Air University Review, March-April 1982

Promoting Leadership in the
Air Force’s Management Environment

A widespread and increasingly articulated belief is that American society lacks effective leadership and that manager and leader may not be synonymous concepts. The popular press decries the lack of leadership in a broad spectrum, ranging from the presidency to the corporate business community. And official and semiofficial military sources have not neglected the issue. Nor has it been ignored in fiction: Anton Myrer’s Once an Eagle vividly portrays the problem. Every officer knows many Courtney Massengales driven by careerism and too few Sam Damons selflessly performing their duty and inspiring their subordinates.

Fiction often comes closer than reality in conforming to academic concepts. There is some validity in labeling George C. Marshall, Dwight Eisenhower, Omar Bradley, and Henry "Hap" Arnold as managers and William Halsey, George Patton, Jimmy Doolittle and Curtis LeMay as leaders, but such distinctions are not clear-cut or definitive. One may question whether management and leadership differ and whether managers can be leaders, but there is little question that the U.S. Armed Forces, especially the combat arms, face critical requirements for traditional leadership. If there are too few Air Force leaders, it may be that impediments within the system prevent the emergence and development of leaders.

This article, then, addresses differences between leaders and managers and the need for leaders. In a more pragmatic vein, it suggests that the Air Force can foster leadership development through several positive changes in concepts of occupationalism, centralization, and careerism. A proper leadership climate in the military must be based on institutionalism, especially in the flying corps, and commanders must be given the necessary authority and time to develop leadership qualities in themselves and their subordinates.

Leaders and Managers

For a number of years, the Air Force has assumed, perhaps unwittingly, that leadership and management are different aspects of the same subject. People who subscribe to this view perceive that the Air Force has enhanced management skills at the expense of leadership abilities. The process began under General George Marshall as a means of mobilizing the nation for World War II, and it was perfected under Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara in the early 1960s. Management involves planning, organizing, staffing, directing, and controlling, and it is job oriented to the extent that people are viewed merely as instruments to accomplish jobs. Managerial motivators are money, prestige, promotions, and other material rewards. On the other hand, leadership involves natural and learned abilities, personal skills, and characteristics that inspire responsible subordinate actions through interpersonal relationships. Sustained peacetime leadership requires the same job expertise, self-discipline, and sense of responsibility required by management, but it also requires self-respect and adherence to moral and ethical principles. The leadership role involves instinct, intelligence, knowledge, craft, example, persuasion, inspiration, compromise, and patience to develop consensus among followers. Leaders are motivated by service, psychic and ritualistic rewards, high codes of conduct, and strong moral values.¹

Another view is advanced by Abraham Zaleznik: "Leaders and managers are basically different types of people, [and] the conditions favorable to the growth of one may be inimical to the other."² Under this view, managerial traits are linked with the conservative tendencies of large bureaucratic organizations. Managers are problem solvers, but they avoid risks because they are survival motivated. They are persistent, tough-minded, hard working, intelligent, and analytical individuals whose inclinations allow them to tolerate mundane and practical work. However, Zaleznik maintains that their attitudes toward goals are impersonal, if not passive. Although they prefer to work with people, they lack empathy or the capacity to sense intuitively the thoughts and feelings of others; consequently, they relate to people according to their roles. Leaders, on the other hand, are creative and imaginative individuals who actively seek risks for opportunities and rewards. Since leaders identify less with organizations, they are willing to entertain alternate approaches and solutions, and they shape rather than react to ideas and situations. They are often lonely people concerned with self-definition, but they genuinely care about other people. Their intuitive natures and communicative skills enhance their interpersonal relationships. This view implies that managers seek to balance jobs and people and that leaders attempt to coalesce jobs and people. Zaleznik may hold an extreme position, and he may be incorrect in proposing that leaders and managers are mutually exclusive. Nevertheless, his position provides a useful distinction between leadership and management, if not between leaders and managers.

