Air University Review, September-October 1981

Professional Autonomy of the Military
in the United States and the Soviet Union

Controversies regarding civil-military relations in both the United States and the Soviet Union focus largely on the issue of professional autonomy: the degree to which the professional nuclei of the armed forces in these nations are constrained by political and organizational forces external to the military. In the United States, this theme is central to the debate between Samuel Huntington and Morris Janowitz regarding the sufficiency of professional ethical neutrality on the part of the military for the maintenance of civilian control over the armed forces. The same theme appears in the Soviet Union, according to the dialogue between William Odom and Roman Kolkowicz regarding the degree to which the relationship between the military and the Party is adversarial or complementary.

Our general view is that the nature of professionalism in both military establishments is changing in ways that reflect more general patterns of change in modern society. The underlying dimension is increased rationalization, which alters the ways in which work is organized in the military as well as in most other institutional spheres. Critical components of this alteration are greater sophistication and complexity in equipment technology and in social coordination technology, greater specialization in work roles and in technology at the subunit level, a greater need for coordination of specialized subunits at higher organizational levels, and increasingly abstract and impersonal planning of such coordination to achieve a more disciplined and methodical organization of subunits both in relation to each other and to the environment. In the military these general societal trends are compounded by the increased potential of new military technologies for devastation.

General recognition of the power of modern weaponry has shifted the role of the military in the United States and the Soviet Union from one of making war to one of deterrence, at least insofar as the relationship between these two nations is concerned. This transformation in the role of the military institution has both broadened the function of the armed forces into the realm of politics even in periods of peace and necessitated more extensive civilian political control of the military, or at least more extensive articulation of military and governmental structures. These trends may be seen by some as constraints on professional autonomy that are unique to the military. We see them as manifestations of more general concerns with social control of those occupational groups that have historically been endowed with the status of professions. While there is no doubt that the consequences of social control of the profession are different for the military than, say, for the bar or the clergy, the social processes involved are essentially the same.¹

An agreed-on set of characteristics of professions and professionals is summarized by Richard Hall, the distinction being made between structural and attitudinal characteristics.² Structural characteristics of a profession are the (1) creation of a full-time occupation; (2) establishment of a training school; (3) formation of a professional association; and (4) formulation of a code of ethics. Attitudinal characteristics of professionals, to the extent they are imbued with professional values are (1) professional organization reference group; (2) belief in service to the public; (3) belief in self-regulation; (4) a sense of calling to the field, and (5) a feeling of autonomy. Numerous articulations have been made of the military’s claim that it has these characteristics, it indeed a profession, and at least at the office level its members are professionals. We do not dispute these claims, but we do question placing greater emphasis on "increasing professionalism" to improve military performance.

The development of an officer corps as a professional occupational category has been limited historically by technological, political, and ideological constraints. In order to justify occupational specialization and differentiation, there had to be a military threat of sonic continuity. And in order for specialized military roles to be filled on the basis of expertise, stratification and ideological systems required that people be assigned positions on the basis of merit rather than birth, and accept a modicum of elitism in society. Officers who served because of their parentage rather than expertise were not military professionals. It was not until the American and French revolutions that officership was achieved rather than ascribed.³ Even then, officers were not necessarily regarded as professionals. Early Americans were not eager to accord professional status even to the traditional European professions: law, medicine, and the clergy.⁴ Similarly, traditional professions were afforded privileged status in Russia prior to the revolution; subsequent decline in the status of these occupations is notable.

