Air University Review, November-December 1982

Clausewitz and U.S. Nuclear Weapons Policy

This year marks the one hundred and fiftieth anniversary of the publication of the classic study On War (Vom Kriege) by German military strategist Karl von Clausewitz (1780-1831).¹ The preeminent philosopher of war, Clausewitz developed a general theory of warfare, one that is internally consistent, has reasonable predictive value, and continues to have great influence on strategic thinkers in the international arena.

Clausewitz was concerned exclusively with land warfare, which was the predominant form of conflict among the nation-states of his day. He did not discuss naval warfare, and war in the air was almost a century away.

The technology of warfare in Clausewitz’s day differed greatly from today’s technology. The archetype of war for Clausewitz was that of the mass army of Napoleon and the innovative strategy and tactics employed by Napoleon. Just as Clausewitz distinguished the basic changes in warfare between the days of Frederick the Great and the Napoleonic era, so we must keep in mind the changes in the century and a half since On War was published. Thirty-seven years have passed since nuclear weapons were introduced into war and changed its very nature:

In the first major contribution by a civilian to nuclear strategy, Bernard Brodie observed that "everything about the atomic bomb is overshadowed by the twin facts that it exists and its destructive power is fantastically great." Since then the major additional fact is that the bomb is not longer monopolized by the United States. Otherwise all developments have served to increase this destructive power and the ease with which it can be delivered. Strategic thinking over the past three and a half decades has been conditioned by these facts.²

If Clausewitz were living in 1982, he would certainly be interested in the renewed debate on nuclear weapons policy. Just as he took into account the changed nature of war in the age of Napoleon as compared with that of the age of Frederick the Great, he would ponder the place of nuclear weapons in the strategic policy of the superpowers.

Clausewitz, who saw how reforms in the Prussian social system and military forces in the early 1800s proceeded by fits and starts, would grant that changes will not come easily in U.S. nuclear policy. He would also note, sadly, that the real impetus to change in the outmoded Prussian military establishment came only after Napoleon had completely humiliated Prussia at Auerstadt and Jena in 1806.

Four Categories
Relevant to Nuclear War

Clausewitz divides On War into eight books covering the following topics: the nature of war, the theory of war, strategy in general, the engagement, military forces, defense, the attack, and war plans. The books concerning the nature of war and war plans contain most of the material of relevance to nuclear policy. Within these books, four topics seem to capture and organize Clausewitz’s thoughts.

War is an instrument of policy.

This seemingly innocuous declaratory statement forms the basis for the relationship between war and policy. Political forces and political policy determine the objective, nature, and scope of war. War has no logical existence apart from policy—"war is merely the continuation of policy by other means."

This relationship between war and policy generates certain requirements concerning war. First, unilateral action by one side cannot eliminate war. If the other side elects to resort to war, the one side can only ensure that it possesses enough force to defeat the other. Second, since war is an instrument of policy, "no one starts a war—or rather, no one in his senses ought to do so—without first being clear in his mind what he intends to achieve by that war and how he intends to conduct it."

The political objective may not be clearly known or understood by each side. The objective of each side will be different, often asymmetrical. Moreover, the strengths of each will be different. These factors make it difficult to determine what means will be required to achieve a nation’s objectives, particularly when the lineup of allied and enemy states may be highly unpredictable and transitory.

Since war is an instrument of policy, war does not suspend the communications between warring governments and between their peoples. Rather, actions take the place of words, that is, the means of communication are different. Actions signal and communicate sometimes just as clearly as words.

In the planning and executing of a war, political factors must dominate. If one objects to the waging of a certain war, one needs to track the objection back to the national policy that employs the war as an instrument.

The central aim of war is to compel the enemy to do what we want. The means to that end is physical force. To achieve that aim, we must render the enemy powerless.

The intensity of war can range from armed observation to extermination. In the more intense kinds, the enemy’s forces must be destroyed, his land occupied, and his will to fight broken. But if we can break his will to fight at the start, we may not have to fight at all.

