Air University Review, January-February 1982

Of Trees and Leaves

To the aspiring student of the military art, doctrine is too frequently an uncharted wilderness. One is confronted by military-journal articles proclaiming the extraordinary importance of doctrine and yet offering disparate definitions of the word. These same journal articles often refer to the derivation of doctrine from lessons learned in bloody combat by the "great captains" while at the same time the basic U.S. Air Force doctrinal manual devotes considerable space to such current and pacific subjects as the "personnel life cycle." It is no wonder that to many, the word doctrine conjures up confusion and consternation.

What has caused this disarray? Some confusion probably stems from the origin of the word, which is more closely tied to religion than to military affairs. Much more confusion is rooted in the use and misuse of the word throughout military literature. Most of the confusion, however, occurs because of our lack of historical awareness, particularly within the Air Force. Our penchant to be on the leading edge of technology has often resulted in a general disdain for things past. Airmen loathe to admit that history, especially "pre-air power" history, contains lessons applicable to contemporary thinking.

All of these confusing factors cloud the picture, obscuring our view of doctrine and its importance. We are unable to visualize doctrine as a working entity, unable to determine if these confusing factors fit together in some sort of coherent whole. In this article I will attempt to bring some degree of order to the obvious confusion by defining doctrine in a manner that is both accurate and connotatively expressive; by revealing the sources and functions of military doctrine; by exploring the different types of doctrine and their relationships; and by considering some of the problems with official military doctrine as published today.

What It Is

As suggested, the word doctrine has a religious heritage. Application of the term, however, has spread to many disciplines. Thus we find, in addition to religious doctrines, scientific, social, political, and military doctrines. All of these doctrinal forms fit conveniently under the definition of "theory based on carefully worked out principles and taught by its adherents."¹

Our concern here, of course, is military doctrine. Many have attempted to refine the common definition of doctrine to better fit the peculiarities of the military. For example, military doctrine has been defined as:

A compilation of principles and policies. . . that represent the best available thought and indicate and guide but do not bind in practice.²

or

Fundamental principles by which the military forces . . . guide their actions in support of national objectives. It is authoritative but requires judgment in application.³

Each of these "militarized" definitions could suffice, but neither captures in useful terms the essence of military doctrine and its importance.

Perhaps the best definition of military doctrine, one that is accurate, concise, and yet retains the vitality befitting its importance, harks back to doctrine’s religious heritage. Military doctrine is what is officially believed and taught about the best way to conduct military affairs.⁴ Defining doctrine in this manner is significant for several reasons. First, using the word "best" connotes military doctrine’s importance to the successful conduct of military operations. Second, the term "military affairs" implies that doctrinal concepts are not limited to battlefield engagements with an enemy. A broader concept of military doctrine is particularly important during an era in which the development and deployment of forces rivals the importance of the employment of those forces. Third, the word "taught" suggests an important function of military doctrine, which will be discussed later. Finally, the word "believed" directly suggests the interpretive and thus transmutable nature of military doctrine. This final point leads naturally to the questions of what is interpreted and why doctrine is transmutable. In short, what are the sources of military doctrine?

Sources

The primary source of beliefs about how "best" to conduct military affairs is the experience of how things were conducted in the past. In other words, the primary source of military doctrine is military history. The remaining discussion, then, is limited to military doctrine.

History can reveal the repeated success or failure of certain actions. These observations can then be generalized into doctrine. Finally, these beliefs, if tested over time, can be abstracted into general principles — doctrine that is axiomatic. For instance, in the history of aerial combat, attacks from the rear place the attacker at a great advantage. This can be generalized into a doctrinal statement such as "maneuver to attack enemy aircraft from its six o’clock position." We could further analyze this doctrinal statement and determine that attack from the rear is advantageous because the enemy has difficulty observing his six o’clock position and thus is often unaware that he is about to be attacked. We might also observe many other instances in which unanticipated actions placed opponents in difficulty. Because of this repeated observation over time, further abstraction to the status of a principle might be appropriate. Such an abstract principle might state, "Surprise is an important element in successful offensive and defensive operations."⁵ This example is certainly oversimplified, but it illustrates the role of history in formulating doctrine. The process is one of repeated observation that may be followed by generalization and, in some cases, abstraction.

