Air University Review, September-October 1981

Soviet Damage-Denial

The most prevalent school of thought on Soviet nuclear strategy maintains that the Soviets believe a nuclear war is both thinkable and winnable.¹ The inevitable result of such a doctrine, according to those analysts, is a Soviet quest for nuclear superiority and war-fighting capability. This capability is said to fit Soviet global strategy, which is aggressive, expansionist, adventuresome—exploiting the political shadow case by its nuclear dominance at every level of warfare. Not everyone agrees with this explanation, and the topic has provided much grist for argument and analysis.² My own reading of Soviet objectives and activities suggests a remarkably purposeful Soviet nuclear strategy, which dictates their force posture and guides their positions at the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT). The result is a Soviet nuclear stance that can be shown as seeking a damage-denial objective. This article proposes a detailed methodology to examine Soviet nuclear objectives and ferret out the principal historical elements of a Soviet war-fighting strategy. The relationship between U.S. offensive nuclear forces on the one hand and Soviet offensive and defensive forces as well as pertinent Soviet SALT positions on the other will be analyzed.

The simplest definition of strategy defines it as the coherent use of force toward a goal. When the Soviet leadership determined the fundamental security goal of the U.S.S.R., that goal doubtlessly reflected political, military, traditional, and historic values. The fundamental goal, which includes the essence of all these factors, is survival; its corollary is defense. To the Soviet leadership, this does not mean working on an adversary’s mind. It means defending against an adversary’s weapons---those physical things that pose the actual threat to survival. My hypothesis is that Soviet marshals have adopted as their fundamental nuclear strategy objective the concept of "damage denial." Most Western analysts would question the practicality of this approach and dismiss it as unachievable in a world of thousands of nuclear weapons and diverse delivery systems. Nonetheless, the West is not the Soviet Union so it is prudent to examine how such a concept would work as seen from the Soviet perspective and what force characteristics it would include over the years.

The U.S.S.R. envisions the current nuclear threat from the United States to consist of the following:

—Intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) from the continental United States

—Submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) from the North Atlantic, Mediterranean, and Pacific Ocean

—Bombers/short-range attack missiles (SRAMs) from the continental United States

—Theater aircraft from NATO and Korea, including carrier-based aviation (forward-based systems—FBS).³

Looking at the foregoing quadrad of American nuclear threats, the Soviet defense planner would consider the means necessary to counter, deny, neutralize, or reduce such threats. He could produce a simple strategy matrix of the type shown in Figure 1. The matrix depicts a methodical approach to a defense in depth, using a combination of offensive, defensive, and arms control measures in an integrated strategy to limit damage to the U.S.S.R. to the lowest levels attainable, with the ultimate objective being damage-denial. Explicit Soviet programs would be designed under each column in an attempt to reduce significantly the specific U.S. threat listed. The net results column shows the percent reduction expressed in terms of the initial U.S. nuclear threat. The basis for these judgments will be explained in detail in subsequent paragraphs. At this stage, it is only necessary for the reader to understand that the Soviet planner desires that there be measures and programs to counter each U.S. nuclear threat and that the ultimate Soviet objective is sharply reduced damage. My included premise is that the Soviet strategy is based on possession of a combination of offensive forces which are most effective when employed in a broad coordinated attack against U.S. nuclear forces on a day-to-day (ungenerated) alert posture. Such an attack results in sharply lower U.S. force levels retaliating in ragged uncoordinated responses against an array of Soviet defense in-depth schemes, including air, missile, and civil defenses.

Figure 1. Damage-denial measures

Most analysts argue that any large-scale nuclear exchange would be preceded by an extensive period of increased tension, hence providing strategic warning and "generated" U.S. alert postures.⁴ "Bolt out of the blue" attacks are properly viewed as noncredible scenarios. On the other hand, not all attacks against day-to-day alert posture are necessarily bolt out of the blue. A crafty and implacable enemy to whom we have ceded the first blow can always allow tensions to ease, time to pass, and generated forces to return to normal alert rates. Since the choice and timing of first attack is stipulated to be at Soviet initiative, there are only limited finite periods before nuclear-powered fleet ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) must return to port and bombers to maintenance. The actual alert posture of U.S. forces in such situations could be far less than fully generated levels. The sections which follow will review the historical Soviet efforts to achieve damage-denial against the U.S. nuclear quadrad in a day-to-day alert posture.

The ICBM Case

In the early 1960s, the United States publicly committed itself to a force of 1000 Minuteman ICBMs. This force was controlled by 100 launch control centers (LCCs), each LCC handling 10 missiles. Originally, missiles could only be launched by an LCC, and the loss of an LCC in effect meant the loss of 10 missiles— making the LCCs a lucrative target. In the same time frame, the Soviets developed and began to deploy the SS-9 ICBM, a weapon whose combination of characteristics argued that its chief purpose had to be the attack of Minuteman LCCs. The incredibly high yield (18-25 MT)⁵ of the SS-9 was required to offset its relative inaccuracy against the LCCs. A force of some 200 to 250 SS-9s would then be sufficient to destroy the 100 Minuteman launch control centers and hence neutralize all 1000 Minuteman ICBMs.⁶

Since the foregoing Soviet intent became painfully obvious to U.S. defense planners, the rather simple U.S. "fix" was twofold: interconnect LCCs so that many more than 10 silos could be controlled by each control center and, more important, initiate an airborne launch control capability that could launch the entire Minuteman force (albeit over a longer period) even if no LCCs survived. Thus, the original SS-9 with its huge yield was outflanked and denied its mission by the U.S. response.

By the mid-1960s, the Soviets recognized that LCC attack was out as a useful strategy. They set about to recoup their SS-9 investment, doing the best they could with what they had at the time. This turned out to be the Mod 4 SS-9, which used three warheads of about 5 megatons each in place of the single yield warhead.⁷ Called a multiple reentry vehicle (MRV) system, it was a crude forerunner to later multiple independently targetable reentry vehicles (MIRVs) technology. Still, the best guess at the time was the attitude control and release mechanisms of the Mod 4 were designed to attack Minuteman silos. So, as a stopgap measure, the Soviets hoped to put as many prompt counterforce reentry vehicles (RVs) as possible on our ICBMs—a force of up to 300 SS-9s carrying some 900 warheads against 1000 U.S. silos of modest hardness. This was clearly a "make-do" stopgap program, whose effectiveness against Minuteman would be far lower than their original LCC attack scheme.

Again, the Soviet intent was clear to U.S. defense planners. This time the U.S. "fix" was more ambitious. All silos would be hardened to a far greater stress level (e.g., 2000-pounds per square inch)⁸ and defended with Safeguard, a two-layered antiballistic missile (ABM) system collocated in Minuteman fields. Additionally, by this time the SALT dialogue had started, and a fundamental U.S. objective would be strict limits on "heavy missiles" (i.e., SS-9s) to reduce the threat to Minuteman.⁹ Hopeful arms controllers spoke of ensuring stability through tight controls on those weapons that provided incentive to strike first in a crisis situation. The example they had in mind was the "heavy missile," which carried multiple warheads of a large nuclear yield and whose only utility could be first use against an opponent’s ICBMs.

The Soviet anti-Minuteman effort is an exemplary model of dedication to single-minded purpose. During SALT I (1969-72) the Soviets resisted every effort to apply meaningful limits on "heavy missiles" and artfully dodged the many earnest U.S. devices (e.g., definitions, no increase in missile dimensions, unilateral statements) to control SS-9s.¹⁰ At the same time, they worked hard to cut missile defense levels in the ABM treaty to low levels. It was clear to many at the time that the Soviets were resisting the heavy missile limitations because they intended to deploy follow-on "heavies" in greater numbers and doubtlessly MIRVed; it was also clear that the United States was painting itself into a vulnerability corner by accepting an ABM treaty which did not permit deployment of an effective Minuteman defense system (already approved for four Minuteman locations.)¹¹ The unfortunate end result of this chain of events at SALT I was an undefended Minuteman force and an unfettered Soviet heavy missile force.