If the thrust of the policy is defensive, the policy must have an active purpose, that is "within the limit of his strength a defender must always seek to change over to the attack as soon as he has gained the benefit of the defense." The defensive is normally the stronger form of warfare, yet only if the defender aggressively parries the attacker’s thrusts.

Since war is subordinate to policy, limited aims are possible if the policy is moderate.

War tends toward extremes. No logical limit exists to force; until the enemy is overthrown, there is no control over his actions. Force and will may compete on each side until the maximum is reached. This, however, is war in the abstract. In reality, war is part of a complex set of social and political actions. These external considerations act to moderate the extremes. For example, despite the emphasis on vigorous action in military textbooks, armies often are idle during most of a war. According to Clausewitz, however, waiting for a better moment before acting is the only military justification for a pause in an army’s activity.

Blind natural force (characterized by violence, hatred, and enmity), the factor of chance and probability, and the subordination of war to policy (which makes it subject to reason) are the major factors that combine to give war its unique character.

In the confusion and fog of war, not everything can go correctly, as planned. This friction increases the unpredictability of war. The strong leader, says Clausewitz, overrides friction by his ability to identify what is necessary and what is possible and his force of will, which overcomes the obstacles posed by the emotions and uncertainties of the battlefield.

The commander in chief needs
to consider some important points.

The objective of fighting must be to render the opponent defenseless or at least put him in a position where that condition will most likely follow. This implies that the proper military objective is the military forces of the opponent or his ability to do harm to your forces. Accordingly, forces should be structured so as to have the capability to destroy the enemy’s fighting capability. As long as the enemy has the capability to threaten and you do not have the capability to eliminate his forces, you remain susceptible to his action.

The amount of resources that need to be mobilized for war depends on the political objective to be attained by each side as well as the capabilities of the nations on each side. In addition, the effect of other countries’ perception of the actions needs to be carefully considered.

When one side expects a more favorable outcome in the future, it has the incentive to wait. Alternatively, when either side can exploit a current advantage that promises to make the future better than the present, that side is likely to act. If neither side can see a particular advantage in moving now, caution may prevail; indeed, according to Clausewitz, most generals tend to weigh their actions quite conservatively.

A nation’s leadership ought to search out the right vantage point from which to view the war. If the commander has a clear and consistent picture of the nation’s objectives in a war, he will be partly shielded from the otherwise abrasive nature of war.

Limited wars are possible, but they must be weighed very carefully. Clausewitz advocates the selection of forceful generals who do not shrink from shedding blood; he is suspicious of generals who tiptoe around their objectives.

The enemy strength must be traced back to the least number of sources, ideally one. This center of gravity will depend on the enemy’s political situation and the disposition of his forces; it may be a critical fortress, a capital city, a major ally, or a supreme leader. The forces at the disposal of the commander must be directed at that center of gravity.

Forces should be used rapidly without the loss of initial momentum. Offensive forces must of necessity decrease and wane in energy as the attack continues. The commander must vigorously follow up the victories he achieves and be prepared for counterattacks against his own extended forces.

Clausewitz’s Critique
of U.S. Nuclear Policy

While he constantly instructs his reader that war is an instrument of policy, Clausewitz avoids discussion of the content of substantive policy. He does not examine national goals and objectives, nor does he prescribe specific military strategy for a given set of national goals. He does cite historical examples, however, of how such commanders as Frederick the Great adjusted their strategies to their goals and available resources.

Although generally silent on the substance of policy, Clausewitz probably would have examined the structure of a policy that has the use of nuclear weapons as one of its operative elements. Clausewitz no doubt would comment about the use of nuclear weapons as instrumentalities in the same detailed manner he described the infantry, artillery, and cavalry of the early nineteenth century. Such an assessment would probably start with comments about general U.S. national policy.

Clausewitz might begin with the observation that United States policy in the l980s is essentially defensive. It is not expansionist in the sense of imposing U.S. will on other nations, assuming they do not take initiatives against U.S. vital interests. Given this policy, the instrument of war is as a conservator of the status quo. So long as major changes occur in an orderly way with a proper regard for the rule of law, war will be very limited in aims, scope, intensity, and duration.