If one assumes, in the interest of academic distinction, that leaders and managers are different, of what value are leaders to the Air Force? Leaders are more likely than managers to concern themselves with the Air Force’s most pressing, solvable internal problem—how to ensure maximum individual efforts. Both views stress the superiority of leaders over managers in dealing with people. Therefore, to inspire young people whose culture places them at odds with authority and to influence junior officers in socializing and adopting institutional values, the Air Force must cultivate and retain supportive leaders. And it must cultivate all types of leaders because future leadership requirements are unknown.³ The military profession does not need leaders to the exclusion of managers: it needs both leaders and managers. But the need to inspire and motivate and the ability to meet unknown challenges are so vital to the Air Force mission that development of leadership must be given top priority.

Is it possible that the Air Force can teach leadership much the same as it has taught management? Certainly, it can teach basic skills and, perhaps, style to deal with differing situations, but style, personality, and situation need not necessarily coincide to ensure successful military leadership. In fact, style is not an essential ingredient of leadership because leaders may rely on a variety of styles.⁴ If leadership development is essentially an internal or individual matter based on innate gifts, personality traits, introspection, and, perhaps, even years of diversified reading, then leadership cannot be taught; and, of course, strong character and charisma cannot be taught. But positive organizational changes can encourage the emergence of latent leaders. Otherwise, the officer corps faces two negative alternatives: leadership skills will atrophy through lack of exercise, or leaders will separate from the military in search of civilian opportunities to use their abilities. Experience may or may not play a significant role in leadership development, but leadership cannot even surface if the system tolerates only the philosophy and practice of management.

Institutionalism
versus Occupationalism

Much has been written about a growing occupational orientation at the expense of institutional orientation. Experience has shown that leadership cannot thrive in an occupational climate; thus, the decline in leadership must be linked to the rise of occupationalism. The occupational orientation between employer and employee is essentially a contractual relationship bound to dominant national managerial values and reinforced by the government’s approach to servicemen. It is exacerbated by working wives and an accompanying breakdown in the military life-style, more separation of place of work from family living areas, increased contacts with civilians, and, especially, weakening distinctions between military and civilian job skills. On the other hand, some institutional concepts that have traditionally isolated the military from civilian communities may no longer be valid, such as the view of the armed services as a calling similar to the ministry.

The orientation of officers and young enlisted personnel mirrors the values of the larger society rather than institutional values. For example, an Army study reveals a disturbing alienation of its junior enlisted personnel, particularly their beliefs that people are not dependable, that there is no right or wrong way to make a living, and that they can expect no justice under the law. Nevertheless, they were susceptible to military socialization because they had adopted positive attitudes during basic training.⁵ And a survey sponsored by the Military Personnel Center in 1977-78 concludes that newly commissioned Air Force officers were amenable to socialization even though they were not motivated by patriotism, institutional values, collateral tasks, the Air Force way of life, or the idea of working for a common goal.⁶ They were neither traditionally nor occupationally motivated. Thus, if young enlisted personnel and officers are not occupationally oriented and are open to socialization, one questions whether the dominance of occupationalism has been overstated and whether the socialization of newly commissioned officers is appropriate.

Surveys conducted at Air War College (AWC) and Air Command and Staff College (ACSC) from 1977 to 1980 indicate that the students had both occupational and institutional characteristics.⁷ The orientation of the graduates of these schools is especially significant for the future because these officers will probably dominate the officer corps in the late 1980s and the 1990s. The War College survey reveals that the respondents felt at odds with senior Air Force officers, whom they viewed as security oriented. They indicated a high sense of duty and some sense of mission, but patriotism, loyalty, selflessness, corporateness, and calling were not strong motivators. These officers were motivated by working, playing the game, succeeding, winning, and serving as team leaders and members. The corporate environment of the Air Force bureaucratic hierarchy and the traditional virtues associated with the military image frustrated them. Although the respondents of the ACSC survey expressed a belief that service in the Air Force should not be considered merely an occupation, 43 percent of the sample believed that other officers perceived it as an occupation, and one-fourth admitted that they personally acted as if it were an occupation. Yet a composite picture of all occupational and institutional factors reveals a slight institutional inclination. However, from the findings of these two surveys, one can conclude—because there seems to be no consensus on exactly what professionalism is and because institutional leanings are not more pronounced—that the Air Force socialization process is not strongly oriented toward the institutional, that if the process is institutionally oriented, it is ineffectual, or that it is diluted by strong occupational pressures.

