Air University Review, March-April 1982

War, Politics, and Hostile Will

Thoughtful American military professionals look back on the Air Corps Tactical School of the 1930s with justifiable awe. It was there that a group of relatively junior officers, battling an entrenched military bureaucracy, logically constructed the justification and doctrine for the aerial warfare that would play such a decisive role in subsequent conflicts. Of particular importance was their justification for strategic bombing, a mission independent of other military operations and the cornerstone of a separate and independent Air Force.

Lost in the admiration for the faculty’s accomplishments is an appreciation of their basic assumptions about the purposes of war itself, assumptions that continue unchallenged to the present time and provide the philosophical foundation for the way we think about war. The advent of nuclear weapons and the reappearance of limited war give us cause to consider whether those unchallenged basic assumptions remain valid. In the aftermath of Vietnam and in the face of a future beset by dangers from every quarter, it is particularly appropriate to challenge our assumptions about the object of war and the role of the military.

The assumptions of the Air Corps Tactical School were essentially Clausewitzian. Like the Prussian master, the pioneer air-power theorists considered war a political act of violence undertaken to achieve policy objectives. They considered war to be the ultimate sanction, engaged in only after all normal means had failed to achieve the objectives of policy. Thus the object of war was to overcome an enemy’s hostile will toward our policies. Of course, the Tactical School faculty also noted that air power provided a new and better way to wage war. Air power could overcome the enemy’s hostile will directly by striking at the heart of the enemy nation. As a result, the enemy’s deployed armies and navies, the vestiges of hostile will, could be bypassed.¹

The question of air power’s superiority relative to other military means is not at issue here but does offer a perspective that will be important later in this article. Several things, however, are at issue. The first is an unspoken assumption about the objective of war. The second is a definitional problem concerning hostile will. Finally, the last and most important issue centers on the obvious assumption that hostile will can be overcome by military means.

The Unspoken Assumption

If war is undertaken as a last resort to achieve policy objectives, then the unspoken assumption is that a successful war will result in a better state of peace. It is difficult to deny that this unspoken assumption existed. Logic dictates that fruition of our policies will result in a more favorable situation, from our point of view, or we would pursue different policies. Logic also dictates that we favor peace over war, for if we did not, war would not be a last resort. Thus the ultimate purpose of war is to achieve a more favorable situation in the peace that follows.

One might argue that if we are the victim of aggression, our ultimate purpose could be to end the war and return the situation to status quo ante. However, this argument flies in the face of logic. A return to status quo ante means a return to the situation that precipitated the aggression. Surely if we prefer peace to war, we would not seek a situation that threatens us with aggression.

Although discussion of the unspoken assumption may appear trivial at this point, the concept of a better state of peace will assume more importance in relation to the second issue, hostile will.

Hostile Will

The most common definition of will refers to a desire or inclination to do something. In the context of war and its purposes, that hostile something is the enemy’s inclination or desire to resist our policies. It is important to note that defining the enemy’s hostile will as the inclination to resist our policies does not indicate the form of the resistance. The events of recent decades have repeatedly demonstrated the effectiveness of many different forms of resistance. It is also important to note that the inclination to resist contrasts sharply with the ability to resist in any specific manner. The enemy can manifest hostile will in a form commensurate with his capabilities, whatever they may be.

Knowing what hostile will is solves only part of the problem. To complete the picture, we must know where that hostile will is harbored. Referring to the enemy’s hostile will treats the enemy state as if it were a single organism rather than a societal organization. To the contrary, it would seem we face at least two types of hostile will. First, there are a vast number of individual hostile wills among the enemy population. Second, there is the hostile will harbored by the enemy’s leadership elite. Both centers of hostility would seem to be interrelated to some degree.

The formation of hostile will and the relationships between the various centers of hostile will are subjects far beyond the scope of this discussion. Despite this limitation, it is appropriate to express the notion that a better state of peace requires that both types of hostile will must be overcome. Eliminating the hostile will of the leadership elite may have the immediate impact of temporarily ending organized resistance to our policies. Over the long term, however, continuing hostile will among the enemy’s general population may give rise to new leaders and resumption of organized resistance.

