Air University Review, January-February 1982
Colonel Mozes W. A. Weers
In his Harmon Memorial Lecture at the Eighth Military History Symposium at the USAF Academy, 1978, Brigadier General Noel F. Parrish, USAF (Ret), stated: "Distortions of history often are used to conceal present truths. The number of such distortions concerning air power and its leaders are too numerous even to mention, yet few corrections have been written." In Parrish’s opinion, the influence of air power on most historians is largely negative, and it is a fact that although many facts about the air war of 1939-45 are well known, a comprehensive understanding of the entire war still is not possible.
Dr. R. J. Overy, a lecturer at King’s College, London, has taken an important step toward remedying this situation. His book The Air War 1939-1945 is purported to be the first general history of the air war to appear in English.* It is indeed a general history, covering the whole war period and all the warring powers, and as such it is, in Overy’s own words, not a "blood and guts" book. Consequently, it deals less with people than with motives, purposes, and choices, but one might argue that the characters and views of the leaders of air power before and during the Second World War are to a great extent revealed by Dr. Overy’s analyses.
* R. J. Overy, The Air War 1939-1945 (New York: Stein & Day; London: Europa Publications Limited, 1980, $16.95), 263 pages.
The First World War had given significant impetus to the development of air power, and by 1939 many people believed that the air weapon was coming of age. Men like Italian General Giulio Douhet, the British Marshal of the Royal Air Force (RAF) Lord Trenchard, and, in the United States, General William "Billy" Mitchell and Major Alexander de Seversky had firm ideas on the use of air power. Basically, two main opinions found outlet in papers and studies: a number of people considered air power an effective weapon that could go a long way toward bringing home a victory in a future war while many opposed the use of air power on the grounds that air bombardments would be inhuman. The debate shaped to some extent the ideas of politicians and military leaders, but the main source for the development of air doctrine (and, as a result, of the hardware with which to execute this doctrine) was World War I experiences. As Dr. Overy puts it: ". . . the formulation of air theory before 1939 was crucial in understanding the actual development of air forces and the choices made about how they should be used." (pp. 5-6) He then distinguishes four separate "though not mutually exclusive" areas of strategic thinking on air power: cooperation between ships and aircraft, cooperation between armies and aircraft, "independent" or "strategic" bombing, and aerial defense.
In the United States, General Mitchell, like Lord Trenchard in Britain, firmly believed that aircraft would be the main offensive weapon of the future. He demonstrated convincingly that aircraft could destroy major surface ships and concluded that a strong and independent air force would be necessary. As we know, the U.S. Navy accepted the challenge and used aircraft carriers to attack the enemy fleet. In Japan, the government did not anticipate enemy air attacks with land-based aircraft, but it was well aware of the potential and dangers of the aircraft carrier. As a result, the Japanese government pleaded, during the 1932 World Disarmament Conference in Geneva, for the abolishment of aircraft carriers. The Japanese naval leaders, however, "happily embraced all aspects of combined naval-air strategy" (p. 6) and accepted, in 1936, Commander Genda’s theory of the mass carrier strike force.
In Europe, only one country, Great Britain, possessed aircraft carriers, but even so, the Royal Air Force was skeptical about the abilities of carrier-based aircraft. In the other European countries, the role of air forces was to a large extent determined by military tradition. In Germany, for instance, the Luftwaffe, although nominally independent, was strongly influenced by the traditional army thinking of the air force staff. The independence of the air force was a political rather than a doctrinal one, according to Dr. Overy: "As far as the function of the air force was concerned it remained closely tied to the needs of the army, and was subject to the directives of the army-dominated supreme headquarters." (p. 133) In the Soviet Union, the air force was an integral part of the army, subordinate to the front commanders. In France, the situation at the outbreak of hostilities was similar to the German situation: a nominally independent air force, to be used for close support of the army front units. Only in Great Britain, where the Royal Air Force had been in existence since 1918, did a truly independent air doctrine exist. Even within the RAF, opinions differed, however: Should Bomber Command have first priority in order to better fulfill its mission (namely, the attack on German air power), or should the air defense organization be enlarged? Nevertheless, British air doctrine stressed that aircraft should be used as flexibly as possible. One way would be the use of strategic bombardment as means of bringing about the defeat of the enemy. Undoubtedly, the geographical position of Great Britain accounts in part for the broader view the British had, a view in line with the long-existing naval blockade strategies. Dr. Overy presents another reason, namely that the championship of strategic bombing as a war-winning strategy was used as a shield to protect the RAF from any attempt to compromise its autonomy.