Next Clausewitz would observe the large force structures maintained by the United States and the U.S.S.R. and their respective allies. Within the force structures, he would pay particular attention to the nuclear weapons and their sizable capabilities.

Of significant importance to Clausewitz would be the potential effectiveness of nuclear weapons. The destructive power of these weapons—unimaginable in his day and unthinkable for many today—as well as their great numbers enable the United States and the U.S.S.R. mutually to threaten each other with catastrophic societal disruption. In addition, he might consider the potential long-term effects on the genetic pool of the human race. He would focus on the concept of deterrence and its central place in U.S. nuclear policy. And Clausewitz would probably begin his serious critique of U.S. policy by posing several questions.

— What nation or nations make up the other side, and who are the friends on our side?

— What deters the other side?

— What is the connection between deterrence and actions should deterrence fail?

— What does the other side think deters the United States?

— What are the ways a central nuclear war could start?

— In what ways could escalation be controlled?

— Are the current dispositions of forces more provocative than alternative deployments could be?

In his day, Clausewitz clearly identified France, its national energies mobilized by the revolution and by Bonaparte, as the key menace to the Fatherland. He early recognized that Prussia must modernize its old-fashioned army and promote the coordination of its efforts with France’s other natural enemies, England, Austria, and Russia. Today, Clausewitz would presumably be an advocate of reform in the United States military establishment (emphasis on readiness and mobility) and of tighter alliances with the U.S.S.R.’s natural enemies (Western Europe, China, Japan, Israel, and the conservative Arab states). Clausewitz would ponder the lack of a clear consensus on what deters the Soviet Union. He would note the position of those who think that the ability to destroy a finite number of Soviet cities is sufficient to deter any Soviet use of nuclear weapons. Clausewitz would object to this notion on the grounds that destruction of population per se is not useful because the opponent’s capability to strike your forces has not been altered. Hence, you have not altered his perception that attacking now or in the future could be favorable to him.

He would note a second position, of those who would say that sufficient weapons and options should exist to enable the United States to respond flexibly to various levels of nuclear strikes. According to this view, the United States should have the option of tailoring strikes in order to cover various geographical areas and target types at varying levels of intensity. Within those general constraints, this second group thinks the rough priority of targeting ought to be to destroy the postwar economic and military recovery assets, nuclear strike forces, conventional strike forces, and military and political leadership. Here Clausewitz would ask: What is to be served by the destruction of postwar recovery assets as a first priority? What are the political objectives to be forwarded? Apparently, the answer would be to make sure the enemy does not recover faster than the United States in the postwar period. Here Clausewitz would caution that in the postwar environment the major countries not involved would very likely become the dominant powers. Furthermore, Clausewitz might ask whether the greatly enhanced uncertainties (friction) of a nuclear war would permit an orderly pattern of response.

With respect to the general question of what deters, Clausewitz would argue that a nation’s ability to counter the force elements of the opposing country would best deter offensive action. He would say that when one side has the ability to destroy the force elements of the other and has a vigorous offensive policy, the other side can do little except to attrit the offensive side’s forces and hope for the best at the peace negotiations. Some observers say this is the risk the United States faces today, given Soviet nuclear capabilities and the Kremlin’s ideological goal of world domination. If the side with the preponderant forces has a less vigorous policy, then war will not occur because both sides will conclude that waiting promises a better future than initiating war. This was the case of the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. through the 1960s. If both sides have equivalent capabilities to destroy force elements of the other but not enough to do so comprehensively, then neither side is likely to act. This is the situation especially when neither side has a particularly activist short-run policy, e.g., one that is directed toward domination of the other by force. Clausewitz would say this was the case of the U.S.S.R. and the United States during the l970s.