Understanding that military history is the principle source of doctrine is enlightening, but two problems still remain. First, how does one apply the wisdom of experience to beliefs about the present and future? Second, how does one accommodate those "military affairs" for which there is little empirical evidence in the past. Situations change, enemies become friends, friends become enemies, and the steady march of scientific progress changes the tools of war at a rapid pace. Experience by itself cannot possibly provide all the guidance needed to cope with every rapidly changing situation.

Lieutenant General John W. Pauly has pointed out that ". . . experience without theory lacks an adequate frame of reference to accommodate future changes that will surely come."⁶ Theory — a notion used to explain phenomena made plausible by reasoning from accepted facts — provides the framework for future application and is the second major source of doctrine. Also, "meaningful Air Force doctrine, suitable for all the complexities and forms of modern aerospace warfare, is the synthesis of theory and experience."⁷ It was the development of theory by members of the Air Corps Tactical School that led to the development of strategic bombing plans used in World War II. Currently, we find that much of our doctrine concerning nuclear war is based on theory since no one has ever waged a nuclear war; the nuclear bombs dropped on Japan did not constitute a nuclear war by any stretch of the imagination.

What It Does

Why do we have these beliefs, and why do we teach them? Again, one can find many statements, both official and unofficial, that attempt to describe doctrine’s functions.⁸ A broad synthesis of these statements reveals three fundamental doctrinal functions. The first, and perhaps most important, is to provide an analysis of experience. The welter of experience must be analyzed in an attempt to distill lessons that can be of value in dealing with present and future circumstances, i.e., beliefs about the best way to conduct military affairs. But the analysis must not be static. Changing circumstances, perhaps best characterized by technological developments, can change what we believe are the important lessons of experience. If present circumstances do not affect the analysis of history’s lessons, doctrine will quickly become irrelevant. The French experience after World War I is illustrative of this problem. Based on the demonstrated superiority of the defense when ensconced in strong trench works during the Great War, the French constructed, during the 1930s, the world’s most elaborate and sophisticated fortifications along the German border. Unfortunately, the static fortifications of the Maginot Line were irrelevant in the new age of mobile warfare.⁹ The French analysis of history’s lessons was not tempered by contemporary circumstances, particularly the advent of motorized ground warfare supported by air power.

If doctrine’s first function is to provide a tempered analysis of experience and thus a determination of what we believe, the second function must be to teach these beliefs or lessons to successors. Without the teaching function, analysis has little value. Without passing on the lessons of experience — ours and others’ — we are doomed forever to "reinvent the wheel." For example, the American Civil War, the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-78, and the Russo-Japanese War (1904-5) clearly illustrated that entrenchments, breechloading rifled weapons, and machine guns had so strengthened defensive capabilities that frontal assaults could be mounted only at frightening cost and with dubious prospects for success. And yet during World War I, "Both sides took turns in staging variations upon Pickett’s Charge, modernized in weaponry and minor tactics but equally futile."¹⁰

Why did such a tragic circumstance ensue when the lessons were so clear? Part of the problem may have been faulty analysis. Or, as Professor Russell F. Weigley indicates, the Europeans may have been blinded by pride. In effect, what happened to "backward" armies was of no consequence to highly trained and disciplined European armies.¹¹ Whatever the reason, the lessons were not effectively transmitted, clearly illustrating the importance of doctrine’s teaching function and the obstacles that can be encountered.

Doctrine should also provide guidance for actions, particularly important in the heat of combat when direction from superiors may be unavailable. Perhaps Lieutenant Commander Dudley W. Knox put it best in 1915:

The object of military doctrine is to furnish a basis for prompt and harmonious conduct by the subordinate commanders of a large military force, in accordance with the intentions of the commander-in-chief, but without the necessity for referring each decision to superior authority before action is taken. More concisely stated, the object is to provide a foundation for mutual understanding between the various commanders during hostile operations.¹²

Some might believe that setting off the guidance function as distinct from the analysis and teaching functions is a frivolous overcomplication. Yet guidance, doctrine’s third function, is actually the fruition of the first two. There is, however, value in maintaining the distinction. Superior analysis of experience coupled with efforts to teach has little value if no lasting impact is made on the student. This implies two things: First, what is analyzed and taught must be useful; and second, the student must be convinced of its utility. One would assume that just keeping the guidance function in mind while analyzing and teaching should eventually lead to more useful doctrine.