While the mystique associated with science did establish the legitimacy of those occupations that were scientific in nineteenth-century America, the Civil War was fought by an officer corps that was not regarded as professional. Although the autonomy of the emerging military had been limited by the framers of the Constitution who specified, in Article 1, that the President was to be Commander in Chief and only the Congress could declare war and appropriate funds for the armed forces, these limitations were not seen as constraints on a profession but on a potential political force and economic liability that had to be held in check. Interestingly, it is the constraints of Article I that Huntington emphasizes in his theory of civil-military relations.⁵

Between the Civil War and World War I, the professionalism of the American officer corps was increasingly asserted and institutionalized. The United States Army followed the British model of a nonprofessional officer corps during the Civil War. A professional military cadre developed in France and Prussia, and the United States Military Academy taught European ideals of officership; but until the Civil War, the U.S. Army was not led by West Point graduates.⁶

Military education was expanded in the late nineteenth century with the establishment of midcareer training at the Navy and Army War Colleges and at the Infantry and Cavalry School. New officer associations were formed and began to publish professional journals, and military officers played an expanded role in military policy planning without posing a challenge to civilian control. The War Department General Staff was established in 1903. World War I became the first opportunity for a professional cadre to lead American forces in combat, and it did so without violating the prerogatives of the major agents of the Commander in Chief, the Secretaries of War and the Navy. The division of labor between military professionals and civilians established at that time has persisted largely unchallenged through the contemporary period, although its organizational manifestations have been changed somewhat with the establishment of the Department of Defense and subordinate service secretariats on the civilian side, and the establishment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the military side.

The fundamental thesis of The Soldier and the State is Huntington’s assertion that "The modern officer corps is a professional body and the modern military officer a professional man." According to Huntington, a profession is an occupation with highly specialized characteristics: expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. The military officer shares these characteristics with the physician and lawyer.

• Expertise refers to specialized knowledge and skill, embedded in an occupational tradition based on a combination of basic liberal education and extensive specialized training.

• Responsibility refers to a service ethic in which the client of the service provided is society, and remuneration is based on professional custom rather than the simple operation of market principles.

• Corporateness refers to the cohesion of the professional community derived from the common training experience, bond of work, and shared social responsibility of the occupational group.

These three characteristics justify both a degree of deference or social honor and a degree of autonomy in the execution of professional activities.

In The Professional Soldier, Morris Janowitz basically accepts Huntington’s definition of a profession.⁷ He describes professions in terms of special skill acquired through intensive training, standards of ethics and performance, and a sense of group identity and system of internal administration, analogous to Huntington’s criteria of expertise, responsibility, and corporateness. Like Huntington, Janowitz views the military’s sharing of these characteristics with the traditional professions: law and medicine; and, like Huntington, Janowitz seeks to apply the category of professional not to the entire range of military occupations and grades but only to the officer corps.

While Huntington and Janowitz agree in the abstract on the characteristics of a profession, they differ in some respects in the application of these criteria to the American military. The major difference is manifested in their treatment of professional autonomy, with respect to the issues of mission definition and civilian control of the military. Huntington argues that the effectiveness of the military can best be guaranteed through professional autonomy and that the violation of that autonomy through the imposition of the liberal values of the civilian state compromises military effectiveness. The expertise of the military professional is in fighting wars, which would be compromised through the imposition of civilian values on the military.

Janowitz, by contrast, sees the military not in terms of a dichotomous choice of activity between peace and war but rather as an instrument of international relations in a world in which the distinctions between peace and war and between political and military activity have become increasingly difficult to draw. As the military becomes increasingly integrated into the policy repertoire of the civilian government on an ongoing basis, the military expertise of the professional soldier must increasingly be supplemented with political sensitivity, and this changed definition of mission serves as a constraint on the war-fighting expertise of the military. This, coupled with the increasing bureaucratization of military organization, in turn constrains the professional autonomy of the military.⁸

Janowitz described the beginning of a process that has continued to evolve as a critical aspect of the modern military and has altered its traditional professional image. This change has been a two-edged sword, in some respects contributing directly to the greater professionalization of the military and in some respects threatening that professionalization. It is a change that is inherently linked to vastly increased potential power of the military through sophisticated weapon systems, economic influence, and possession of skills an apparatus capable of performing almost the administrative and technical tasks required by civilian society. This potential has generated a subsequent need by society to contain military autonomy under detailed civilian control.