Institutional values are inculcated in large part by institutional socialization, and the prevailing values of the larger society simply make socialization more or less difficult. Today’s officers will determine the orientation and the leadership climate of the future Air Force. A disproportionately large number of the future Air Force elite will come from the intermediate and senior professional schools, and, based on the values expressed in the mentioned surveys, they will not show a strong institutional inclination. Therefore, in view of the identity crisis experienced by these officers, one questions whether the Air Force can retain officers with outstanding leadership potential if this statement by Morris Janowitz is correct: "In a private enterprise society, the military establishment could not hold its most creative talents without the binding force of service traditions, professional identification, and honor."⁸ An official study entitled "AF Impact 77" addressed these issues and offered proposals for improving service life and recapturing some traditional military values, but this study did not address the organizational practices responsible for the current problem.⁹ Several basic but very difficult organizational changes cannot only improve retention rates in the officer corps but also permit identification and development of potential leaders.

A Climate for Leadership

To facilitate the emergence of leaders, the Air Force must revive relevant aspects of the declining institutional value system. For example, it must promote integrity, specifically honesty, as the essence of an officer’s character. Certainly, an officer must first establish his credibility and gain the trust of his subordinates if he expects to inspire and lead them. But unless the officer corps demands personal and professional integrity, emphasis on occupationalism will inevitably subvert organizational changes. Of course, all aspects of the institutional value system probably cannot be resurrected in the Air Force since specialization and technology have so civilianized specific jobs. But, just as integrity and the broader institutional values are critical factors for Army combat arms, they are also critical requirements for the flying corps and, possibly, the missile force.

integrity, a prerequisite
for leadership

The lack of integrity reflects a conflict between a relatively high personal sense of ethics and the perceived compromise demanded by standard military practices. Army War College studies prepared in 1970 and 1977 on the state of military ethics reveal a damning list of problems:

. . . selfish, promotion-oriented behavior; inadequate communication between junior and senior; distorted or dishonest reporting of status, statistics, or officer efficiency; technical or managerial incompetence; disregard for principles but total respect for accomplishing even the most trivial mission with zero defects; disloyalty to subordinates; senior officers setting poor standards of ethical/professional behavior.¹⁰

Unrealistic standards based on the can-do attitude, zero defects, and acceptable readiness reports were applied to junior officers. The studies imply that the ability to differentiate between the ideal military ethic and military practices decreased as rank increased. Many young, idealistic officers became so frustrated with such behavior that some of them resigned from the service and left officers who seem to condone unethical behavior.

These findings are not confined to the Army. A 1974 survey of Air War College and Air Command and Staff College students reveals the following perceptions: to become a general officer, one must spend more time with self-aggrandizement than with the mission, and a twenty-year career is sufficient because the system rewards lack of integrity. More recently, the respondents of an AWC survey expressed the belief that the hierarchical management system represses individual expression, does not permit the "freedom to fail," and punishes the bearers of bad news. An ACSC survey found that 88 percent of the survey group felt pressured to compromise their integrity, and 100 percent thought that their fellow officers compromised their integrity.¹¹

A problem as pervasive as the lack of integrity within the officer corps cannot be rectified quickly or easily, even after admitting existence of the problem. The Army report of 1977 made several recommendations, including the need at all levels for systematic formal instruction in ethics and acceptance of a formal code of military ethics. It also emphasized that reform must begin at the top and that top leaders must demand honesty and accept the truth even when it is not what they prefer to hear.¹² Of course, subordinates must also practice honesty. Top leadership must prove to the officer corps that it means to promote integrity rather than moralize about its absence.

One way to confirm sincerity and resolve to promote institutional values is to make drastic revisions in the inspection system. Although it is intended to function as a positive, constructive force, the inspection system is viewed negatively and even adversatively by many in the field. Consequently, the system inadvertently encourages cover-ups and dishonesty: the tendency is to hide the truth if it is considered damaging. Unit cohesion may be superficially improved, but improvement under negative rather than positive motivation only jeopardizes the principles of cohesion. Inspections by higher headquarters should be abolished if they do not relate directly to organizational readiness, and organizational readiness inspections must be made as realistic as safety and funding will allow. And they should be limited exclusively to readiness evaluation. Assistance teams similar to teams from the Leadership and Management Development Center should be made available for use by unit commanders. Such teams must focus solely on improving mission effectiveness rather than become proxy inspections. Contrary to the present inspection system that is often counterproductive because it tends to direct emphasis away from mission-centered efforts, assistance teams could help to reinstitute a positive, mission-centered emphasis.

Integrity is an essential quality for effective leadership, but the prevailing inspection philosophy threatens the leadership climate. Superiors are the most influential, positive socializing factors for subordinates, but they reduce or even nullify their socializing effectiveness if they compromise their integrity with inspection gaming. And such a climate reinforces the alienation of their subordinates from their institution. A system does not enhance a superior’s leadership potential when it frequently requires a choice between immediate self-interests and mission requirements. Although an officer can internalize or supply certain traditional values for his personal understanding of himself, the Air Force system must provide a climate that demands integrity. Some leaders, even great leaders, function effectively with flaws of character. But, in general, the absence of strong character relates directly to an absence of peacetime leaders, for their influence is based on their professional abilities and their personal and moral relationships with their followers. Strong character is a most powerful force for inspiration and motivation. Conversely, followers are rarely inspired by leaders perceived as lacking integrity.

corporate bonds and institutionalism

The need and potential for institutionalism and traditional leadership are great within the flying corps. Fliers should very closely approach the traditional model, for they are directly committed to combat and, consequently, are bound by the "unlimited contract." They also have the potential to develop strong corporate bonds. However, if Captain Frank Wood is correct in his provocative article, the flying corps has failed to maintain its esprit de corps.¹³ This failure is due to at least two phenomena: specialization and the rise of a new managerial elite within the armed forces and the larger society. Fliers are not unlike their contemporaries in this respect, but, since their specialization does not include management as a common denominator, they have little professional affinity with support officers. The absence of a common bond only frustrates corporateness when fliers find themselves isolated from other elements of the Air Force. They are unlikely to turn inward and reestablish traditional values, for such a perception is impossible without strong direction and encouragement from higher authority. The Air Force itself compounds the role-identity crisis involving fliers.

The capabilities of modern communications coupled with awesome increases in firepower have led to extreme centralization. Thus, flying officers have less autonomy than support officers. Centralization necessary for firepower control has been expanded to include areas that could be somewhat autonomous. This phenomenon is especially exasperating for a generation that places major importance on control of life-style and individuality. The latter is more difficult to establish in a large squadron of officers than in units with lower ratios of officers to men. And a widely held belief is that promotion and selection for professional schools are linked to management expertise that is difficult for fliers to acquire as junior officers. One-third of the officers join the Air Force to fly, but they quickly confront the dilemma of sharpening their flying skills or developing managerial skills to compete with their nonrated contemporaries who are trained for full-time jobs as managers.

Positive leadership and a return to institutionalism could help to solve most of the problems facing the flying corps. Prestige must be based on norms that differ from the occupational norms of the larger society. The Air Force hierarchy opposes the establishment of a separate flying corps or adoption of a pluralistic, compartmentalized service discussed by Charles Moskos.¹⁴ Thus, the means of promoting corporateness falls on flying unit commanders, who can achieve this objective to some degree by emphasizing the trappings of the military: uniforms, flags, and Air Force and unit history. "AF Impact 77" recommends this approach. A more difficult but more effective means would be to reestablish the traditional link between leaders and followers. This proposal does not imply that fliers should neglect development of their managerial skills, but it does suggest that the flying corps is not a microcosm of the Air Force. Viewed in this light, it has different leadership needs, and its efficacy may depend on traditional leadership.

Modern communications have made centralization an all-pervasive feature of modern society. Although centralization may be essential for efficient control, it has proved detrimental to the development of leaders. Centralization and especially the management control system threaten to destroy the chain of command, the military commander, and the traditional unit structure. Esprit and personal commitment have been eroded because few people within units have personal stakes in decision-making. In numerous instances, centralized authority causes resentment and condemnation of the military and further reinforces alienation. According to General Theodore Milton, discontent is not confined to the lower and middle ranks, for "there is [even] discontent in the senior ranks because getting there is too often proving to be a disappointment. Both responsibilities and privileges have been eroded away."¹⁵

General Lew Allen, Jr., recognizes the problems inherent in centralization and has attempted to resolve them through "Buck Stop," a campaign to decentralize decision-making authority.