The Military Role

Can military means be used to attack an enemy’s hostile will effectively? The Air Corps Tactical School faculty thought so. They viewed overcoming hostile will in terms of compelling the enemy to do our bidding. But does compelling policy compliance necessarily produce a better state of peace in the long term? The evidence of relatively recent history indicates that military actions which compel policy compliance cannot by themselves effectively attack an enemy’s hostile will. Such a contrary statement requires substantiating evidence.

First, in the American Civil War, the Confederacy surrendered at Appomattox after four years of gallant, sometimes brilliant resistance against overwhelming odds. The South had been starved, burned-out, and pillaged. Her once-powerful armies had finally crumbled under ceaseless Union blows, and the South lay militarily and economically prostrate. Yet, the hostile will—resistance to Union policies— remained for many years. Some would even contend that vestiges of this resistance remained until very recent times. Consider, for instance, the revolt of the Dixiecrats in the 1948 Presidential election or the Governor of Alabama "standing in the school house door" in defiance of federal court orders. The hostile will of the Confederacy was not overcome by crushing military defeat. Only time and changing circumstances could heal the wounds.

Also consider Germany at the conclusion of World War I. Here was another nation starved and its field armies in full retreat, facing total disaster if the war continued. Hostile will, however, remained. One sees the turn to passive resistance, as demonstrated by the Germans in opposing French occupation of the Ruhr. Economic resistance, the willful inflation of German currency, was also used to resist the French. One must remember that despite the horrors of World War I, all that was required to set the stage for the second great war was residual hostile will, a scapegoat, economic problems, and a skillful demagogue willing to exploit the situation.

Finally, recall the French experience during the Second World War, when the French Army suffered a stunning total defeat and major portions of the country were occupied by the Nazi conquerors. Yet French hostile will remained, best exemplified by expatriate forces and the internal resistance movement. The Nazi war machine had crushed the French military but had not overcome French hostile will.

The parallels in these three examples are obvious. Yet there is one parallel that may be less than obvious: the harsh extra-military policies of the victors toward the vanquished. After the American Civil War, the difficult Reconstruction period with its carpetbaggers and scalawags was long and bitterly remembered by Southerners. After World War I, the peace settlements imposing not only guilt but also severe economic penalties did little to win the hearts and minds of the German people. Finally, the outrages of Nazi occupation in France are still too fresh a memory. Evidence also exists that military means can, in certain circumstances, be counterproductive in terms of overcoming hostile will. The classic example is the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor. Although a military stroke of tactical genius, it was an act of incredible strategic stupidity. Previously ambivalent American attitudes toward Japanese expansion in Asia and the Western Pacific were solidified by perceived Japanese perfidy and deceit. The attack on Pearl Harbor virtually guaranteed that the United States would not be satisfied until the Japanese had been totally defeated.

We can find in recent history, however, examples of total military defeat accompanied by the collapse of enemy hostile will. At the conclusion of World War II, both the German and Japanese military forces had been badly beaten while their civilian populations had been bombed, burned, starved, and, in two instances, vaporized in atomic blasts. Yet both the Germans and Japanese quickly became important American allies. Disregarding minor quarrels among friends, this supportive relationship has lasted for three and one-half decades. Clearly, German and Japanese hostile will was overcome. How does one account for this development, which is so startling when compared with previous examples?

There were many differences, of course, between the Civil War, World War I, and French examples compared with the aftermath of World War II. However, it would seem that the most significant and pervading difference was in the character of the policies of the Western victors toward the vanquished Axis powers. After World War II, immediate humanitarian efforts to relieve suffering were quickly evident. Punishment was carefully reserved for war leaders rather than for entire populations. Perhaps most important, economic policies were obviously aimed at restoring the self-sufficiency of the German and Japanese economies rather than aimed at extracting plunder. These enlightened policies can be contrasted with those of the Soviets in their area of European occupation. Harsh Soviet actions led many Germans to "resist with their feet" by fleeing to the West. The East Berlin riots of 17 June 1953 and the need to build an escape-resistant wall are further evidence of the continuing German will to resist Soviet policies.

One may argue that the presence of a supernumerary Soviet threat played a decisive role in the attitudes of the vanquished Axis powers. The existence of such a threat on their eastern border may help explain the attitude of the West Germans, but it does not adequately explain the postwar Japanese experience.

What useful conclusions can be drawn from this discussion? If experience gives any indication—and it is the only indicator available—one can reasonably conclude that military action, by itself, does not overcome hostile will and thus lead to a better state of peace. Military action can destroy the capability of an enemy to offer some forms of resistance or it can suppress some forms of resistance and thus compel policy compliance But these are interim measures. A better state of peace requires policy acceptance, unless we are willing to follow the example of Scipio the Younger at Carthage and literally destroy the enemy, or unless we are willing to pay the price of continuous compulsion

Framed in such a manner, we can begin to appreciate the true significance of overcoming hostile will The task is to change an enemy’s attitude or mind-set so that our policies are accepted. With reference to experience for guidance, it appears that the key to this task is the character of the policies used in conjunction with military actions. Although the object of war is to overcome hostile will, the practical military objective in war is limited to the elimination of the enemy’s ability to resist militarily. Based on the experience of Pearl Harbor, it may also be concluded that the form of military action can at times be as important as its substance in terms of hostile will.

Recognition that military action by itself cannot overcome hostile will in no way denigrates the importance of successful military operations in war. If war is a last resort, what reason is there for the enemy nation (either the power elite or the citizenry as a whole) to even consider accepting our policies without successful military actions on our part? In war, military success often sets the preconditions required for policy acceptance. For example, in a struggle with a totalitarian nation, military removal of the power elite and its controlling infrastructure may be required if the enemy’s general population is to accept our policies. Although military actions are only part of war, they are the dominant part that differentiates war from any other political activity.

Before leaving this point, one caveat is in order concerning military success. Military success does not always mean traditional military victory. Fabius illustrated this point as he led Hannibal on a frustrating chase through Italy. In our own time, military success for the North Vietnamese fighting Americans meant merely inflicting casualties and avoiding total defeat. Our frustrations and casualty roles combined with skillful North Vietnamese propaganda slowly eroded our national will. Thus military success takes many forms.

If these are the conclusions, what significance do they hold? Clearly the conclusions demonstrate the unitary nature of war and politics. War is a continuation of political activity with the addition of military combat operations. The significance of this concept is that it is the antithesis of traditional American attitudes concerning war and normal political activity. Perhaps in rebellion against the dynastic wars of their European forefathers, Americans have, for the most part, regarded the military as a necessary evil.² Americans considered war an aberration not to be confused with normal political activity. Military action has been reserved for occasional crusades against some clearly defined malevolence. With such a stark view of the enemy and a crusader’s disposition, the traditional American objective in war became the total overthrow of the enemy, a strategy of annihilation.³ Americans seemed to assume that the total overthrow of the enemy would automatically result in a better state of peace. Thus, separated from normal political activity, the object of war became, in a sense, the war itself rather than the peace that followed.

But as the examples indicate, the total overthrow of the enemy does not necessarily overcome hostile will and does not necessarily result in a better state of peace. The American tendency to separate war from politics and treat war as a purely military crusade can be counterproductive in terms of both military operations and war’s aftermath. The demand for unconditional surrender of the Axis powers in World War II is a case in point. As General Eisenhower said, "If you are given two choices— one to mount the scaffold and the other to charge twenty bayonets, you might as well charge twenty bayonets."⁴ More reasonable terms, from the German viewpoint, might still have resulted in the Nazi downfall but at a much earlier date with far fewer casualties. Equally important, an earlier end to the war would have meant less time for the Nazi death camps to pursue their grisly work. Finally, an early negotiated settlement might have prevented an ideologically hostile Soviet Union from standing astride Eastern Europe at the war’s end.

The notions that war and politics are one and the same and that military power is a political instrument used for political purposes are particularly important in an era of limited wars for limited objectives. By definition, annihilation cannot be the objective in these situations. Military actions must be coupled with enlightened nonmilitary policies if we are to achieve satisfactory and lasting settlements of the issues in dispute.