The intense ten-year Soviet effort to neutralize Minuteman was beginning to pay off. United States defense planners, hamstrung in their missile defense plans and unsuccessful in arms control approaches, had to create an entirely new approach to ICBMs—the MX—which definitionally would be survivable. The anticipated Soviet deployments did appear. The SS-18 with its 8 to 10 MIRVed RVs began to replace the SS-9. As the 1970s came to a close, the Soviet offensive anti-Minuteman threat came to be recognized as some 300 SS-18s with up to 10 RVs each with estimated warhead yields of 1 to 2 megatons and designed to provide greatly improved accuracies.¹²

While the Soviet forces for damage-limiting efforts against ICBMs were clearly centered on their heavy missile efforts, a number of defensive efforts also apply. The modest ABM deployment of 64 Galosh interceptors to defend the National Command Authorities at Moscow is only effective against accidental or unauthorized missile attacks and attacks by third nations (e.g., France, China). But it would also be effective against a surviving Minuteman ICBM force anticipated to be on the order of 10 to 50 missiles.¹³ The existing and expanding ABM radar infrastructure of Dog House, Cat House, and Hen House argue that additional interceptors are planned or that unconventional missile defenses are contemplated (more on this under the SLBM case).¹⁴ Soviet ICBM forces and command and control centers are "superhardened" by U.S. standards, perhaps exceeding 2500 psi overpressures.¹⁵ Only Minuteman (and the few Titan IIs) has the accuracy and yield combinations needed to threaten such targets seriously. Coupled with intense civil defense measures (evacuation, industrial hardening, fall-out shelters), Soviet damage-limiting efforts against the ICBM start to look quite plausible and practical. The paucity of surviving U.S. ICBMs and the existing defenses of the U.S.S.R. argue for the unhappy result that the Soviets indeed do have a "damage-denial" capability against U.S. ICBMs.

Accordingly, we can conclude that Soviet offensive and defensive measures as well as Soviet SALT negotiating positions are entirely consistent with a desired Soviet end-state of damage-denial. As a result of all these interactions, the Soviet leadership should have high confidence of being able to reduce the Minuteman threat in the early 1980s time frame by 97 to 100 percent of its original potential.

The SLBM Case

Soviet defense experts, trying to make a damage-denial case against U.S. SLBMs, would at first glance be given little chance of success against the "invulnerable leg" of the triad. On second glance, however, a determined and defense-oriented adversary can be shown to be capable of markedly reducing the quadrad’s sea leg. To begin with, on a day-to-day alert basis, some 50 percent of our invulnerable SLBM force is in port and hence subject to quick destruction by either Soviet ICBMs or SLBMs just like any other fixed target.¹⁶ Even if a U.S.-generated alert is possible, a significant number of SLBMs are lost in port. Of the total current number of 41 U.S. SSBNs, 10 are the older Polaris type (all in the Pacific), and the remaining 31 are the Poseidon type (all in the Atlantic/Mediterranean). The Polaris submarines are being phased out over the next few years and will be replaced in the future by a smaller number of new Trident submarines.¹⁷

Current Soviet open-sea antisubmarine warfare (ASW) capability is largely discounted by U.S. defense planners. While the Soviets have deployed ASW forces like the carriers Moskva, Kiev, and Minsk and have some 250 ASW helicopters (Hound, Hormone, Haze) with associated sonobuoys and over 140 ASW patrol aircraft (Mail, May),¹⁸ the most effective ASW weapon at sea is still the nuclear-powered attack submarine (SSN). Many view this technique as simple application of the adage "set a thief to catch a thief." While low-frequency passive sonars on Soviet SSNs are probably able to detect moving U.S. ballistic missile submarines at distances up to perhaps 20 or 30 kilometers, the chances of maintaining such a track in the presence of changing sea conditions, sea noises, and an evasive quarry would be slim.¹⁹

However, since the Soviet tracker has no need to remain covert, he would not need to rely on passive sonar but could employ an active sonar. Active sonar tracking is a different story. Active trailing from short range (one kilometer or less) with sonars operating at a frequency of 100 to 1000 kilohertz would provide excellent target resolution, permitting the Soviet submarine to sail in trail without concern for collision, as well as be unperturbed by the target’s evasive movements and indifferent to decoy attempts.²⁰

The United States Navy, more than any other group, realizes the dangers of this situation and presumably works to avoid it by creating detection barriers and "delousing" techniques to deceive and "peel off" the trailing submarine. In the past, these techniques probably promised and delivered much success; but the advent of the new Soviet Alfa class attack submarine poses some sticky problems. The Alfa has a titanium hull (incredibly expensive) which permits it to cruise at depths "off limits" to U.S. submarines. It is reported to be faster than U.S. submarines and quieter than previous Soviet attack boats.²¹

In effect, the Soviets have developed a "look-up, shoot-up" capability in ASW to correspond to the "look-down, shoot-down" air defense techniques used against bombers. This is an unsettling and dangerous development because all U.S. SSBNs start their patrols from a small number of known home ports. Once an Alfa submarine is on the trail, the SSBNs are not only at known locations ("localized") but can also be killed on command. The tracking Alfas can communicate freely with their Soviet homeland since they do not try to hide—no element of surprise is necessary, only the relentless pursuit and being in position when the attack order comes. Over 40 Soviet nuclear attack submarines of all classes are now available for deployment including 6 Alfas.²² They know where American SSBNs start, and they have the potential to place a trail on every one; and with the Alfa submarine, that trail could prove to be the Soviet Pinkerton to the U.S. Butch Cassidy.

The single most important effectiveness parameter in an antisubmarine warfare program to destroy SSBNs is time. Measures that require several days to search, localize, and destroy may be acceptable in some scenarios, but in general they cannot be relied on as a principal method of damage-limiting. Soviet admirals must seek measures that take minutes rather than hours or days. For this reason, the "instant" response and "kill on command" afforded by trailing attack submarines is clearly the preferred approach. However, in some areas, such a technique may not be possible. For example, prudence (and the U.S. Navy) and geography would argue for the Soviets to concentrate their surface and air ASW capability in the Mediterranean. It is in a Mediterranean war zone that the greatest possibility exists of the Soviets’ establishing local air and other surface superiority via the mechanism of intense cruise missile attack on U.S. carrier groups. Attacks would come from both Soviet cruise missile submarines and naval long-range bombers, including the highly capable Backfire. ASW operations then begin to look more plausible, given the confined nature of the Mediterranean.²³ Soviet attack submarines could also be used in the Mediterranean, but they would be better employed in the Norwegian Sea and Bay of Biscay in the SSBN trail mode described earlier, until greater numbers of Alfas are available. This would then allow conventional Soviet ASW forces in the Mediterranean to attack all detected submarines without worrying about sinking a friendly. The drawback to the Soviets of such conventional ASW tactics is the loss of surprise and the relatively extended period of time required. There could not be high assurance that the few U.S. SSBNs in the Mediterranean would not fire their missiles before being found and destroyed. Actual results would be very much dependent on the scenario chosen.