Redefining Military Doctrine

To this point, all seems simple and clear enough. Why, then, is there confusion and consternation? The answer lies in the nature of official U.S. military doctrine as published today and our lack of awareness that very different types of doctrine have existed throughout modern military history. Each type had its own unique characteristics and functions. Taken together, however, they form an integrated whole. Unfortunately, doctrine as published in the United States today is only a small part of that integrated whole. The result is confusion and consternation.

There seems to me to be three meaningfully distinct types of doctrine: fundamental, environmental, and organizational, and I think a brief survey of these doctrinal types will be helpful in resolving the confusion.

Fundamental doctrine, as the name implies, forms the foundation for all other types of doctrine. Its scope is broad and its concepts relatively abstract. Essentially, fundamental doctrine consists of beliefs about the purposes of the military, the nature of war, the relationship of military force to other power instruments, and similar subject matter on which less abstract beliefs are founded. A few samples of doctrinal statements that fit into the fundamental category will clarify the issue. We might believe, for example, that:

• War is policy carried on by other means.

• War is the failure of policy.

• The object of war is to overcome an enemy’s hostile will.

• The object of war is the destruction of enemy military forces.

• The object of war is a better state of peace.

Any of these statements, if officially believed, would fit the definition of fundamental military doctrine. They would seem applicable in democratic or authoritarian states and would seem cogent whether discussing Napoleon’s campaigns or recent Arab-Israeli conflicts.

An examination of these statements also reveals two other significant characteristics of fundamental doctrine. The first is its "timeless" nature. It seldom changes because it deals with basic concepts rather than contemporary techniques. The second characteristic, which stems from the first, is that fundamental doctrine is relatively insensitive to political philosophy or technological change.

Other subjects that could be considered a part of fundamental doctrine are the basic principles for the effective employment of military forces. These "principles of war," as they are most commonly called, are fundamental factors that commanders must carefully consider when making force-employment decisions. Professor I. B. Holley has indicated that principles of war are doctrinal beliefs that have become axiomatic.¹³ But axioms depend on one’s interpretation and analysis of history and the current circumstances that influence both interpretation and analysis. This problem is well illustrated by the different principles of war adopted by armed forces throughout the world.

Although fundamental doctrine is the most basic form of doctrine and thus the foundation for all other forms, one rarely finds officially adopted, pure fundamental doctrine. The great military philosophers (Clausewitz, Liddell Hart, and others, for example), who dealt extensively in these most fundamental concepts, wrote unofficially. How, then, do their theories become doctrine? First, their works are studied and taught, particularly in military educational institutions. Second, bits and pieces of their theories are found in official doctrinal publications.

As man’s technology enabled him to put to sea and take to the air, the proclivity to wage war in these environments quickly followed. Quite naturally, beliefs about how best to use sea power and air power also developed. Thus environmental doctrine (the rubric for the doctrinal sea power, air power, etc.) is a compilation of beliefs about the employment of military forces within a particular operating medium.

Environmental doctrine has several distinctive characteristics. First, it is clearly narrower in scope than fundamental doctrine because it deals with the exercise of military power in a particular medium. Second, environmental doctrine is significantly influenced by factors such as geography and technology. Sea power doctrine, for example, is obviously influenced by geography — there are many places to which you cannot take naval vessels — and by technology, particularly since the advent of naval aviation and submarine warfare. Air power doctrine is less influenced by geography but is totally dependent on technology.