In sum, one can say that at the outbreak of hostilities the European continental countries were committed to tactical air power, that only Great Britain had acknowledged the theories of strategic bombing, and, in the Pacific region, that naval air power constituted the dominating factor in the struggle for the initiative.1
Based on these points of departure, Dr. Overy describes the course of World War II. Two chapters are dedicated to the European air war (Chapter 2: 1939- 41; Chapter 3: 1941-45), one to the air war in the Far East, and one to the strategic bombing offensives. This grouping is not accidental. When the war broke out in 1939, activities in the air were few, with the exception of Poland. In Poland, the Luftwaffe destroyed the Polish Air Force in a series of attacks on airfields. This job completed, the Luftwaffe turned to giving direct support to the advancing Wehrmacht. The campaign did not result in new viewpoints on the use of air power, which it should have, because the Luftwaffe lost not less than 285 airplanes, with another 279 planes damaged, for a total loss of 333 Polish machines. (p. 28) The lesson to be learned was that the conquest of the command of the air would have to be repeated over and over again, and that a permanent result could be reached only if one of the belligerent powers would continually be superior: ". . . sheer quantity became a factor capable of achieving domination in the air." (p. 2) This, the Luftwaffe (and the RAF) experienced on 1 August 1940, when the Luftwaffe received orders to overpower the Royal Air Force in the shortest possible time: the beginning of the Battle of Britain.
So much has been written about the Battle of Britain and the following blitz that the course of the campaign is well known. Still, the air war in Europe in 1940 and 1941 included more than just the air war over England. Dr. Overy points out that both the air war at sea (or rather over the seas) and in the Mediterranean were of great importance for the course the war was going to take. Germany could not effectuate a blockade of the British Isles, and in the Mediterranean the RAF gained a local advantage, which unfortunately could not be exploited because the airfields in Greece, Crete, and Cyrenaica fell into German hands. Dr. Overy’s conclusion is that after two years of war
the impact of aircraft on the war. . . was both less decisive and less terrible than had been expected before 1939. In combination with the army the Luftwaffe had confirmed that tactical support was an essential component of ground offensives. . . But in many other respects the impact of air power was disappointing and the air theory out of touch with operational reality. (p. 44)
The German invasion of the Soviet Union was "a watershed for the development of the air war." (p. 47) Both the Germans and the Soviets made a massive but limited use of their air power in accordance with existing doctrine. The Allied powers, however, developed not only their tactical air forces but also worked hard at building a strategic bombing force. When the Axis powers discovered the extent of the air threat, it was too late for them to adopt a more general air strategy. Dr. Overy notes that "the lack of attention in doctrine, strategy and preparation given to air defense, bombing and the naval war paved the way not only for the Allied victory in the air but for the land victory as well." (p. 47)
The struggle in the Far East was characterized by the close relationship of air power and naval power although the land-based aircraft retained its value in Southeast Asia. The belligerents were convinced that a permanent air superiority was a conditio sine qua non for the execution of other ambitious plans. The fact that Japan did not succeed in keeping the command of the air it had obtained with the daring attack on Pearl Harbor and the Philippines led to final defeat. On the American side, especially, military leaders were convinced that the Japanese defeat could be enforced by strategic air bombardments. The air offensive commenced in November 1944 with precision attacks on economic targets, but in March 1945 precision bombardments were abandoned in favor of general urban attacks with great quantities of incendiaries. The nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki finished the job, but we now know that Japan had already decided to surrender. And no wonder: in August 1945, the area destroyed by conventional bombardments was 30 times the size of the area destroyed by the two nuclear devices.
Dr. Overy has devoted a separate chapter to the strategic air offensive, but the preceding paragraphs demonstrate that this division is somewhat artificial: The air war in Europe after 1941 and the air war in the Far East should by definition include the strategic bombardments. Still, a separate essay is useful. It is a well-known fact that at the outbreak of war different opinions existed with regard to the strategic air offensive. Notwithstanding Douhet’s theories, many officials did not believe that the airplane could play a decisive role in a future war.2 Those who had read Douhet or had otherwise concentrated on the possibilities of strategic bombardment were divided as to its moral admissibility, as was demonstrated by George H. Quester in his book Deterrence before Hiroshima (1966). Others were convinced that the industrial and military efforts would be out of proportion in view of the results that could be expected, or—as in Germany—they underestimated the necessity of such efforts. Only Great Britain and the United States stuck to their plans, and the fast-growing industrial capacity made possible the building of the gigantic bomber fleets.
In the beginning, the Allied powers were worried about the increase of German industrial production, notwithstanding heavy Allied attacks. Dr. Overy states that the original German plans foresaw a much greater increase. The Allied bombardment curtailed German production effectively, as has been admitted by Albert Speer, Hitler’s chief industrial expert.
