Air University Review, July-August 1982

Space Power Doctrine

An examination of space power doctrine should begin with two basic questions: What is military doctrine? What purpose does it serve? The answers to these questions can lead to a better understanding of how military space doctrine fits into an overall plan for our future military activities in space.

Doctrine has been defined as: (1) something that is taught; (2) the body of principles in a branch of knowledge; (3) a system of belief; (4) a principle accepted as valid and authoritative. ¹ JCS Publication 1 defines doctrine as " fundamental principles by which the military forces or elements thereof guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application." ² From these definitions and from common usage, one can deduce that doctrine represents a set of agree-on principles and practices that are fundamental and authoritative.

I suggest that doctrine is a shared belief that establishes cohesiveness within a group or organization and provides direction for group activities. As a unifying influence, doctrine serves as a vehicle of communication between advocates of a particular school of thought. Religious groups, political parties, the military services, and most other organizations have some principles or tenets of belief that bind the participants to a common purpose or direction. Once an organization is firmly established, these principles are documented and remain fairly constant. During the formative stages of organizational development, however, doctrinal statements are subject to review and modification.

The development and articulation of doctrine serve as a focal point for discussion, challenge, and group consensus-building. Thus, when new concepts are being formulated, the process of doctrinal development may be more valuable than the product that is finally produced. As a vehicle for discussion and debate, doctrine provides an evolutionary baseline, while inviting creative thought, constructive criticism, and meaningful discussion. This process clarifies thinking by identifying key ideas, aids understanding by exposing various points of view, and eventually unifies opinion by eliminating weak arguments. Once widespread acceptance is achieved, doctrine establishes a degree of permanence and organizational stability.

In the early years of development of the United States Air Force as a separate service, air power doctrine played a vital role in the establishment of principles, practices, and direction for future military air forces.³ From these early efforts, fundamental concepts of air superiority, close air support, and battlefield interdiction have evolved. Likewise, space power doctrine promises to provide a similar avenue for the development and deployment of military forces in space.

Assumptions

In the formulation of space power doctrine, several fundamental choices should be clearly stated. Perhaps the most important choice is to establish the precise purpose space power doctrine is intended to serve. Simply stated, this choice can rest between two extremes. Should space power doctrine define military principles and practices for a world as we would like it to be; or should it define the art of what is militarily possible, unencumbered by treaty restrictions and self- imposed restraints?

If what we want is a statement of our space objectives or an overall plan for the development of our future space forces, then our space power doctrine should reflect current policies, treaty agreements, and administration guidance. It should be open to modification as policies change, owing to international developments and technological advancements. If, on the other hand, we want a set of irrefutable principles by which we can gauge the effectiveness of our military space systems, operational concepts, organizational elements, and command and control structure, then certainly our space power doctrine should be as comprehensive and unencumbered as possible. Only the limits of our resources, physical constraints, and technological frontiers should restrain our thinking.

Although both versions of space power doctrine are needed in the gradual development of military forces for space, the greater benefit appears to rest now with an unencumbered version. There are several reasons for making this judgment. The first is that policy statements concerning our space goals, objectives, and requirements are provided by other directives and program documents.

Second, if the fundamental tenets of space power are not described in a doctrine manual, they are not likely to be stated anywhere. As previously noted, doctrine development needs an unencumbered, evolutionary communication vehicle to synthesize ideas and consolidate broad-based beliefs.

Third, an unencumbered version of space power doctrine has more continuity than one that is constrained by current defense policies. Basic doctrine becomes a repository for tried and proven principles; defense policies are, of necessity, influenced by short-range objectives and political compromises.

Finally, our national leaders need to gain a basic understanding of: what is militarily possible in space, the strategy choices available, and the expected course of future space weapon development. It is possible to begin the formulation of fundamental space warfare concepts and doctrine that can serve as a primer for the articulation of specific space policy objectives later. Without an overall strategic concept for space, based on what is militarily feasible, our national leaders are denied a sound basis for establishing our most essential space goals, our negotiating objectives, or our space program priorities.

A Conceptual Framework

The application of space power doctrine is differentiated from that of air power doctrine by the atmospheric boundary above which aircraft cannot fly and below which spacecraft cannot operate.⁴ Ballistic missiles and the space shuttle represent systems that operate through the transitional boundary from the lower atmosphere to outer space. They should be included in space power doctrine when their mission terminates in space and should be included in air power doctrine when their mission terminates in the atmosphere or on the earth’s surface. Other overlaps exist, just as they do between land, sea, and air, and they should be appropriately defined.

To simplify the following discussion, the unencumbered version of space power doctrine will be referred to as basic space power doctrine. The constrained version that follows current administration policies and treaty obligations will be referred to as operational space power doctrine. Other terminology, such as environmental and organizational doctrine, could also be used to make the necessary distinction.

Basic space power doctrine provides the wellspring of concepts and ideas from which policies, strategies, mission requirements, and weapon programs flow. In its formulation, basic space power doctrine should consider such elements as: (1) the basic principles and practices of warfare, (2) the laws of physics and orbital mechanics, (3) the unique environment of space, (4) the evolving space weapon technology, and (5) our resource limitations. Unless we can first establish what is militarily feasible in space, we will have no standard against which to measure the progress of our own space efforts, nor the consequences of what our enemy may choose to do. Thus, we must forecast the general course of military events in space, and then formulate valid principles and practices based on those assumptions. Both defensive and offensive weapons in space should be considered. Basic space power doctrine facilitates the fomulation of an overall strategy for the operation of military forces in space. It can ensure that we are not caught off guard by a more imaginative and more aggressive adversary.

Using basic space power doctrine as the starting point, we can decide exactly what we want to do militarily in space with an awareness of the benefits and risks involved. Thus, in the formulation of our national space policies, we should consider basic space power doctrine in addition to our national interests and objectives and the possible threats to those interests.

Operational space power doctrine spells out the who, what, when, where, and how of our military space activities. It should be consistent with the overall space policy decisions of our national leaders and compatible with our basic space power doctrine. Once our operational space power doctrine has been established, we can make enlightened decisions concerning the space systems, weapon programs, and operational forces needed to carry out our space mission requirements. The process is interactive, involving modification at all levels as our understanding of military space operations increases through additional theory and practice.

The concepts and relationships discussed earlier are illustrated in Figure 1,⁵ which shows the flow of ideas from the general and abstract to the more detailed and specific. Without some fundamental concept for the military use of space as documented in a basic space power doctrine manual, we will lack the organizational cohesiveness and sense of direction essential to make and implement timely and effective force planning decisions for space.

Obstacles

Although the vigorous development of basic space power doctrine appears to be a profitable pursuit, there is little evidence to indicate that this process is actually taking place. One reason for avoiding the development of a far-reaching basic space power doctrine is that the idea of combat in and from space is considered to be too provocative. With few exceptions, the official thinking associated with space programs has been as an adjunct to conventional land, sea, and air forces. This approach avoids the controversy associated with warfare in space and also preserves well-established service prerogatives. The introduction of offensive weapons into space opens a new arena of combat, one that many would choose to avoid if possible.

In choosing between peace or security in space, the United States has chosen the path of peace. Thus, we prefer to rely on international treaties and arms control agreements that ensure the peaceful use of space, rather than develop military systems that provide the capability to defend our interests in space. The deployment of an active space defense force aimed at the destruction of enemy military capabilities is considered provocative; it introduces new uncertainties and threatens to upset the peace and stability we seek in the world. This choice, however, comes at the expense of national security.

If, instead, we choose security as our first priority, we would be obligated to exploit every avenue of self-defense within our economic and technological capability. Most often, this basic choice, cast in the stark terms of "peace versus security," is not made explicit in the articulation of our defense priorities. Certainly, we would prefer to have it both ways if that were possible.

There are other practical reasons why we have avoided official documentation and debate on the active exploitation of space for military purposes. These reasons deal with cost, politics, and organization. The economic sacrifices that must be made to support a massive military space defense program have been incompatible with our desire to promote the social development and economic welfare of American citizens. Without the obvious presence of an immediate threat from space, it is almost impossible in our democratic society to galvanize sufficient public opinion to support an expensive, long-range effort to secure our freedom for future generations. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union does not share this difficulty. Deliberate, determined, and consistent military programs requiring considerable consumer sacrifices are possible in a militarily oriented totalitarian society.

Another reason for postponing an open discussion of our military entry into space is the political obstacles that must be overcome. Entrenched bureaucrats are threatened by such drastic changes, and parochial service interests are better served by advancing current roles and missions. Seasoned program advocates continue to push the procurement of traditional aircraft and missile systems, while slowing the development of new space systems that compete for service funding. With seemingly fixed resources to be shared among the four services, there is little margin for the creation of new, esoteric space systems that are certain to generate renewed interservice rivalries. There is much to be said for supporting the status quo and gradual change; however, we may not have the choice of such a luxury if our adversaries select a different set of military objectives. Unlike our experience in previous world wars, the United States can no longer expect to have the time required to react successfully to a technological surprise in space because of the size, complexity, and cost of strategic space systems.⁶

A final obstacle is the lack of a focal point within the Department of Defense for coordinating the concepts, doctrine, and goals of our future military space forces. Division of responsibility among several offices and organizations diffuses support for military space forces while diluting authority, funding, and influence. Without a suitable organization to consolidate key personnel, programs, and funding, there will be no central group to interpret and implement far-reaching space objectives.

