Air University Review, September-October 1981

Working With the Soviets:
Expectations and Warnings

Anything written by Mohamed Heikal, long-time publisher of the influential Cairo daily Al-Ahram, confidant of Nasser, and enfant terrible of Egyptian politics, is required reading for students of the Middle East. This particular book* should also be required for students of the Soviet Union and the Third World in general. It is an insider’s account of how the Soviets came a cropper in Egypt. As such, it is of particular relevance today, when we are increasingly concerned about Soviet inroads in South Asia.

*Mohamed Heikal, The Sphinx and the Commissar, The Rise and Fall of Soviet Influence in the Arab World (New York: Harper and Row, 1979, $12.95), 304 pages.

Like most of Heikal’s works, The Sphinx and the Commissar has an essentially cynical approach to everyone’s motives. It is full of illuminating anecdotes—the table talk and indiscretions of people such as Khrushchev and Brezhnev, about whose private lives we know very little. Heikal recounts Mikoyan’s views on Stalin and Trotsky and Marshal Malinovsky being ordered to tell his joke about the stereotyped behavior of betrayed husbands. He also includes Khrushchev complaining that Shepilov had told the Politburo that while talking to the President of Finland he (Khrushchev) had been scratching his armpits as though they were invaded by fleas.

More important, the book traces the ups and downs of the Egyptian-Soviet relationship from 1919 to 1975, with particular emphasis on the period since 1955, which is treated in considerable detail. The concluding chapter starts with the statement that by 1975 the great Soviet offensive, which had begun in 1955, was a spent force. The year 1955 was when the first nonaligned conference at Bandung and the first Egyptian-Soviet arms deal took place. In those distant days it was thought necessary to camouflage them as Egyptian-Czech transactions.

Nasser’s acceptance of Soviet aid and his apparent ability to maintain his independence in spite of the Soviet embrace made the Soviets acceptable and respectable in the Third World. Their entry into Egypt was also their entry into Africa, and it facilitated their entry into South Asia. The vector of their penetration of Egypt was the Palestine problem, and in the final analysis it was their inability to do anything about that problem, other than supplying arms to the combatants, which led to their downfall. While Soviet successes in the region illuminate the limits of American power and influence, Soviet failures are illuminating, too, and tell us something about how we should react to the Soviets.

Heikal ascribes the Soviets’ eventual failure in Egypt to their inability to comprehend the dominating role of nationalism in the Arab world, the innate contradiction between being both a revolutionary and a superpower, and the extreme inflexibility of Soviet institutions. Heikal comments that whatever the shortcomings of the American system, at least it provides variety. He makes the interesting observation that whereas Nasser dealt in turn with Truman, Eisenhower, Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon, and their teams and Sadat with Nixion, Kissinger, Ford, Carter, and Vance for 25 years, between the two of them they dealt in Moscow only with Khrushchev and Brezhnev, and with the same Gromyko coming back year after year to lecture them in the same manner and in almost the same words.

Heikal also notes that the Soviet leaders often appeared to be claiming a monopoly on the truth and expected the Arabs to approve their policies toward Yugoslavia, China, and Czechoslovakia. Because they regarded themselves as custodians of the only true interpretation of history, they always tended to see events elsewhere in terms of their own experience and failed to understand the realities of power elsewhere. He cites their failure to grasp the true nature of the Arab-Israeli conflict and their mishandling of Somalia as examples.

Heikal speaks of the lack of meaningful personal contact between the Soviets and the Arabs and cites an interesting set of statistics in this respect: of 200,000 Arabs who have been to the Soviet Union, fewer than 100 have married Russian girls; of the 15,000 Arabs who went to the United States in the late fifties and sixties, 7000 married American girls. (He does not cite the source of his figures. In particular the figure of 7000 seems much too high. Nevertheless, the broad lines of this phenomenon are apparent to any resident of the area, where American wives of Arabs are common and Russian ones very rare.) He describes Soviet ineptness in the field of cultural exchanges—the export of films and books that are uninteresting and unlistened-to radio programs. He ascribes this to the Soviet perception of public opinion as something to be molded rather than cultivated.

Heikal notes that the Soviets’ achievements at home have been impressive but have not always been exportable. They have furnished a truly staggering quantity of arms to the Arabs—25,000-30,000 tanks, 7000-8000 military aircraft, and 15,000-17,000 artillery pieces*—but most Arab governments are opposed to communism, and communist parties are illegal in most Arab countries.

*These figures are out of date as a result of more recent Soviet deliveries.

Heikal predicts an inevitable explosion in the area because of tensions underlying the increasingly conservative surface and believes the Soviets will just as inevitably be sucked into it by the imperatives of the moment. Whether they will be more successful this time depends on whether they have learned the lessons of the past. He concludes that this time they may not miss. He was writing before the fall of the Shah of Iran.

So much for his conclusions. They are plausible, but Heikal is only one of a number of people with views on the subject. He is uniquely well qualified with respect to the discussion in Chapter 1, "Nasser’s Advice." It briefly surveys the development of relations between the U.S.S.R. and Egypt under Nasser, focusing on Khrushchev’s remarkable lack of tact in dealing with the Arabs, and then sets down Nasser’s ideas (although I suspect much of this is pure Heikal) about the nature of Soviet relations with Third World countries. He includes a very instructive list of dos and don’ts for Third World leaders dealing with the Russians. He posits five stages of relations in chronological sequence: (1) mistrust (by the Soviets), (2) interregnum (a period of Soviet neutrality), (3) honeymoon (unlimited political and military backing leading to a Western conclusion that the Third World leader is a Communist), (4) quarrels (during which the next phase is decided), and (5) pigeonholing.

This last phase he describes as normalization, during which the Soviets, in their need to place everything in a hierarchy, put the country into one of three categories as shown on the facing page.

Nasser’s purported dos and don’ts are pragmatic: He counseled under dos:

(1) Ensure that you negotiate in a language both can understand—Russian interpreters in European languages are faultless, but those in languages like Burmese, Swahili, and Arabic are to be avoided.

(2) Go to Moscow with a good stock of anecdotes, jokes, proverbs, and folk sayings—these can help greatly in smoothing over difficult moments.

(3) Go well briefed on the history of World War II and the fundamental part played in it by the Soviet Union.

(4) You will need a strong digestion and a strong head to survive all the toasts.

(5) The leaders of your delegation must be in firm control of its members. The Soviets will be trying to discover who ranks where, and it is important that the whole delegation speak with one voice.

(6) What really matters is what you hear from the political leadership. Where major policy or planning decisions are involved, trust only what you are told by the First Secretary of the Party. He illustrates this by an anecdote about Marshal A. A. Grechko telling the Egyptian Minister of War in 1967 to stand up to the Israelis. "The moment they attack you, or if the Americans make any move, you will find our troops on your side." Yet the Soviets did not, of course, come to Egypt’s aid when the Israelis attacked and when asked about his statement by the Egyptian Ambassador, Grechko said, "It was just one for the road." (This is the first public affirmation by a senior Egyptian of something we had long surmised. It is not yet clear to me how much credence we can give this particular account, but it certainly fits well with what we know.)

(7) Try to find out who your Soviet friends are and watch how they are being treated. If they show signs of slipping, you may be slipping, too.

(8) The Soviets mistrust those educated in America or anyone having had anything to do with international institutions.

(9) If you want something specific in the way of aid from the Soviets, give them plenty of time. They do not like to be surprised by last-minute demands.

(10) Remember that agriculture is the Soviets’ Achilles’ heel. Unless you are in a real crisis, never ask them for wheat (as the Egyptians did in 1966).

(11) Remember that the Soviets assess any political problem with their eye on the United States.

(12) Remember that the Soviets think on a different time scale from yours. Your problems are probably urgent; they see things in terms of historical and revolutionary processes.

(13) Always remember that the Soviets look on the prospect of another war with horror. . . and will insist that only those who do not know what war means can contemplate with equanimity the thought of a nuclear confrontation.

(14) Soviet leadership is made up of Slavic peasants, easily moved to laughter and tears. They are fascinated by the attributes of power.

Under don’ts, Nasser advised:

(1) The Soviets will not permit any discussion of their errors or shortcomings, past or present.

(2) If you must quarrel with them, see that it does not last longer than a year or 18 months. If the quarrel persists and they come to the conclusion there is nothing to be looked for from the leader with whom they are dealing, they will eventually give the signal that he is to be regarded as an enemy.

(3) It is absolutely taboo to equate them with the United States as a superpower.

(4) On no account try to defend China.

(5) Do not take offense at what may seem to be their interference in your internal affairs. They are free with advice and warnings.

(6) The Soviets are highly sensitive about the publication of any information concerning themselves. They are always shocked when reports of negotiations in which they have taken part come back to them via a third party. (They are not alone in this respect.)

(7) Do not underestimate Soviet leadership’s sensitivity to the status of local communist parties.

(8) Be careful in your choice of gifts. Never offer them jewels. Cultural objects—antiquities—are best. When Nasser gave Khrushchev a vase from the Sakkara excavations and told him it was 5100 years old, Khrushchev took it to a meeting of the Supreme Soviet and put it on the table in front of him.

A fascinating, readable book, well worth the money.

Ambassador Richard B. Parker (B.S., M.S., Kansas State University) is Diplomat in Residence, University of Virginia. Before his retirement he was Department of State Advisor to Air University. As a foreign service officer, he has been ambassador to Morocco, Algeria, and Lebanon. During World War II, he served in the Army and joined the Foreign Service in 1949. After two years in Sydney, Australia, Ambassador Parker began a series of assignments in the Near East, North Africa, and the Middle East and in 1974 became Chief of the U.S. interests section in Algiers. He is author of two books on Islamic architecture.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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