Lowering the level of decision-making authority will give more responsibility to commanders and supervisors and help them develop into more effective leaders. Further, decentralization enriches the work environment and quality of life of all our people by making their jobs more challenging and rewarding . . . ¹⁶

Former Military Airlift Command Commander, General William G. Moore, Jr., has indicated that decentralization stands at the heart of his philosophy of command. He states that the man with the facts should have the authority to act, that men become leaders by leading and making mistakes, and, more important, that the mission depends on men who can think and act for themselves, especially during contingencies and war.¹⁷

Decentralization may actually be an oblique means of forcing leadership development. Three-quarters of the wing commanders responding to a 1977 survey by the Air Force Institute of Technology felt that they had sufficient authority to carry out their responsibilities. Flying commanders felt most restricted.¹⁸ This response may actually indicate that many commanders are managers, not leaders, because managerial norms encourage deferral of decisions to higher levels to avoid risk. Therefore, deliberate efforts to force decisions downward may compel managers to adopt leadership characteristics. Future leaders represented in a survey revealed that "55% complained of the lack of control over their own working environments," and they were concerned that they lacked the "freedom to fail." ¹⁹ These statements reflect the old cliché that to lead one must be allowed to make decisions and learn from those decisions. But the incipient danger of centralization is that it favors people who are inclined to conform, not question, and, perhaps, not even think outside the prescribed mold. It may drive potential leaders to separate from the Air Force because they see no opportunity to exercise their talents. In essence, excessive centralization establishes and rewards mediocrity rather than merit. Aggressive commitment to the spirit of "Buck Stop" could check the dangers of excessive centralization.

The most important way to find and develop leaders is to provide the flexibility that will allow commanders at all levels to become leaders and serve as leadership models for their subordinates. Increasing the time that wing and squadron commanders serve in their commands is one way to achieve this objective.²⁰ Currently, command positions are necessary steps for admission into the elite and definite prerequisites to general officer rank. A revised system would necessitate some promotions to the elite without command experience and demand a well-defined, rigorous selection process for commanders. Traditionally, short tours ensured maximum numbers with command experience, and they provided leadership pools that could be expanded into wartime cadres. But this is no longer a valid justification for short tours unless one anticipates large-scale mobilization. Short tours emphasize short-time, statistically quantifiable factors, encourage retention rather than delegation of authority, promote the can-do attitude that can compromise integrity, and support an authoritarian rather than a participatory style. The current command rotation system is, in effect, management- rather than leadership-oriented.

An extension of standard tours would reduce the number receiving command experience, but it would improve the quality of the experience and facilitate leadership development. After becoming efficient in performing their managerial responsibilities, commanders would have time to develop the personal relationships necessary for effective leadership—time not currently available to them. The Army recently approved considerable extensions of its standard command tours, partially for the reasons cited in this article. If the Air Force were to follow suit, commanders could become acquainted with their subordinates as individuals and learn to trust them to the extent that they could be comfortable in delegating authority to them. This would improve the confidence of their subordinates, reduce their dependence on authority, develop their potential, and give them stakes in the success of their units. Furthermore, it would provide commanders with opportunities to lead by inspiration. They could identify and nurture truly talented subordinates through use of mentor systems. Historically, such systems have played vital roles in the development of leaders, but they require time for leaders to develop personal relationships necessary to cultivate the full potential of their subordinates.²¹

In addition to the rewards of getting to know their subordinates, commanders would have more time to study the mission and determine the most effective means of accomplishing it. They would hold one position long enough to see the results of their policies and decisions; therefore, long-term, nonquantifiable factors such as training would gain in importance. Freedom from excessive oversight, knowledge of subordinates and their jobs, and awareness of the personal impact of their decisions would encourage commanders to promote questions and discussions of issues affecting their subordinates. This approach would improve unit cohesion and esprit de corps because everyone would have a shared stake in the unit’s mission. These are necessary qualities if the Air Force expects young servicemen to adopt institutional values.