The broadening of the military function to include peace, political and social stability issues as well as effective waging of war, the differentiation of tasks performed within the military to include administrative, clerical, logistical communication, and research support roles to much higher degree than combat roles, and the integration of military decision-making under civilian structure has not destroyed the professional status of the military but enhanced it. As Bengt Abrahamsson explains, it is precisely these kinds of changes occurring in close association with the advancing industrialization of the larger society that have "transformed the officer corps from a group of part-time employed ascriptively recruited soldiers to a well-educated, technically. . .trained corps of experts recruited on the basis of achievement and skill."⁹ From Abrahamsson’s point of view, the concern is that the size, economic impact, capacity for total warfare and nuclear devastation, and infiltration by military people into industrial and political circles raise concerns about insufficient control by the civilian sector of military power and autonomy.

Others are more likely to be concerned that the extension of military functions leading to the interpenetration of military strategy and political strategy, the overlapping of military and civilian roles, and the general integration of military and civilian sectors has led to the reverse problem: excessive loss of a singularly military sense of purpose, military autonomy, and of internal control. Military frustration over these concerns is quite common and should be addressed. However, these pressures stem essentially from the increased professional stature, breadth, and importance of today’s military, and similar frustrations are articulated by today’s medical and legal professions also.

These frustrations also reflect real pressures and confusions and challenge us to develop adaptations in military organization, public image, and personnel motivation appropriate to the reality of modern armed forces.

Military Professionalism
in the Soviet Union

Russia had been influenced early by French and Prussian notions of military professionalism, and a professional cadre had been established under the czarist regime. The issue of professional autonomy of the military since the Revolution has hinged on the relationship between the Party and the armed forces in general and the role of the commissar, or political officer, in particular.

As in the United States, modern conceptualizations of government, or more appropriately Party, relations with the military in the Soviet Union are an issue of some scholarly debate. Roman Kolkowicz sees the military operating as an interest group with a professional ethic of autonomy, which rather than acting simply as an executor of policy, modifies policies that it does not wholly approve through a variety of organizational tactics.¹⁰ The Party must make resources available to the military in pursuit of national goals, but must be concerned about those resources’ ultimately being used against the regime.

William Odom has a more benign view of Party-military relations and feels that the adversary nature of the relationship has been overstated.¹¹ Drawing heavily on Huntington’s notion of military professionalism, he sees the military and the Party having common rather than divergent interests on a range of central issues, with the military serving as an "administrative arm of the Party," rather than a competing entity.

The prevalent view in the West (with the exception of Colton)¹² of the military in the U.S.S.R. might be summarized as follows: "If the Party is to continue to exist, it must control the military. The MPA (Main Political Administration) is the primary agency through which this control exercised."¹³ Given the nature of the Soviet system, the degree of control exercised by the MPA over the military seemed to require little elaboration and received little attention.

The Soviet Military and the Communist Party by Kolkowicz was an attempt to provide a more thorough analysis of the role of the political cadre within the military. Kolkowicz envisioned the political officer as a controlling agent and quotes a Soviet source:

A well established information system enables the political organs always to be on top of things and to react at the right time to deficiencies in the activities of the officer personnel and in the Party and Komsomol organizations.¹⁴

The implications of this quotation fail to acknowledge that for the political officer to react to deficiencies means among other things to ensure that an atmosphere in the unit does not develop which might lead to a questioning of commander’s orders.

Such statements are common in the Soviet military literature. They provide support to the notion of the political officer as a control agent and suggest that he is superordinate to the military officer who has a right to either interfere with the orders of the officer or to issue commanding orders. This implication is incorrect. Much of the literature places a special emphasis on the fact that the order of the officer is law. In other words it is part of the role of the political officer to ensure that an order is indeed a law for subordinates. As the Soviets, whether military or political, so frequently emphasize, edinonachalie or one-man command is the primary law of the military organization; and the political officer is to explain and educate the subordinates of its importance.