As one would expect, sea power doctrine developed long before air power doctrine. Sea power’s most notable modern exponent, Alfred Thayer Mahan, expressed the consistent theme that sea power was supremely important in shaping national destinies. Although much of what Mahan wrote was unofficial, it qualifies as doctrine because it was taught (for example, at the Naval War College, where Mahan was President from 1886 to 1893) and because his ideas about sea power were widely believed. As M.T. Sprout has noted, Mahan "precipitated and guided a . . . revolution in American naval policy, provided a theoretical foundation for Britain’s determination to remain the dominant seapower, and gave impetus to German naval development . . .’’¹⁴

Air power doctrine is a newer example of environmental doctrine. The Italian airman Giulio Douhet and American aviator William "Billy" Mitchell were two of the most articulate exponents of air power, and their writings form the foundation of air power doctrine. Their emphasis was on the decisiveness of air forces in war, theorizing that strategic bombing would destroy a nation’s will and ability to wage war. Following this logic, they believed armies and navies were, at best, defensive weapons and that the outcome of war would be decided in the air.¹⁵

During the 1930s, the Air Corps Tactical School faculty expanded the themes of Douhet and Mitchell. These air power pioneers theorized that if certain elements of an enemy’s industrial web could be destroyed, the economy which supported war-making capability would collapse like a house of cards. The key was daylight precision bombing aimed at destroying vital industrial elements. These theories became unofficial doctrine. As the threat of a European war increased, doctrinal beliefs were directly or indirectly converted into detailed action plans, i.e., strategy that specified equipment needed and targeting priorities.¹⁶

The first official air power doctrine published in the United States was FM 100-20, which appeared in July 1943. It has been called the Magna Charta of U.S. air power, for it contained the first definitive official statement that air power must be centrally controlled by an airman. Additionally, FM 100-20 contained statements indicating the importance and unique capabilities of air power. It indicated, for example, that strategic bombing could defeat an enemy nation, that interdiction could result in battlefield isolation forcing enemy retreat, and that close air support paved the way for the advance of ground forces.

FM 100-20 was, for the most part, air power doctrine, one form of environmental doctrine. By our definition, it contained virtually no fundamental doctrine. It did contain, however, scattered elements of "organizational doctrine."

Organizational doctrine is best defined as basic beliefs about the operation of a particular military organization or group of closely linked military organizations. It is, in fact, an attempt to bring the abstractions of fundamental and environmental doctrine into sharper focus by leavening them with current political realities, capabilities, and cultural values. Typically, organizational doctrine will discuss roles and missions assigned to an organization, current objectives, administrative organization, force-employment principles as influenced by the current situation, and, in some instances, tactics.

Organizational doctrine has several salient characteristics when compared with fundamental or environmental doctrine. First, organizational doctrine is very narrow in scope. While fundamental doctrine concerns the basic notions of military force and environmental doctrine concerns the use of force within a certain operating medium, organizational doctrine concerns the use of particular forces (e.g., U.S. forces or Soviet forces) in a particular environment (e.g., U.S. Air Forces or Soviet Air Forces) at a particular time — today. The second characteristic of organizational doctrine stems from the first. Organizational doctrine is current and thus tends to change relatively frequently in order to remain "current." This contrasts sharply with the almost timeless qualities of fundamental doctrine. Environmental doctrine would also seem to have considerable staying power.

The U.S. Army’s FM 100-5 is an excellent recent example of organizational doctrine, exhibiting all of the characteristics described above. FM 100-5, although bearing the title Operations, is concerned primarily with the European battlefield and operations against the Warsaw Pact. A large portion of the manual describes current trends in weapon lethality, force organization, as well as current concepts for fighting offensive, defensive, and other specific types of operations.

Air Force Manual 1-1, Functions and Basic Doctrine, is another example of organizational doctrine. It is the successor to FM 100-20 mentioned earlier. The evolution from the environmental air power doctrine of FM 100-20 to the organizational U.S. Air Force doctrine of AFM 1-1 (1979) was very gradual. The first successor manual appeared in 1953, followed by revisions in 1954, 1955, 1959, 1964, 1971, 1975, and 1979. The 1953 edition was primarily air power (i.e., environmental) doctrine flavored with just a bit of the then current political situation. Each succeeding revision saw the inclusion of more and more of the attributes of organizational doctrine and less environmental emphasis. The end result is U.S. Air Force doctrine, not air power doctrine. Air power environmental doctrine is no longer officially published.

