Air University Review, March-April 1982
by
Colonel George E. Daniels
Air Force Regulation 1-2 (22 November 1978) establishes the need for a USAF operational doctrine entitled Reconnaissance (AFM 2-11), thus emphasizing the lack of current reconnaissance doctrine. It may be indicative of the importance of doctrine in general or, more specifically, the degree of interest shown for the mission of reconnaissance that accounts for the lack of such information. Without an authoritative document to expand the principles established in basic doctrine and provide direction for the employment of aerospace resources, it is easy to see why numbers of reconnaissance assets have dwindled, control has vacillated, and the needs are difficult to define. Thus, because of this obvious deficiency, a new approach to a reconnaissance operational doctrine seems vital.
Surveillance and reconnaissance constitute one of the nine basic operational missions of the Air Force established in AFM 1-1. It is especially important to recognize the operational nature of these missions and that the definition of both surveillance and reconnaissance be understood. *According to JCS Publication 1:
* All definitions throughout the articles are taken from The Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms, JCS Publication 1, 3 September 1974, unless otherwise indicated.
Reconnaissance—A mission undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy; or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographic, or geographic characteristics of a particular area.
Surveillance—The systematic observation of aerospace, surface, or subsurface areas, places, persons, or things by visual, aural, electronic, photographic, or other means.
While surveillance and reconnaissance appear similar in purpose, the main difference is in specification and duration. AFM 1-1 states that surveillance systems collect information continuously while reconnaissance missions are directed toward localized or specific targets. Surveillance and reconnaissance systems are the eyes and ears of the political and military structure through which the necessary information is gained to support the decisionmaking process. The importance of this mission cannot be overlooked.
Basic doctrine is specific in defining strategic and tactical surveillance and reconnaissance operations and the relationship between them. The important factor to recognize in this relationship is that the function being supported determines if it is strategic or tactical, not the command that performs the mission or trains the crews. Neither is it the department nor agency that funds the platform. Thus the myth of national reconnaissance, strategic reconnaissance, and tactical reconnaissance operating as separate and distinct entities with individual purposes may be dissolved.
AFM 1-1 provides basic guidance as to the nature of strategic and tactical surveillance and reconnaissance.
Strategic surveillance and reconnaissance operations support our needs for national and strategic intelligence. They also help fill the information requirements of the tactical commanders. Through these strategic operations, we can assess the total capability of a foreign nation to wage war, and can monitor the progress of a war. These operations provide information that is essential to:
Identify targets for strategic and tactical attack.
Provide indications and warning of hostile intent and actions. . . .
Assess damage to enemy and friendly targets.
Determine force structure.
Determine our requirements for research and development of warfighting systems.
Help verify compliance with treaties and agreements.
Tactical surveillance and reconnaissance operations support the theater and the tactical field commander. When these tactical systems are assigned targets, the resulting information may fill both national and strategic intelligence requirements. Tactical systems provide indications of hostile intent, plus information from which intelligence is derived. These surveillance and reconnaissance systems provide information on:
The disposition, composition, and movement of enemy forces.
The location of enemy lines of communication, installations, and electronic emissions.
Post-strike damage.
Conditions in surface battle areas.
Weather and terrain.
The use to which the information is put determines the strategic or tactical nature of the collection operation. The operational mission of collecting information is known as surveillance and reconnaissance.
Surveillance and reconnaissance do not exist for their own purpose. Therefore, it is necessary to discuss the information product, the relationship to intelligence, and disciplines employed. The JCS Publication 1 definitions are important at this point:
Information (intelligence)—Unevaluated material of every description, including that derived from observations, reports, rumors, imagery, and other sources which, when processed, may produce intelligence.
Intelligence—The product resulting from the collection, evaluation, analysis, integration, and interpretation of all information concerning... foreign countries or areas.
Strategic intelligence--Intelligence which is required for the formation of policy and military plans at national and international levels.
Tactical intelligence--Intelligence which is required for the planning and conduct of tactical operations . . . . tactical intelligence and strategic intelligence differ only in scope, point of view, and level of employment.
While the basic definitions may appear to quibble over semantics, it is important to realize that the basic product of the surveillance and reconnaissance operational missions is information and that it only becomes intelligence after it has been transformed through the processes defined above. This does not mean that information has no direct value. The conversion to intelligence is often time-consuming; therefore, information provided to satisfy the needs of combat commanders directly is combat information. It has been defined as combat information.
Combat information—Unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander, which, due to its highly perishable nature or the critical timing of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user tactical intelligence requirements.
The interrelationships of surveillance, reconnaissance, information, and intelligence have been extracted from JCS Pub. 1 and AFM 1-1 to provide clarification. The specific expansion of principles and procedures governing the processing, production, and dissemination of intelligence will be addressed in AFM 2-10, Intelligence (forthcoming).
The methods used to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance are best described by the intelligence discipline supported. The general categories of imagery and signals intelligence (SIGINT) can be used to describe collection activities that cover the major portions of the electromagnetic spectrum. While each is a specialty unto itself, it is necessary to understand a description in general terms, some applications, and significant capabilities and limitations of each discipline.
imagery
Imagery, as defined in JCS Pub. 1, consists of "collectively, the representations of objects reproduced electronically or by optical means on film, electronic display devices or other media."
Photography is the oldest mechanical means of conducting surveillance and reconnaissance, dating back to the box camera and balloon. The cameras and films of today are highly sophisticated and provide what is generally considered by commanders as the ultimate intelligence product, a picture. While it may be worth a thousand words and serve as hard evidence on the battlefield or at the conference table, it is not totally infallible. Dummy equipment, derelict vehicles, and camouflage are used to deceive the viewer. Optical photography requires sufficient light to expose the film, either daylight or with photoflash augmentation as well as direct viewing of the subject, unrestricted by weather phenomenon. Infrared film is often used to overcome camouflage; at night, because it records variations of relative temperatures, it is passive in nature and does not unnecessarily expose the position of the reconnaissance platform as does photoflash augmentation. The greatest limitation in film-based photography is the time required to deliver, process, and interpret the imagery after the target has been acquired. The greatest advantage is the detail so necessary when trying to locate, identify, and determine the size of the enemy force.
Radar imagery is produced by an active sensor that emits and records the reflected signal. Radar provides a standoff capability and is a day/night all-weather sensor. The product requires sophisticated processing and specialized interpretation skills, but because of its electronic nature it is possible to digitize and data link relay the image, thus making it a near-real-time sensor. Radar is a very good wide area surveillance sensor capable of providing target location; however, it is not capable of specific identification unless it is correlated with data collected simultaneously from other disciplines. Dispersal patterns, field formations, and knowledge of enemy tactics provide clues to identify general categories of equipment. Knowing the presence of tanks, artillery, or bridging operations may satisfy the combat information requirements of a commander while other sources and disciplines are employed to gain specifics such as type and caliber. It is possible to improve the identification capability of radar sensors within the constraints of time and fiscal practicability.
Nonimaging infrared sensors provide the battle commander the ability to detect and track missiles and identify impact areas. They may also be used to track certain types of aircraft. The heat emissions of exhausts provide the necessary data, even though the vehicle itself may not be seen. Heat emissions from power generators or distribution lines may aid in locating unit headquarters or communication nodes even without transmission.
Another type of infrared system capable of cockpit display or data link relay is forward-looking infrared (FLIR). This sensor system functions on relative differential temperature measurement but records and displays electronically rather than on film, as in the case of photographic infrared. The system is totally passive and can produce scenes of the battlefield in detail that allow identification of equipment without regard to light level. There are restrictions caused by weather that may totally or partially attenuate the temperature measurement and thus restrict its use.
intelligence disciplines
Signals intelligence is "a category of intelligence information comprising all communications intelligence, electronics, intelligence, and telemetry intelligence."
As seen by this definition, there are specialties or disciplines within the broad general category of SIGINT, each of which provides a unique type of information. The definition of each specialty found in JCS Pub. 1 is fairly descriptive.
Communications intelligence (COMINT) is the "technical and intelligence information derived from foreign communications by other than the intended recipients." It is through COMINT that the battle commander is able to gain the most vital information, intent. If the directions being given to enemy forces can be accurately determined in sufficient time to allow the battle commander to take counteractions, the effect of the enemy intention may be negated. This is not without its difficulty or flaws, however. The practice of communication security by the enemy is designed specifically to deny unauthorized persons information of value or to mislead their interpretation. Even though the enemy’s intention may be overheard, its accuracy must be determined.
Electronics intelligence (ELINT) is the "technical and intelligence information derived from foreign, non-communications, electromagnetic radiations emanating from other than nuclear detonations or radioactive sources." Search and acquisition radars and tracking systems emit electronic signals that when collected may provide the battle commander the ability to locate and identify the enemy air defense systems. Many of the characteristics of electronic systems such as radars are unique and provide reliable identification when properly analyzed. Knowledge of the electronic order of battle (EOB) of the enemy is essential for planning offensive action against him in order that concentrations of firepower may be avoided or destroyed as required.