The role of the political officer might be more easily understood if seen in the context of the overall development of the military organization in the U.S.S.R. The importance of the military professional trained in the science and technology of the military art and possessing unique expertise was acknowledged in 1918, when former czarist officers were called into service during the civil war. Former officers were utilized in all the services and served as instructors in the newly established military schools. According to Fediukin "invaluable help was rendered by the old military specialists in the organization of military schools and the preparation of red commanders."¹⁵ Between 1918 and 1920 forty thousand officers were trained in the newly established military schools and in courses provided for new officers.¹⁶

The inclusion of former officers led to the institution of the commissar system and raised the issue of professional autonomy still debated today. The commissar system was to ensure that the czarist officers—who were not exactly supportive of the usurpers of power—did not betray the revolution. The role then was indeed one of control. But it would be erroneous to assume that this was the only function of the commissars. The commissar was to show a special vigilance toward the military specialist, as the former officers were called, but he was also charged with the reeducation of this officer and with helping him understand the historical significance of the revolution.¹⁷ The educational role of the commissar was not only directed toward the military specialist but to the troops. He was charged with ensuring discipline and obedience of the troops to the orders of the military specialist. The signature of the commissar on all orders of the specialist served as an assurance to the soldiers that the order given was not a betrayal. From its inception the domain of the commissar role was not merely control but included socialization and education of the masses to the authority of the specialist. He was to be aware of the importance of good morale as well as carrying the ideology of Marx and Lenin to the troops and to the military specialist.

The operational realm was the domain of the specialist not to be interfered with by the commissar. His was the deciding voice to be supported by the commissar even if he disagreed with the decision. Leadership in the military sphere belonged not to the commissar but to the specialist. The responsibility for military operations falls exclusively on the military leadership.¹⁸

While the institution of the commissar role was no doubt a novel one, the importance of the military specialist was in essence a recognition of the role of the professional, as imperative to the success of the revolution.

While the relationship between the commissar and the military specialist during the Civil War may have approximated the rules only rarely and most likely produced conflict, the interdependence between the political and military officer was likely to lead to a process whereby control was not the most important part of the relationship. Regardless of the degree of conflict between these two role incumbents, the importance attributed to the freedom of the military specialist to make decisions of a military nature and to the educational role of the commissar provides a clear indication that the political leadership recognized the role of the military professional as necessary, not only for the immediate period but for the future as well. And the insistence that the role of the commissar was more than a policeman established the base for the future role obligation. Indeed, throughout the stormy history of the Soviet military, the role of the commissar or political worker always included an educational and morale-building component.

Changes in the system during the first decade of the Soviet state brought changes in the military as well. By 1928, when Stalin inaugurated the first Five Year Plan, the roles of the commissar and military specialist were merged. The establishment of the Zampolit or The Deputy Commander for Political Affairs was, until the great purge in 1937, a role subordinate to the military officer, generally defined as a helping role for the effective education of the personnel supportive of combat readiness, discipline of subordinate personnel, and facilitation of resource procurement.

On the eve of the purge, the commissar role with its control component was reintroduced, and the signature of the commissar was required on all commanding orders. In 1940 the control aspect of the role was eliminated only to be introduced again in July 1941 and finally eliminated in October 1942. The political officer was once more designated subordinate to the military officer, primarily an "educator," supporter of the officer in ensuring discipline and obedience to orders, morale builder as well as overseer of the so-called well-being of the troops.¹⁹

Edinonachalie or one-man command has remained (since 1942) the organizational mode of the military, and, similarly, the role of the political officer has remained subordinate.

