Air University Review, September-October 1981
Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Hodgkinson
Since 1952, the United States Air Force (USAF) has had a straightforward and remarkably unchanged role in theater nuclear warfare: to contribute to deterrence by providing quick reaction alert (QRA) aircraft capable of striking deep, fixed targets with nuclear weapons. A strong argument can be made that the USAF merits a "well done" for this mission, particularly if one bases that evaluation on the ambiguous metric of deterred enemy attacks. However, a new set of theater nuclear weapons and concepts for employment of those weapons is emerging. Simultaneously, there are increasing arms control pressures on long-range theater nuclear assets. The combination of these factors will unquestionably have a profound impact on how the USAF conducts its theater nuclear force (TNF) business.
For various endemic reasons, the Air Force has not always responded positively to these new opportunities and has not developed a comprehensive and coherent TNF policy. This neglect has serious potential impact on a variety of national security and arms control issues, including USAF force structure.
This article, then, has a twofold purpose: first, to make the case that USAF does indeed have a pressing and vital need to initiate a major overhaul of its TNF policies, and, second, to propose one way that goal might be accomplished.
Why is it so important at this time for the United States Air Force to change what has been a successful TNF position? The answer is that new factors are creating new requirements. First, there is the programmed modernization of the long-range TNF; second is the emergence of new concepts for flexible use of TNF weapons; third, there continue to be very strong pressures from the U.S.S.R—to some extent supported by our NATO allies—to limit or eliminate TNF, including nuclear capable aircraft.* The combined impact of these three factors means there will be growing demands on the Air Force to evolve a responsive new TNF posture and to justify a continuing nuclear role for dual-capable aircraft (DCA).
*During talks initiated in the fall of 1980, the Soviets seemed particularly interested in reducing forward-based systems, those NATO aircraft that could strike the Soviet Union from Europe or nearby carriers, in return for reductions of Soviet SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers. See, for example, Robert Kroon, "U.S., Soviets Delay Talks on Missile Limits Abroad," Washington Star, October 16, 1980, p. 2.
In December 1979 NATO defense ministers agreed to modernize with 464 ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) and 108 Pershing II missiles starting in 1983. When these systems are deployed, nuclear tactical air power (Tacair) will no longer be the only TNF system capable of striking the U.S.S.R. Further, the missiles are very accurate, have a greater range than F-111s or F-16s, and enhance their prelaunch survivability through ground mobility. All of which raises the question: If these missiles are deployed as planned, is there a continuing need for the nuclear capability of DCA? Stated more positively, what are those things that aircraft can do better than missiles in the TNF arena? There is also the related question of how GLCM will complement other TNF assets. While these issues are vitally important to theater commanders, they are no less important to the USAF, which has responsibilities for force structure, training, doctrine, etc.
In parallel with this programmed modernization of long-range TNF, numerous new concepts for flexible employment of these forces are emerging. NATO forces have attempted to develop dynamic concepts for incisive use of theater nuclear weapons. In the United States, the Army has developed the "integrated battlefield" concept whereby nuclear, chemical and/or conventional weapons are used singly or in combination to achieve a military objective. The Army has asked the Air Force to support this capability, which will require careful USAF review and probable revision of coordination and planning procedures as well as training requirements. An underlying concern in the integrated battlefield concept—and other ideas being developed in the United States and Europe—is the capability of Tacair/GLCM to strike enemy mobile forces. From these concerns two questions emerge: Is nuclear strike against mobile forces a meaningful and desirable capability? If so—and I don’t imply here that it is—what should USAF do to improve that capability? It does not appear that the factors motivating these questions (not least of which is the massive Soviet ground forces capability) will soon go away. The Air Force must respond to new concepts as part of a comprehensive review of its TNF posture.
Modernization of TNF and the emergence of new concepts has focused particular attention on the viability of DCA. For example, the FY81 Military Posture Statement suggests that GLCM might replace the nuclear capability of DCA in order to affect a concomitant increase in the conventional air capabilities of NATO.
Meanwhile, there is a further complication; the Soviet Union continues to press for reduction of European-based DCA as part of the arms limitation talks. At a July 1980 meeting with West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt, the Soviets offered to negotiate reductions in SS-20 missiles and Backfire bombers if NATO forward-based systems (i.e., DCA) are included in the discussions. It now seems the Soviets are insisting the DCA issue be considered in the bilateral talks under way in Geneva. While the results of these and other arms limitation talks are still very mushy, it does appear there will be a growing requirement for USAF to articulate a rational need for DCA or face their possible loss as a negotiation pawn.
The preceding discussion has focused on a few of the important factors that appear to be of sufficient gravity to drive USAF to a thorough reexamination of its TNF posture. Quite clearly, very current and major issues cry out for rational, priority attention.
To date, the USAF has not responded enthusiastically to changing TNF requirements, and the reasons remain unclear. What is clear is that there simply are not many people primarily concerned with TNF related planning; those few who are involved work in disparate organizational elements. The Air Staff, for example, has at best only a handful of staff officers who work TNF, even on a part-time basis. One result of this inattention is that the USAF Mission Area Analysis—ostensibly the very core of USAF requirements process—has not yet been able to come to grips with tactical nuclear issues. This, I believe, is symptomatic of the lack of consensus on the Air Staff regarding TNF and the low priority, given to the subject. The situation at Tactical Air Command and the overseas using commands is no more promising.
On the positive side, there is a USAF/Defense Nuclear Agency cooperative effort that evaluates various TNF issues under the aegis of a joint steering group. This group has sponsored several significant studies, accomplished mostly by civilian contractors. Those efforts, however notable, have not yet served to stimulate Air Force action. The research efforts of the Defense Nuclear Agency and outside contractors can supplement—but cannot replace—a concerted, cogent USAF effort.
More troubling than the USAF TNF organizational shortfalls, and perhaps the root cause of those deficiencies, is an apparently lukewarm attitude on the part of the fighter community toward TNF in general and nuclear alert in particular. The TNF mission, represented so far by QRA, lacks the esoteric elegance of modern air-to-air or air-to-ground combat and suffers proportionately in status and priority. In 1976, Colonel (now brigadier general) David L. Nichols, in an Air University Review article, presented a farsighted evaluation of future requirements for nuclear Tacair.1 Colonel Nichols believed, even then, that Tacair was being used ineffectively and challenged the Air Force to provide new and vigorous thinking on the subject. To date, for whatever reasons, that challenge has not been met.
In contrast to the USAF low-key approach to TNF, the U.S. Army has demonstrated notable vigor. For example, an entire organization, the U.S. Army Nuclear and Chemical Agency, is dedicated to thinking the unthinkable. That agency has a parent directorate within the Army Staff (DAMO-NC) headed by a general officer. In addition, the Army War College for years has offered an extensive course in TNF matters. By contrast, the Air War College has offered only a minimal course to date but is scheduled to increase this year in apparent recognition of the importance of TNF to that USAF. This is not to suggest that the Air Force should follow the Army’s example. However, it does serve to highlight the relative priority given the subject by the respective services and may well give an indication of how the Air Force can expect to fare in TNF matters compared to the Army.
On the other hand, the U.S. Navy steers the middle course. Although lacking a substantial organization or training committed to theater nuclear warfare, the Navy has recognized its deficiencies and established an organic working group to reevaluate and redirect the thrust of naval theater nuclear warfare programs. This group has been empowered to chart a bold new course, reporting directly to the Chief of Naval Operations Executive Panel to ensure the all-important visibility and stature for the group. Reports to date are favorable; it appears that the group’s recommendations have the potential to impact significantly on Navy theater nuclear warfare posture. This success provides a thoughtful example for the Air Force.
If the preceding arguments are at all convincing, it should be clear that the USAF has a pressing need to reevaluate its TNF posture, but there are certain institutional constraints to doing this. How then is this obstacle to be overcome? I propose that a small dedicated group be formed—for a limited and specified duration—to take an intensive look at TNF issues impacting on USAF and recommend appropriate new initiatives.
The Air Force has, of course, participated in various joint TNF groups headed by the Office of the Secretary of Defense, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, etc. But those groups have been oriented toward specific issues (e.g., NATO rationalization, standardization, and interoperability, and long-term TNF modernization). However, this is not that sort of proposal at all. Rather, I propose an internal Air Force group to develop a broad road map for TNF matters so that specific issues can be approached in a more purposeful, consistent manner.
The membership and sponsorship of this group would be of paramount importance. Primarily, the group must have sufficient clout within the Air Force to impact in a major way on policies. Plans, and programs or the group’s activities will degenerate into "just another study.’ This means that the group should be led by a general officer who has the ear of top management. His job will be to articulate the group’s findings and recommendations to those in a position to make change. This general should be supported by a full-time working group of perhaps six officers representing Air Staff and the Tactical Air Forces. The important criterion is that the membership be dedicated full time. Part-time members stand an almost certain chance of being terminally distracted by the in-basket.
In addition to this core group, assistance could be solicited from organizations such as Rand and the Defense Nuclear Agency. Rand, for example, is quite familiar with the USAF issues and organization and well experienced in structuring and focusing study efforts through their "Project Air Force." Similarly, the Defense Nuclear Agency has worked previously with the Air Force on TNF matters and is perhaps the single best focal point for knowledge of nuclear technology within the Defense Department. Other assistance could come from a variety of sources, the USAF Scientific Advisory Board being one example. However, while outside agencies may provide valuable insights, direction and leadership must come from the core group of USAF officers. Only then will there be a chance for the required action to take place.
Before leaving the membership question, the concept of using the existing institutions rather than the proposed dedicated ad hoc group merits comment. For example, steering groups and/or working groups formed internal to the bureaucracy are most useful in many circumstances. They provide an opportunity to meet and establish interdirectorate positions periodically. However, that implies that there is a strong base of’ knowledge on the subject and each directorate involved has a well-thought-out entering position. In the case of TNF, I would argue there is neither.
There has also been serious suggestion that a permanent "TNF Division" be formed on the Air Staff. It may or may not be the case that reorganization of some sort is in order, but it seems to me that decision should come after there is some consensus on what role USAF will play in TNF. Therefore, the first order of business is to establish the temporary TNF initiatives group that will help formulate those policies.
The charter for the proposed group should ideally be open enough to allow a thorough evaluation of the current USAF TNF posture and exploration of new ideas. The time would also be ideally open-ended. Practically, though, a target date for completion must be established, perhaps six months from initiation. Objectives must be carefully focused to fit within this time frame. As a minimum, I suggest the following areas be explored:
— What are appropriate roles and missions for USAF’ assets in theater nuclear warfare (e.g., QRA, mobile target kill)?
— What types of new concepts and weapons are needed to ensure that the job described in the preceding question be done well?
— How can survivability (the sine qua non of any nuclear deterrent) be improved?
— How many people are realistically required to work TNF on a continuing basis? Where should they be placed organizationally?
Obviously this is not an exhaustive listing. It is simply a crude attempt to illustrate that the problem can be limited enough to reasonably expect success. After all, the need is for a “road map” for the USAF TNF posture, not for a detailed solution of all problems. The chal-lenge is clear; continued inaction may lead to a small or even nonexistent role for USAF in theater nuclear warfare. That may be entirely appropriate, although I do not believe so. In any event, it seems clear that it is in the interest of the Air Force to ensure that the TNF posture is a result of deliberate and careful planning rather than benign neglect.
Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Center for International Studies
Cambridge, Massachusetts
Note
1. Colonel David L. Nichols, "Who Needs Nuclear TACAIR?" Air University Review, March-April 1976, pp. 15-25.
Contributor
Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Hodgkinson (USAFA; M.A., Oklahoma State University) was Air Force Research Associate at the Center for International Studies, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, until his recent assignment to Belgium. His operational assignments have included aircraft commander in the F-4 and FB-111; air operations officer, Hq Seventh Air Force and Hq USAF; and air officer commanding at the United States Air Force Academy. He was involved with planning aspects of NATO theater nuclear force modernization at the Defense Nuclear Agency. Colonel Hodgkinson is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College.
Disclaimer
The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.Air & Space Power Home Page | Feedback? Email the Editor