What is the connection between deterrence and U.S. actions should deterrence fail? Clausewitz would note that extensive effort has been made to structure U.S. forces which could engage enemy targets, but he would also note that less effort has been expended in thinking through how the warfare system would respond in the transattack and postattack phases of conflict. He would also ask what U.S. political objectives would be served by a capability that seems best suited for a spasm war. He would note that war is never a single blow. In this regard, he would be skeptical of the assumption that nuclear war would be a single brief spasm and point out that friction in war would prevent the single short blow from succeeding.

With regard to the question of how a nuclear war would start and intensify, Clausewitz would probably note the lack of robustness of the United States command and control system. He would particularly note the centralized control structure for U.S. nuclear weapon release. Here he might comment that the centralized control system ensures that nuclear forces can be responsive to the political objectives as they might change during war. On the other hand, he would very likely be critical of the war worthiness of systems that would report progress of the battle to allow political decisions. In a similar vein, he would note that pressures upon the United States Commander in Chief during a nuclear war might be much more intense than those on commanders of his day. On the other hand, he might suggest that the surviving commander, shielded from the smoke and din of the battlefield in his airborne command post, would find it easier to continue the mutual devastation.

Clausewitz might have a great deal of trouble with the concept that nuclear war represented political intercourse by other means. Certainly, the signal-to-noise ratio of the communication would be so small that it would require a most discriminating commander to understand the messages fully. Hence, the control of escalation or anything else would be very difficult.

Given the essentially defensive nature of professed United States intentions, Clausewitz would cast a questioning glance at the alert policy for U.S. forces. He might wonder if less provocative postures could be devised to implement this defensive mode. Included in the less provocative postures might be a more vigorous effort in arms reduction. He would view any way of reducing enemy armaments as an appropriate strategy.

Development of U.S. Nuclear Policy

As he reviewed United States national policy, Clausewitz would note the historical development of our nuclear policy in the post-World War II era and be particularly interested in how U.S. theorists and practitioners view the structure of nuclear policy. Specifically, he would be interested in the distinctions drawn among what the United States says to others (declaratory policy), what weapon systems the U.S. develops and buys (acquisition policy), and how the U.S. in fact plans to use the forces now deployed (employment policy).

As Clausewitz looked back over the thirty-seven years the United States has had nuclear weapons, he would note that our declaratory policy has been through several substantial changes:

• the early influence of strategic bombardment doctrine of the late 1940s to the early 1950s;

• the massive retaliation policy of the 1950s;

• the city avoidance and assured destruction variations of the early 1960s;

• the development of limited options during the early 1970s;

• the declaration of equivalence in its many forms during the 1970s;

• the notion of a countervailing policy in the late 1970s and early 1980s; and

• the current move to reinvigorate strategic nuclear capabilities.

The pronouncements of United States Presidents as well as statements by Secretaries of State and Secretaries of Defense provide the major authoritative exposition of the declaratory policy. This declaratory policy, however, usually leaves a margin of ambiguity, with the result that those responsible for development and purchase of the weapons can operate with wide latitude. Clausewitz would probably be fascinated with the complexity of the pluralistic society of the United States, where the power to make and influence decisions is spread among the executive, legislative, industrial, academic, and other special interest groups.

Clausewitz would also be intrigued by the unpredictability of the course of development of this era’s key weapon systems like the intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM), bomber, and cruise missile. For example, he would note the tenacity of the Air Force in the l950s in defending its right to develop and deploy guided missiles and, once having won the interservice battle, its failure to develop the ICBM until forced to do so by the pressure of others outside its leadership circles. He might also cite the start, stop, rethink, start, stop, rethink, and start again of the manned bomber program. The B-70 program was started in the late l950s and was canceled in 1963; the Advanced Manned Strategic Aircraft (AMSA) studies that were started in 1964 resulted in the B-1A development program in 1969; after the decision not to produce the B-1A in 1977, the decision to produce the B-1B was made in 1981.