Professionalism as the mark of the military officer has been supported throughout the history of the Soviet state. Considerable resources for the development of a professional military cadre were allocated for educational institutions, the establishment of officers’ clubs, and development of a military literature; also included were high material rewards, i.e., salaries, as well as symbolic rewards, such as the institution of military ranks.²⁰

Autonomy, or freedom from controls by external agents, has traditionally been regarded as the sine qua non of a profession. This component of the professional role has long been debated with respect to the U.S.S.R., not only as it pertains to the military but other professionals, also. The establishment of the MPA was not the primary threat to the autonomy of the officer. In fact the purges of 1937-38, which devastated the leadership cadre of the military, were no less devastating to the political cadre, the purported controllers. Stalin was determined to silence any real or imagined opposition, and the holocaust created by the purges did not single out the military as managers of violence as more of a threat than the Party leadership. There is relatively little evidence to suggest that the political officer constituted a threat to the autonomy of the professional officer or that the officer feared interference by the political officer.

The death of Stalin followed by the emergence of the Khrushchev leadership has been portrayed as a period of conflict between the Party and the military. But it is important to note that this conflict was at a level of policy which had little bearing on the professional activities of the officer. Rather, it involved questions and decisions that are the domain of the civilian authorities in other societies as well. The fact that high level officers were questioning Khrushchev’s views on troop reduction or commitment of resources to the civilian sector is indicative of a changed atmosphere rather than greater control of the military. If initiative and independence constitute a component of professionalism and professional autonomy, the available Soviet literature suggests a much stronger emphasis on these characteristics. In large measure these components are a function of changing warfare and technological developments, which lead to similar structural arrangements regardless of the political system. In the 1960s as well as in the 1970s, Soviet military literature devoted considerable attention to the notion that the revolution in military technology places a special responsibility on the professional military cadre, to train and prepare the new officer cadre.²¹ It also emphasized that education and training are not only more important today but, given the increased level of educational achievements of young people, requires a different approach, what might be called a more professional approach.²²

The focus on professionalism is not compromised by an organizational structure that provides room for a political officer. The latter’s focus on morale and on the education of troops in fact enables the officer to focus on the professional domain. It is not at all dysfunctional to the military organization for the political officer to help implement decisions that were made by the commanding cadre.

Professional Expertise
and Professional Autonomy

The definition of professionalism that underlies the views of Huntington and Kolkowicz is a functionalist one, in which an occupational group having a particular expertise is given certain privileges, including autonomy; in exchange for the maintenance of an ethic of public service and self-regulation.²³ In the case of the military, expertise in the management of weapon systems capable of ever-increasing devastation threatens the autonomy of the profession. However, current pressures on the military profession stem not only from these developments within the military but from broader social currents as well.

Views of the professions were extremely favorable in the 1950s and 1960s, when professional autonomy was justified in terms of perceived positive consequences for society. This atmosphere of trust in professional autonomy has passed in the United States, however, as civilian professionals have been shown to have translated autonomy and professional status into personal gain and convenience quite independent of the level of service provided to the public. Civilian professionals such as doctors and lawyers feel themselves put on the defensive, in part because their activities as individuals are coming under increasing ethical scrutiny and in part because they envision themselves as eventually more likely to work in large corporate contexts rather than as independent practitioners, finding that constraints of bureaucratic organization frequently are incompatible with those of professional practice.

This latter issue has been less critical to the military because it originally developed as a profession practiced within a bureaucratic context. However, the increasing complexity of military technology, greater levels of organizational specialization that this complexity requires, and increasing recognition of the political consequences of military autonomy have altered the nature of the bureaucratic constraints placed on the military professional. Moreover, decision-making is done by teams rather than by individuals, and, increasingly, these teams include civilian experts as well as military personnel. These factors change the nature of military practice, as increasingly sophisticated expertise leads to lesser levels of autonomy both in terms of the individual practitioner and the occupational group.