Organizational doctrine can itself be categorized. In addition to capstone publications such as AFM 1-1 and the Army’s FM 100-5, we also have operational doctrine that is even narrower in scope. AFM, 2-1, Tactical Air Operations, and the Army’s FM 17-50, Attack Helicopter Operations, are two examples of operational organizational doctrine. Finally, the United States has joint/combined doctrine, such as JCS Publication 2, Unified Action of Armed Forces, which is another form of organizational doctrine. Obviously, as these publications become more and more narrow in scope, they take on the characteristics of regulations or standard operating procedures. Where one draws the line between beliefs about how to do things and directives about how to do things is a matter of conjecture.

How do these complex puzzle pieces fit together? Clearly, fundamental doctrine is the basis for all other doctrine types while environmental doctrine is at least part of the basis for organizational doctrine. With these relationships in mind, I constructed the doctrine tree as the most useful way to visualize the whole of doctrine.

The trunk of the tree is fundamental doctrine, the basis for all other doctrine types. The trunk, of course, has its roots in the ground, which represents history or experience, the primary source for doctrine. The tree branches represent environmental doctrine — each springing from the trunk, each individual and yet all related. The leaves represent organizational doctrine — dependent on both the trunk and the branches, changing from season to season.

Let’s carry the tree analogy even further. What happens if we cannot accurately interpret the lessons of history? This is analogous to cutting the tree’s roots, which could kill the tree (i.e., lead to defeat). What happens if we do not have valid fundamental or environmental doctrine? This is analogous to a diseased trunk or branch, which could kill the tree including the leaves (i.e., lead to defeat). The doctrine tree analogy illustrates that doctrine must be a coherent whole to be valuable. The tree illustrates the dependencies involved and the often ignored importance of fundamental and environmental doctrine.

Where does this leave doctrine today? As noted, the only officially published doctrine, at least in the Air Force, is organizational doctrine. AFMs 1-1, 2-1, etc., fit our definition of organizational doctrine although they do contain some references to fundamental doctrine (the "principles of war" in AFM 1-1, for example) and to environmental doctrine (characteristics and capabilities of aerospace forces, also in AFM 1-1). However, even these concessions to more basic doctrinal types are modified by current circumstances. If organizational doctrine is all that is published today, the central question becomes one of sufficiency. Is organizational doctrine enough? We can begin to examine this question by looking at the three types of doctrine in comparison with the three purposes of functions of doctrine.

Fundamental and environmental doctrine fulfills the analysis and teaching functions. The broad abstract concepts of fundamental doctrine are generally the results of considerable historical analysis. The point is notable in the two great military philosophers previously mentioned: Clausewitz was an interpreter of Napoleon while Liddell Hart based nearly all of his fundamental concepts on historical research and interpretation. Environmental doctrine is also often based on historical analysis and "lessons learned" as they relate to the relevant operational environment. Mahan, for example, won his initial acclaim as a historian.

Of particular note, however, is environmental doctrine’s teaching function. Clearly it has functioned so as to transmit basic lessons concerning the environment in question. However, it often functions as a selling tool by teaching the uninitiated about the opportunities and benefits of exploiting that environment. Thus environmental doctrine can act as a weapon in the bureaucratic struggles over roles, missions, and associated budget allocations. Mahan developed sea power doctrine and extolled its virtues in part to promote a large

Navy and Merchant Marine. Mitchell promoted an independent Air Force through air power doctrine. Thus, environmental doctrine has had a unique dual-teaching function.

Organizational doctrine presents a different picture. Even a cursory examination of Air Force Manual 1-1 reveals that it does not fulfill doctrine’s analytical function. Historical references are more gratuitous than instructive. Concepts are presented as facts without reference to derivation. It is also clear that without the analysis function, Air Force organizational doctrine, typified by AFM 1-1, cannot accomplish the teaching function defined earlier. Quite clearly, the purpose of U.S. Air Force doctrine is almost exclusively one of current guidance.

The fact that organizational doctrine cannot fulfill the three purposes or functions of doctrine does not totally address the issue of sufficiency. But the shortcomings of organizational doctrine lead to other important issues that call sufficiency into question. One must first wonder how experience will be analyzed and the lessons taught if we publish only organizational doctrine. Do we not need a solid grounding in the art of war itself before we attempt to fulfill the current guidance for U.S. forces in today’s environment? Is not a military leader without knowledge of the fundamentals of the military art analogous to a brain surgeon without knowledge of basic medicine?