Finally, Clausewitz would note the stability in employment doctrine in contrast to and despite the variability of the declaratory policy and the unpredictability of weapon choices. Plans for the employment of nuclear weapons have included military force targets as well as war-sustaining targets. Although the relative priority of the target types may have been harmonized with the declaratory policy, since the 1950s the nuclear weapon stockpiles have been adequate to program weapons against diverse target types. The process of developing a single integrated operations plan (SIOP) for strategic nuclear weapons is the domain of the Joint Strategic Target Planning Staff (JSTPS), which was formed in the early 1960s. As a possible cause of the comparative stability of employment targeting, Clausewitz would note the difficulty of making rapid changes in the employment plan, due in part to the complexity of operational plans for nuclear war.

In sum, Clausewitz would probably have expected a stable declaratory nuclear policy and a firm linkage from what the United States says through what it designs and buys to how it plans to use the nuclear forces.

What Clausewitz Would Suggest

After his review of the general U.S. strategic policy and specific nuclear policy, Clausewitz would be in a position to make some recommendations about how the United States might make nuclear policy more consistent with the principles he advocated in On War.

The center of gravity of the nuclear policy should be the disarmament of the enemy’s capability to use nuclear weapons. The logical starting place here would be disarming him before hostilities occur. Clausewitz would probably advocate strong and active efforts to remove nuclear weapons from the arsenals of the world. Knowing the risk that, once started, nuclear war could go all-out, he would note that disarmament efforts have not matched the seriousness of the potential holocaust. Clausewitz constantly referred to the importance of confusion, chance, and uncertainty—all kinds of friction—in war. Given the destructive power of nuclear weapons and the small but finite probability that a decision-maker might find nuclear war acceptable, he would like to see a sharp reduction or, better, elimination of nuclear weapons.

However, until efforts to disarm the enemy by mutual agreement are successful, he would caution the United States about the real possibility of nuclear war. If nuclear war should break out, the U.S. objective would have to be the rapid destruction of the capability of the opposing nuclear forces. He would admit two useful target classes: hostile nuclear and conventional force elements and the enemy’s military and political control structure. But, if pressed, he would collapse the target priorities to one center of gravity, namely, the nuclear force elements.

Because existing forces must be concentrated at the center of gravity, Clausewitz would not advocate an attack upon urban centers or industrial facilities. He would recognize that changes in weapon systems—beyond his old infantry, cavalry, and artillery—alter how specific military objectives are attained, but disarming the enemy would remain the aim.

Clausewitz would then suggest that U.S. leaders think carefully through the entire sequence of nuclear war, from the peacetime posture through the pre-, trans-, and postattack phases of the war to the subsequent postwar recovery of enemy lands. He might find that inadequate thought had been given to how a nation should fight a nuclear war. He would note that if the thought of nuclear war is repulsive to many, this is all the more reason for the United States to be moving with great speed to eliminate nuclear weapons. Well aware that social and political forces must be in harmony with military forces if victory is to be achieved, Clausewitz presumably would point to the resurgence of vocal antinuclear elements in the United States and allied countries in 1982 as further incentive to work for the elimination of these weapons. He no doubt would worry over the problem of verification since he would recall how the Prussian military reformers evaded Napoleon’s efforts to restrict a Prussian military buildup after 1806.

In keeping with the need to think through the entire process of nuclear war would be the suggestion that the United States consider carefully the role of friends and allies in all stages of nuclear conflict. For example, the United States might even plan with its friends how they might help us recover after a large nuclear war.

Clausewitz would note the use in current discussions of nuclear strategy of such phrases as "inflicting unacceptable damage to the enemy" and "terminating the conflict on terms favorable to the United States." He would want to understand what those terms meant for the political leader, military planner, and field commander. Given the predictions of vast human and material loss from a nuclear conflict, Clausewitz would want to understand what political objectives could conceivably be served by nuclear war. He would suggest that those who contemplate waging nuclear war be required to link employment doctrine to some political policy.

