Air University Review, March-April 1982

The Ideological Underpinnings
of Soviet Military Thought

The basis of military thought of a great power is inevitably sustained by the prevailing political philosophy of the time. Traditionally, the fundamental objective of armed forces has been to safeguard the national security, but that objective cannot exist exclusive of other national objectives. It is no accident, then, that nations with imperialistic ambitions have developed armed forces far greater than required for self- protection; and, at the other extreme, we may observe how in these unstable times certain nations have given up their fundamental objectives that they have given their self-security over to the force of reason rather than to the reason of force.

To a greater or lesser degree, military power is one of the favorite instruments of political action available to national leaders, but this utility is not necessarily a function of power. Military power in the hands of a statesman does not always translate into control; on the other hand, it is not unusual for a medium-sized power to achieve conquests out of proportion to its size. The possible variations depend on the interplay of strategic decisions and actions between the national leaders and the armed forces, as in the inner workings of a running engine.

The United States came out of World War II with an imposing military machine and a weapon then deemed by many as ultimate. But this favorable military position was not fully exploited by American political leaders. History thus shows us the paradox of a superpower that was politically defeated although the greatest military power in the world. Between 1946 and 1949, the "free" world inexplicably lost all the nations of Eastern Europe, and the Soviet Union buffered itself at the expense of Poland, East Germany, Hungary, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Bulgaria. In more recent times Vietnam, supported politically and logistically by the U.S.S.R. and China, afforded yet another political and military lesson that shook the internal stability of the United States.

As a consequence of those realities, the world today attends a drama that may prove tragic to human freedom. Its plot boils down to a total confrontation between two large blocks of nations, but with one antagonist lacking inner strength because of, among other reasons, a plurality of interests and a divided world vision. The absence of intellectual unity in nonsocialist nations determines their major weakness in the eyes of those that do adhere absolutely to one philosophical belief. Those nations incorrectly called "western and Christian" have until now offered no alternative that could replace a united world vision.

It would be difficult to undertake a study of Soviet military thought without first examining the philosophical roots that feed the state’s political doctrine, for military power to the Marxist-Leninist establishment is but an instrument of politics, and that notion is inextricably twined with its concept of peace, war, and politics.

Let us recall that Marxist philosophy, premised on an erroneous concept of elemental matter, posits a permanent and global confrontation which, by analogy, applies to the social environment, thereby defining problems that, though basically spurious, are foisted as realities into the daily life of the common man. So, notwithstanding its fundamental fallacies, Marxism is above all a social-political reality of undeniable consequence.

Marxist ideologists enunciate their postulates by framing them within the ideas formulated by Marx, Engels, and Lenin, and that orientation is also observed in the foundations of Soviet military thought. To prove this point and dispel all doubts, I shall advert to the statements of Boris N. Ponomarev, acting member of the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and head of the International Department of the Secretariat of CPSU. These positions keep Ponomarev in direct contact with all the Communist parties outside the U.S.S.R. Ponomarev, though having an obscure public image, is, with Mikhail Suslov, possibly one of the Party’s most important ideologists. Ponomarev, therefore, is actively involved in all matters concerning the strategies and tactics of "fraternal" Communist parties, the orchestration of the so-called "proletarian internationalism," and the coordination of activities of subordinate parties. Of the more significant acts of Ponomarev in recent times, two predominate: the planning of the takeover of Portugal, a failure for the present, and the virtual political destruction of "Eurocommunism," decreed in Paris in April 1980. Thus Ponomarev would seem to be a reliable spokesman of Soviet political thought and, by extension, a source for understanding the infrastructural basis of Soviet military thought.

It would be simplistic to study Soviet military thought apart from Marxist philosophy, its natural foundation. Unlike in any other ideology, military power is to Marxism-Leninism a means of political action aimed at putting violent pressure on those sectors that defend themselves against the assault of the Red wave.

