Air University Review, November-December 1982

One More Time

The Weasel force, while small in absolute terms, is important in the overall scheme of tactical warfare. Colonel Harold E. Johnson has provided an excellent capsule history of our specialized operations and useful ideas about a high-low mix of Weasels for the future in the form of two-seat A-l0s and F-l5s. There were some conclusions and opinions enumerated by Colonel Johnson that warrant further discussion, however.

Colonel Johnson stated:

From my experience in the Weasel hunter-killer role, if the EWO was an effective, confident operator, the attachment of jammers . . . was, and is, so much excess baggage. The Weasel aircraft should be either a SAM killer or a jammer. I am not convinced that it needs to be both. (p. 91)

These statements are undoubtedly based on his experience with the electronic (noise) jammers and radar warning receivers (RWRs) used with the F-105F/G. The F-4G jamming pods in use today are capable of much more than noise transmission, and the effects of jamming on the F-4G RWR are considerably different from that experienced with the F-l05F/G. Having flown both aircraft extensively, I believe that Colonel Johnson may have drawn a conclusion about tactics at present and in the future based on experience with equipment of the past. The F-4G can carry a jamming pod in an AIM-7 cavity and does not sacrifice a weapons station as it did on the outboard pylon of the F- 105F. Of course, the ALQ-l19 jamming pods are much more capable than the QRC-160 and ALQ-71 pods that Colonel Johnson and I flew with in 1966. I am convinced that the Weasel needs a pod; the reason: there is no longer a conflict between being a hunter-killer and carrying a self-protection pod. As I am prone to say to our Weasel students, "There comes a time when you have no choice but to cease Weaseling and start surviving." Thus I question Colonel Johnson’s position vis-à-vis the jamming pod.

Colonel Johnson has proposed a novel idea about a high-low altitude mix of forces that could be used to supplement or augment the Wild Weasel, that is specialized two-seat A-l0 and F-15 aircraft with defense (SAM) suppression as their primary mission. On the surface, such a force is attractive; however, fiscal reality will eventually have to creep into any such discussion.

Sophisticated Wild Weasel avionics and weapons (mostly missiles) are some of the most expensive ones. These usually result in major aircraft modifications which reduces the number of aircraft available to the general-purpose forces, or an increased fleet size; either will add to the overall cost of specialization.

The U.S. Navy made use of a concept similar to the one suggested by Colonel Johnson when it made various of its attacks aircraft capable of employing the AGM-45 Shrike antiradiation missile. Colonel Johnson has suggested a similar defense suppression force multiplier, and I would welcome such a move, other things being equal. However, when the very small size of our F-4G fleet is considered, it is obvious that aircraft such as those proposed by Colonel Johnson would have to compete for limited funds with all other missions and roles. Having been a Weasel for some time now, I am not confident that such a program is feasible with our current and proposed defense budget limitations and priorities.

Colonel Johnson states on page 92 that ". . . there appears to be an increased emphasis on standoff jamming in lieu of the hunter-killer. . . ." While any tactical aviator would welcome the support of an EF- 111 or EA-6B in combat, I believe that these resources are additive to the overall effort and certainly are not a replacement for Wild Weasel operations. The Air Force has recently begun testing the integration of tactical standoff jammers with hunter-killer aircraft in exercises such as Red Flag, and those of us who have participated are clear in our thinking that neither resource is, or should be, used in lieu of the other.

I must disagree with Colonel Johnson that ". . . the weapons designated for use on the SAM killer mission appear less flexible now than in those days." (p. 92)

Clearly, the AGM-45 is a more potent and more flexible weapon now than it was fifteen years ago. The spectrum of conventional free-fall ordnance (and fuzing) is much wider than that we had access to with the F-l05F/G. The AGM-65 Maverick, while having some limitations, can be employed against radar emitters and considerably widens our capability in selected circumstances. Put succinctly, the F-4G has more flexibility than the F-105F/G ever could have. Granted, it is one generation younger.

With the experience of about 175 combat missions in the F-l05F/G and about 250 flying hours in the F-4G, I can say that our capabilities have increased greatly. However, the job to be done is a much bigger one today. The F-105F/Gs were optimized for use in Southeast Asia. The F-4G must attempt to counter numerous radar threats.

Until late in the Vietnam War, we Weasels did not have to contend with optical tracking radar capabilities. Today, most threat radar systems feature optical tracking to increase their flexibility and lethality. Other active and passive measures designed to compound the defense suppression problem for the Wild Weasel have evolved over time, making today’s operations considerably different from, though not totally unlike, that experienced over North Vietnam.

When I came back to Weaseling, some of my young instructors would overstate the capabilities of the F-4G over its F-l05 predecessor by describing them as a "quantum leap" forward. Although I cannot accept this terminology, I am comfortable with saying that the differences are significant. It is axiomatic that the nature of combat and tactics will evolve with a change in weapons and technology; however, care must be exercised when drawing conclusions and making projections based on this change. While the principles of war are unaffected by time, less general precepts cannot be so. In short, much is still the same with our mission and yet a very great deal has changed.

Lieutenant Colonel Martin A. Noel, Jr., a student at Air War College, was the Operations Officer for the 562d Tactical Fighter Training Squadron, George AFB, California.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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