So far, Dr. Overy’s book is an excellent compilation of the events that took place during World War II, reviewed in light of the existing theories of that time. It is doubtless to Dr. Overy’s merit that he deals in three more chapters with leadership, organization, and training, with aircraft economies, and with science, research, and intelligence. These three chapters are quite interesting for everyone who really wants to know why the Allies won the air war.
It would detract from the value of these chapters if we tried to summarize them here. Two examples may suffice:
• The war made it necessary to concentrate power in the hands of a limited number of persons. In the West, though, most decisions were reached by committee work. In Germany, on the other hand, the concentration of power had led to corruption and a lack of efficiency that proved to be disastrous for the Luftwaffe.
• The air war caused a multiplication of staff work. In Great Britain, the RAF ran its own staff courses and possessed a sufficient number of capable staff officers when the war broke out. Also, there was close cooperation with competent civilians in the air ministry. In the United States, the situation was different. Until 1941, no separate air staff existed, and the total number of Air Corps officers in 1938 amounted to 1600. The problem was solved by recruiting business and industrial leaders, who applied well-proven management techniques for the explosive expansion of the Army Air Corps. In Germany, many promotions resulted from political loyalty or because one was favored by Hermann Goering. The Prussian staff tradition, on the other hand, placed great demands on the Luftwaffe staff, which could not always be fulfilled. In addition, the requirement that all staff officers should have combat experience caused the death of almost 25 percent of the staff officers. Gaps were sometimes filled with army officers who knew their staff procedures but failed to understand the requirements of the Luftwaffe.
In his preface Dr. Overy states that the purpose of his book is to show two things. "First of all why the Allies won the air war.. . . Secondly, to show how important air power was to the achievement of overall victory." (p. xi) Has he succeeded?
In my opinion, he has. As Dr. Overy states: ". . .during the war there developed a dichotomy between those powers that practised a limited air strategy and those who developed a general air strategy." (p. 203) This contrast was indicative for the way in which the war was fought and organized and for the degree to which industry was mobilized for war purposes—but, there was more to it. In the United States and Great Britain, once the Battle of Britain was won, the industrial base was safe from enemy air attacks, whereas in Germany an increasing number of interruptions from bombing attacks brought about a general social impact. Dr. Overy has very ably demonstrated how the many facets of the air war were related to each other. Without detracting from the dangerous work of the air crews, the book shows that it was the totality of the warring nations — this is valid both for the Allies and for the Axis powers — that was responsible for the way the air war was fought by their air forces.
As for the second question, Dr. Overy maintains that "the difficult question is not whether air power was important, but how important it was." (p. 205) His conclusion is that aircraft certainly did not replace navies and armies during the Second World War. On the other hand, air power became "the component without which the military machine could not be made to work." (p. 203) However, the findings of Dr. Overy deny the exaggerated significance that the air war assumed at the time (and to a certain extent still holds today) in the popular mind. In fact, one might say that the air war was part of World War II but that this war was definitely not an air war per se. As Alexander P. de Seversky wrote in 1950: "Europe and Germany provided no conclusive tests of the efficacy of all-out air strategy, simply because the war was not planned or fought that way."3 We shall have to keep this in mind when we try to draw lessons from the 1939-45 war. Dr. Overy’s book can assist us in this process.
Alphen ann den Rijn,
The Netherlands
Notes
1. See, for example, Professor Edward Homze’s "The Continental Experience," in Air Power and Warfare, Proceedings of the Eighth Military History Symposium, USAF Academy (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1978).
2. Bernard Brodie’s Strategy in the Missile Age (Princeton, New Jersey, 1965) contains an interesting study of Douhet’s theories. See also Edward Homze, op. cit., who maintains that many in the air services of Europe during the interwar period had neither heard of him nor read his books. A French translation of ‘Il Dominio dell’Aria’ appeared in Paris in 1932; a German translation in Berlin in 1935. In the United States, this and some other works were translated by Dino Ferrari and published under the title The Command of the Air (New York: Coward McCann, 1942).
3. Alexander P. de Seversky, Air Power: Key to Survival (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1950), p. 72.
Contributor
Colonel Mozes W.A. Weers,
Royal Netherlands Air Force (Ret), was Commandant of the Royal Netherlands Air Force Staff College at the time of his retirement in 1977. He still holds a lectureship in strategic studies at the college and serves as a member of the Netherlands Military Services Arbitration Court. His military career included assignments with the RNethAF Training Command and the Air Staff as well as with the International Logistics Working Group F-104 at Wahn AFB (Germany). Colonel Weers has published articles in the Militaire Spectator (Dutch) and Strategic Review.Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor