mutually supportive. Collateral missions must be delineated, joint operations must be carefully planned, and support functions must be adequately addressed to prevent duplication of effort if aerospace strategy is to be successful in both supporting the other services while performing its own intrinsic missions.

A final characteristic must be the all-encompassing nature of aerospace strategy. This is probably the most critically important characteristic of all, for without it aerospace strategy is doomed. It is important to remember that one of the distinguishing features of the post-nuclear age is the expansion of the aerospace environment from solely inner space to outer space. If future aerospace strategy ignores either of these environmental parts, then it is neither taking full advantage of the environment or developing a strategy that can successfully cope with the entire range of threats that can occur in the aerospace realm. Potential adversaries, the Soviet Union in particular, have not subscribed to such ignorance. The United States can ill afford to. Overall, future aerospace strategy must realistically meet all challenges anywhere in the aerospace medium. This is best done by the development of an all-encompassing strategy.

Finally, the assumptions outlined above and the characteristics developed from these assumptions must be melded into a coherent strategy. In general terms, this strategy should include the ability to fight on a local, theater, or strategic (intercontinental) level in both inner and outer space. It must also include the ability to defend against attacks launched on any level from within any medium. In addition, aerospace strategy must be able to carry out various other functions coincident to battle, including communications, intelligence, and logistical support. Finally, this strategy must enable the Air Force to operate harmoniously with the other services in joint missions.

From such a strategy comes the advocation of the development and employment of specific weapon systems. While it is not the purpose of this article to defend or reject any particular weapon system, there are, nevertheless, five categories of weapon systems that must be a part of future aerospace strategy.

Initially, aerospace strategy must include an offensive capability in both inner and outer space to serve a variety of local, theater, and strategic missions. This would include the development of manned aircraft (both strategic and tactical, fighter and bomber), missiles (both intercontinental and theater), and some form of space offensive system such as a killer satellite. By developing such systems, aerospace strategy will be able to wage, as necessary, offensive operations in both inner and outer space in any theater of action and thus take the war to the enemy, damaging his military systems, strategic resources, command and control structure, intelligence capabilities, and logistical infrastructure.

Along with this capability must be a defensive capability able to defend American military and civilian resources from an attack from air or space. It must take the form of a ballistic missile defense system, air interceptors, surface-to-air missile systems, and a space defense system. This last system will probably be the hardest to acquire but could take several forms, including the hardening of space systems against electromagnetic, nuclear, or laser attack or the development of a defensive system based on the killer satellite concept. The key thought to keep in mind is the need to develop defensive systems that prevent the enemy from using either inner or outer space with total impunity.

Third, aerospace strategy must ensure that adequate, survivable command, communications, and control (C³) systems are always maintained. This is best accomplished through redundancy in both system types and system location. In other words, C³ systems should utilize both inner space (airborne command posts) and outer space (satellites) and ensure that more than one discrete system exists in each medium.

Fourth, future tacticians will rely on instantaneous intelligence to determine when and where to engage the enemy as well as to ascertain the status of their own forces. Thus, aerospace strategy must be able to supply this intelligence, and redundancy in systems and locations appears to be the key. There must be several survivable ways to collect this intelligence, including systems in inner space (manned reconnaissance aircraft and remotely piloted vehicles) and outer space (satellites). Each system must have a backup to ensure that the loss of one system does not seriously jeopardize the ability to collect intelligence in any medium.

Finally, aerospace strategy needs to be able to meet the needs of the other services’ requests for aid. Therefore, this strategy should allow for weapon systems that, while not of continual specific use to the Air Force, are important in aiding the other services. Whether called collateral or support functions, these would include things such as the maintenance of an aerospace rescue and recovery force, the development of a rapid space satellite launch capability, and the assurance of an aerospace logistics system second to none.

The development of a coherent aerospace strategy capable of meeting the needs of tomorrow’s Air Force and the security interests of the United States is of crucial importance. While minute specifics of such a strategy will and should be vigorously debated, the general framework of this strategy will probably follow the assumptions, characteristics, and weapon system categories that were discussed herein. Above all, though, there is an overriding need to recognize that this strategy cannot be designed based on current perceptions. Whether we like it or not, the postnuclear age is rapidly approaching. Only through a concerted effort to analyze and define this new age can the Air Force hope to develop the best aerospace strategy possible.

Editor's note: This article, written while he was a captain in the U.S. Air Force, is one of two essays for which Kenneth C. Stoehrmann received Honorable Mention in the first Ira C. Eaker Essay Competition.

Contributor

Kenneth C. Stoehrmann (USAFA; M.A., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy and University of North Colorado) is Associate Manager, Foreign Force Employment, BDM Corporation, McLean, Virginia. In the Air Force he was a political science instructor, USAF Academy; he continues in the Air Force Reserve. Stoehrmann has published award-winning articles in the Review and in other military journals.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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