The degree of success of the Soviet attack against SSBNs in port and at sea will determine the numbers of the U.S. SLBM RV force arriving at Soviet targets. From the earlier section, it was noted that on a day-to-day basis some 50 percent of SSBNs can be destroyed in port, leaving about 15 surviving Poseidon boats. Losses to Soviet ASW and trailing nuclear submarines could range from a few to almost all of the Poseidon submarines, depending on optimistic or pessimistic assumptions. If the intense Soviet ASW effort is only moderately successful, we could anticipate the loss of one SSBN in the Mediterranean and most of those in the Atlantic which are unfortunate enough to have an Alfa on their trail. If the 6 Alfas can destroy 4 SSBNs, some 10 Poseidon SSBNs would remain. (More Alfas would mean more SSBN kills.) The 10 Poseidons would have a potential force of some 1600 warheads (10 boats times 16 missiles times a nominal 10 RVs per missile).²⁴ A missile launch reliability factor of 90 percent would result in 1440 warheads arriving at Soviet defenses. These warheads have a relatively smaller yield (50 KT) than their ICBM counterparts, and since reentry velocity usually is a function of missile range, SLBM reentry speeds will be lower than those for ICBMs.²⁵

Little attention has been focused publicly on Soviet antiballistic missile (ABM) efforts since the ABM Treaty of 1972. The Soviets were quite willing (some say eager) to sign a treaty severely limiting ABM systems; and hence in the minds of many, the Soviets "accepted" the impossibility of defending against ballistic missiles and the inevitability of catastrophic destruction. Under the ICBM case discussed earlier, it is clear that a solution other than ABM was developed by the Soviets to deny damage from ICBMs. However, or defense against SLBM warheads, ABM defenses are both necessary and plausible: necessary because of the ASW uncertainties previously discussed and plausible because of the technical characteristics of SLBM trajections and warheads in the context of Soviet defensive missile deployments. The negotiating record at SALT I set forth a strong continuing U.S. concern for "SAM upgrade"—that is, the attainment by surface-to-air missile systems of the capability to intercept missile warheads in flight.²⁶ This U.S. concern was based on years of uncertainty as to the full capabilities and intended role of the so-called "Tallinn System," later designated the SA-5 by Western agencies.²⁷ The uncertainty was based on several factors.

First, the SA-5 system was tested and developed at the officially declared ABM test range, Sary-Shagan.²⁸ Second, medium- and intermediate-range missiles were fired to impact areas located at Sary-Shagan. Senators John "Jake" Garn and Gordon J. Humphrey have charged that many of these missiles could have served as the targets for ABM intercept programs.²⁹ If so, the target most closely approximated in terms of range, radar cross section, and trajectory would be SLBMs. Third, if such a system as the SA-5 were to act as a terminal atmospheric defense weapon, it would require all-azimuth radar data for warning, acquisition, and pointing inputs to the SA-5 intercept radar. The Hen House long-range radar deployment was coincident in time with initiation of the SA-5 deployment.³⁰ Hen House radars are deployed (in accordance with the ABM treaty) on the periphery of the U.S.S.R., scanninig outward over U.S. SLBM launch areas.³¹ As a linear array radar, Hen House can handle multiple targets limited only by internal computer configurations that can never be physically seen or assessed directly by U.S. intelligence.³² Acknowledged ABM radars such as the Dog House and Cat House also possess the capability to be used by the SA-5 in an ABM role as does a new class of large ABM capable phased-array radars publicly announced by Senator Garn.³³ Fourth, and most important, the assessed technical characteristics of the SA-5 system itself indicated a clear capability to perform as a terminal ABM system to destroy ballistic missile targets of the SLBM variety given adequate radar acquisition data.³⁴

Because of this relative wealth of uncertainty, the final ABM treaty included an explicit obligation in Article VI not to test SAMs "in an ABM mode." Since the ABM testing of the SA-5 could have been completed for some years prior to 1972, the treaty’s impact on an SA-5 ABM capability would be slight. Even at that, the reported repeated violations of the treaty after 1972 by the use of the SA-5 radar in tracking ballistic missiles resulted in Soviet tests against missiles similar in range to a normal SLBM trajectory.³⁵ The Soviets claimed (and the administration) accepted) that the SA-5 radar was not being tested in an ABM mode, but rather was being used in a "legitimate range instrumentation role."³⁶ Whether it is designated as a "range instrumentation radar" does not alter the fact that it has been used in a missile-tracking role. Its ability to track missile warheads on the range is therefore prima facie evidence of its ABM capability. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird claims that thousands of SA-5 interceptors have been deployed in hundreds of sites around some 110 Soviet urban areas, principally in the European U.S.S.R.³⁷ Such a deployment could play havoc with the surviving 1440 SLBM RVs.

The SA-5 anti-SLBM defenses are unorthodox and even "sneaky" in that they exist in the context of an ABM treaty under which the United States officially assumes they do not exist and takes no actions or precautions to counteract the capability. And an SA-5 ABM capability only makes sense in an overall damage-denial scheme which negates ICBMs some other way and reduces the number of SLBM RVs by ASW efforts to levels which can be countered by active SA-5 defenses, civil defense, and hardening of key targets.³⁸

The use of the SA-5 in an ABM role, like the earlier use of the SS-9 MRV against Minuteman, would only be a stopgap device in the Soviet quest for damage-denial. The Soviet ABM-X-3 missile defense system with its small, transportable phased-array radars and high acceleration missile has been under development for a decade and provides the basis for a potential "breakout" threat. As Senator Jake Garn points out, "The ABM-X-3 radar is at least a semi-mobile system. It can be clandestinely deployed and, for all we know, this could be going on right now." He goes on to point out that, "Individually, it is possible to rationalize the specific actions of the Soviet Union in the ABM area but they form a clear pattern of activity which seems aimed at a major Soviet operational ABM capability in the early to mid-1980s."³⁹ Whether "breakout" deployment would follow or precede abrogation of the ABM treaty is a moot point. So long as the treaty is in force, the United States is effectively years away from a matching ABM deployment while full Soviet deployment could be months away. Conversely, a straightforward abrogation would seem logical if the Soviets thought they had finally achieved an anti-SLBM system of unquestioned capability and the U.S. response to the abrogation would be limited to modest rhetorical and diplomatic efforts.

In any event, as shown above, the most logical purpose for and target of either an unorthodox or breakout ABM program is the U.S. SLBM force.

To date there have been no serious proposals reported by either side to limit antisubmarine warfare forces by arms control agreements. If my hypothesis is accurate, the Soviets will not accept any SALT measures to limit or degrade their ASW capabilities, or to restrict the continued widespread deployment of large ABM-capable phased-array radars, or to reduce the scope and capability of their surface-to-air missile deployments.⁴⁰

Accordingly, it would appear that there is ample reason to question whether the 50 percent of SSBNs not destroyed in port are invulnerable at sea. The ultimate size and employment of the Soviet Alfa submarine program could have catastrophic effects on the deployed U.S. SSBN force. The SLBMs in surviving SSBNs, with their relatively low yield and inaccuracy, pose little threat to Soviet hardened targets—ICBMs, command and control centers, and the very hardened relocation shelters for the political elite. Moreover, it is likely that the U.S. retaliatory attack with SLBMs would be ragged, uncoordinated, and spread out over time. It would consist largely of individual RVs arriving at individual targets (airfields, military depots, industrial facilities) on predictable azimuths and trajectories and with no penetration aids.⁴¹ The SA-5 batteries in the target area could reduce the attack significantly. Tied in with the civil defense program already mentioned in the ICBM case, the "invulnerable leg" of the triad would have sharply reduced retaliatory capability even under optimistic assumptions. The potential of the SLBM force to inflict sufficient damage to carry the burden of deterrence under these circumstances is not encouraging. We can take some solace in the fact that these potential SLBM vulnerabilities to the Soviet SA-5 system were recognized in the mid- 1960s and resulted in the replacement of the Polaris 3-warhead A-3 missile with the multiwarhead Poseidon missiles.⁴² Otherwise, the SA-5 system would have had a far greater impact against the far fewer Polaris RVs that would be arriving at Soviet anti-SLBM defenses.

The Bomber Case

There is a historic basis for the Western view that a Soviet "defense mentality" exists. And that historical basis is founded chiefly on Soviet air defense efforts over the past 30 years. No other nation in history has poured such huge amounts of national resources into a quest for protection against air attack. The results are well known and widely reported. A dense and redundant combination of air and ground defense systems exists under the central control of one command, PVO-Strany (Air Defense of the Homeland), which itself has as many assigned personnel as the entire United States Air Force.⁴³ But PVO-Strany is only half the story—bombers must survive a first strike by Soviet offensive missiles.