During the 1970s we saw a rise of distrust and criticism in the treatment of professions by social scientists. It is both a reflection of a demand for accountability and a serious reaction to the naïvely one-sided view of professions held during the 1950s and 1960s. The conflict or power perspective on professions that appears so strongly in the social science of the 1970s views the distinctive characteristic of professional occupations to be their monopolistic domination of the markets in which they operate and their efforts to control, through certification procedures and other autonomy-related measures, as much of the environment related to their activity as possible.²⁴ Autonomy is still considered to be a critical factor and indicator of professional status but is discussed in terms of the conflict and dominance relations between professions and the government, professions and the public, and professions and each other. It is also discussed more in terms of professional self-interest than in terms of service. While there is no all-out condemnation of professional principles as such, there is emphasis on the extent to which professionalism is a self-serving ideology. Efforts at increasing autonomy in the name of service have been countered with descriptions of the self-serving dynamics in the application of those principles by professions today and with calls for accountability through outside evaluation and control.

Thus professionals today operate in an atmosphere of considerable distrust, and they feel themselves put on the defensive. We even find the American Medical Association investing in general good-will advertising about itself in a manner very similar to that used by Texaco, Standard Oil, and other giant corporations. The relevance of this to the military is that it is important for people concerned about threats to military status and autonomy to understand that many of these threats are directed at professional elite groups generally, not just at the military. Also, accommodations which take place in the face of these threats are being made and will continue to be made by other professional groups. Such accommodations do not necessarily sadly mean a loss of professional stature relative to other professions but loss of certain privileges; in addition, certain inconveniences may come from providing justifications and information required by accountability-seeking government or private agencies.

The emergence of the military as a profession in the United States and the Soviet Union was a phenomenon of the twentieth century. The idea of a professional military was rejected in the United States at the time of our Civil War but had been accepted in the Soviet Union by the time of their civil war, a half century later.

Unlike the traditional professions, the military calling emerged in a bureaucratic organizational environment in which the question of individual autonomy was never an issue to the degree that it affected other professionals, who increasingly found themselves practicing in bureaucratic rather than individual contexts. The question of the autonomy of the occupational group has emerged as an issue in civil-military relations in both the United States and the Soviet Union. Three points are worth emphasizing with regard to this issue.

First, in both nations, military professionals have been granted a high degree of autonomy in terms of operational matters and tactics. It is primarily with regard to more general issues of international relations that civilian policy becomes preeminent. While it may appear that civilians are increasingly encroaching on military policy, we regard this as largely a reflection of the increased ambiguity between what is military and what is civilian. What we are seeing is not so much the imposition of politics on the military as it is the increased relevance of the military for peacetime politics. To the degree that the military is constrained, the constraints are largely in areas that are not within the traditional domain of the military but pertain to expanded roles of the military rooted in new development in weapons technology.

Second, in both nations, the role of professionals as a privileged class has been questioned. The concept of a profession implies elite status, and the basic ideologies of both nations are antielitist. For a period in the midtwentieth century, social scientists evaluated professionalism positively and uncritically. More recently, however, critical social science theory has questioned the privileged status of professions.

Third, the Soviet Union, unlike the United States, invented a role to represent the interests of the government within the armed forces, thus building what might appear to be a dual authority structure. The roles of political officer and commander have become increasingly cooperative. The political officer has become more responsible for educational and morale issues, leaving the commander free to attend to military issues. The United States has discontinued the civic education activities that were once a part of military socialization but has been adopting strategies from civilian work organizations for the improvement of morale and job satisfaction. These functions are the responsibility of specialized organizational effectiveness officers whose role is coming to resemble the evolving responsibilities of the Soviet political officer.²⁵

1. For an expansion of this theme, see David R. Segal and J. Lengermann, "Professional and Institutional Consideration" in Sam C. Sarkesian, editor, Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress and the Vo1unteer Military (Beverly Hills, 1980).

2. Richard H. Hall, Occupations and the Social Structure (Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey, 1969). See also Bengt Abrahamsson, Military Professionalization and Political Power (Beverly Hills, 1972).