Meaning to the Military

Our final concern must be the meaning of the foregoing to the military professional. Much of the material in the preceding paragraphs is foreign to the American military, cutting across the grain of the American military tradition that "there is no substitute for victory." Although there is no substitute, I have attempted to point out that military victory is not enough. Certainly the nearly unbroken series of military victories in Vietnam followed by an ignominious conclusion to our efforts there illustrates the point vividly

The unity of war and politics holds great significance for the military professional. If the military is only one instrument of power used in war, then the various instruments of power must be made to work in concert. If military victory does not necessarily overcome hostile will, then the military can no longer pay only lip service to the "other war," i.e, the battle for men’s minds. If the instruments of power are to work in concert, they must have a common objective. This brings us back to the absolute and unparalleled importance of the objective ends desired As we have seen, however, Americans have often confused means with ends in war.

Description is always easier than prescription. If one is to offer prescriptive advice to the military, it would seem the place to begin is with the objective. Thus any military leader should ask: What is the objective? It does not seem flippant to add that, having received an answer, the second question should be: What is really the objective? It is difficult to overstress the importance of a clear understanding of the objective. If we are to be successful in war, everything should flow from the objective.

One can also offer prescriptive advice concerning professional horizons. If we are to be able to meld military expediency with postwar objectives, the professional horizons of the military must not be limited to the narrow confines of the battlefield. Only by expanding our horizons can the military fully appreciate how nonmilitary instruments of power can contribute to winning both the war and the peace. Perhaps equally important, expanded horizons can aid us in recognizing how the different instruments of power can work at cross-purposes and thwart our pursuit of the objective. In sum, the military must broaden its professional horizons if it is to understand that winning the war is far different from winning the peace that follows.

Broader professional horizons saddle the professional military with a special burden in both an individual and institutional sense. From the individual’s viewpoint, the military leader’s capabilities and expertise are already heavily taxed by the scale, speed, destructiveness, and complexity of modern warfare. Broadening professional horizons to include political, economic, and technological considerations (among others) imposes an even heavier burden, requiring serious study and deep reflection. Institutionally, the need for broad horizons and complex traditional skills places a heavy burden on the military education and training system. The curricula offered by these institutions must, on one hand, provide a broad-based but integrated education concerning war and its many ramifications and, on the other, provide training for the peculiar technical skills required to prosecute combat operations. These are difficult tasks to which the military must devote considerable resources.

Finally, returning to the challenge of the Air Corps Tactical School assumptions at the beginning of this article: Did the School faculty accurately define the purposes of war? The answer is affirmative but with qualifications. If the ultimate purpose of war is to achieve a better state of peace, then these pioneer air-power theorists were correct when they proclaimed that the objective of war is to overcome the enemy’s hostile will. The faculty’s error was in equating compulsion with overcoming hostile will; they followed the American tradition if assuming that winning the war equated to winning the peace. To them, the fundamental issue concerned the relative abilities of land power, sea power, and air power to win the war. Not even this brilliant group fully understood that the fundamental issue concerned lie use of all political power instruments, military and nonmilitary alike, to truly overcome hostile will and win a better state of peace.

For many of the professional military, this most fundamental issue is not yet clear. If we do not, at long last, gain an understanding of the relationship between war, politics, and hostile will, we will condemn American fighting men to die in vain as we win each war while losing the peace that follows.

Air Command and Staff College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

1. Perhaps the best firsthand account of the Air Corps Tactical School philosophy is found in Haywood S. Hansell, Jr., The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Maxwell AFB, Alabama: Air University, 1973). See in particular Hansell’s quotation from a lecture by Lieutenant Colonel (later Lieutenant General) Harold L. George, p. 32-34.

2. There are many sources for this conclusion. For a discussion related specifically to U.S. foreign policy, see John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy since World War II (New York, 1971), pp. 3-20.

3. This was Russell F. Weigley’s main theme in The American Way of War (New York, 1973).

4. Quoted in R. E. Dupuy, Men of West Point (New York, 1951), p. 324.

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew (B.A., Willamette University; M.S., University of Wyoming) is Chief, Warfare Studies Division, Air Command and Staff College. He his served as missile combat crew commander and wing missile staff officer and at Hq SAC with duties on the CINCSAC Battle Staff. Colonel Drew is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air War College and a Distinguished Graduate of Air Command and Staff College. He is a previous contributor to the Review, and his article here is the second-prize winner in the first Ira C. Eaker Essay Competition.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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