Currently the United States maintains some 30 percent of its strategic bomber force on day-to-day alert.⁴⁴ The other 70 percent is subject to quick destruction by either Soviet SLBMs or ICBMs—with SLBMs normally cited as the most likely threat. This is due to the shorter warning time between SLBM launch detection and arrival at target. Some analysts postulate "depressed trajectories" for Soviet SLBMs, which cut missile flight times down to the 5-to-8 minute category and severely jeopardize even the alert bombers.⁴⁵ There has been no evidence of Soviet testing of depressed trajectories, and the trend in Soviet SLBM systems (i.e., Delta and Typhoon) has actually been toward much longer range missiles and greater stand-off distances for the missile submarines. The result of such developments should be greater assurances that bombers on alert will have enough time to launch successfully. At the current active strategic inventory of about 316 B-52s and 60 FB-111s, some 110 would thus be expected to survive the Soviet SLBM/ICBM attack and proceed toward their targets.⁴⁶

The alert force bombers arriving at PVO-Strany’s defenses face a geographically distributed Soviet force of about 10,000 surface-to-air missile launchers, 2500 dedicated interceptor aircraft, and a network of 7000 ground radars.⁴⁷ Whether the bombers can penetrate to their targets has been and is the subject of much detailed simulation and analysis. Results will vary widely and be dependent on the assumptions made about the success of low-level flight, the destruction of Soviet defenses by bomber-carried SRAMs or surviving U.S. ICBM/SLBMs, the efficacy of Soviet internetting of their air defense resources and the "frictions" of war. Of all the U.S. nuclear attack systems, however, the Soviets must feel most secure about defense against the bomber. The degree to which they expend funds, material, and manpower into a massive air defense system attests to their confidence that it is an effective investment in damage-denial. The "good news" is that the comparison between 110 U.S. bombers and thousands upon thousands of Soviet defensive weapons is misleading. After all each bomber will encounter only those weapons that are located en route to and at its target area. This number is not insignificant but is an order of magnitude less than a simple allocation of total defense weapons to a quantity of bombers. Moreover, thousands of Soviet SAM systems are deployed in "barrier" defenses; like the great Wall of China or the Maginot Line, it is necessary only to breach the barrier at one or two spots and the remaining part of the barrier never sees a target or fires a shot.⁴⁸ Still, the final determination of how many bombers actually destroy their primary targets (not just "defense suppression" targets) could be discouragingly low.

The Soviet effort to reduce potential damage from U.S. bombers was also reflected in their SALT positions. "Bomber armaments" were a principal theme of Soviet negotiators, a theme resolutely followed to restrict and constrain both the stand-off and penetration capability of bombers. Attempts to prohibit or sharply limit SRAMs, ballistic missiles, and cruise missiles were all undertaken in one fashion or another.⁴⁹ The United States fended most of these off successfully but did accept a quantitative limit of ALCMs per heavy bomber and the constraint of including such heavy bomber/ALCM combination in the MIRV sublimit. Thus, the Soviets were able to build fairly sharp "boundary conditions" on the size and nature of the future U.S. bomber threat. At the same time, they have consistently resisted any attempt to limit air defenses in any fashion. In this way, SALT is used by the Soviets to support their overall objectives in a selective, clever way. To explain, the Soviets insist that limits on air defense are not acceptable, but limits on missile defenses are; they maintain that limits on heavy missiles are not acceptable, but limits on heavy bombers are. The resulting mix of forces is, of course, heavily slanted toward Soviet advantage, since they use their heavy missiles in effect as an ABM to destroy Minuteman and freely deploy massive air defenses to counter our constrained bomber force.

The air defense density of the U.S.S.R., the age, size, and relatively small numbers of U.S. bombers, and the basic unknowable nature of possible Soviet deployments of mobile tactical SAMs and antiaircraft guns all portend potential drastic reductions in U.S. penetrators. After a potential loss of up to 70 percent of the bomber force on day-to-day alert to missile attack, we would have to press the attack with some 110 surviving aircraft. Under optimistic assumptions and today’s forces, if half of these 110 reached their targets, it might be considered a remarkable achievement. As in the SLBM case discussed earlier, there is also a real chance the number is much lower. The net result, then, is a reduction by the Soviets of the day-to-day strength of the bomber leg of the triad by 85 percent under optimistic conditions and by even more under pessimistic assumptions.⁵⁰

The Forward-Based Systems (FBS) Case*

American planners tend to think of nuclear war with the Soviets in terms of the "triad" of so-called "strategic forces" discussed in the preceding sections. This is due in some part to institutional biases ingrained by the budget, program, and planning system in use within the Department of Defense, and also to organizational arrangements of American combat forces. In the former instance, it is "clear" that a nuclear weapon system is "strategic" if it is in Program I and "tactical" if it is in Program II. It is also "clear" that weapons assigned to the Strategic Air Command (SAC) are strategic, while weapons in the regional unified commands (PACOM, EUCOM, LANTCOM) may or may not be. Soviet defense planners have no such biases and see American nuclear forces as a "quadrad." Soviet preparations for war and for negotiating at SALT reflect their view that what they term "FBS" can be every bit as "strategic" as an ICBM.⁵¹

*While the Soviets invariably have used the concept of U.S. "forward-based systems" and the term "FBS" to argue the issue, the United States has sought to replace the term with "Allied Regional Offensive System" or "AROS." The intent of both sides is thus self-evident just from the labels chosen.

Since the early 1950s, the Soviets have maintained a potent offensive posture comprised of long-range theater nuclear forces (LRTNF). Made up chiefly of medium-range and intermediate-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs/ IRBMs) and medium bombers, this Soviet force provided the capability to obliterate within a few minutes the entire fixed NATO nuclear infrastructure. Likely targets include airfields, fixed defense and missile sites, nuclear storage depots, and all nonmobile support facilities. The United States has never attempted to match the Soviet effort in LRTNF, preferring historically to rely on central nuclear systems, especially the U.S. SLBM force which reportedly has a proportion of its targeting dictated by NATO requirements.⁵² However, U. S. land-based systems in Europe (chiefly aircraft like F-4s, F-111s) have both the nuclear weapons and the theoretical range capability to attack the U.S.S.R.⁵³ Whether U.S. FBS have or do not have such a role in U.S. nuclear attack plans would not make any difference to the Soviet planner. He must base his defense preparations on the assumption that U.S. FBS do have such a role and respond accordingly. Based on this sort of logic, it is easy to understand why the Soviets have for over two decades maintained very large numbers of LRTNF systems—some 500 S-4 MRBMs, 100 SS-5 IRBMs, and several hundred medium bombers.⁵⁴ Flight times of Soviet MRBMs and IRBMs from their silos to NATO airfields are about 10 minutes so even tactical warning of Soviet missile launch would not greatly increase the survivability of U.S. nuclear-equipped tactical aircraft. We could anticipate that most such aircraft would be destroyed on ground.

The Soviets also refer to U.S. naval aircraft carriers as "FBS’’ in that such ships normally forward-deployed in the Mediterranean Sea and Sea of Japan could theoretically attack Soviet homeland targets. The Soviet response to naval aircraft carriers is large scale and well documented. Deployments of both attack submarines and cruise missile submarines by the Soviets are pointed primarily at the carriers. Additionally, a large fleet of naval bombers (inc1uding Backfires) equipped with air-to-surface missiles (ASMs) has the primary mission of sinking carriers.⁵⁵ For these and other reasons, the overall consensus has long been that in a nuclear conflict the forward-deployed aircraft carriers have a short life expectancy.

Those few U.S. FBS, both land- and sea-based, which survived the initial Soviet offensive nuclear attack still have a formidable task. As they wind their way to Soviet targets, the aircraft face the same air-defense density described previously. That is, the same network of 10,000 SAM launchers, 2500 interceptor aircraft, and 7000 ground radars is available to reduce the attack by FBS even further.

Some may question why U.S. nuclear-equipped ballistic missile systems were not included in the FBS discussion above. On some occasions, the Soviets have indicated that the United States Army’s Pershing I missiles qualify in their accounts as FBS. But even the Soviets have waffled on this point, since it raises a "balance" question with SS-4s/5s and SS-20s. More important, of course, is the fact that Pershing I has a range capability of only some 390 nm.⁵⁶ This means that, even from forward-deployed positions in the German Federal Republic, it is not possible for Pershing I in its normal configuration to attack the Soviet homeland. That is why the December 1979 NATO Ministers’ decision approving deployment of the longer range (1000 NM)⁵⁷ Pershing II missiles as well as ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) marks a fundamental shift in NATO’s strategy toward the U.S.S.R.

Soviet positions on FBS at SALT have historically demanded U.S. recognition of the "quadrad" argument and sought "compensation" for such U.S. "unilateral advantage." Indeed, the FBS issue was the chief obstacle to an agreement on offensive systems in SALT I.⁵⁸ That is why the simple "freeze formula" was the modest (and unpopular) outcome of SALT I.⁵⁸ The "breakthrough" at Vladivostok was the Soviets’ apparent dropping of their previously very strong stand on including FBS as part of each nation’s permitted aggregate ceilings of nuclear systems. The eventual SALT II treaty basically incorporated the Vladivostok formula. This Soviet switch on FBS can be attributed in some measure to the facts previously noted—especially the very small threat actually posed by existing types of U.S. FBS given the clear Soviet dominance in LRTNF. However, enter the U.S. GLCM and Pershing II and an entirely new set of considerations applies to drive the Soviet negotiating objectives. Now from the Soviet viewpoint, the entire FBS issue must be reintroduced and examined anew. The NATO decision on LRTNF modernization was clearly the correct one to stimulate Soviet acceptance of the inclusion of SS-4s/SS-5s/SS-20s into the negotiating arena. In the meantime, however, the Soviets continue to claim U.S. "circumvention" of the SALT II treaty through planned deployments of GLCM and Pershing II.⁵⁹

Limiting our analysis of the Soviet FBS issue to past deployment and capabilities, we can see that the Soviets have always possessed a clear damage-denial posture against long-range U.S. FBS forces in a nuclear scenario. Only the actual future deployment of weapons such as Pershing IIs and GLCMs in a survivable basing arrangement can alter the gloomy result.

Implications for
Force Modernization

For the U.S. day-to-day alert posture case, all four legs of our current "quadrad" are reduced to a degree, even under favorable assumptions, that one must seriously question their deterrent value, not to mention their relative inability to contribute to "war-fighting" strategy and escalation control. The Soviet force posture, both past and present, indicates that a major objective is an ultimate damage-denial capability against the "quadrad" of U.S. nuclear systems. Soviet efforts have been based on relentless and remarkably purposeful strategy, using the entire spectrum of U.S.S.R.’s offensive and defensive weaponry. The strategy also requires the development of supporting Soviet positions in SALT. No matter what label is appended to the Soviet strategy (e.g., "warfighting"), the resulting Soviet capability has clear implications for U.S. force modernization and SALT efforts. To deny the Soviet strategy of denial, the measures listed below are proposed.

The MX approach depends on a great proliferation of target aim points to respond to current and SALT II-constrained Soviet force levels. This is a straightforward, brute-force scheme. If SALT fails and Soviet warhead levels rise still higher, the Air Force has said that this basing scheme could be coupled with preferential hard-site ABM defense system to reduce sharply Soviet success in a first-strike with their SS-18s and SS-19s.⁶⁰ Should MX in a deceptive basing mode be ruled out for political, cost, or environmental reasons, it will be necessary to consider other ideas to outflank Soviet SS-18 attacks on our ICBMs. A less-desired option but one that could be necessitated by political rejection of MX multiple aim point schema is to put some MX missiles in Minuteman silos in a "launch under confirmed attack" (LUCA) mode.⁶¹ The MX missile has been sized to fit Minuteman silos, and 200 MX missiles fitted with 10 warheads can provide 2000 highly accurate warheads capable of destroying Soviet ICBM silos.⁶² With a declaratory U.S. LUCA policy and a predetermined target list limited to Soviet nuclear, military, and command infrastructure targets, any first-strike attack by the U.S.S.R. on our ICBMs would serve no rational military purpose. It is in theory the "perfect deterrent" since it removes the principal incentive for a preemptive attack.⁶³ Other parallel steps could be to: (1) deploy a modest number, on the order of 100, of truly mobile canister-loaded small ICBMs (Minuteman II or smaller) spread throughout western federal lands; and (2) deploy a sizable force (several hundred) of ICBMs in a deep, underground, burrow-out mode. This force would be used as an enduring force for long-term war fighting and escalation control purposes. Removing the requirement for "instant" retaliation should make it feasible to base some ICBMs in hardened configurations impervious to Soviet attacks (e.g. deep underground, tunnels in mountains).

The current trend of larger and fewer U.S. ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) falls into a Soviet strategy of trail and kill with their new Alfa attack submarines. The United States will need more SSBNs and much higher percentages of its SSBN force at sea to deny such a Soviet strategy. The Navy must also develop anti-Alfa defense systems that overcome the Alfa’s superior characteristics of speed and depth performance. Since the Soviet trailing submarine always has the advantage of shooting first (premise is the U.S.S.R. gives attack code worldwide simultaneously to their first-strike forces), the anti-Alfa defenses cannot rest on weapon systems in which it is assumed the United States fires first. Thus, the most important devices needed are those systems that can help the SSBN "break trail" through either deception or coercion.

For SSBNs that survive, a much needed feature is SLBMs with warheads that have higher yields, greater accuracy, and assured penetrability. This is necessary in order that SLBMs not be viewed principally as "city-busters" or useful only against "soft" targets. The threat posed to SLBM reentry vehicles by SA-5 and ABM breakout schemes argues for penetration— aid devices (e.g., decoys, chaff, maneuver, saturation) to overcome the inherent shortcomings of SLBM trajectories (high reentry angles, large radar cross-sections, and slow velocities) that make them easier targets than ICBMs.

The Soviet SLBM threat to bombers has a straightforward but prohibitively expensive solution. Increasing the alert rate (both airborne and on-strip) greatly enhances bomber survivability but also compounds the "wear-out" of a scarce resource. Inland basing and dispersal are also well-known options that cost a lot (both politically and in dollars) for small improvements in theoretical survivability. Well-studied ideas of utilizing portions of western interstate highways and civilian airports offer possible options in a real emergency, but a new bomber with built-in features that permit high airborne alert rates at reduced costs is the ultimate objective.

Despite massive Soviet investment in air defense systems, bomber penetration continues to look quite plausible. The short-range attack missile (SRAM) carried by B-52s to penetrate Soviet-fixed defenses is a highly effective defense suppression weapon. Coupled with long-range stand-off air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs), the combination presents a formidable task to Soviet defenders. The most serious threat to future bomber penetration would probably be an airborne warning and control system (AWACS) possessing low-altitude tracking capability (a "look-down" feature) tied to an interceptor aircraft also equipped with "look-down" radars and "shoot-down" air-to-air missiles. This implies that the United States should seek ways both to hide and defend the bomber. To "hide" includes ideas of concealment, deception, and decoying which among other things means finding ways to cut down on the bomber’s observable radar and infrared "signatures." For defense, ongoing airborne-laser test programs suggest a promising approach for future bombers.

Over the long-term, the United States should recognize as inevitable a Soviet "grand design" to deploy active defense systems against ICBMs and SLBMs. Whether the system eventuates in the form of large phased-array radars and long-range ABMs, or in the form of a proliferated "breakout" of smaller weapons (e.g., ABM-X-3 system), or in the form of clandestine "SAM upgrade" (e.g., based on SA-5 system tests at Sary-Shagan against MRBMs),⁶⁴ the historical Soviet drive for complete defense will be the dominant element. This understandable Soviet objective implies that the United States must have on hand, preferably already deployed, a maneuvering reentry vehicle (MaRV) for use with both ICBMs and SLBMs. In addition to MaRV, the already established penetration-aids programs which provide chaff, decoys and jammers are also necessary.

The Soviets have a good idea with regard to what they refer to as U.S. forward-based systems. They maintain that FBS are an integral part of a U.S. "quadrad" of nuclear forces. Rather than argue with the Soviets that FBS are separate and distinct forces, the United States might be more prudent to agree with the U.S.S.R. and then actually integrate FBS forces into a wartime strategy that used the totality of U.S. nuclear forces as a coherent whole. Such an integrated approach would replace the disconnected planning done now by widely separated commands that have completely different outlooks on the type of war being fought. Before FBS could be considered a useful military force, however, drastic actions are required to correct their near-zero survival chances against attacks by Soviet SS-20s/SS-4s/SS-5s. This implies tactical warning systems (e.g., over-the-horizon radars, line-of-sight radars, infrared launch detection systems in space), increased alert rates, and mobile basing for ground missiles. The proliferation of weapons, both numerically and geographically, is required. Clearly, the first steps toward this end were inherent in the December 1979 NATO alliance decision to approve GLCM and Pershing II deployment.⁶⁵

Very hardened command facilities exist in the U.S.S.R. to assure the survival of the Soviet leadership. If an objective of U.S. attack plans were to "decapitate" the communist leadership from the civilian population, then the United States should develop and deploy large yield "neutron" weapons for use on a portion of our "enduring ICBM" and SLBM forces. Such weapons used against command facilities would kill the leadership and make internal government operations questionable. If one believed Soviet civil defense really works, and if a U.S. objective is also to kill the Russian population (to my mind, an objective which has no rational validity), neutron weapons are an implied course of action.⁶⁶

As we examined each leg of the "quadrad," it was clear that the Soviets maintained a consistent approach by adopting arms control positions that supported their damage-denial strategy. The lesson for U.S. negotiating objectives and strategy would thus appear to be to negate the Soviet strategy by a combination of unilateral action and mutual agreements. Central to our strategy is the provision of necessary incentives to change the historic Soviet quest for nuclear advantage at all levels of warfare. Much of this translates into "keep on doing what you’ve been doing, but use more sticks" to get his attention. Specifically:

On ICBMs. Seek reductions and eventual phase-out of "heavy ICBMs" to enhance "crisis stability" and reduce incentives to strike first. Establish equality in payload and number of RVs as the limited parameter. MX is the essential quid pro quo for the United States to achieve constraints on Soviet ICBMs. Longterm goals include improved ICBM survivability for both sides at lower ICBM force levels.

On MIRVs. Seek lower and lower limits on ICBM MIRVs as part of a reductions scenario. Two hundred MXs would confront Soviet defense planners with a real incentive to agree to lower ICBM and MIRV levels. Since a much larger portion of Soviet nuclear forces is on ICBMs, this acts to increase Soviet vulnerability to MX attack. At the same time, lower MIRV limits would decrease the Soviet threat to MX and Minuteman.

On SSBN survivability. Seek agreements prohibiting peacetime trailing of SSBNs by attack submarines. Trail Soviet SSBNs with U.S. SSNs to demonstrate the threat.

On bomber survivability. Establish "keep-out" zones for SSBNs to assure longer flight-times for SLBMs and hence improve bomber survivability. Ban the testing of depressed-trajectory SLBMs for the same reason.

On reductions. Seek reductions in systems in which Soviets have force multiplier advantage (e.g., "heavy" ICBMs with 10 MIRVs) and increases in systems in which the United States has force multiplier advantage (e.g., bombers with 28 ALCMs and SLBMs with 14 MIRVs). Some have also argued that the United States should change its historic "nuclear umbrella" policy toward NATO by seeking deep reductions in "central systems" and corresponding increases in numbers of Eurostrategic systems. While this idea would result in lower damage levels to the United States, it would also act to decouple U.S. and NATO forces and be readily transparent and unacceptable to the Soviets (e.g., "circumvention" of the intent of the SALT treaty).

On FBS. Seek equal ceilings on Eurostrategic weapons, starting with missiles and later including cruise missile submarines and medium bombers. Deployment of GLCM and Pershing II and increases in F-111 theater basing is essential to stimulate Soviet participation. Two opposing objectives are possible: (1) draw down Eurostrategic systems to very low (or zero) levels or, (2) adopt the opposite approach and seek larger levels thereby shifting the burden of nuclear war to NATO.

On ABM. Approach the 1982 review of the ABM treaty with the position that the ICBM vulnerability problem is of paramount concern and must be accommodated by either a reduction in Soviet "heavy missiles" or by a verifiable ICBM MIRV drawdown, or by an all-encompassing ABM defense of ICBMs.

On Soviet defenses. Seek constraints on air defenses and civilian defenses, the thrust of which would be unilateral in application, since the United States has meager resources in each. While Soviet acceptance of such measures is unlikely, there could be negotiating leverage and usefulness to the United States in pursuing such constraints.

1. Leading spokesmen for the "war-fighting" school of thought include Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks it Could Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Air Force, September 1977, pp. 54-66; Colin S. Gray, Nuclear Strategy: The Case for a Theory of Victory, International Security, Summer 1979, pp. 54-87; and Paul H. Nitze, "Deterring Our Deterrent," Foreign Policy, Winter 1976-77, pp. 195-210.

2. Views countering the Pipes/Gray/Nitze arguments can be found in Fred M. Kaplan, Dubious Specter: A Skeptical Look at the Soviet Nuclear Threat (Washington: Institute for Policy Studies, 1980); Raymond L. Garthoff, "Mutual Deterrence and Strategic Arms Limitation in Soviet Policy," International Security, Summer 1978, pp. 112-47; and Fritz W. Ermarth, "Contrasts in American and Soviet Strategic Thought," International Security, Fall 1978, pp. 138-55.

3. Soviet positions on FBS are well known from Soviet arguments in SALT. A good résumé is found in Lawrence Freedman, "The Dilemma of Theatre Nuclear Arms Control," Survival, January/February 1981, p. 3.

Also see John Newhouse, Cold Dawn (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1973), pp. 174-76, 205, 222, 267, 271, and 194-96.

Our chief negotiator in SALT I, Gerard Smith, has also provided the details for history in his Doubletalk: The Story of the First Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (New York, 1980), pp. 90-93.

4. Strategic warning is normally anticipated from Soviet actions to increase their modest level of day-to-day SSBN deployments, movement of long-range bombers, and civil defense preparations. Foregoing all or any of these actions is again at Soviet discretion. Soviet capabilities to attack U.S. nuclear forces as postulated herein are not dependent on other than day-to-day levels of Soviet SLBMs and bombers, since the chief burden of such an attack would fall on Soviet ICBMs, IRBMs, and MRBMs.

5. Harold Brown, speech to the United States Naval Academy, reported by Richard Burt, "Brown Says Soviets Long Sought Way to Knock Out US Missiles," New York Times, May 31, 1979, p. 4; the estimated yield of the SS-9 is reported in The Military Balance, 1980-1981, London, International Institute for Strategic Studies, p. 89.

6. Missile Effectiveness Calculator distributed by Heavy Military Electronic Systems, General Electric, Syracuse, New York. This "too handy" device can quickly provide single shot probability of kill (SSPK) using inputs of warhead yield, accuracy, and target hardness. Cumulative kill probability (PK) is then related to SSPK by PK = 1 -(1- SSPK)ⁿ where n is the number of warheads arriving at the target.

7.John R. Taylor, "Gallery of Soviet Aerospace Weapons," Air Force, March 1978, pp. 106-7; yield estimates are from Mi1itary Balance, p. 89.

8. As reported by Edgar Ulsamer, "The Accelerating Momentum of Soviet Military Might," Air Force, March 1978, p. 39. Also see Congressman Les Aspin, "Judge Not by Numbers Alone," Bulletin of the Atlantic Scientists, June 1980, pp. 28-33. Congressman Aspin claims that ". . . a silo upgrade program reduced vulnerability of the entire Minuteman force. . . [and]. . .strengthened the blast resistance of Minuteman silos from 300 to 2,000 pounds per square inch (psi) of transient atmospheric overpressure."

9. Smith, pp. 28, 122-25, 130, 206-7, 249, 325, 333, 389-90.

10. Ibid. Also see Newhouse, pp. 20-24, 128, 149, 155-56,168, 200-205, 223-24, 251.

11. A good overview of the entire ABM issue is US Arms Control Objectives and the implications for Ballistic Missile Defense, Proceedings of a Symposium at the Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, November 1-2, 1979; the paper by Albert Carnesale, "Ballistic Missile Defense: Updating the Debate," is particularly germane.

12. Military Balance, p. 89; also see Colin S. Gray, "Soviet Rocket Forces: Military Capability, Political Utility," Air Force, March 1978, p. 52.

13. Using the Missile Effectiveness Calculator described in footnote 6, and assuming that in the SALT-declared force of 308 SS-18s that at least 220 are the Mod 4 (10 RV) variety with a presumed yield of 1 megaton each, a circular error probable of .1 nm, a Minuteman silo hardness of 2000 psi, and an SS-18 system reliability of 90 percent, some 970 Minuteman silos would be destroyed by a Soviet two-on-one attack. If backup SS-18s were used to replace known booster failures, Minuteman silos destroyed would increase to 987. SS-19s could be used too if required.

14. This radar infrastructure is explicitly described in Mark B. Schneider, "Russia and the ABM," Ordnance, March-April 1972, pp. 372-74.

See also testimony to the Senate Armed Services R&D subcommittee as reported in "Russian ABM Work Boosts US Penetration Effort," Aerospace Daily, July 27, 1977, pp. 139-40.

It is reported that "DIA’s James Miller outlined the current Soviet ABM system," including descriptions of an early warning radar net of Hen House radars, two battle management radars—the Dog House 40 miles from Moscow and a similar radar at Checkhov—and other engagement radars of the Moscow ABM system.

The Cat House radar is reported in Military Balance, p. 10.

Senator John "Jake" Garn discusses the construction of additional large phased-array radars outside the Moscow area in his "The Suppression of Information Concerning Soviet SALT Violations by the US Government," Policy Review, Summer 1979, p. 24.

15. The 2500 psi estimate appears in George J. Keegan, "New Assessment Put on Soviet Threat," address, Aviation Week and Space Technology, March 28, 1977, p. 42,

16. General George S. Brown, "The Strategic Nuclear Balance," Commander’s Digest, March 9, 1978, p. 7. General Brown, as Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was discussing the difference between Soviet and U.S. ballistic missile submarine forces and stated that "about 15 percent of the Soviet first line nuclear fleet, as compared to over 50 percent for the United States, operates away from port at any given time."

17. Harold Brown, Department of Defense Annual Report Fisca1 Year 1981 (Washington: Government Printing Office, January 29, 1980), p. 71. This report says "all 10 Polaris submarines will be retired by the end of FY 1981," and the remaining total of "544 US SLBMs will be deployed on 33 submarines," evidently meaning 31 Poseidon SSBNs and 2 new Trident class SSBNs (which are known to be behind schedule).

18. Military Balance, pp. 11-12.

19. Richard Garwin, "Anti-submarine Warfare and National Security," in Arms Control: Readings from Scientific American (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman and Company, 1973), pp. 25-31.

20. Ibid., pp. 252-54.

21. Former Under Secretary of Defense William Perry was quoted in Defense Daily, July 16, 1980, p. 76, as describing the Alfa as "a hot rod, a very high performance submarine" and the "world’s fastest and deepest diving submarine."

Newsweek, February 9, 1981 p. 58, reported that "Studying the ‘Alpha’ [sic] more closely, the [U.S.] Navy discovered it could dive more than 3,000 feet—three times as deep as any American submarine" and also "recorded an unprecedented event: a submarine tracking underwater at almost 50 miles per hour. The Navy was stunned."

Also see Harold Brown, p. 103, which states that "we are not yet clear about the mission it is intended to perform but it is clearly superior to current Soviet SSNs. . ."

22. Sources differ on current Alfa deployment availability. Military Balance says two; Clarence A. Robinson, "Soviets Push Advanced Naval Weapons," Aviation Week and Space Technology, September 24, 1979, p. 139, says "several" are at sea; William T. Lee, "The Soviet Defense Establishment," Air Force, March 1980, p. 106, says six.

23. The complexities of sound propagation in oceans is discussed in Garwin’s "Anti-submarine Warfare and National Security." He points out the effects of temperature, pressure, salinity, depth, position, season, convergence zones, and sound channels.

24. Military Balance, p. 88. says 10 RVs at 50 kilotons each for the Poseidon C³.

25. Ibid. for yield estimate. For relationships between range, launch angle, reentry angle, burn-out, and reentry angles for ballistic missiles, see C.W. Besserer, Missile Engineering Handbook (Princeton, New Jersey, 1958), pp. 324-25.

26. See New house, pp. 11-12,73-75, 122; and Smith, pp. 32, 95, 107, 131-33. 172-73, 193, 303-7.

27. Ibid.

28. Department of State, "SALT ONE: Compliance, SALT TWO: Verification," Selected Documents No. 7, February 1976, pp. 2-4. It notes that the Soviets have acknowledged that Kamchatka and Sary-Shagan are the only ABM test ranges in the U.S.S.R. In 1973 and 1974, the United States observed Soviet tests of ballistic missiles in conjunction with tracking by the SA-5 radar, thereby again raising the question of an ABM role for the SA-5 system.

Also see Herbert Scoville, Jr., "Verification of Soviet Strategic Missile Tests" in Verification and SALT (Boulder, Colorado, 1980), pp. 164-66. Scoville includes a useful map (p. 165) showing the relationship between the Kapustin Yar launch center for the medium range ballistic missiles that act as targets for the Sary-Shagan ABM test center—some 1200 miles away. This distance and flight trajectory approximate the characteristics of the Polaris SLBM.

29. Senator Jake Garn, pp. 26-28; Senator Gordon J. Humphrey, "Analysis and Compliance Enforcement in SALT Verification," International Security Review, Spring 1980, p. 14.

30. Schneider. p. 374. Also see Newhouse, p. 73; and Smith, p. 305, who points out that the Soviets in 1970 had "five very large warning radars in operation and under construction. . .called HEN HOUSES. . .[whose] locations and performance characteristics gave some of them a potential for acquisition and early tracking of incoming reentry vehicles. They were phased-array radars with a power-aperture product well above our proposed threshold for presumed ABM capability. Two of these units were located on the northern perimeter of the Soviet Union . . . and a third uncompleted one near the Black Sea was under flight paths of missiles which might be launched from submarines in the Mediterranean Sea. We believed that these three units as well as HEN HOUSE constructed in the future might perform significant ABM function if the Soviets later decided to deploy a regional or nationwide ABM defense."

31. U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements, 1980 Edition (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1980), p. 141. (This is Article VI of the ABM Treaty.)

32. Smith, pp. 303-4; and Garn, p. 27.

33.Garn, pp. 24-25, 29. Senator Garn points out "The new Soviet radars are an acute embarrassment to the [Carter] administration because a 1972 US unilateral statement put the Soviets on notice that even the far more primitive HEN HOUSE radars were regarded as having a significant ABM potential."

34. Senator Garn, p. 26, says the SA-5 can intercept targets up to 150,000 feet at ranges over 100 nm. Also see General Bruce Holloway, CINCSAC, in testimony to Congress, House Armed Services Committee, Hearings (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1971), p. 2909. General Holloway pointed out that "with predicted intercept data from remote ABM radars, it [the SA-5] could defend large areas of the Soviet Union against missile attack."

35. Clarence Robinson in SALT 1-2, a special 1976 publication of Aviation Week and Space Technology, claimed on page 60 that the SA-5 Gammon missile could intercept targets at altitudes of about 100,000 feet and that SA-5 radar "had been tested more than 60 times against reentry vehicles flying trajectories to simulate US ICBMs and submarine-launched ballistic missiles."

36. State Department, Selected Documents No. 7, p. 3.

37. Former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird, "Arms Control: The Russians Are Cheating!" Reader’s Digest, December 1977, p. 99.

38. Many authors have speculated that the SA-5 was a Soviet reaction to the U.S. B-70, a high-altitude, high-speed bomber, canceled by McNamara in 1961, and have disparaged its ABM potential. (See George Rathgens, "The Dynamics of the Arms Race," Scientific American, April 1969; and Newhouse, p. 12.) That line of reasoning is logical only if the SA-5 had self-defense capability against the other half of the B-70 package—the medium range airborne ballistic missile, Skybolt, which was to be carried for stand-off defense suppression. The only U.S. weapons currently approximating Skybolt’s trajectory characteristics are SLBMs. The absurdity of deploying a new defensive system capable of coping with only half the threat facing it is self-evident.

39. All the material on ABM-X-3 is drawn from Garn, pp. 24-29.

40. Early in SALT I, the Soviets did suggest some ASW measures that could act to degrade U.S. advantages. See Smith, p. 99. In Strobe Talbot, Endgame: The Inside Story of SALT II (New York, 1979), p. 208, the Soviets reportedly "floated the idea of ASW-free zones…."

41. Garn, p.27. Senator Garn claims "There are no US penetration aids on Poseidon. Any Poseidon RV that can be tracked by a SA-5 radar can be destroyed by a SA-5 interceptor. All U.S. penetration aids, chaff packages, are on Minuteman ICBMs which the Soviets will he able to eliminate in the early 1980s. . ."

42. Military Balance, p. 88.

43. "Organization of Soviet Armed Forces" in Air Force, March 1980, p. 112, lists PVO-Strany strength as "some 550,000." Active duty USAF strength for FY80 was 557,000.

44. Harold Brown, Annual Report, FY 81, p. 72.

45. Talbott, pp. 206-8. Ex-Congressmen Bob Carr and Thomas Downey are given credit for raising the "depressed trajectory" issue in SALT.

46. Aircraft figures from Harold Brown, Annual Report, FY 81, p. 72. As noted in the introduction and footnote 4, the premise is that the Soviet’s attack is and can almost always be timed to correspond to the U.S. day-to-day alert posture; therefore, if 30 percent of the force survives, about 110 bomber aircraft are available.

47. Harold Brown, p. 77.

48. Ibid., p. 132. The Secretary of Defense points out the United States "plans to penetrate Soviet defenses at low altitudes, avoiding known and suspected ground-controlled intercept (GCI) radars and surface-to-air (SAM) sites, using electronic countermeasures (ECM) to confuse radar, and attacking heavily defended targets from outside their defenses by using short-range attack missiles (SRAM)." With projected Soviet defensive improvements, however, the "probability of our bombers reaching their targets when these [future Soviet] systems are fully deployed will decrease significantly unless we take action now to counter these Soviet programs."

49. Both Smith and Talbott have extensive references on this subject. Another interesting source is the Kissinger background briefing of November 25, 1974, reported in Roger P. Labrie, editor, SALT Handbook: Key Documents and Issues 1972-1979 (Washington: American Enterprise Institute, 1979), p. 288.

50. Estimates of SSBN losses at sea and bomber losses during penetration must remain by their nature basically unsubstantiated. If I were a study consultant, I could claim the bomber estimates are heuristically derived based on the fact that B-52s were not intended to fly at low altitudes and are in many instances older than the pilots that fly them.

51. Smith, pp. 90-93; also see footnote 3.

52. Military Balance, p. 119; also see Lawrence J. Korb, "The Question of Deploying US Theater Nuclear Weapons in Europe," Naval War College Review, May/June 1980, p. 99, who says SACEUR has "400 Poseidon warheads assigned . . . for use against Warsaw Pact military installations."

53. Korb, p. 99; and Freedman, p. 4; and Military Balance, pp. 90 and 119.

54. Military Balance, p. 118, says current inventories are 380 SS-4, 60 SS-5, 160 SS-20, and 518 medium bombers (Backfire, Badger, Blinder). This is a decrease from previous years’ estimates of the number of SS-4 and SS-5 systems.

55. Harold Brown, Annual Report, FY 81, p. 104 (includes map of Backfire’s antishipping mission profile and radius of action); and Lee, p. 106. Also see John R. Taylor, "Gallery of Soviet Aerospace Weapons," Air Force, March 1980, pp. 120-21.

56. Military Balance, p. 118.

57. Korb, p. 100; and Karl Lautenschläger, "Theater Nuclear Forces and Grey Area Weapons." Naval War College Review, September/October 1980, p. 15.

58. See footnotes 3 and 51.

59. John Morrison, "Soviet Defense Minister Warns U.S. against Placing New Missiles in Europe," Washington Post, October 26, 1979, p. 18.

60. General Richard H. Ellis, "Launch-Under-Attack and MX Survivability," Air Force Policy Letter for Commanders, October 1, 1980, p. 2. In Talbott, p. 170, General Lew Allen, Air Force Chief of Staff, is quoted as having said that MX in a Multiple Aim Point System would constitute "a great sponge to absorb" all the Soviet land-based MIRVs.

61. References to LUCA, the technology and systems required to implement it, and the pros and cons of said strategy are credited to Edwin J. Philbin’s analysis, "Launch under Confirmed Attack: A Strategic Response Viewed," Airpower Research Institute, Maxwell Air Force Base, Alabama, unpublished.

62. Harold Brown, Annual Report, FY 81, pp. 88-89, 130. In Department of State, Selected Documents No. 12 B, SALT II Agreement, June 18, 1979, p. 27, Secretary of State Vance’s analysis points out that Article IV, paragraph 11, limits the number of "reentry vehicles" (warheads) on new ICBMs to ten.

63. Rationale for this judgment is similar to the logic chain set forth in Nitze.

64. See footnotes 26, 28, 29, 30, 33, 34.

65. Korb, p. 101.

66. Technical details of relevant weapon effects can be found in S.T. Cohen, "Enhanced Radiation Warheads: Setting the Record Straight," Strategic Review, Winter 1978, pp. 9-17.

Those who argue for the reduction of defence expenditure in the countries of the West not only seem to live in a land of total make-believe, but they refuse to give the Marxist-Leninists who govern the USSR any credit either for meaning what they say (and have been saying for a long time) or for knowing what they are doing. What they have been saying, and have not ceased to say, is that the capitalist countries of the West are doomed to go down before the inexorable advance of communism, with the Red Army playing a major part in their overthrow. What they have been doing is building up huge armed forces, far greater than what would be necessary, in any conceivable situation, for their own defence, at a cost gravely detrimental to domestic development in the USSR and in a mode essentially offensive.

General Sir John Winthrop Hackett
The Third World War—August 1985 (1979)

Colonel WilIiam J. Barlow (USNA; M.S.A.E., University of Washington; M.B.A., George Washington University) is Military Assistant to the Under Secretary of the Air Force. His previous assignments have included Chief, Department of National Security Affairs, Air War College; Staff, Commander in Chief, Pacific, as chief planner for Pacific Command Defense Plans; and various assignments in astronautical engineering. Colonel Barlow has served as a member of the Office of Secretary of Defense Strategic Arms Limitation Talks support group and the U.S. delegation to SALT with the U.S.S.R. in Vienna and Helsinki. Colonel Barlow is a graduate of Air Command and Staff College and a Distinguished Graduate of Air War College.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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