The leadership crisis in the Air Force cannot be blamed so much on the larger society as on the service itself. The dominance of managerial norms has adversely affected the development of traditional leadership, as has the presence of strong occupational pressures in the absence of strong institutional ones. Unfortunately, the Air Force may have created this condition at the time it became a separate service. If this is true, the challenge of reorienting the system will be even more difficult because there is no other precedent. Nevertheless, both the value orientation and the success of the socialization process are the Air Force’s responsibility. If the crisis is of the Air Force’s making, it alone is responsible for the solution. Individual efforts are essential, but such efforts will be insignificant, perhaps futile, until changes in basic policy create a climate that encourages leadership development.

1. Richard A. Gabriel and Paul L. Savage, Crisis in Command (New York, 1978), pp. 18, 145; Carl E. Welte, "Management and Leadership: Concepts with an Important Difference," Personnel Journal, November 1978, p. 630; Lance Morrow, "A Cry for Leadership," Time, August 6, 1979, p. 28.

2. Abraham Zaleznik, "Managers and Leaders: Are They Different?" Harvard Business Review, May-June 1977, p. 67.

3. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier: A Social and Political Portrait (Glencoe, Illinois, 1960), pp. 150-72.

4. R. E. Utecht and W. D. Heier, "The Contingency Model and Successful Military Leadership," Academy of Management Journal, December 1976, pp. 606-18; Victor H. Vroom, "Can Leaders Learn to Lead?" Organizational Dynamics, Winter 1976, pp. 17-28.

5. Stephen D. Wesbrook, "Sociopolitical Alienation and Military Efficiency," Armed Forces and Society; Winter 1980, p. 186.

6. Major Stanley W. Monkus, "Attitudes and Motivations of Newly Commissioned Officers," (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Air Command and Staff College, 1979).

7. Major Joseph R. Daskevich and Major Paul A. Nafziger, "The Pulse of Professionalism, ACSC 1980," (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Air Command and Staff College, 1980); Lieutenant Colonel Vincent J. MacDonald, "The Air Force Military Manager of the 1980’s: Leader of Gamesman?" (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, Air War College, 1978).

8. Janowitz, p. 422.

9. "AF Impact 77," Air Force Times, 25 July 1977, pp. 1, 33.

10. "Study on Military Professionalism," (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Army War College, 1970), p. 31. This study was classified "For Official Use Only" until 30 June 1973. It now carries the disclaimer that it does "not purport to reflect the position or policies of the Department of the Army or the Department of Defense." See also Colonel Melville A. Drisco, Jr., "An Analysis of Professional Military Ethics: Their Importance, Development, and Inculcation," (Carlisle Barracks, Pennsylvania, Army War College, 1977).

11. Lieutenant Colonel Rodney V. Cox, Jr., "Military Leadership of the 1990s," (Newport, Rhode Island, Naval War College, 1978); MacDonald, op.cit.; Daskevich and Nafziger, p. vii.

12. Drisco, p. 40.

13. Captain Frank F. Wood, "Air Force Junior Officers: Changing Prestige and Civilization," Armed Forces and Society, Spring 1980, pp. 483-506.

14. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The Emergent Military: Civil, Traditional, or Plural," American Defense Policy (Baltimore, Maryland: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 519-31.

15. General T. R. Milton, "What’s Happening to the Military Profession?" Air Force, February 1980, p. 79.

16. General Lew Allen, Jr., "Air Force Buck Stop," TIG Brief, 25 January 1980, p. 2.

17. General William G. Moore, Jr., "Decentralization Develops Leaders," Supplement to the Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, April 1979, pp. 24-25.

18. Roger T. Manley, Charles W. McNichols, and Michael J. Stahl, "Quality of Air Force Life: A Report of the Attitudes and Perceptions of Air Force Commanders," (Wright-Patterson AFB, Ohio: Air Force Institute of Technology Report, 1977), p. 3-3.

19. MacDonald, p. 46.

20. Time in command positions is not governed by written guidelines. It varies according to level, and it is somewhat longer overseas, but it appears to average 18 months and rarely exceeds 24.

21. Zaleznik , pp. 75-77.

Major Jeffrey C. Benton (B.A., The Citadel; M.P.S., Auburn University; M.A., University of North Carolina) is Chief, Special Plans, 513th Tactical Airlift Wing, RAF Mildenhall, England. His previous assignments include instructor, flight examiner, and training flight navigator in the KC-l35 and AC-130, assistant professor of aerospace studies, and tactical officer at The Citadel. Major Benton is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor