Air University Review, September-October 1981

A Response

WHILE we agree with Lieutenant Colonel Richard L. Hodgkinson that a problem exists, we do not see the suggested solution as the only or preferred answer to the identified problem. Put simply, our view is that the malaise surrounding theater nuclear force (TNF) thinking is so widespread and of such a pervasive character that formation of a group in the Air Staff, even if headed by a general officer, will do little to correct the situation. That we have failed to articulate "new and vigorous thinking’ is not the sole locus of our concern. One must ask some deeper questions of the TNF process and of USAF roles, missions, and organization.

First, we need to clarify some things. Deterrence, or threatened use of TNF to prevent enemy aggression, is not the same as actual use if that deterrence fails.¹ The requirements laid on weapon systems for deterrence and war fighting may be considerably different. Failure to separate the two concepts, particularly with regard to technical characteristics of systems intended primarily for one role or the other, has caused a great amount of confusion and will continue to do so until the implications of war fighting in a nuclear environment are clearly thought out. A weapon system may have good deterrence characteristics, but it may have different, more important war-fighting characteristics within a given context. The converse is also true.

Second, the Air Force enters the TNF arena not by any bureaucratically mandated authority for nuclear affairs but rather under the purview of our nuclear tactical air power (Tacair) missions and responsibilities as assigned by higher authority: primarily in the missions areas of counterair, interdiction, offensive air support, and reconnaissance.² No military service has been assigned a primary responsibility for conducting tactical nuclear warfare.

Third, tactical nuclear warfare is to be fought by combatant commanders, none of whom are directly under the command of the Department of the Air Force. All United States combat forces are assigned to unified or specified commanders under the command of the President and the Secretary of Defense through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or through specific combined command arrangements deriving from international treaty obligations (i.e., NATO). In short, there is no such thing as "Air Force TNF." There is, however, a very definite requirement for the Air Force to provide the organizational precepts, doctrine, training, and equipment for forces to carry out primary functions of air war, to include the use of nuclear weapons in the performance of those functions.³

With these above caveats in mind, let us turn to some of Colonel Hodgkinson’s points. In our view, one must separate the deterrent and war-fighting spheres in order to bring clarity to thought. The problems of arms limitation, arms reductions, and TNF modernization are primarily ones of security policy in relation to a potential enemy who also possesses considerable tactical nuclear forces. These problems are thus primarily political problems. The symbology involved in putting a new system into Europe on behalf of NATO, to meet NATO goals and requirements, is a form of political symbology that communicates both to and among allies in the alliance and to our political and possible military adversary. The act of modernization is far more important than the technical details of the system or systems used to accomplish that modernization. In many ways, the early presence of a more modern system like Pershing II or ground-launched cruise missiles (GLCMs) is what is required, irrespective of who is to operate it, who will use it, or even what specific role that weapon will play should deterrence fail. Deployment signals an intent to meet a challenge and demonstrates the capability to enact the deterrent threat. It must be remembered that our own and NATO’s security goal is a viable deterrent, thus never to be in a position where we must resort to the use of nuclear weapons, be that use on the battlefield or in a strategic exchange. If the Air Force has failed here, it is because we have not been sufficiently attuned to the political and intellectual symbology required and necessary to gain acceptance of Air Force preferred methods and systems.

The war fighting, or defense, side of the question is much more difficult. Here the questions of who employs a system, how and why, become vitally important to commanders. And here we put forth the suggestion that NATO forces have not developed dynamic new concepts for selective and incisive use of theater nuclear weapons nor has the U.S. Army solved the problems of the integrated battlefield. (We will assert that the Army is very desperately trying to do so, for reasons of traditional roles and assigned responsibilities as a service.) We say this for one very simple but overriding reason: neither NATO nor the United States has thought through and agreed-on "how to fight" a tactical nuclear war; albeit we have written numerous concepts, we have not translated these concepts into operational doctrine. In short, the doctrine on which a war-fighting strategy to achieve political goals can be built does not exist and neither does a strategy. Do not misunderstand, war plans exist, but the answers of strategy, of use under what conditions and to achieve what political purpose, do not. Existing and past war plans are based on assumptions of war initiation, on generalized scenarios. The real-world adequacy of those plans to achieve desired outcomes of war, as strategy to be enacted, cannot be ascertained. We have a "disconnect" in thought.

The TNF problem from a war-fighting standpoint commences only after the political decision to use nuclear weapons has been made. The "good strategy" for use, and the battlefield problems that must be addressed in fulfilling that strategy, are greatly dependent on actual scenario of battlefield dynamics obtaining when that decision is made. This does not rule out planning, technical modernization, or generalization about what must be done to fight more efficiently with nuclear weapons, however. War and combat between two large sets of military forces do have characteristics that have proved to be timeless in their essence. We could afford to be sloppy in thought when our potential adversary had no capability to fight a tactical nuclear war. Now, that potential enemy has the capability, and supposedly a doctrine slanted to the winning of war by use of whatever weapons such victory requires, be those weapons conventional, nuclear, or chemical.⁴

Let us forgo comment on Colonel Hodgkinson’s organizational fix for the moment and concentrate on the war-fighting areas he feels need emphasis. The areas calling for such emphasis are "survivability—both prelaunch and inflight; . . . a need to develop a nuclear capability against movable targets," and how best to fulfill the requirement for quick reaction alert (QRA). We agreed most emphatically but would ask what makes the first two areas unique to nuclear war fighting.

To fulfill the traditional roles of air power in tactical combat under conditions of modern warfare, conventional or nuclear, we must increase the survivability of our weapon systems. To interdict the battlefield efficiently and effectively, we must provide a greater overall capability against movable targets. Both of these problems are far beyond the scope of tactical nuclear warfare and much less glamorous because they imply solutions that require the devotion of expensive resources into improved secure communication systems, command and control systems, weapon system sheltering, increased suppression of enemy air defenses, and better on-board sensor systems for both reconnaissance platforms and attack vehicles. In short, we must search for better ways to perform air superiority, interdiction, offensive air support, and reconnaissance without interfering with the performance of other combat forces in fulfilling their role. The capability to override these problems through quantity has been long gone from our national arsenal, perhaps never to return. The dilemma is one of air power and limited resources in the face of an enemy with a sizable margin of quantitative superiority in the weapons of war.⁵

If tactical aircraft are specialized, they are specialized by function—air-to-air combat against enemy aircraft, Wild Weasel against enemy surface-to-air missile systems, air-to-ground combat—not to deliver tactical nuclear weapons. (If anything, the weapons have been specialized in order to be delivered by aircraft.) If war were to have no conventional phase, if we were certain that aggression would be met with a nuclear response as in the late 1950s, then specialization of aircraft for nuclear delivery might make sense. But there is no need to specialize solely for the delivery of tactical nuclear weapons. After all, the warheads are contained in subsystems suitable for air delivery. It would be a waste of resources and money to so specialize because the delivery mechanics of nuclear and conventional delivery are almost identical. Aircraft, by their very nature, are dual-capable and, more important, reusable.⁶

It is not solely a question of TNF being unglamorous for the fighter pilot or the tactical air community, as implied by Colonel Hodgkinson. From our viewpoint as tighter pilots,⁷ there is little essential difference in the use of tactical nuclear weapons or conventional weapons on the battlefield.⁸ Knowing the target, getting to the target, finding it, and delivering the ordnance are still the name of the game for the aircrew.⁹ The problems involved are common to most forms of tactical air power application.

The QRA problem is different and cannot be decided solely on considerations of battlefield utility. Why? Because QRA is a symbol of deterrence, readiness, and intent to enact the deterrent threat should aggression occur. Thus, QRA is primarily political. From a military, war-fighting standpoint, reserving dual-capable aircraft (DCA) for possible future use when the air commander is involved in a theater-wide fight for existence in a conventional war is probably a tremendous waste of assets. But the political purpose of deterring escalation to nuclear war by the enemy may be even more important. That determination, in turn, depends on the overall political-military strategy being pursued. Aircraft on alert are visible, the enemy knows where they are, and they are a constant symbol. The symbolic use for deterrence must be evaluated against the opportunity costs of not using them in their conventional capacity. This is not an easy question to answer but, nonetheless, one that must be weighed in the overall strategy for successful resolution of the conflict. ¹⁰

While it is extremely cost effective for aircraft to be dual-capable, the same cannot be said about missile systems. The unit cost of missile systems, coupled with the fact that missiles are not reusable, indicates that they should be specialized to the nuclear role. Once built, they are not particularly cost effective in comparison to aircraft for most conventional applications (although there are some exceptions to this). If there is an Air Force failing in this regard (and we feel there has been, or the Army would not be fielding a system that has a rational battlefield use in Air Force-assigned responsibilities such as interdiction and counterair attack), it is because we have not thought through how best to incorporate newer delivery vehicles into our battlefield responsibilities, or have not paid attention to our institutional history as regards roles and missions disputes, or, finally, that we have in fact made conscious decisions that a particular system just was not right for the Air Force. That such conscious decisions might have been made on grounds other than pure battlefield utility is freely admitted, but it must also be admitted that it is a bureaucratic and political world we live in, with budgets tight and demands on resources to fulfill multiple responsibilities quite high.

Which brings us back to Colonel Hodgkinson’s organizational fix. We really do not believe that the creation of another cell in the Pentagon will solve the problem. There is already a "TNF mafia" in the Air Staff, but if the war-fighting problems of tactical nuclear war are not unique, as we maintain, institutionalizing that group will not solve the general problems of air power application. Additionally, tactical nuclear warfare will be waged, if ever, by the "warlords," the combatant commanders, not the Air Staff. While it is the Air Staff's job to organize, train, and equip the warlords, the latter bear the responsibility for articulating the requirements to best solve the problems of battlefield dynamics in their theater of operations against the enemy the will face. The Air Staff must, of course, ensure that the overall doctrine for this war-fighting capability exists, and hopefully, the Air Staff would also contribute to the creation and formulation of war-fighting strategies. To do less would be a dereliction of professional responsibility. If such groups are to be formed, they should be formed at European Command and Pacific Command, not in Washington.

The responsibility for solving the larger political-military doctrinal problem is shared by everyone wearing a uniform and serving in a combat arm. One reason the Army and Navy may seem to be getting the jump on the Air Force in this regard is that they take their doctrine a little more seriously than the Air Force. The Army commander is looking for better ways to fight his battle under his own control to fulfill his responsibilities as a professional soldier.¹¹ Our professional responsibility is air power, and in tactical battle that responsibility translates into air superiority, interdiction, tactical air support of ground forces, reconnaissance, and the support of these functions. That is a collective responsibility of everyone wearing a blue suit. Unfortunately, shared responsibility is often unfulfilled.

We would suggest that such institutions within the Air Force as the newly formed Airpower Research Institute at Air University be tasked, as a priority item, to seek formulation of tactical war-fighting concepts involving nuclear weapons and/or that our Air Force research associates take on the task as their personal research projects (perhaps they should even be directed to do so as part of their activities). Further, we suggest that consideration of tactical nuclear problems be given even more emphasis in our professional schools, along with increased emphasis on the theory, practice, and doctrine of air power in general. And, last, each of us, individually and collectively, should investigate, learn, and use Air Force doctrine as it now exists. The intellectual tools are at hand; the will to focus attention may not be.¹²

Colonel Hodgkinson presents one view of how to untangle the apparent mess in which we find ourselves in the TNF arena. Although we agree with some of his observations, the tantamount concern we have is with the organizational method to accomplish a remedy. We believe that the Air Staff, in concert with the other service staffs, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and the Office of the Secretary of Defense must come to grips with the overall strategy of how to fight a nuclear war and achieve our national goals. A belief in deterrence and a belief in the ability to control escalation do not make deterrence and escalation control automatic. This war-fighting strategy must be based on the operational concepts promulgated by the unified and specified commanders. In short, the Air Force must decide how it plans to fight the battle using tactical air assets, some of which are nuclear weapon systems. This can be accomplished, in our view, by educating our people on air power theory, doctrine, and past practice. The strategy will follow.

1. The "classic" distinction is drawn by Glenn H. Synder. See either his Deterrence and Defense: Toward a Theory of National Security (Princeton University Press, 1961) or his "Deterrence and Defense: A Theoretical Introduction," contained in Richard G. Head and Ervin J. Rokke, editors, American Defense Policy (Johns Hopkins University Press, 1973), pp. 99-112.

2. U.S. service functions are laid out in Department of Defense Directive 5100.1 and further elaborated in JCS Publication 2. The NATO terminology, as set Forth in Allied Tactical Publication (ATP) 33A, Tactical Air Doctrine, is used here. For quick "translation" purposes, counterair is air superiority and includes both offensive and defensive counterair; offensive air support includes battlefield air interdiction (BAI), close air aupport (CAS), and that portion of tactical air reconnaissance devoted to support of the ground forces. The United States has ratified the ATP.

3. Note that strategy is omitted from the listing. The omission is intentional on the grounds that formulation of strategy is not solely a service function. Many analysts have pointed to a weakness in our collective abilities to formulate strategy. One of the larger stipulated causes of this weakness is the tendency for services not to think "joint.’ Rather, airmen think air war, army officers think land war, and navy officers think naval war. No one is officially charged to think war. See J. C. Wylie, USN (Ret), Military Strategy: A General Theory of Power Control (Rutgers University Press, 1967).

4. Soviet doctrine is considerably different from doctrine as formulated in the West. There appears to be little discussion of selective release or gradual escalation in Soviet writings. When and if used, "weapons of mass destruction" will be used heavily and probably in a preemptive mode. See Joseph D. Douglass Jr., The Soviet Theater Nuclear Offensive (Washington: GPO, 1976), prepared under the auspices of the USAF for DOD/DR&E and the Defense Nuclear Agency.

5. The dilemma is itself not unique to considerations of nuclear war fighting. We appear to have this dilemma across the board of military balance.

6. A reluctance to realize this statement as fact helped impose operational restrictions on some of our most potent delivery platforms during the early stages of the Vietnam War. Many of our "strategic" platforms were not dual-capable in fact, but the "fix" in terms of conventional bomb racks was relatively simple and inexpensive in comparison to the revision of thinking necessary to change mind-sets as to the suitablility and risk involved in actually using--and thus possibly losing--a "strategic bomber."

7. This is the personal, not the editorial, use of the first person plural.

8. There are some differences in procedure and technique, as well as technical differences, to be sure, but many of these differences are the result to safety considerations (both for peacetime and potential combat) deriving from the need to control the tremendous destructive potential and provide for aircrew/aircraft survivability due to weapon effects.

9. If the truth be known, at least one of the delivery techniques—the least technical of the bunch—is one of the easiest fighter pilot chores: Practice circular error actual (CEA) with practice devices is quite small.

10. The dynamic nature of deterrence of escalation in combat is one area not sufficiently addressed in the literature. Aircraft, perhaps unfortunately if one believes QRA should be given to other weapon systems to fulfill, can move long distances with their weapons. Less mobile launching systems can be overrun more easily by enemy ground forces.

11. This item contributes to our assertion that the Army’s "integrated battlefield" may not be solving the problems of tactical nuclear war fighting. The Army views, as promulgated to date, look at the problem through the eyes of ground commanders and are based on assumptions not necessarily considered valid by air commanders. Again, this is a matter for joint doctrine and strategic thinking to solve.

12. Are you aware that AFM 1-5, Theater Nuclear Doctrine, was published in 1979? And, if you are so aware, you might be interested in the fact that one of our major commands has been tasked to produce operational doctrine for tactical nuclear warfare but has so far been unable to come to grips with an overall concept. One reason we have not produced the concept is that such a concept must be, by its very nature, tied to the political symbology—and that task may be beyond the purview of the Air Force as a single service. We suspect that if one were to count warheads, one would find that on a quantity basis, the Air Force does not have operational control over the majority. Again, our potential use is tied to our roles and mission responsibilities.

Contributor

Lieutenant Colonel Donald J. Alberts (USAFA; M.A., Georgetown University; M.S., University of Southern California) is Special Assistant for Southern European Affairs in the European and NATO Affairs Directorate of the Department of Defense and a frequent contributor to the Review.

Lieutenant Colonel Thomas A. Cardwell (B.B.A., Texas A&M University; M.S., University of Southern California) is a student at Air War College. Until recently he was assigned to the Doctrine and Concepts Division, Hq USAF. Colonel Cardwell is a graduate of Squadron Officer School, Air Command and Staff College, and Industrial College of the Armed Forces.

The conclusions and opinions expressed in this document are those of the author cultivated in the freedom of expression, academic environment of Air University. They do not reflect the official position of the U.S. Government, Department of Defense, the United States Air Force or the Air University.

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