One might also wonder how many of the difficult issues facing the military can be logically addressed without the context provided by fundamental and environmental doctrine. Have nuclear weapons changed the basic nature and purposes of war? What is the impact of unconventional forms of war, such as Mao’s People’s Revolutionary War? Given both experience and new technology, what are the practical capabilities and limitations of military power in general and air power in particular? Will not the answers to such fundamental questions shape the future U.S. military establishment?

Finally, one must wonder what happens to organizational doctrine that does not rest on the foundation of more basic doctrinal forms. If there is no logic "audit trail" from fundamental concepts to current application, how does one judge the validity of organizational doctrine? It would appear that organizational doctrine without a firm foundation runs the risk of becoming little more than dogma.

Organizational doctrine, no matter how well structured, cannot adequately fulfill all three doctrinal functions. Organizational doctrine, by definition, cannot provide the context needed to logically address many of the difficult issues facing the military. The most serious problem, however, may be that if we do not develop more historical awareness, organizational doctrine can lose its basis. If the entire doctrine tree is not healthy, the leaves of organizational doctrine can blow unfettered in the winds of change, providing confusion rather than guidance.

Air Command and Staff College
Maxwell AFB, Alabama

1. Webster’s New World Dictionary (New York, 1978).

2. R. F. Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine: A History of Basic Thinking in the United States Air Force 1907-1964 (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1971), p. 3.

3. JCS Pub. 1, as quoted in Lieutenant General J .W. Pauly, "The Thread of Doctrine," Air University Review, May-June 1976, p.3.

4. The author owes the idea for this most useful definition to Professor I. B. Holley, Jr., of Duke University. In addition to presentations of this concept by Professor Holley at Air University, he presented a similar concept in the 1974 Harmon Memorial Lecture at the U.S. Air Force Academy.

5. See Doctrine Information Publication #2 published by Assistant Deputy Director for Strategy, Doctrine and Long-Range Planning, Hq USAF, 5 October 1978.

6. Pauly, p.3.

7. Ibid.

8. For a few examples see Futrell, Ideas, Concepts, Doctrine, particularly Chapters 1 and 15; Pauly, op. cit.; Lieutenant Colonel D. L. Hutchinson, "A New Look at an Old Problem," Air University Review, January-February 1979, pp. 69-73; and Major Robert C. Ehrhart, "Some Thoughts on Air Force Doctrine," Air University Review, March-April 1980, pp. 29-38.

9. There are numerous accounts of the French experience. Two are exceptional: Alistair Home’s To Lose a Battle, France 1940 (Boston, 1969); and William L. Shirer’s The Collapse of the Third Republic (New York, 1971).

10. Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War (New York, 1973), p. 195.

11. Ibid.

12. Lieutenant Commander D.W. Knox, "The Role of Doctrine in Naval Warfare," originally in Proceedings, March-April 1915, as quoted in Weigley, p. 514.

13. Refer to Note 4 concerning lectures at Air University.

14. M.T. Sprout, "Mahan: Evangelist of Sea Power," in Makers of Modern Strategy, edited by Edward Meade Earle (Princeton, New Jersey; 1971), p. 415.

15. See Giulio Douhet’s The Command of the Air (Rome, 1921, 1958 translation), and Mitchell’s Winged Defense (New York, 1925). Also see Edward Warner, "Douhet, Mitchell, Seversky: Theories of Air Warfare," found in Earle, pp. 485-503.

16. An excellent discussion of this is found in Major General Haywood S. Hansell, The Air Plan That Defeated Hitler (Maxwell AFB, Alabama, 1973). See also Futrell, Chapter 3.

Lieutenant Colonel Dennis M. Drew (B.A., Willamette University; M.S., University of Wyoming) is Chief, Warfare Studies Division, Air Command and Staff College. He has served as missile combat crew commander and wing missile staff officer and at Hq SAC with duties on the CINCSAC Battle Staff. Colonel Drew is a graduate of Squadron Officer School and Air War College and a Distinguished Graduate of Air Command and Staff College. He is a previous contributor to the Review.

Disclaimer

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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