Closely related to ELINT but requiring uniquely different collection and analysis is a discipline known as radiation intelligence (RINT). RINT is the "intelligence derived from the collection and analysis of non-information bearing elements extracted from the electromagnetic energy unintentionally emanated by foreign devices, equipments, and systems, excluding those generated by the detonation of atomic/nuclear weapons."
The key words are "unintentionally emanated." For example, a radar acquisition system may be operating in a standby mode, while the intended target is being tracked optically. The electronics portion of the system may be operating under full power with the exception that the transmitter output has been routed by switch action to ground or to what is known as a dummy load rather than to the antenna. Some of this electronic power inevitably escapes and may be recorded, and even though the enemy is not transmitting, he may be emitting. A much simpler example of unintentional radiation is that caused by the ignition system of the family car and heard in the radio unless an attenuation device is installed. The collection and analysis of these spurious signals provide information to the combat commander when the enemy has no intentions of displaying an active electronic presence.
Telemetry intelligence (TELINT) is the "technical and intelligence information derived from the intercept, processing, and analysis of foreign telemetry."
A study of the guidance and control signals being transmitted to a missile, for example, may reveal much information about the operating parameters of the missile. If such analysis could be done fast enough, it might even identify the location of the intended target.
The mentioned disciplines identify in a broad sense the collection capabilities required by the Air Force. Each is a unique field with specialties and subspecialties of its own. However it is through the application of these capabilities, either independently or in combination, that we are able to acquire the necessary information about the enemy to satisfy the decision-making process at all levels.
In order for the surveillance and reconnaissance disciplines to be applied effectively, we must first establish objectives. This is more than identification of the enemy. It must first be determined if the information will be used for strategic intelligence, tactical intelligence, or combat information. Within these broad categories, we must then determine the nature of the specific missions being supported. This will assist in determining the accuracy, timeliness, and frequency of the collection. For example, if indications and warning information are required, the collection must be accurate, timely, and nearly continuous. On the other hand, if scientific and technical data are required to determine the status of a foreign nation’s research and development efforts, the collection must be accurate; timeliness and frequency of collection may be determined when a testing event takes place. Therefore, collection may be more periodic than continuous.
It is important to note at this point the nature and value of timeliness. For information or intelligence to be of any value, it must arrive at the decision-maker in the proper form and in time to impact the decision being made. Information or intelligence that does not or cannot arrive in time may in fact have a negative value. Information that is sent to the decision-maker unnecessarily or after the decision has been made may cause other vital information being transmitted also to be delayed beyond the time when it could have an impact on decisions. Persons working throughout the surveillance, reconnaissance, and intelligence communities must be keenly aware of both the value of information and its negative value.
It is important to understand the sources of authority for the Air Force to conduct surveillance and reconnaissance and the fact that it is not done solely for the Air Force. Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 and The Unified Action Armed Forces, JCS Pub. 2, identify as a primary function of the Air Force to: "Furnish close combat and logistical air support to the Army to include tactical reconnaissance and aerial photography." And "provide adequate, timely and reliable intelligence."
Not only is it important that the Air Force be organized, trained, and equipped to collect information and produce intelligence but, more important, it is recognized that this function is vital to Army operations. The degree to which the Army depends on the Air Force for support is spelled out in great detail in Army Field Manual 100-5, Operations. It is not necessary to specify in the same detail in this document the types and methods of support. It is vitally important, however, to recognize that surveillance and reconnaissance systems must provide different levels of support and meet different limitations of timeliness and accuracy, depending on the echelon of command being supported.
The Army has defined the battlefield by zones of responsibility and intelligence needs of the commanders responsible for each zone. The distances given are not exact but can be used for Army planning purposes.
The captain’s zone at company level extends from the forward line of own troops (FLOT) to 4-5 kilometers (km). Combat information is needed to support direct fire operations, and this information is virtually impossible to provide by other than organic means, such as gun sights and night observation devices. Very little outside support is expected, but the Air Force should remain aware of this need by troops in contact with the enemy. Should technology provide a simple solution in the future, integration of support must be explored. Emphasis must remain on simple solutions; otherwise the captain will rapidly receive negative value combat information that could prove fatal.
The colonel’s zone at battalion and brigade level extends from the FLOT to the fire support coordination line and includes the captain’s zones of the companies under their command. Colonels need both intelligence and combat information in order to see the enemy. They worry about the forward edge of the second echelon of enemy reinforcements, determine their movement, and control the friendly indirect fire weapons, counterfire, and direct tactical maneuver. Air Force surveillance and reconnaissance activities should be capable of providing support in this zone, which is not accomplished without difficulty, however. The problem of sorting out which battalion commander needs which bit of information may prove extremely difficult. Technology in data handling devices may offer some solutions when coupled with procedures such as templating (also described in FM 100-5). The emphasis again must be on simplicity because the battalion operates under extremes of field conditions and cannot be burdened with over-sophistication and negative value information.