Clausewitz would have some specific suggestions about U.S. capabilities in the nuclear field. Given the essentially defensive U.S. posture, Clausewitz would suggest that greater defensive capabilities be acquired. He would find the total lack of defense against ballistic missile attack unacceptable, despite the availability of active and passive means of defense. He would note that the defensive posture requires the United States to wait for the attack and then be in a position to assert the initiative. Given that the battle would be accompanied by friction and the fog of battle, he would question the ability of the United States to identify quickly the nature of a Soviet attack and respond appropriately. He almost certainly would be skeptical of U.S. ability to implement a launch-on-attack option, let alone a launch-on-warning option.

To those who would argue that defenses are irrelevant in nuclear war and that only offensive weapons are needed, he would point out that if a nation is able to defend against the initial attack, this might serve as a moderating consideration in the battle; there might automatically be less of a need to retaliate massively. Further, since a rational Clausewitzian planner on the other side would attack U.S. nuclear force elements and these are the only means available to disarm the enemy, nuclear assets must have means of defense beyond their inherent survivability, which is currently brought about by hardening, escape, mobility, and concealment.

Associated with a need for enduring political control is the continuing requirement to monitor the progress of the battle. Clausewitz did not hold much stock in the wartime commander’s ability to know the status of the other side’s forces. He might alter that assessment with the current capabilities to survey, but then he might not. In his assessment of the usefulness of command, control, communications, and intelligence as they exist today, he would have to weigh the probable damage to these systems in the event of nuclear conflict; he would find the extent of that damage enormously difficult to foresee.

With respect to U.S. weaponry, Clausewitz would place greater stress on high accuracy munitions and innovative techniques to kill hardened targets while at the same time reducing collateral damage. He would find the degree of collateral damage that would result from current nuclear war plans to be unacceptably disconnected from the policy the plans are supposed to support. The massive immediate casualties and long-term radiation effects on the global environment would cause Clausewitz to suggest that the whole subject of weapons effects of a nuclear war should be reopened with the aim of finding weapons that are much more precisely keyed to the objective of disarming the enemy without exterminating a large fraction of humanity at the same time.

He would recommend that the United States consider lower levels of alert rates of its nuclear forces and encourage the U.S.S.R. to do so as well. This would have the objective of reducing the general level of tensions. He would place stress on the ability to generate, relax, and regenerate the forces. In line with his notion that good defense is aggressive defense, he would urge that the United States be able to move quickly from a defensive posture to an offensive posture once warning has been received or when the attack has begun.

Clausewitz would be in favor of continued emphasis on high assurance antifleet ballistic missile submarine (SSBN) capability. Since the Soviet SSBNs represent a possible residual force able to coerce in the postattack environment, this element needs to be disarmed as completely as the other force elements.

Given a revised nuclear policy and capabilities, Clausewitz would argue that the U.S. single integrated operations plan should be changed to reflect the policy. Despite the complexities involved in changing the SIOP, the planning process must be responsive to the targeting needs of any revised policy. If weapons levels are reduced and choices among target sets have to be made and if U.S. policy requires a certain flexibility for limited strikes as well as an emphasis on a single center of gravity, the SIOP may not be able to include all the types of targets now covered.

Clausewitz would be the first to say that changes in nuclear plans, procurement, and deployment will not be easy. The logic of his approach dictates an immediate search for ways to abolish or reduce greatly inventories of nuclear weapons. As for waging nuclear war, Clausewitz could hardly view it as an effective method of forwarding the political objectives of either the United States or the Soviet Union.

1. Karl von Clausewitz, On War, edited and translated by Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1976). The quotations from On War cited throughout the article are from this translation of Clausewitz.

2. Lawrence Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1981), p. 396.

Editor's note: This article was developed from a 1982 National War College Strategic Studies paper.

Colonel Nicholas H. Fritz, Jr. (USAFA; M.S., Air Force Institute of Technology), is Director of Projects, B-1B System Program Office, Aeronautical Systems Division, Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio. He has served on the Air Staff as a strategy and policy analyst, as a B-52 commander in the Strategic Air Command, and previously in the B-1 System Program Office from 1972 to 1976. Colonel Fritz is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and the National War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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