3. David R. Segal, N. Kinzer, and J. C. Woelfel, "The Concept of Citizenship and Attitudes toward Women in Combat," Sex Roles, 3 (1977): 469-77.

4. Daniel J. Boorstin, The Americans: The Colonial Experience (New York, 1958). Daniel H. Calhoun, Professional Lives in America (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1965).

5. Samuel P. Huntington, The Soldier and the State (Cambridge, Massachusetts, 1957).

6. For an expansion of this theme, see Allan R. Millett, The General (Westport, Connecticut, 1975).

7. Morris Janowitz, The Professional Soldier (New York, 1960).

8. See Arthur D. Larson, "Military Professionalism and Civilian Control," Journal of Political and Military Sociology, Spring 1974, pp. 57-72.

9. Abrahamsson, p. 16.

10. Roman Kolkowicz, "Interest Groups in Soviet Politics: The Case of the Military," in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, editors, Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder, Colorado, 1978), pp. 9-26.

11. William E. Odom, "The Party Military Connection: A Critique" in Dale R. Herspring and Ivan Volgyes, editors, Civil-Military Relations in Communist Systems (Boulder, Colorado, 1978).

12. T. J. Colton, Commissars, Commanders and Civilian Authority: The Structure of Soviet Military Politics (Cambridge, Massachusetts,1979).

13. Harriet F. Scott and William F. Scott, The Armed Forces of the U.S.S.R. (Boulder, Colorado, 1979), p. 269.

14. Roman Kolkowicz, The Soviet Military and the Communist Party (Princeton, 1967), p. 72.

15. S. Fediukin, Sovetskaia Viast i Burzhuaznye Spetsialisty (Moskva, l965), p. 71.

16. A. Iovlev,"Stanovlenie i Razvitie Voenno-Uchebnykh Zavedenii Krasnoi Armii i Flota," Voenno Istorichesleii Zhurrol, September 1974, pp. 86-90.

17. See Fediukin; also D. A. Voropaev and A. M. Iovlev, Borba KPSS za Sozanie Voennykh Kadrov (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1956).

18. Fediukin, p. 86.

19. Iu. P. Petrov, Partinoe Stroitelstvo v Sovetskzi Armii i Flote (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1964).

20. Ibid.

21. V. K. Konoplev, Nauchnoe Predvidenie 0 Voennom Dele (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1974).

22. M. M. Lisenkov, Kulturnaia Revolutsiia v SSSR i Armiia (Moskva: Voenizdat, 1977). M. Timofeechev, "Vazhneiskii Printsip Sovetskogo Voennogo Stroitelstva," Kommunist Voruzhennykh Sil, February 1969, pp. 12-19. Kommunist Voruzhennykh Sil, "Vooruzhennye Sily SSSR v Gody Mirnogo Sotsialisticheskogo," December 1966, pp. 74-79.

23. Hall, pp. 78-82.

24. For example, see E. Friedson, Professional Dominance (New York, 1970).

25. David R. Segal, "Civil-Military Relations East and West," Studies in Comparative Communism, Autumn 1978, pp. 310-24.

David R. Segal (B.A., Harpur College; M.A., Ph.D., University of Chicago) is Professor of Sociology and of Government and Politics at the University of Maryland, where he was appointed Distinguished Scholar-Teacher for the 1980-81 academic year. He is on the Executive Council of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Consulting Editor of the Journal of Political and Military Sociology, and Associate Editor of Armed Forces and Society. Dr. Segal is coeditor of The Social Psychology of Military Service and coauthor of The All Volunteer Force.

Dr. Janet S. Schwartz (B.A., City College of New York; M.S., Ph.D., Cornell University) is a visiting associate professor at the School of International Service, American University. Dr. Schwartz has held positions on the faculties of the University of Maryland and Wells College, Aurora, New York. She has published articles in Social Forces and other professional journals.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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