In the U.S. Army view, the general’s zone at division and corps level extends from the FLOT to 150 km and includes the zones of colonels. From this zone the enemy will provide tactical reinforcement and support. The Army looks to the Air Force to provide surveillance and reconnaissance in this area by either standoff or penetration tactics. While time constraints for reporting information from these areas is not as restrictive, it is important to remember that if the distance from the FEBA that enemy actions can be detected equals time to react, then time cannot be eroded due to poor communications or faulty procedures. The value of information becomes critical because of the volume to be handled from such a large area. It becomes essential that the most important elements necessary for decision-making be identified in advance and that efforts be undertaken to satisfy them as quickly and directly as possible.
While the Air Force is satisfying the surveillance and reconnaissance needs of the Army, it must also do the same for its own forces and possibly for the National Command Authorities and strategic planners. Some of the information will be of use to all organizations, but it is a mistake to believe there is a high degree of overlap. The fine detail required for targeting weapons is unnecessary for strategic planning. The technical information required to satisfy a research and development question may go far beyond the needs of a combat soldier or airman who only needs to know what is where, when, and how many.
A workable management system should be established to satisfy a wide variety of users; it must be able to integrate the needs of all users and match them with appropriate collection resources. Tactics must be developed in coordination with the organizations being supported to assure that the needs are understood and the best system capability is applied to each task.
Within the Department of Defense, the procedures for tasking collection resources are governed in general by JCS Publication 2. The flow of intelligence requirements follows command channels with the Director, Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA), having validation authority. Requests are forwarded from component commands, through the unified and specified commands, to the Director, DIA, acting for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Once requests have been validated, the tasking for collection is passed to the agency or command responsible for operation of the particular collection resource.
Assets operated by Strategic Air Command are tasked through the joint reconnaissance center in the Pentagon to the strategic reconnaissance center at SAC Headquarters, and hence to the operational unit. Some assets are tasked through specific procedures established by the intelligence community, and these vary by discipline. For specific details refer to AFM 2-10.
Collection resources assigned to a specific theater of operation must be managed through a centralized collection management office (CMO). The CMO is responsible for receiving requests, determining the most appropriate resource for collection, tasking the unit operating the resource (either directly or through applicable procedures), and maintaining a follow-up on request satisfaction through feedback. While it would be highly desirable to have a single CMO in each theater of operations, it is often not possible due to command arrangements or combined operations. In such cases the Air Force component should establish a CMO to coordinate the collection activities with other component commands to ensure maximum use of available resources and preclude unnecessary collection duplication.
The Air Force must pursue the surveillance and reconnaissance mission because it supports the intelligence needs of the NCA, DOD, and our allies. Without knowledge of what is happening in the world around us, we will be unable to identify our potential enemies, know the threat they pose to us, or be able to defeat them should the need arise.
To have a viable surveillance and reconnaissance capability, we must identify in detail the information needs of those we are tasked to support, determine the conditions under which the data must be collected, and assess the continuous or periodic nature of the collection. Technology must then be applied by discipline to determine the specific sensor required to accomplish the collection and under what operating parameters. Then and only then should we begin to evaluate the platform necessary to accomplish the mission. Technology must not be allowed to drive collection simply because it is possible. If there is no requirement, information collected under those conditions is of negative value.
Starting with a platform and trying to determine what surveillance or reconnaissance missions it could perform has been done successfully several times—in fact, it is our normal method. The fallacy is that we often spend valuable and scarce resources in an attempt to make sensors operate under less than optimum conditions or develop an operational profile that is unrealistic for the mission. Serious consideration must be given to the needs of those being supported. When quantified in even gross terms and coupled with templating procedures to streamline the transformation of information to intelligence, it will be possible to develop the rudiments of force structure.
The size of the surveillance and reconnaissance force must be determined by the importance placed on the need for information. Indeed, this need may be greater than bullets or bombs or the platforms that dispense them. The Air Force must vigorously pursue this important mission with creative and innovative ideas. Technology must not be chased but effectively applied to ensure that the information collected and delivered to the requester always retains its value.
Air War College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama
Contributor
Colonel George E. Daniels (B.A., Ohio Wesleyan University) is Commander of the 601st Combat Support Group, Sembach Air Base, Germany. He has served as aircraft commander in the F-86D/L, T-33, T-39, and RF-4C and in command positions in reconnaissance assignments. Colonel Daniels served at the Pentagon in the Doctrine Development and Space Operations Divisions. He is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and the Air War College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.
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