By formulating irreconcilable differences, Marxist thought engenders the kind of violence it preaches. The peace it proposes is achieved only by subjugating nations to the principles of communism. Getting right to the point, Ponomarev asseverated that "the easing of tensions signifies the spread and intensification of the ideological struggle, which in no way can include the peaceful coexistence of conflicting ideologies." These declarations attest to the political arrogance characteristic of Marxist-Leninist ideas, and it behooves one to bear them in mind when considering any policy inclined to accept a coexistence with the Soviet sector.

Lenin breathed vitality and professionalism into the Marxist-Engelian philosophy and fortified it with a chain of ideas that accentuated its intrinsic aggressiveness. Notwithstanding his accord with Karl von Clausewitz’s On War, Lenin did not hesitate to twist the original concept of the Prussian general. Clausewitz defined war as "the continuation of politics by other means," while Lenin held that "war is the core of politics, its violent continuation by other means." Moreover, Clausewitz regarded war as a matter of external political affairs, whereas Lenin tended to see it as a matter of internal politics. From this perspective Lenin did a lot of original research and, within the framework of orthodox Marxist thought, drew many coherent conclusions, much to the danger of security in the non-Communist world. It would be pointless, therefore, to look for distinctions between political and military thought in the Marxist-Leninist ideology.

However, Lenin was not the only one to issue criteria and guidelines for Soviet military thought. Toward the end of the 1920s, Boris Shaposhnikov expressed in his book The Mind of the Army another idea that undoubtedly served to launch the anesthetic campaign for peaceful coexistence. Shaposhnikov reasoned that "if war is the continuation of politics by other means, then it is also true that peace, that is politics, is the continuation of war by other means." Thus the traditional distinction between war and peace was dissolved and replaced by a new conflict, continuous and without solution, in accordance with the Marxist Law of Dialectic. Shaposhnikov thereby attempted to eliminate a conventional idea that had prevailed prior to the triumph of bolshevism. The old distinction between war and peace was deliberately erased, and the two concepts were fused into the single idea of uninterrupted struggle. According to this new version of war and peace, the distinction was determined by the instrument at the center of all human activity, politics.

There are in Marxist philosophy certain political principles that provide the key for interpreting the military attitude of its adherents, in the U.S.S.R., as well as in other parts of the Communist world. Class struggle is to the Communists a socioeconomic reality that translates into a continuous battle between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat, between capitalists and workers.

Regarding that ongoing battle, the main spoils of which are the means of production, Marx expressed, unequivocally, that "Communists invariably oppose violence as an end in itself, and the degree to which it is applied depends on the behavior of the class enemies." This idea-principle constitutes the actual tactical version of the revolutionary war better known as peaceful coexistence, one of the better lures devised by international communism to trap the ingenuous. Lenin summed up his mentor’s doctrine by pointing out that "there is only one way to pose the question: either the bourgeois ideology, or the socialist ideology; in this there is no compromise." Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, former Defense Minister of the U.S.S.R., cast some light into that Leninist dialectic by stating that "no compromise is possible between the Communist and the bourgeois ideologies, and the conflict between the two is inevitable." As far as international communism is concerned, any kind of peaceful coexistence with non-Communist states is impossible, and therefore its global strategy aims to "annihilate capitalism," a catchall term for all philosophical concepts not in accord with leftist extremism. Today the U.S.S.R. is cultivating an international image of peace and compromise on all points, but daily events belie their sincerity; and their armed forces, the chief instrument of the Soviet’s political scheme, betray that great public farce. Under the guise of peaceful coexistence, the Soviets have advanced throughout the world at a minimal cost in comparison to the gains they have secured. Ethiopia, Angola, South Yemen, and Southeast Asia (Vietnam, Laos, and Cambodia) are the fruits of a military-political action coherently carried out and advisedly adjusted to Marxist-Leninist ideo-doctrinal principles.

As the military threat was intelligently intensified with the cooperation of a well-trained diplomatic corps, a climate of relaxing tensions and disarmament was claimed to deceive the leading nations of the non-Communist world. In a coordinated multifaceted operation, while SALT I and II entertained the Western powers, the Soviets strengthened their huge military machine, ensnared more countries in the network of proletarian internationalism, performed gestures of peace, and praised the coexistence of pluralistic ideologies.

But no one seemed to remember Marxist-Leninist convictions regarding war, politics, peace, and the coexistence of pluralistic ideologies; nor were the statements of officials like Ponomarev heeded. As he put it: "the struggle for peace and general disarmament is foreign to the national liberation movement," bearing in mind the evidence of a "growing influence of Communist parties in the national liberation movements [of non-Communist states]." At the same time, Ponomarev stresses that "peaceful coexistence favors all forms of liberation struggles," since the aid given by Communists throughout the world to those "who fight with arms against all manners of colonialists" does not conflict with the global tactic of "peaceful coexistence, but, rather, reinforces it."

According to Ponomarev, the peaceful coexistence of nations of diverse social systems "increases the possibilities of taking over power through a peaceful struggle," but it "does not in any way exclude the use of nonpeaceful methods if the situation requires it and the conditions are favorable." But more categorical still is his assertion that "under conditions of peaceful coexistence world Communism assumes a continuous offensive against the positions of capitalism." In that great global struggle, the participation of the U.S.S.R. will come to the fore as it "brings to bear on the revolutionary process an influence of increasing progression."

Those somber warnings may be construed as ideo-political swaggering by those unfamiliar with the resolve of communism, but they constitute a tragic reality suffered by the one-third of the world under the yoke of the manifold versions of local Communist forces; and, as Ponomarev explains, while CPSU "pays constant attention to national liberation movements, it lends them its omnidirectional assistance." And those who still believe that communism’s internal split between pro-Soviets and pro-Chinese has altered its fundamental political objectives ought to give careful thought to some of Ponomarev’s statements: "the unity of the international Communist movement presupposes as a matter of fact a unanimity in all things basic and fundamental, in the disposition for unity of action, despite the discrepancies that may exist between this or that theoretical or political matter."

Moreover, the CPSU ideologist formulates a disturbing if superficial balance of the results of that global tactic, and at the same time he reveals its true essence: "regarding peaceful coexistence as a form of class struggle on the world stage, the Communist movement has been able to intensify the action of the masses in the struggle against the thrall of capitalism," ever since, according to official political thought, there was perceived "an insoluble tie between the struggle for peaceful coexistence and the battle against imperialism."

In studying the infrastructural basis of military thought in the U.S.S.R., one cannot skip lightly over the version of peace professed by Marxist-Leninists, for such an oversight has caused many naïve political figures and others unfamiliar with Communist ideology to make serious errors. It boggles the mind to note how the U.S.S.R., notwithstanding her superaggressive political and military doctrines, can proclaim herself as the fervent defender of world peace and call herself a peaceful nation, as she tries to figure in every organized effort for world peace. Where is the ideological honesty in these displays? Where the political honesty?

As paradoxically as it may seem, the Soviets are sincere in their quest for peace; however, this sincerity is not as simple as it seems. One would have to interject a few clarifications in order to discern the true infrastructural basis of Soviet military thought.

The definition of Soviet peace is a matter of interpretation. According to Ponomarev, "the assurance of peace has contributed to the consolidation of revolutionary victories and has propitiated them. An international peace is one which best allows the realization of the goals of Communism." Lest any doubts remain as regards this definition of political doctrine bearing directly on military thought, that same ideologist remarked that "internationalism is the ideology and the practice of peace and friendship among nations."

The idea of peace held by Communists does not coincide with that of non-Communists, and therein lies the confusion, a confusion that the Soviets ably exploit through the kind of sociological manipulations that have become their trademark. In effect, the Soviets, as well as other Marxists, love "peace," but a distorted peace based on individual and social subjugation, voluntary or otherwise, and one in which revolutionary power makes possible the transformation of society along the lines of materialistic principles.

In that concept of peace there is a total absence of equanimity, of civilized coexistence, of mutual respect. Individual freedom is subordinated to collective interests as determined by an autocratic and repressive government, and man becomes a mere social object. It is necessary to make a clear interpretation of Communist peace, for every means of its revolutionary power is brought to bear toward its success in all areas. One of these means is the military, and, therefore, its doctrinal basis partakes of the Communist version of peace. The "Communist peace" presumes the elimination of "world wars from society, allowing nations and humanity as a whole to defeat capitalism with a minimum of social and material losses." For Ponomarev the attainment of that strategic vision of international communism would assure a society free of global conflicts.

Thus it is revealed that Marxist ideology is not loath to a bloody war carried to extreme, and, in that sense, the Communist conscience comforts itself by considering that "the responsibility for the victims does not fall on the revolutionary classes." In Marxist terms, the genocide the Red forces practiced and continue to practice in Laos, Vietnam, Angola, Ethiopia, and Central America is the undesirable consequence of the opposition of those who fight against Communist expansion.

The problem lies in the refusal of free societies to surrender to revolutionary pretensions. Were it not for that rebellion against the loss of freedom, the inalienable right of all human beings, an idyllic peace would prevail. As we can see, the problem boils down to a slight discrepancy between the world visions of each sector. According to Ponomarev, "the greatest and most monstrous crime committed by imperialism against humanity is the battle it wages against socialism." Yet it is interesting to note that the Polish people, under a socialist regime for more than three decades, have recently abnegated the system.

The rooting of Soviet military thought in political philosophy is absolute, unlike any other case in history. That opportunistic concept of sociopolitical justice is extended to the notion of war and serves to determine, from a unilateral point of view, the legitimacy or illegitimacy of each individual conflict. The patterns of Communist classification reflect Leninist ideas to the effect that wars are judged "just or progressive" when they have a "liberating" intent, that is, if the war aims to liquidate a regime that happens to differ with socialism. On the other hand, wars are "unjust or reactionary" when waged by the armed forces of non-Communist governments to stem the tide of a tyrannical power.

The opinions of Marshal Grechko evince the inflexible position of Marxism-Leninism, which maintains that its dogmatic "truths" are not to be subjected to any clarifying dialogue with advocates of other doctrines. The "scientificism" they attach to all their premises crumbles when we note they are mere assertions that cannot resist a rigorous test. Communist thinkers isolate themselves in their shells and scorn all open debate.

Thus Grechko brazenly affirmed that "any war waged by the imperialists on the U.S.S.R. or other socialist states will always be unjust and reactionary; but waged by the U.S.S.R. or other socialists states against the imperialists, any war would be just and progressive, for it would be the continuation of revolutionary policy."

Ponomarev accentuates a threat existing in every corner of the world where a revolutionary struggle is seething. This threat is clear and hangs over all non-Communists who choose to defend their political self-determination and individual free will. "The Communists have supported and will always support just wars [Marxist definition]: wars in defense of social progress, of national liberation, and the insurrection of people against imperialistic oppression." This Soviet vow must not be ignored.

Without examining every angle of Soviet political thought in depth, we can draw valid conclusions about the basis of the infrastructure of Soviet military thought. Ponomarev warns the non-Marxist world that until now Communists have no major reason to consider themselves fully satisfied with their accomplishments, and he observes that the mobilization of their foreign policy is an excellent way to spur the development of socialism.

The political aims of communism are clear and definitive, and its leaders have avouched that they will spare no intellectual or material means to make those aims a reality. And of all these means, Soviet military thought stands out as one of the most frightening instruments created by the Communists to perpetrate their onslaught on the rest of the world.

Soviet Military Thought

The U.S.S.R. is the leading Communist nation, despite the declaration of their officials to the contrary. Yet Boris Ponomarev himself, at the 24th CPSU Congress of 1971, indicated that all domestic and global revolutionary victories have had as their main collaborator the Communist Party of the Soviet Union. French Communist leader Georges Marchais corroborated the role played by CPSU, stating that "all freedom movements, all struggles for social emancipation, national independence, and peace rely on the support and aid of world socialism and, most of all, on the U.S.S.R. This high rank among Communist states accords CPSU a significant political-military representation. The U.S.S.R. cannot deny her leadership despite her efforts to veil it.

Since Soviet military thought sets the example for Communist nations, an analysis of its structure would be useful in proposing ways to deal with the military factor in Marxist-Leninist ideology. In any non-Communist society, the armed forces are justified by virtue of the necessity to protect the national interest, regardless of the government in power. Such an interest has a permanence and transcendence beyond current problems, the government in power being merely a transitory element.

The Soviet Armed Forces, on the other hand, were created to serve as an "instrument of defense for revolutionary conquests," as was expressed by Marshal Andrei Antonovich Grechko (1903-76), who was not only a military man but also a distinguished politician who enjoyed the confidence of the Kremlin. From Grechko’s statements we see that the purposes of the Red armed forces differ considerably from those of non-Marxist countries. In the Soviet Union, the armed forces serve the Marxist-Leninist revolution and work to defend its existence and continuity, above any other social or national objective. As the Communists see it, no other function is more important, and, therefore, their military thought assumes a profoundly political tone.

It is important to understand why Communists say that their regime creates "a new army on account of its principles," an army whose task is "to defend the revolutionary victories of the workers." If the function of the Soviet Armed Forces is political, then it is easy to understand the influence of CPSU in the ideodoctrinal and professional life of military organizations; since having asserted itself as the vanguard of the state and society, it becomes, as a matter of fact, the directing center. This principle explains the control imposed at the political level on the military establishment.

Such are the differences between Soviet military thought and that of non-Communist nations, that Marshal Grechko accused the armed forces of these nations of being reactionary and imperialistic, because they "attempt to impede the practical realization of peaceful coexistence among nations of different social systems." This idea of Grechko’s betrays an absence of professional priorities and attributes to the armed forces a partisan political role inconsistent with military tradition.

A knowledge of this break of the politicized Soviet Armed Forces with military tradition will enable us to assess the extent of the danger descending on the free world. To the degree that it correctly understands the mission of the military forces serving Marxism-Leninism, the free world will discern with greater clarity the impossibility of any kind of negotiations or overtures aimed at a theoretical easing of tensions.

SALT I and II sufficiently illustrate the point: behind the mask of those documents the "new army" has grown in alarming measure, in open contradiction of the diplomatic intentions professed by the Soviets. "The Soviet state is the most peaceful of nations; it is a stranger to goals of conquest or to unjust wars," declared Grechko. His words bear a sincerity deadly to the future of the free world.

Perhaps the non-Communist world forgets that the Soviet version of peace, democracy, war, coexistence, and mutual respect departs from traditional meaning. Perhaps they also forget that Marxism-Leninism not only pretends to be a revolutionary ideology but that in fact it is one; and that its aims render it a real threat to all conflicting thought. This poor memory with respect to the essence of communism has put the free world in a very serious state of defenselessness.

The control of the armed forces by the CPSU constitutes their main organizational aspect, which evinces the absolute subordination of the military sector to the political. That explains why the screening process for service in the armed forces is based on political loyalty to official dogma and to the CPSU. Another principle that warns us about the infrastructure of Soviet military thought is compulsory adherence to proletarian internationalism, which promotes the material and intellectual expansion of communism as part of the political-military formations called "local."

According to norm, Soviet military forces have to be constantly prepared to repel any type of aggression, without distinguishing between aggression originating within the country or from outside its borders. This principle merely restates the role that the CPSU assigns the armed forces: to serve as bodyguards of the "Communist vanguard," the implication being that the Party is the main justification for the existence of the armed forces.

Proletarian internationalism creates permanent commitments that frequently prove risky because of the need for direct involvement. Grechko used to emphasize the need to reinforce the indoctrination of military organizations to prepare them for their increasingly active international role. Today, the Soviets employ countless "advisers"—military and civilian—to instruct the armed forces of other socialist governments, to assist the governments themselves, and to collaborate in the repression of a frequently active opposition.

Gradually, the armed forces of the Soviet Union have become influential in foreign policy, passively as well as actively: in the first instance by dissuasion or by veiled threats; in the second instance, through a variety support to "fraternal" socialist forces and to outlaw groups (guerrillas) engaged in wars of national liberation.

Grechko correctly observed that the international role of the Soviet Armed Forces had increased substantially and that this resulted from the expansion of territories controlled by Marxists. "As world socialism formed," he said, "the role of defense took on a broader international character." For communism, the armed forces is one of the main instruments of peace, but, of course, the peace meant here is Pax Sovietica.

The current programs of the CPSU also dispel all doubts regarding the interventionist policy of the Soviet Armed Forces and those of other Communist nations, particularly with respect to their readiness to quell uprisings in any socialist state. This program affirms that "the USSR considers it her international duty to guarantee, jointly with all other socialist nations, the security and defense of the entire socialist camp." This concept was used by Leonid Brezhnev this past decade to premise his theory of limited sovereignty for Communist states.

The pretext of "limited sovereignty" has been more than sufficient to pose the threat of Soviet intervention in any socialist nation; and from a military perspective, in accord with this basically imperialistic concept, Grechko held that "to observe national sovereignty does not imply setting the interests of one socialist nation against those of another. The sovereignty of a socialist nation consists not only of its right to independence but also of its responsibility to the future of socialism, as part of the community of sister nations, the Communist movement, and the international proletariat."

This latent threat to the independence of socialist nations is crystal clear, and it makes no allowances for departures from the Communist line. Should a socialist nation attempt to achieve full independence, it would incur the wrath and subsequent intervention of the Communist fraternity. The freedoms accorded to individuals and nations in the Marxist camp can be exercised only within the narrow guidelines fixed by doctrine, and the Soviet Armed Forces stand ready to enforce this principle. Grechko stated that "we have never concealed nor do we conceal now the basic principles of our military policy. These principles can be clearly seen in the policies of the Communist party and of the Soviet government, as well as in the armed forces."

This spirit of political determination led Grechko to justify the necessity of continually increasing Soviet military training and promoting the international activities of the armed forces. The Communist territorial expansion brought about a corresponding expansion of responsibilities on the part of the Soviet Union to control other nations, as the Hungarians, East Germans, Poles, and Czechs well know. But as new territorial acquisitions became geographically more remote, fresh problems arose.

The Soviet Communists solved those complex operational problems by being practical. Cuba (in Latin America and Africa) and Vietnam (in Asia) were recruited as Soviet enforcers; thus, the Soviets spared themselves the trouble of participating directly in international police actions or intervening in the increasingly frequent wars of "liberation." The Cuban involvement in Africa, Latin America, and the Middle East has obligated Castro to commit some 20,000 members of his armed forces in addition to an undetermined number of technicians, advisers, and other personnel specialized in subjugation and indoctrination. In Asia, particularly in the southeast, the Vietnamese have been obligated to employ about 180,000 men in the neighboring nations of Laos and Cambodia to extend the new pro-Soviet bamboo curtain.

One of the more noticeable flaws in the defense of non-Communist nations is a lack of political understanding of the military reasoning of Soviet leaders. This lack of understanding has existed throughout their history of relations with Communist nations. They have failed to realize that in the U.S.S.R. there is no military thought independent of official ideology, nor are the armed forces there, as in non-Communist countries, dedicated primarily to the security and protection of purely national interests. The Soviet Armed Forces, according to official dogma, are comprised of men characterized by their socialistic conscience and their Marxist-Leninist vision of the world. This ideological makeup renders them professional guardians of the imaginary socialist castle, and, consequently, their chief role can be no other than the preservation of ideological progress and the destruction of all enemies of Marxism-Leninism, internal as well as external.

The Red armed forces constitute an instrument of submission operated by an exclusive and elitist corps: the CPSU. They are not at the service of the community, nor do they attend primarily to the traditional requirements of national security. This awesome political-military machine is geared to maintaining the ascendancy of a sole political party, according to the will of the elitist Politburo. Therein lies the substantive difference between the Soviet Armed Forces and those of non-Communist nations.

Soviet military thought ties in with Marxist-Leninist thought and is nothing more than the practical side of an arbitrary doctrine. This explains the aid extended by the Red armed forces to all revolutionary forces of the extreme left. The internationalist commitment they assume as an armed branch of the CPSU paves their way for intervention, directly or indirectly, no matter in what part of the world, their presence usually revealing itself through their ubiquitous advisers and through their contribution of weapons to equip regular as well as outlaw forces.

Their version of international responsibility makes the Soviet Armed Forces a threat to the rest of the world. Without their ideological vestment, Soviet officers and soldiers are no different from those of other countries; but invested with Marxism-Leninism, they vitalize a most infernal war machine.

No matter how sincere, overtures by non-Communist countries will have no effect on the efforts of the Soviet Armed Forces to carry out their ideological-political mandate. It is impossible to change the designs of communism through dialogue. The Communists see only one invariable solution: the subjugation of the whole world under communism and the eradication of capitalism or any other enemy ideology.

Marxism-Leninism has subverted traditional military thought, and, for that reason, it is impossible to put faith in such solutions as SALT I and II. Any political document that attempts to curb the Communist doctrine of military threat is doomed beforehand to total failure. The CPSU is not about to deviate from its ulterior motives, or to postpone them, unless they are checked by superior force. And that force need not be purely physical, that is, military. It could consist of a willingness to act if circumstances require it. The Cuban missile crisis is a memorable and effective example of that kind of willingness, and it enables us to confirm that Marxist progress is not fueled so much by real power as by weak opposition on the part of the non-Marxist world.

Soviet military thought is the military reflection of Marxist-Leninist thought; the two are indivisible. In the U.S.S.R. there is no pure military professionalism, nor is such a purity conceivable in Communist terms. Article 31 of the 1977 Constitution of the U.S.S.R. clearly frames the defense of the "socialist Fatherland"—not the Fatherland alone—and establishes that "with the purpose of protecting socialist triumphs, the peaceful works of the Soviet people, the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the State, the Soviet Armed Forces have been created." Let there be no doubt, then, as to the first and foremost goal of the Soviet Armed Forces: the unwavering defense of the socialist Fatherland.

The foregoing observations on Soviet military thought invariably lead us to a most pessimistic conclusion regarding the true meaning of world peace. The Third World War was tacitly declared years before the Second World War. When the first Communist Party took power in a real country—czarist Russia—communism matured from theory to practice. Revolutionary struggle ceased being an idea and became a reality that few men were able to see in time to check it, and Soviet military thought took wing attendant to the most sensational ideopolitical adventure of all time. The true leaders—the Politburo of the CPSU—of the Soviet military establishment are waging an offensive strategy of such subtlety that the physical presence of the Red armed forces is hardly needed.

The armed forces of non-Marxist countries, especially those at the front line of defense, must wake up to reality and abandon their usual defensive strategy. As any military manual teaches, to give the enemy the initiative is tantamount to defeat. To retreat before political blackmail is a concession to an illusory and impossible peace which signifies the turning over of our destiny to an enemy that has sworn to hang us with the very rope we sell him.

Fundamentals for the Understanding and Interpretation of a New War, Aeronautic Circle, Argentina, 1976.

Marshal Andrei A. Grechko, The Armed Forces of the Soviet State, Progress Editorial, Moscow.

Boris Ponomarev, Topics on the Revolutionary Movement, International Peace and Socialism Editorial, Prague, 1975.

Comodoro José C. D’Odorico, Argentine Air Force Retired, is presently director of Aeroespacio magazine and Professor of Revolutionary War in the Argentine Air War College, where he also serves as an advisor. Comodoro D’Odorico attended the Inter-american Defense College, Washington, D.C., in the class of 1970.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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