Strategic warfare has evolved from defensive dominance associated with trench warfare in World War I to an offensive dominance associated with the nuclear weapons that saw the close of World War II. Since those fateful days of 1945, we have relied more and more on strategic nuclear offensive systems and less on strategic defensive systems. The Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty sealed the fate of our defensive systems in 1972, when it restricted each of the superpowers to one limited system for the nation’s capital and one to protect an intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM) site. Moving away from strategic defensive systems, the United States has abandoned the Safeguard Antiballistic Missile System that protected our ICBM site and has largely dismantled our Continental Air Defense System. In addition, civil defense measures were abandoned. Instead, we chose to make our cities vulnerable to Soviet nuclear weapons in the belief that they would do the same. This condition of mutual vulnerability still prevails today as each side maintains a precarious balance of overwhelming strategic offensive weapons that deters the other side from using its weapons. Both the United States and the U.S.S.R. have continued to develop and deploy new generations of strategic offensive weapons that provide more warheads, better accuracy, larger yields, and increased survivability.

As the state of technology advances and the stability of the nuclear weapon balance deteriorates, both superpowers must move away from their reliance on offensive weapon systems while at the same time moving toward a more stable condition using defensive weapon systems. This transition over the next twenty years will be most difficult, inasmuch as any significant defensive breakthrough by one side may be countered by an escalation of offensive power by the other side. The evolution of military weaponry has never allowed a status quo condition to exist indefinitely. It is man’s nature to pursue the art of the possible, especially when it concerns military systems.⁷

In considering future strategic defensive systems, we can choose between earth-based, air-based, and space-based systems or a combination of the three. To neglect space-based systems at this time would be shortsighted because of their inherent military advantages. In addition to the wide-area surveillance, early acquisition, and strategic warning functions that are accomplished by current satellite systems, space-based strategic systems can take the battle away from the U.S. homeland and provide early interception and destruction of offensive enemy weapons.

A space weapon system being considered today is the space-based, directed-energy battle station.⁸ This hypothetical system would be capable of destroying ICBMs and sea-launched cruise missiles (SLBMs) during their vulnerable boost phase and strategic bombers during transit flight. Such a system, once completed, could degrade the effectiveness of the current generation of strategic systems.

Perhaps even more significant is the fact that once they were placed in orbit, these battle stations could destroy all enemy satellite systems and prevent an opponent from reentering the space arena for any reason. The nation that is able to achieve a space-based global defense system first has the potential for freezing other nations out of the high ground of space, thus achieving total military dominance. Space power doctrine should address these fundamental possibilities for space warfare now in the hope that we can plan more deliberately and prepare more decisively for the uncertain events that lie ahead.

I suggest that basic space power doctrine be separated from the more commonly accepted operational doctrine so that the unconstrained, creative thought process can take place. If basic space power doctrine is to serve as a means for communicating the fundamental tenets of space conflict among our future military space leaders, then the process should begin now by divorcing it from current policy directives. We need to accept the possibility of space warfare and overcome the political and organizational obstacles to the development of unencumbered space power doctrine.

The possible emergence of revolutionary space weapons, such as a directed-energy laser battle station, requires that we look objectively and creatively into the future to develop valid principles and strategies for the exploitation of military forces in this arena of potential conflict. Timely space power doctrine can ensure that we use our limited national resources effectively to provide for the well-being and survival of America throughout the next century.

1. Webster’s New ColIegiate Dictionary, s. v. "doctrine."

2. JCS Publication I, Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (Washington: The Joint Chiefs of Staff, June 1979), p. 113.

3. AFM 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine of the United States Air Force, February 1979, Chapter 6.

4. This definition is contrary to Air Force Manual 1-1, which treats air and space as a continuum in its discussion of aerospace power doctrine. In combining aero and space into a unified doctrine, some unique advantages and limitation of the space environment are overlooked. The characteristics of the space environment and the capabilities of space weapons are sufficiently different from air power doctrine that a distinction should be made. Otherwise, we shall be hampered in our efforts to exploit the unique aspects of the space arena.

5. This diagram is adapted from a more comprehensive framework described by Richmond M. Lloyd and Lieutenant Colonel Dino A. Lorenzini, USAF. See "A Framework for Choosing Defense Forces," Naval War College Review, January-February 1981, p. 48.

6. Lieutenant Colonel Dino A. Lorenzini, USAF, and Major Charles L. Fox, USAF, "2001: A U.S. Space Force," Naval War College Review, March-April 1981, p. 53.

7. Colonel Trevor N. Dupuy, USA (Ret), The Evolution of Weapons and Warfare (Indianapolis, Indiana: Bobbs-Merrill, 1980), p. 287.

8. Clarence Robinson, "Laser Technology Demonstration Proposed," Aviation Week & Space Technology, February 16, 1981, pp. 16-19.

Lieutenant Colonel Dino A. Lorenzini (USAFA; M.B.A., Auburn University; S.M., Ph.D., Massachusetts Institute of Technology) is R&D Program Manager, Directed Energy Office, Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA). He was a faculty member at the Naval War College; a Deputy Director at the NAVSTAR Global Positioning System Program Office; and Research Associate at the Frank J. Seiler Research Laboratory, USAFA. Colonel Lorenzini has published in the Naval War College Review. He is a Distinguished Graduate of the Air Command and Staff College and a graduate with highest distinction from the Naval War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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